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THE STATE OF ISRAEL

A Historical,
Economic
and Political
Study



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1. Modern Bourgeois Historiography and Sociology on Israel

Although the State of Israel has only been in existence for a little over two decades it has been given considerable attention by modern bourgeois historiography and sociology. The subject "present-day Israel"—the country as a whole, its development and problems (economy, state system, legislation, home and foreign policy, Zionism and religion, immigration, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and so forth)—has been studied by bourgeois researchers in many countries, including Israel herself.

But not all the monographs and other works devoted to this subject are of equal scientific value from the standpoint of content, the factual material offered or historical authenticity; some are far from being the best examples of propaganda literature. Only a few bourgeois researchers have treated the subject objectively and given a more or less critical picture of the historical, economic and political processes actually taking place in that country.

Two points must be considered when one reads Western literature on Israel: the first is the bourgeois, subjective approach to the various problems, and the second is that many of the publications have been subsidised by big Zionist organisations, which, naturally, want them to press home a definite political orientation.

For instance, every effort is made to implant the theory that Israel is the successor of the Biblical Hebrew states in ancient Palestine. To this end history is falsified: the Jewish nation is taking shape in Israel only today and the only succession one can speak of is religious and, partially, lingual.

Moreover, bourgeois literature has advanced the thesis that the State of Israel is a "modern miracle" of political and economic development, whereas in point of fact Israel is a capitalist state with all the contradictions inherent in it.

There is a trend towards tendentiously supplanting the history of the modern State of Israel by the history of the Jews in general (in the collective sense, mainly as a demographic factor), and on that basis Israel is unfoundedly given out as the centre of world Jewry with a claim to a certain diktat in relation to the Diaspora, i.e., the Jews living in other countries.

Lastly, pseudo-psychological theories are being spread about "Jewish exclusiveness". Arguments of this kind have a dangerous and harmful racist hue.

These "concepts" cannot be ignored, because with their seemingly abstract doctrinairism they are, in fact, used as a screen for the actual, conscious and purposeful policy of the Israeli leaders and of world Zionism. But before examining the aims of this policy, let us illustrate the above-mentioned "theories" on the example of some recent books by bourgeois researchers.

For example, in *Israel. The Making of a Nation*, published in 1963, D. R. Elston, an English scholar, writes: "There is a clear link between the ancient history of Palestine and the post-Ottoman history of that turbulent and significant country; that is to say, between Biblical Palestine and the Palestine of the Balfour Declaration and the State of Israel." To give weight to this argument, he stresses: "For the Jew, of course, there has been uninterrupted spiritual continuity since the dispersal of his people. . . . It is this spiritual continuity that sustained the Jews as a nation in the lands of their exile, and gave moral force to the movement that brought about a resumption, at national level, of the Jews' physical association with Palestine and led to the *rebirth* of an independent State of Israel" (my italics—G.N.). Since Elston uses this "con-

* D. R. Elston, *Israel. The Making of a Nation*, London, New York, Toronto, 1963, p. 1. Elston further misconstrues history by ignoring the fact that as political and historical entities nations emerged and took shape only with the rise of capitalism.

cept" as his keynote in characterising Israel's contemporary economic and political position, it determines, of course, the real value of his highly biased work despite the interesting facts offered in it.

Somewhat earlier (in 1958) Aubrey C. Das, an Israeli researcher, published a book under the title *Israel. A Young State in Asia*, in which Israel is given chiefly as a "nation", whose existence history has recorded "for some 4,000 years". Das crowns her detailed historical review—from the Biblical period to the Roman destruction of Jerusalem—with the conclusion that ever since then the country "did not regain its independence until *rebirth* of Israel in 1948" (my italics—G. N.). "Through the years," Das contends, "the nation's leaders regarded it as their prime task to strengthen the inner moral force of the people" dispersed throughout the world. Distorting facts, Das seeks to prove that the Jews had actually never lost their links with Palestine and characterises the next period in the history of the "Jewish nation" as a stage of its "national rebirth", a stage covering the period from the French bourgeois revolution to the outbreak of the First World War. On the basis of these untenable premises she identifies the next stages in the history of the "Jewish nation" until the creation of Israel.* These arguments have the sole purpose of allowing Das to deduce the "theory" of Israel's continuity from the ancient Hebrew states on the territory of Palestine. Small wonder, therefore, that a good half of a book on modern Israel is devoted to ancient history.

The "theory" of Israel's Biblical history is propounded even more forcefully by the American researcher Joseph Badi in *The Government of the State of Israel*. He writes: "The conquest of Jerusalem by the Roman forces in 70 A. D. marked the end of Jewish independence, until, only as recently as 1948—1,878 years later—the State of Israel, the *Third Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine*, emerged" (my italics—G.N.).

* Aubrey C. Das, *Israel. A Young State in Asia*, Jerusalem, 1958, pp. 5, 19, 40.

** Joseph Badi, *The Government of the State of Israel*, New York, 1963, p. 9.

A thick volume was published in the USA in 1963 by the Israeli scholar Howard Morely Sachar under the title *The Course of Modern Jewish History*. The annotation states that this book deals with a period in the life of the Jews from the creation of ghettos to the formation of the State of Israel, i.e., only with the modern history of the Jewish people. However, Sachar gives this period only as the "pre-history" of the State of Israel. Only at the end of the book does he formulate his approach to the history of the Jews as the history of the State of Israel. Rejecting two diametrically opposite viewpoints—that the purpose of Zionism had been fulfilled with the creation of Israel as a sovereign, secular state, and that Zionism is out to make Israel the single, authentic homeland of all Jews wherever they lived—Sachar propounds a different theory on behalf of the "majority of Jews". He says that as a state Israel was created "for the less fortunate Jews" as distinct from their co-religionists "in the free, democratic lands of the West", in other words, as he puts it, for those living "behind the iron curtain" and in the Arab lands.

It would be difficult to put the political orientation of this "theory" more bluntly than Sachar does when with undisguised nationalism he declares that through the "Jewish state" Jews throughout the world "could recreate the austere ethical grandeur of Hebrew civilisation". This is a striking example of how far the modern Zionists are going in their claim to the role of "world civilisers". Such is one of the body of "concepts" that allegedly explains the "history of the Jewish people".*

These examples lay bare the utter tendentiousness of the "continuity theories", which are untenable and essentially nationalistic. Moreover, they show the true value of these studies in bourgeois historiography. A point not to be overlooked is that doctrines of this kind are used to provide "psychological", "legal", "moral", "ethical" and other "foundations" in justification of the far-reaching claims of the leaders of Israel and world Zionism, which has now become an extremely reactionary and dangerous factor of social life. It is not hard to see what the argu-

* Howard Morely Sachar, *The Course of Modern Jewish History*, New York, 1958, pp. 565-66.

ments about "continuity" conceal if it is borne in mind that willy-nilly, overtly or covertly, this formulation of the question in all cases implies a "Palestine within historical boundaries" far in excess of the territory of modern Israel. The expansionist substance of these pseudo-scientific "concepts" is obvious: after the aggression against the Arab countries in June 1967, the Israeli ruling circles used these "theories" to reinforce their territorial claims.

On the other hand, the bourgeois-nationalistic ideology of Zionism, which conditions and permeates all aspects of Israel's home and foreign policy, draws its strength precisely from the "theory of continuity" (a modified form of the "single Jewish nation"). What such dangerous ideological and political exercises like, for example, the argument about Jews "behind the iron curtain" lead to has already been partially shown. The insistence with which the "theory" of the "exclusiveness of the Jewish nation" is put forward in a seemingly identical doctrinaire shell has lately become more pronounced. This racist idea, currently given a new disguise, is the logical development of the Zionist doctrine.

We shall return to the question of Zionism farther down. For the moment we shall confine ourselves to showing how the idea of "Jewish exclusiveness" is developed in the latest treatises of bourgeois scholars. First and foremost, mention must be made of two works on Zionism penned by Israeli researchers. A noteworthy point is that both were published in West Germany, and one of them goes so far as almost to represent pre-Nazi Germany as the homeland of political Zionism. This book, Gerhard Holdheim's *Political Zionism. Formation, Substance, Development** is a historical study of Zionism in the period up to the creation of the State of Israel. But, in fact, Holdheim's aim is to prove that the formation of Israel is the concrete realisation of the ideas of political Zionism. He advocates the solution of the Jewish problem through the "acquisition of territory" and not through struggle against all oppression and the abolition of exploitation of man by man.

* Gerhard Holdheim, *Der politische Zionismus, Werden, Wesen, Entwicklung*, Herausgegeben von der Niedersächsischen Landerzentrale für Politische Bildung, 1964.

He lauds "united Jewry", claiming that class contradictions and the class struggle are alien to it.

The idea of the "exclusiveness of the united Jewish nation" is presented even more emphatically by the Israeli bourgeois sociologist Zvi Rudy in *The Sociology of the Jewish People*. Writing that the Jews were a "wandering people" at least until the second half of the 19th century, he notes that this reveals the "specifics of the Jewish character", and that the "continuity of Jewish history" is due "chiefly to the biological instinct of self-preservation, highly developed among the Jewish people". He argues vehemently that the Jews are a "single nation" and perseveringly propounds the theory about the "specifics of Jewry". Anti-Semitism, he holds, is the result of the "existence of a people without a homeland and their own national-state life", and he tries to contrapose his views to the Marxist standpoint that anti-Semitism is the product of a system founded on exploitation.

His arguments, however, boil down to the concept "Hebraism", which he introduces and explains. He speaks of the "spiritual exclusiveness" of the Jews as a "nation", which, he claims, gives that nation a specific that has been preserved through millennia to the present, regardless of the conditions of the Diaspora. According to Rudy, "Hebraism" is the "intellectual and emotional heritage of the Jewish people"; it is the "focal point of the spiritual life of the nation at all the historical stages of its existence". Lastly, "Hebraism" is the "heritage of Jewish traditions preserved in the collective memory of the peoples".

The interpretation of this is that:

a) Israelite culture is the *only* (?) one in the Middle East that has outlived all other Eastern cultures and, together with the culture of ancient Greece, laid the foundation for Western culture. This thesis is scientifically untenable in the light of the existence and achievements of the Egyptian, Persian and other ancient civilisations;

b) the Israelites are the *only* (?) people who, with their highly-developed civilisation, have outlived all the peoples of the ancient East;

c) the Jewish people were the *first* (!) to have a large historical literature as early as the 10th century B. C., and in the 8th century B. C. to have a vast knowledge of the

surrounding world compared with the peoples of the ancient high civilisation—the Assyrians and Babylonians, who, allegedly, confined themselves to a theocratic world outlook;

d) the *influence* of the Jewish cultural heritage may be traced in every field of science and in literature and music.

Rudy ends his study with the formation of the State of Israel, which he describes as a "new stage of the political and social development of the Jewish people as a whole".

Thus, Rudy not only offers a tendentious and untenable theory of Israel's continuity from the ancient Hebrew states in Palestine but "substantiates" the extremely suspect idea about "Jewish exclusiveness", the "exclusiveness of the Jewish nation". All this is accompanied by an exaggeration of Israel's significance, by a perversion of facts, by the preaching that Israel plays a "civilising" role, particularly in relation to the Arab countries.*

2. A Few Facts from the History of the Jews. Emergence of Political Zionism

Some knowledge of the history of the ancient Hebrews in Palestine is necessary to form a truer judgement of the "continuity" theories and also to show the sources of the rise of political Zionism at the turn of the present century, especially as these questions are directly linked with the subject we are discussing.

The Hebrew tribes of Judah and Israel appeared in ancient Palestine in the 13th century B. C. Known as Canaan in those days, the country was a domain of the Egyptian pharaohs. No clear recorded data exists on the history of these tribes** prior to their settlement in Palestine. It is surmised that between the years 1500 and 1300 B. C. the Hebrew tribes or large clans followed a nomadic way of life in regions neighbouring on Palestine, chiefly in

* Zvi Rudy, *Soziologie des jüdischen Volkes*, Rowohlt, Reinbek, 1965, pp. 31, 32, 55, 70, 75, 125, 126, 135, 138, 140, 181.

** Hebrews—sons of Ibri, meaning "of the other side" (of the River Jordan). In Biblical times the Jews called themselves the sons of Israel. The name Jew came into use much later.

Southeastern Trans-Jordania and in territory adjoining Southern Palestine.* The Hebrews appeared in Palestine at one and the same time with the Philistines, after whom the territory was subsequently named. In the 10th century B. C. the Hebrew tribes, which had settled mainly in the mountains of Judah, founded a kingdom that flourished under David and Solomon. After an existence of only a hundred years it split into two kingdoms: Israel and Judah.**

In the year 721 B. C. the kingdom of Israel was destroyed by the Assyrians, and Judah was subjugated by Babylon in the year 586 B. C. Most of the Hebrews were expelled from Palestine and this marked the beginning of the so-called epoch of exile (Galuth) of Babylonian captivity. Subsequently the Hebrews dispersed over the entire Persian Empire and the Hellenic world.*** Thus began the dispersal of the Jews, or the emergence of the Diaspora. When Babylon fell, part of the Jews returned to Palestine and formed a small Judaeon kingdom, which embraced the region of Jerusalem and existed until its destruction by the Romans in the 1st century A. D. After the Bar Korbha uprising was crushed by the Romans in the year 135 A. D. the Jews were forced to leave Palestine and they lost all links with that country. However, Arab tribes of Semitic origin lived unchangeably in Palestine. In the 7th century they intermarried with the Arab tribes that came

* The Biblical legend of the captivity of the Jews in Egypt and their exodus from that country relates to the period of the nomadic wandering of the Hebrew tribes. Bourgeois scholars sustain this legend, sharing the view that the Jews migrated from Egypt to Palestine, which was allegedly held out to them as the Promised Land. For example, see Oscar Kraines, *Government and Politics in Israel*, Boston, 1961, p. 1.

** In themselves these small Hebrew kingdoms were of no significance to world history. Their fame, as the fame of the ancient Hebrews, is linked with the Holy Scripture and with the writings of the prophets. Judaism provided the foundation for the Christian and Moslem faiths, which for many centuries determined the history of a considerable part of mankind. (This is underscored, for example, in the foreword to G. Soden's book *Palestine and Its History*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1909, p. VI.)

*** Another opinion widespread among foreign scholars is that in remote times the Hebrews left Palestine of their own free will and settled in richer countries. For example, see *Tension, Terror and Blood in the Holy Land. The True Facts of the Palestine Question*, Damascus, 1955, p. 39.

from the Arab peninsula and since then Palestine has been an Arab country.*

Palestine's new history opens with the rise of the bourgeoisie and the beginning of the struggle for the partition of the world. In the 17th century Oliver Cromwell showed an interest, for "reasons of a practical economic nature"***, in the return to England of the Jews expelled in 1290 by Edward I. He reckoned that the Jews would bring their money and property which would be "useful in the attainment of his imperialist expansionist ambitions"****.

During the French campaign in Palestine in 1788 Napoleon recruited Jews from Asian and African countries into his army. He advanced the idea of setting up a Jewish kingdom in Jerusalem under France's aegis.

In the period of the so-called Eastern Question (1840-1847) both Britain and France, each acting in its own interest, actively peddled the idea of creating a Jewish state in Palestine. A broad movement demanding the "rejuvenation of the Jews" was organised in Britain on the eve of the London conference of five European Great Powers in 1840.****

In official British circles at the time it was suggested that "the restoration of the Jewish nation would not only hasten the millennium but also be a strength to British policy".***** According to bourgeois historians, in that period the British Christians were more zealous Zionists than the British Jews.)*

With the building of the Suez Canal in the 1850s-1870s Palestine received the close attention of Britain and France, who were rival colonial powers. Allegedly out of sheer philanthropy France undertook the colonisation of Pales-

* For facts on the appearance of the Arabs and their settlement of Palestine see, for example, T. Mommsen, *A History of Rome*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1949, Vol. V, p. 403; F. A. Brockhaus and I. A. Efron, *Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, Russ. ed., St. Petersburg, 1902, Vol. 22, p. 623; H. Hall, *Hey Palestine*, New York, 1946, p. 11; V. B. Lutsky, *The Palestine Problem*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1946, pp. 1-3.

** Josef Cohn, *England und Palästina*, Berlin, 1931, p. 21.

*** Ibid.

**** Convened to settle the Eastern Question sparked by the seizure by Mohammed Ali, khedive of Egypt, of Syria, including Palestine, which belonged to Turkey. Britain backed the integrity of Turkey.

***** Norman Bentwich, *The Jews in Our Time*, Bristol, 1960, p. 147.

*) Ibid.

tine, sending there impecunious Jews. While the Suez Canal was under construction Sir Moses Montefiore had talks with the Turkish Sultan on the purchase of land in Palestine for settlement by Jews. The Jewish Colonisation Association, founded and financed by the German businessman Baron Moritz Hirsch, engaged in the purchase of land in Palestine. The bourgeois historian Franz Oppenheimer later wrote of the real aims of the philanthropy of French businessmen in particular: "Edmond Rothschild foresaw ... the importance of the regions in so-called Greater Palestine... and purchased 75,000 dunams of land in Khuran."^{*}

Halukim, Jewish settlements maintained on overseas funds, sprang up in Judea, Samaria and Galilee in the 1880s. A small number of Orthodox Jews calling themselves followers of Zion settled in Jerusalem, Safad and Tiberias.

The further history of Palestine was linked entirely with the political Zionist^{**} movement, launched at the close of the 19th century. Political Zionism borrowed its underlying idea from religious Zionism, which was particularly widespread in the Middle Ages. Founded on the postulates of the Judaistic religion, especially on the Biblical prophecy that the Holy Land of Palestine would one day belong to the descendants of its ancient population, religious Zionism propounded the idea that from all parts of the world the Jews would return to Mount Zion in Jerusalem, i.e., to the land of their forefathers. Religious Zionism was compounded of mystical ideas and elements of narrow Jewish nationalism, which was to some extent, a reaction to the horrors of the medieval Jewish ghettos.^{***} Reduced to desperation, the Jewish poor regarded it as their last hope. This hope was expressed by the hymn: "This year in exile still, but the next in Jerusalem. This year in slavery still, but the next as free men." However, a point to be remembered is that throughout Jewish history the wealthy section of the Jews did not share the

^{*} Franz Oppenheimer, *Co-operative Colonisation in Palestine*, Russ. ed., Petrograd, 1917, p. 1.

^{**} The term Zionism derives from the name of a hill in Jerusalem.

^{***} Medieval ghettos are described by A. Tyumenev in *Jews in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, Russ. ed., Petrograd, 1922, p. 215.

suffering of the Jewish masses. They were always in a privileged position. For instance, the army recruitment system instituted in Russia in 1827 did not affect wealthy Jews. As the minister concerned, Bludov, pointed out, the aim of the "Jewish reform", carried out later, was "to separate rich and educated Jews from the main mass of the Jewish population". Jewish members of the senior merchants' guild were exempt from the regulations concerning the Jewish Pale.*

Political Zionism was rung in by the publication in 1896 of *The Jewish State* by the Austrian Jewish journalist Theodor Herzl, in which the mystical idea was given concrete form and a patently nationalist colour.

The substance of the Herzl doctrine, as he himself put it, is that the Jewish question cannot be interpreted "as a social or religious question, although it sometimes acquires that hue. It is a national question and to settle it we must first make it a question of world-wide politics, which will be resolved by a council of cultured peoples. We are a people, a united people".^{**} This slogan expresses the core of Herzl's philosophy.

The Jewish state was thus proclaimed the panacea for all the misfortunes and sufferings of the Jews. It was proclaimed that the Jews in Diaspora were a "united people", and every effort was made to drive home the notion that the common interests of Jews harmonised. The following is how Herzl is interpreted by the high priests of Zionism: "By 'national question' he [Herzl—G. N.] meant that the Jewish question was not only a question of the Jewish poor, as various philanthropists believe; rich Jews, like all other Jews, lived in abnormal conditions: anti-Semitism, it must be remembered, is directed against them, *above all*. The Jewish question concerns all Jews regardless of economic position or religious belief, for 'we are a united people'.^{****}

From the very outset being a bourgeois trend, political Zionism excluded the possibility of the Jewish problem

^{*} For an earlier description of the Jews in Russia see N. D. Travodsky, *Trade and Other Rights of the Jews in Russia Under the Laws Preceding the Presently Operating Legislation on Jews*, Russ. ed., St. Petersburg, 1885.

^{**} Theodor Herzl, *Der Judenstaat*, Berlin, 1936, pp. 13-14.

^{***} *The Jewish Encyclopaedia*, Vol. XIV, p. 334 (my italics—G. N.).

being settled within the framework of the class struggle. By diverting the mass of the Jews from the political struggle of the proletariat, Zionism was far from a genuine settlement of the Jewish problem. The first Zionist congress, held in Basle in 1897, set up the World Zionist Organisation and adopted a programme permeated with a spirit of narrow bourgeois Jewish nationalism and proclaiming the aim of creating for the Jewish people "a Home in Palestine secured by public law" by settling it with farmers and artisans and by uniting the entire Jewish people through local and general associations in accordance with the laws of the different countries, and by promoting Jewish national feeling and consciousness.* Moreover, it was planned to solicit a charter from the Turkish Sultan for the settlement of Jews in Palestine.

At its very inception the Zionist movement, headed by Herzl, was critically received by some sections of the Jewish intelligentsia, particularly in Russia. For instance, in a book entitled *The Jews and Zionism*, published in 1898, A. Bonyuk and M. Frenkel noted that Zionism was not a progressive movement, that "essentially, it is a superficial movement that does not reflect the real requirements and aspirations of the Jewish people", and wrote that in the event a Jewish state was created the Jewish bourgeoisie would most certainly seize the power, entirely remove the working masses from it and subject them to unbridled exploitation. They maintained that the Zionists were, "in fact reactionary nationalists."***

Even a prominent representative of the Jewish bourgeoisie in Russia like Baron Leo found that Zionism was an obstacle to social progress. "In the light of the aims pursued by it," he wrote, "Zionism must be called a reactionary phenomenon."****

When the Marxist teaching of the proletarian class struggle for liberation from oppression of every kind, including national oppression, spread in Russia in the late 19th and early 20th century it influenced the thinking of

* *The Jewish Encyclopaedia*, Vol. XIV, pp. 334, 336.

** A. Bonyuk and M. Frenkel, *The Jews and Zionism. A Cultural and Economic Outline*, Russ. ed., Kiev, 1898, pp. 3, 20, 38.

*** Leo, *Zionism and the Jewish Question*, Russ. ed., St. Petersburg, 1906, p. 34.

the most progressive section of the Jewish intelligentsia, which was opposed to the settlement of the Jewish problem as preached by Zionism.*

Zionism and its philosophy were criticised also by the Jewish intelligentsia in Western Europe, where the publication of Herzl's pamphlet was received with cold reserve and, in many cases, with bitter condemnation.** At the third Zionist congress in 1899 the Zionist leaders Herzl and Nordau admitted that millions of Jews knew nothing about the Zionist movement.*** From its inception and for years afterwards Zionism failed to win massive support.

The true class nature of Zionism became manifest as soon as the first steps towards the attainment of its aims were taken. The implication of the slogan "All Jews must unite round the banner of Zion" was that the Jewish bourgeoisie would provide the funds, the intelligentsia would devote their spiritual strength to the movement, and the working masses would give it their energy. For the Jewish poor it meant immediate settlement in Palestine and heavy physical labour. The Herzl plan called for the settlement in Palestine "first of the desperate, then the poor, then the well-to-do and, lastly, the rich. Those settled there earlier would achieve a high level of well-being by the time the wealthy arrived . . . who would quickly see a new field for their spirit of enterprise so despised and hated by everybody".**** A contribution of one gold franc—the Shekel—was made to the "common cause". Jews who recognised the Basle programme and paid the Shekel were regarded Zionists.

Banks and commercial firms were quickly set up in Palestine—the Jewish Colonisation Bank with a capital of £2,000,000, the Palestine Land Development Company, the National Foundation which purchased land, the Anglo-

* In *The Zionist Movement in the Light of Criticism* (Russ. ed., St. Petersburg, 1900, pp. 35-36), G. M. Bubis, a Russian Jewish intellectual showed that for the Jewish masses Zionism held out nothing but disappointment and all the attendant suffering, that it could not provide the solution for the "unhappy Jewish question".

** This is noted, for instance, by Gerhard Holdheim in *Der politische Zionismus. . .*, p. 13.

*** Theodor Herzl, Max Nordau, *Reden gehalten auf dem III Zionisten Congress zu Basel*, Vienna, 1899, p. 17.

**** Theodor Herzl, *Der Judenstaat*, p. 31.

Palestine Society with an initial capital of £39,000,000, the Anglo-Levantine Bank with a basic capital of £25,000,000, and so on. These banks, societies, firms and foundations were controlled by the Jewish big bourgeoisie holding posts in the executive agencies of the World Zionist Organisation. An indication of what operations they engaged in is given by S. Tolkovsky, who wrote that the "Palestine Land Development Company purchases large tracts of land, which it develops and improves and then fragments into small plots for re-sale to individuals".* Similar aims were pursued by the middle bourgeoisie that went to Palestine. Franz Oppenheimer found that in Palestine private ownership "had turned the landowners into profiteers. . . . They avariciously drove for quick profits, caring nothing for the sense of homeland."**

In Palestine the Zionist agencies likewise bought up land. For instance, the capital of the Palestine Co-operative Foundation, founded in December 1910, reached 145 million francs in 18 months. These large sums came from the Shekels paid by the Jewish poor and from the exploitation of the same poor in Palestine.

For the impoverished Jewish colonist the reality of Palestine was exhausting labour, the most undisguised exploitation and appalling living conditions in the unaccustomed and unhealthy climate of barren regions. Disease, poverty and cheap labour were the result of "classless Zionism",*** of the implementation of Herzl's Zionist slogans. This was later admitted by another "father of Zionism", Chaim Weizmann, who wrote: "The pioneers . . . become old, tired, decrepit. . . . They saw their children, born to them in Palestine, leaving the land and going to the cities, or, what was worse, returning to the exile from which they themselves had once fled in order to build a homeland for the coming generations."****

Political Zionism, as we have already pointed out, was

* S. Tolkovsky, *The Jews and the Economic Development of Palestine*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1918, p. 18.

** Franz Oppenheimer, *Co-operative Colonisation in Palestine*, Russ. ed., Petrograd, 1917.

*** Y. A. Belyaev, "The 17th Zionist Congress", *Antireligioznik*, Leningrad, 1931, No. 9, p. 27.

**** Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error. The Autobiography*, New York, 1949, p. 127.

partly the reaction of the Jewish poor to national oppression under capitalism, and from the very beginning it was used by the imperialist powers to further their plans of aggrandisement. Herzl and the other leaders of Zionism counted on assistance from the big powers, and this created the basis for Zionism's close alliance with imperialism, an alliance that steadily grew stronger.

After Turkey's refusal to co-operate, Herzl made an attempt to enlist the support of the German Kaiser, by pointing out that German imperialism's plans for expansion in the Middle East would be furthered by Jewish colonisation in Palestine. He wrote: "I particularly drew attention to the fact that with the Jews there will come to the Orient German influence."*

However, the Zionist leaders pinned most of their hopes on British imperialism.** In 1902 Herzl met Lord Rothschild in London and kindled his interest in the idea of founding Jewish colonies in the Middle East under the British flag. In the autumn of the same year he met Joseph Chamberlain, then the British Colonial Secretary, and found a quick understanding of his desire because for "various reasons the empty lands in Sinai interested Chamberlain most".*** Turkish hostility, however, wrecked the plan for the Jewish colonisation of Palestine under the aegis of Britain.

In return for support for the Zionist plans Herzl promised the Sultan that the Turkish debt would be partially covered with the preliminary payment of £1,500,000, and, in addition, offered assistance in the building of Turkey's Navy and backing on the international scene, and undertook to build a university in Palestine. The Sultan decorated Herzl with a medal and in the accompanying letter wrote caustically: ". . . the Jews will get Palestine only in the event the Osman Empire is broken up."

Facts show that the creators and leaders of political Zionism pursued chiefly political aims instead of looking for ways of really settling the "Jewish problem". At the

* Paul Novick, "Zionism and the Imperialist War", *The Communist*, Vol. XIX, No. 5, May 1940, New York, p. 464.

** Herzl's statements on this point are underscored in Gerhard Holdheim's *Der Politische Zionismus* . . . , p. 14.

*** Edgar Dugdale, *The Balfour Declaration. Origins and Background*, London, 1940, p. 14.

sixth Zionist congress in 1903 Herzl gave the particulars of a plan, suggested by Joseph Chamberlain, of creating a Jewish state in Uganda, which would be called New Palestine. Chaim Weizmann noted in his memoirs that the Uganda project was favoured by businessmen who were utterly indifferent to whether there was a link between the "national home for the Jews" and the "land of forefathers".* They suggested setting up a Jewish home in Argentina, Sinai, Kenya and elsewhere.** Moreover, Herzl had two meetings with the tsarist minister Pleve, who was notorious as the organiser and inspirer of the persecution of the Jews living in the Pale in Russia. Weizmann says in his memoirs that he sought to dissuade Herzl from going to Russia. But Herzl was prepared to co-operate with a rabid anti-Semite and reactionary so long as Zionist ideas were accepted and became widespread in Russia.

In Russia, where revolutionary unrest was spreading among large sections of the intelligentsia, the youth and the working people, including Jews, Zionism with its reactionary doctrine of classless "Jewish interests" could be extremely useful in diverting the Jewish working masses from the revolutionary struggle alongside the Russian proletariat, against their oppressors.

When the imperialist war broke out in 1914 Germany was the first to appreciate the practical advantages of an alliance with Zionism, which, she felt, could help her obtain a protectorate over Palestine. She pressed Turkey to agree to the formation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Turkey gave her consent in 1916. But by then it was becoming increasingly clear that the war would end in favour of the Entente, and this made the Zionists finally turn to Britain.

Further developments, which led directly to the creation of the State of Israel, strikingly illustrate the sharp struggle of the imperialist powers to redivide the world, win spheres of influence and establish themselves in the Middle East. This struggle was particularly bitter between the imperialist circles of Britain and US monopoly capital.

* Chaim Weizmann, *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

** The Zionists were converted to Palestine as the "Promised Land" for the settlement of the question of creating a Jewish state only at their 7th congress in 1905.

FORMATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL AND THE GROWTH OF US IMPERIALIST INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST


1. The Balfour Declaration. Britain Receives the Mandate for Palestine

On November 2, 1917, towards the end of the First World War, the British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour made a declaration* on a "national home for the Jews" in Palestine on behalf of the British Government. Known as the Balfour Declaration, it stated in part: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country."**

This declaration crowned the year-long negotiations between the Zionist leaders and the British ruling circles. In October 1916, the World Zionist Organisation handed the British Government a memorandum in which it enlarged on its views regarding the future administration of Palestine after the "special Jewish nationality" was recognised and in the event the country was incorporated in the British sphere of influence. The German historian Josef Cohn writes that the memorandum was the point of

* In the form of a letter to Lord Rothschild.

** *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Chicago, 1947, p. 133.



MAP 1. STATE OF ISRAEL

departure at the last stage of the talks between Weizmann and the British ruling circles,* which culminated in the Balfour Declaration.

However, the talks became concrete only after April 1917, when Britain decided on a major campaign in Palestine, planning it for the autumn. In July 1917, the British Government agreed to make a statement in favour of the Zionists. The question was only over the wording of the Declaration, which it was decided would be brief and reserved. Although the Zionists wanted the Declaration to recognise Palestine as the "national home of the Jewish people", it was worded with the utmost caution and only stated that the British Government viewed "with favour" the establishment of a "national home for the Jewish people."

Official British diplomacy admits that the Balfour Declaration was determined primarily by Britain's war policy, namely to weaken the enemy and improve the Allied position.** Its aim was, among other things, to influence Jews in all countries and assure the Entente of the assistance of Jewish bankers, particularly in the USA, inasmuch as by that time "the Allies had almost exhausted the gold and marketable securities available for American purchases".*** Actually, since the outcome of the First World War was being decided in favour of the Anglo-French-US coalition,**** Britain was now interested in strengthening her own postwar position in the Middle East. This is borne out by the debate in the British House of Commons at the close of 1917 in connection with the Balfour Declaration. An MP, H. C. King, asked "whether the desire of the Government to see established a Jewish Zionist nationality in Palestine has been communicated to the Allied Powers, especially to France, Russia, Italy and the Allied States; and whether it is one of the Allied war aims, or only a British war aim, to set up a Zionist community in

* Josef Cohn, *England und Palästina*, p. 73.

** David Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, London, 1938, p. 1118. Furthermore, Lloyd George wrote that the British declaration was a propaganda move calculated to mobilise opinion in favour of the Entente and destroy the unity of the enemy countries.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 1122.

**** The USA entered the war in April 1917.

the Holy Land?" Balfour's reply was, in part, that "no official communication has been made to the Allies on the subject".*

In the course of the war Britain's attitude to Palestine underwent several changes. A secret agreement with France (the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916)** envisaged instituting an international administration in the country after the war. According to David Lloyd George, until the end of 1916 Britain had no other plans with regard to Palestine.*** However, from the correspondence of Sir Henry MacMahon, the British High Commissioner for Egypt, with the Grand Sharif of Mecca Hussein it is obvious that Britain did not confine herself to back-stage negotiations with France. She promised the Arabs, provided they acted against Germany and Turkey, that after the war she would help to create an independent Arab Caliphate that would include Palestine.**** Britain's plans regarding Palestine changed depending on the course of the hostilities against Turkey, with the result that just before the end of the war the British Government conspired with the Zionist bourgeoisie.***** "Developments in the theatres of hostilities and the resultant assessment of the military situation and the strategy that was to be followed," Josef Cohn writes, "were of decisive significance to the course of the negotiations" (meaning the Balfour Declaration—G. N.).

As one of the victor powers, Britain soon annulled her agreement with France regarding Palestine and backed down on her earlier promise to create an independent Arab

* *The Parliamentary Debates: Official Report, Fifth Series, Volume XCIX. Seventh Session of the Thirtieth Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 8 George V. House of Commons. Tenth Volume of Session 1917, London, 1917, p. 838.*

** For details see M. S. Lazarev, *The Fall of Turkish Rule in the Arab East*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1960, pp. 129-37.

*** David Lloyd George, *Op. cit.*, p. 1115.

**** This correspondence was conducted between July 1915 and January 1916 (see *Extracts from the MacMahon Correspondence, 1915-1916, Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945*, London, 1946, Append. 1, Letters Nos. 1-3, 8, pp. 144-47; and also M. S. Lazarev, *Op. cit.*, pp. 103-11).

***** The rich Jewish bourgeoisie were particularly influential in Britain and the USA in the mentioned period. They demanded the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

state. The circumstance that in the course of the war British troops had occupied some territories of the Ottoman Empire, including Palestine, helped to give the British ruling circles a free hand. Assessing British imperialist policy in the Middle East immediately after the termination of the First World War, Lenin wrote: "Britain at any rate will not renounce the seizure (annexation) of Palestine and Mesopotamia."*

Britain counted on support from the Jewish big bourgeoisie in return for her backing of its claims to Palestine. For its part, the Zionist bourgeoisie** regarded the British protectorate over Palestine as a vital condition for the creation of a Jewish state.*** The historical links which it was alleged the Jews had with Palestine were given as the motive for the formation of the Zionist state and for the Balfour Declaration. But in making that Declaration Britain ignored the indigenous population of Palestine—the Arabs. As Fayeze A. Sayegh, the Arab historian, points out, Britain did not even notify, much less consult, the Palestinian Arabs when she made her promise to the Zionists.****

The Balfour Declaration was an exceedingly subtle move on the part of British diplomacy. The promise to create a "Jewish national home" in Palestine by no means implied the subsequent establishment of an independent Jewish state. This idea was totally excluded. Lloyd George admitted that from the very beginning Britain had act-

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 24, p. 379.

** At the outbreak of the First World War and during the initial years of the war the centre of Zionist headquarters was in Germany. It was then moved to Britain, and after the Second World War until the creation of the State of Israel it was in the USA.

*** The above-mentioned memorandum was handed to the British Government by the Zionist Organisation in 1916 as a programme for Palestine on the calculation that it would be a British protectorate during the next ten or fifteen years (Edgar Dugdale, *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-25).

**** Fayeze A. Sayegh, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, New York, November 1965, p. 12. At the time the Balfour Declaration was made public, only 10 per cent of the population of Palestine were Jews. Balfour quite cynically said: "Zionism, be right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land" (Harry N. Howard, *The King-Crane Commission. An American Inquiry in the Middle East*, Beirut, 1963, p. 250).

ed on the principle that "Palestine would appear to be incapacitated by physical and other conditions from ever becoming in any real sense the national home of the Jewish people".* The maximum policy, in the event the Turks were defeated and turned out of Palestine, was to set up some form of European (under no circumstances Jewish) administration in that country.** The Jews were to be given civil and religious equality with the other communities. As official British circles viewed it, this policy was very far removed from the romantic and idealist aims of the Zionist leaders. Britain maintained this attitude throughout the entire period of her Mandate in Palestine up to 1948. The deliberately vague wording of the Balfour Declaration gave the British Government every possibility of freely interpreting it and, consequently, of manoeuvring. "Every word in it was weighed upon a gold scale."***

The oil wealth of the Middle East was of immense significance to British imperialism. By turning Palestine into a colony, which, in the words of Lloyd George, was "Egypt's strategic buffer", Britain strengthened her strategic position in the Middle East and, until the outbreak of the Second World War, remained the principal colonial power in that part of the world. Lastly, for Britain Palestine was an important strongpoint against the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples.

After agreeing with France on the division of spheres of influence, Britain found that in her aspirations in the Middle East she had a new rival—the United States of America. The end of the First World War saw the USA playing the role of world creditor, which enabled it to take an active part in the postwar imperialist carve-up of the world. By that time US oil interests had also taken definite shape in the Middle East. As early as 1908, acting as President Theodore Roosevelt's representative, Admiral Colby M. Chester negotiated railway and oil concessions with the Turkish Government. Prior to 1914 the

* David Lloyd George, *Op. cit.*, p. 1125.

** *Ibid.*, p. 1131.

*** Carl J. Friedrich, *American Policy Toward Palestine*, Washington, 1944, p. 6.

USA had obtained seven oil development concessions in the Negev Desert, Palestine.*

Prompted by its own interests and expansionist ambitions in the Middle East, the USA gave the British every support in their intention to create a "Jewish national home" in Palestine. At a time when the Entente powers were partitioning the possessions of the enemy and when Anglo-US rivalry was beginning to mount, the US ruling circles regarded the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine as a factor fully in line with their Middle East policy. They felt that it could be used as a buffer state to undermine British influence in that part of the world. In October 1917, when the British Cabinet was deliberating the question of a "Jewish national home", President Woodrow Wilson's personal representative, Colonel Edward M. House sent the British Government a telegram to inform it of America's support of the substance of the Balfour Declaration. "This," Weizmann wrote, "was one of the most important individual factors ... in deciding the British Government to issue its declaration."*** But US imperialism was after bigger game. It was suggested that the Mandate for Palestine should be given to the USA.*** There was stunned reaction in Britain. At a sitting of the British War Cabinet's Eastern Committee in December 1918 Lord Curzon declared that "the Americans in Palestine might be a source not of assistance but very

* Frank E. Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations*, Washington, 1949, p. 267.

** Chaim Weizmann, *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

*** *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945*, London, 1946, p. 38. The USA's predatory designs in the Middle East in the period immediately after the First World War are most eloquently borne out by the recommendations of the American King-Crane Commission that was sent on a tour of Palestine, Syria and Turkey in the summer of 1919 for the alleged purpose of studying the situation there. These recommendations were that Syria, including Palestine, should become a US mandated territory, and that the USA should be given a mandate for Armenia, the planned International Constantinopolitan State, Turkey and the whole of Asia Minor. The grounds for this was that the USA was "the only Great Power territorially and strategically disinterested". However, the USA did not venture to submit the King-Crane recommendations to the Paris Conference of 1919, for which they had been specially prepared. They were published officially only in 1947. For details see Harry N. Howard, *Op. cit.*, pp. 345-61.

much the reverse to ourselves in Egypt".* A British Foreign Office White Paper contained the conclusion that the Mandate for Palestine should be exercised solely by Britain.

US and British diplomacy interpreted the Balfour Declaration each in its own way to suit its own aims. Britain, as we have pointed out, gave her backing to the idea of a "Jewish national home" in Palestine in the calculation that it would win the support of the Jewish bourgeoisie for her expansionist designs; on the other hand, she regarded the fulfilment of the promise given in the Balfour Declaration as a voluntary act. The USA, on the contrary, pressed for a clear formulation of the British commitments in Palestine. In March 1919 President Wilson stated that "the Allied Nations, with the fullest concurrence of our own Government and people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth".** Britain made an attempt to revise the frontiers of Palestine and thereby explore the ground for a possible retraction of the promises given in the Balfour Declaration. Immediately, a tensely worded cabled letter was received from the US President "as to the honour of Christendom being involved in providing the Jewish homeland with adequate boundaries".*** At the San Remo Conference Britain obtained the consent of the Allies for the Palestine Mandate on April 25, 1920, only after the Balfour Declaration had been included in the Mandate agreement, as insisted on by the USA.

To get the approval of the League of Nations for the Mandate and reach agreement with the USA as speedily as possible**** the British Government published a White Paper on June 3, 1922, in which it reiterated its promise to found a "Jewish national home" in Palestine, but nar-

* David Lloyd George, *Op. cit.*, p. 1147.

** Carl J. Friedrich, *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 12.

**** The Soviet historian P. Osipova notes that when the question of the British Mandate over Palestine was being decided, the correspondence between the USA and Britain showed that the "American Government was firmly determined to obtain the positions it needed and to push aside its British rival who had forged ahead" (See P. Osipova, *From the History of the British Administration of Palestine, 1919-1939*, Russ. ed., Moscow, p. 69).

rowed the definition "national home" in such a way as to absolve itself of any commitment. It stressed that it did not contemplate "that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish national home, but that such a home should be founded in Palestine".* The creation of a "Jewish national home" in Palestine was taken to mean nothing more than the further development of the existing Jewish community with the assistance of Jews in other countries. It was held that this Jewish community "may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and pride".**

The USA stated its stand in a resolution passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on June 30, 1922 and later signed by President Warren G. Harding. This resolution said, in part, "that the United States of America favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people"**** and gave to understand that the British Government should do nothing which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and other non-Jewish communities in Palestine. In other words, it stipulated that the interests of United States capital were to be protected in that country. In effect, the Congress resolution comprised the preamble to the agreement, approved by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922, giving Britain the Palestine Mandate. The preamble referred to the Balfour Declaration, whose implementation was declared as the main condition for giving the Mandate to Britain. The USA and Britain had obviously struck a bargain.

Under the terms of the Mandate Britain was made responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would secure the establishment of a "Jewish national home". Moreover, Britain was committed to promote the development of local self-governing institutions and also to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion (Art. 2). A Jewish Agency, representing the World Zionist Organisa-

* Carl J. Friedrich, *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

** *Ibid.*

*** *Ibid.*, p. 58 (Append. B).

tion, was to be set up for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the British administration.

Britain undertook to facilitate Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine provided this did not prejudice the rights and status of the other communities. The Mandate entitled Britain at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of military supplies, thereby turning Palestine into a buffer state at the approaches to Egypt and the Suez Canal. British imperialism drew indisputable advantages from its deal with the Zionist bourgeoisie. As Weizmann himself put it, it was the Zionists "who gave substance and reality to the idea of a British protectorate—which afterward took the form of a Mandate—over Palestine".* The Mandate finally came into force on September 29, 1923.

In pursuance of its expansionist aims in the Middle East, the USA raised every possible obstruction to hamper Britain's freedom of action in Palestine. A major success in this direction was the signing of the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 "with respect to the rights of the two Governments and their nationals in Palestine".** In Article 1 the United States consented "to the administration of Palestine by His Britannic Majesty, pursuant to the Mandate". The next Article laid down the provision that the United States and its nationals would have and enjoy all the rights and privileges secured under the terms of the Mandate to members of the League of Nations and their nationals, notwithstanding the fact that the United States was not a member of the League of Nations. American businessmen in Palestine were given additional privileges. Article 3 guaranteed the interests of American private capital, as a consequence of which it penetrated into other countries of the Middle East. United States nationals were permitted freely to establish and maintain in Palestine educational, philanthropic and religious institutions, to receive voluntary applicants and to teach in the English language (Art. 5). Lastly, there was a reservation stating that nothing contained in the Convention should

* Chaim Weizmann, *Op cit.*, p. 192.

** Carl J. Friedrich, *Op. cit.*, pp. 73-74.

be affected by any modification which might be made in the terms of the Mandate, unless such modification should have been assented to by the United States (Art. 7). It was stipulated that a duplicate of the annual report to the League of Nations, required of Britain as the Mandatory, would be furnished to the United States.

The USA thus obtained the possibility of influencing British policy in Palestine and, at the same time, of strengthening its own position in the Middle East. Carl J. Friedrich's comment on the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 was that it "did provide the United States with a sufficient status to participate in the shaping of the future of the national home should she desire to do so". The convention came into force a year after it was signed.

The period from the publication of the Balfour Declaration of 1917 to the signing of the 1924 Convention marked the first phase of the struggle in the Middle East between British colonialism, which was still powerful but had begun to show clear signs of decay, and US imperialism, which was quickly ascending. For the time being the scales were tipped in favour of Britain, which was, however, feeling the pressure of her American rival. Underlying the aggravation of Anglo-US contradictions in the Middle East were oil interests, which, as Friedrich neatly remarked, were the "real prelude" to the 1924 Convention. These contradictions never relaxed throughout the period of the British Mandate over Palestine, only assuming various shape depending on the balance of strength between the two imperialist powers. The USA rapidly won one position after another, and within two decades was playing the leading role in this area.

2. British Colonial Policy in Palestine. Status of the Yishuv and the Semblance of Arab Self-Administration

Britain's virtual seizure of Palestine gave her important strategic and political advantages. It was difficult, says Balfour's biographer Edgar Dugdale, to foretell these advantages even at the time the idea of founding a "Jewish national home" in Palestine was conceived. However, Brit-

ain's quarter-century rule in Palestine is a classic example of colonial enslavement and a policy of fanning hate between oppressed peoples, in particular, between Arabs and Jews. Britain pursued her "divide and rule" policy with extreme flexibility. Even bourgeois historians have to admit that in Palestine Britain "used the Arabs against the Jews and the Jews against the Arabs".* While creating some semblance of local self-administration, the British colonial authorities pillaged the country, making it increasingly more dependent economically and politically. With the aid of partial concessions they constantly balanced between the Zionist bourgeoisie and the Arab feudal nobility and bourgeoisie. By stirring antagonism between the Arabs and the Jews British imperialism hindered the national liberation movement of the peoples of Palestine. The following are a few facts from the history of British colonial rule in Palestine.

In September 1920 the British authorities published the first ordinance on Jewish immigration (setting the annual quota at 16,600). This immediately sparked clashes between the Arab and Jewish communities. The report of the British military commission set up to investigate the "disorders" was never made public. Arab-Jewish conflicts went on unabated and grew particularly acute in May 1921 (more than 500 Arabs and Jews were killed in Jaffa alone). Martial law was imposed. The British White Paper of 1922 was a subtle diplomatic move designed to calm the Arabs, appeal to the Zionists and circumvent the American rival.

Speaking in November 1927 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the declaration, Lord Balfour said: "... this movement for a Jewish Home ... was, in addition to the question of economics, a great question of human, intellectual and emotional development. ... One of the great duties of the Mandatory Power is to give those great forces their fair chance."** British policy in Palestine,

* *America and Palestine. The Attitude of Official America and of the American People Toward the Rebuilding of Palestine as a Free and Democratic Jewish Commonwealth*, 2nd Revised Ed., Prepared and Edited by Reuben Fink, New York, 1945, p. 69.

** *The Earl of Balfour, Speeches on Zionism*, London, 1928, pp. 119, 120, 121.

very accurately outlined by Balfour, was to maintain its hold on that country at all costs. The aspiration of the Zionist bourgeoisie to found an independent Jewish state in Palestine ran counter to British interests, and Britain struck a bargain with the Arab nationalists. Under an agreement signed in 1928 the Emir Abdullah ibn-Husein received a semblance of independent power in Transjordan while, in fact, remaining under British control.

In September 1928, the British authorities in Palestine provoked a violent conflict between the Arabs and the Jews (the cause being the Wailing Wall, a remnant of the western wall of the ancient Temple built by Solomon in Jerusalem). In August 1929 the conflict exploded into open Arab-Jewish slaughter, which assumed a particularly large scale in Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem. The recommendations made by the Shaw commission of inquiry were that the Government should officially specify the terms of the Mandate covering the rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine and clearly state its stand on the question of land ownership and immigration. In October 1930 these recommendations were extended in the Simpson report, which suggested restricting Jewish immigration and land purchases. Both documents were a far cry from the promises made in the Balfour Declaration. On the basis of the Simpson report the British Government published a new White Paper, which the Zionist bourgeoisie assessed as a "modification" of Britain's line in the question of founding a "Jewish national home" in Palestine. The 1930 White Paper demonstrated that British imperialism had strengthened its position in the country and was preparing for another offensive against the people. More land and naval forces were brought into Palestine.

In October 1933, the British provoked another major Arab-Jewish clash. But by then the Arabs were beginning to realise who was stirring and benefiting by these conflicts, and many of them grew into a struggle of the Arab population against the British authorities. This may be regarded as a phase of the national liberation movement of the Palestinian population. Cases of this kind became frequent, assuming a large scale in April and May 1936 and involving considerable loss of life. Britain increased her forces in Palestine from 10,000 to 30,000 men. The un-

rest reached such proportions that a new Royal Commission was sent to Palestine under W. R. Peel. This commission recommended the partitioning of Palestine, the formation of a Jewish state, the neutralisation of the territory round Jerusalem and Bethlehem, and the incorporation of the rest of the territory in Transjordan. It was the first time this was suggested. Even under these conditions Britain retained her position in Palestine. The corresponding provisions were stated in the British White Paper of July 7, 1937. But this was nothing more than another tactical move in the British policy of balancing and stirring hostility between the Arabs and the Jews.*

Palestine was steadily militarised by Britain. Military tribunals were instituted under the emergency ("defensive") law of 1937. The armed forces were enlarged. In 1938 the British Government formally repudiated its own recommendations for the partitioning of Palestine. *

There was no let-up in the clashes between the Arabs and the Jews during all these years. Britain found herself compelled to convene in February-March 1939 a conference in London to "consider policy" toward Palestine with the participation of the Palestinian Arabs, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Transjordan and the Jewish Agency. The Jewish delegation consisted of representatives of the Palestinian Zionists and of Zionist and non-Zionist organisations in other countries, chiefly in the USA.** Led by Weizmann, the Zionists insisted on the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The Arab representatives upheld their historical rights and demanded Palestine's independence. The conference achieved nothing because both sides refused to accept as a basis the British proposals published in the White Paper of May 17, 1939, envisaging the establishment within ten years of an independent Palestine state, which would have such treaty relations with Britain as would prove satisfactory, above all, for strategic requirements. During these ten years Palestine would be administered by Britain, which would have

* The Arab nationalists' slogan was "Palestine belongs to the Arabs"; the Zionist bourgeoisie demanded the establishment of a Palestine Jewish state.

** Actually, two parallel conferences were held because the Palestinian Arabs refused to sit at the same table with the Jewish delegates.

complete freedom of action in the event she felt that a "strategic situation" had developed. The possibility of prolonging the Mandate was not ruled out. Jewish immigration was not to exceed 75,000 during the first five years, after which it was to cease altogether. Moreover, the British Government declared that it never "intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish state against the will of the Arab population". Any further enlargement of the Jewish national home could take place only with Arab consent.* At the same time, Britain did not contemplate converting Palestine into an Arab state.

British imperialism, thus, did not abandon its policy of aggrandisement in Palestine, but on the eve of the Second World War, in the face of the growing national liberation movement in the Arab countries, it had to state more explicitly the "pro-Arab" substance of this policy. By that time there were Arab and Jewish political parties in Palestine. The country consisted, in effect, of two autonomous parts: the Yishuv (Jewish community) and the Arab community.

* * *

By the time the Second World War broke out the Palestinian Yishuv had fairly well-organised self-administration agencies: an Elected Assembly (Asefat Hanivharim) and a General Council (Vaad Leumi). A special role was played by the Jewish Agency set up under Article 4 of the Palestine Mandate. It was formed by the Palestinian Zionist bourgeoisie as an organ to advise and co-operate with the British administration. This Agency, which since 1929 included representatives of Jewish non-Zionist organisations, mainly American, functioned on behalf of the World Zionist Organisation as well. Formally, it took no part in the country's administration, confining itself to Jewish colonisation and settlement, to directing the operations of the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet Leyisrael) in the purchase of land, and of the Palestinian Foundation Fund (Keren Hayesod), which engaged in setting up agricultural settlements.

The Jewish Agency was the principal link between the

* *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945*, London, 1946, p. 168.

Palestinian Zionist leaders and the Zionist big bourgeoisie in the USA, and provided the channel through which the latter sent large sums of money to Palestine, including "donations", which opened the door for private American capital. The firm link formed during the period of the Mandate between the Palestinian Zionists and the American billionaires played an important role later in forming the State of Israel, furthering US penetration in that country and bringing it under US influence.

The Palestinian Yishuv also had a number of organised political parties. The largest of these was the Right-reformist Mapai headed by David Ben Gurion, the leader of the Palestinian Zionists. A bourgeois party, it demanded the creation of a Zionist state in Palestine, upheld the Biltmore programme charted by the American Zionists in 1942, and maintained contacts with big American monopolies.

The General Zionist Party, a party of the big and middle bourgeoisie, propounded what was basically the same programme as Mapai and later maintained close ties with Wall Street. Its leader, Chaim Weizmann, headed the Jewish Agency and was, at the same time, Chairman of the World Zionist Organisation. The aggressive Herut, a revisionist party, demanded that the boundaries of the Jewish state should be extended to include the entire territory of Palestine and Transjordan. The petty-bourgeois Hashomer Hatzair party (later called Mifleget Papoalim Hameuchedet or Mapam), the largest after Mapai, advocated the establishment of a bi-national Arab-Jewish state. It was the opposition party and it took the line of denouncing the revisionists. Moreover, there were a number of bourgeois religious Jewish parties.

The interests of the working people, both Jews and Arabs, were championed by the Palestinian Communists. The Communist Party of Palestine, founded in 1919, operated underground and was persecuted by the British colonial authorities.

The Zionists' political institutions and parties formed in Palestine played an important role after the Second World War, particularly in the period of the creation of the State of Israel, where the power was seized by the Zionist bourgeoisie. The following figures give an idea of

the growth of the Palestinian Yishuv. In the period 1922-1945 the Jewish population grew from 83,700 to 554,000, i.e., 6.6-fold. The land owned by the Zionist foundations in Palestine increased from 225,000 dunams in 1901 (1 dunam = 0.1 hectare) to 800,000 dunams in 1945. The land owned by the Zionist bourgeoisie increased 8-fold in less than 50 years; in the last 20 years of the Mandate it increased 1.8-fold. Land was purchased chiefly from Arab big landowners residing abroad, but actually at the expense of the Arab fellaheen, who were thereby deprived of the land they had been leasing for years.*

The bulk of the Zionist land was in the most fertile areas—along the coast and in the Esdraelon and Jordan valleys.

Many Zionists acquired land in Palestine to make a quick profit and not to satisfy the needs of the Jewish settlers. This is borne out by the fact that many of the owners of these lands did not settle in Palestine. For example, over one-third of the land purchased in the country belonged to the Jewish multi-millionaire Baron Rothschild, who preferred to remain in Paris.

In only the form of donations and gifts the Zionist foundations and institutions in Palestine received more than 42,000,000 Palestine pounds in the period from 1917 to 1945. This money was used mainly for the purchase of land from the Arabs. The Arab population strongly protested against the transfer of their primordial land to the hands of the Zionist organisations, but having been oppressed for years by Osman Turks and then by the British colonialists, and constantly pillaged by invaders, the Arabs were unable to stem the influx of big Zionist capital that was buying up their land.

In *Britain and Palestine*, a book published by the bourgeois historian Josef Cohn in 1931, it is asserted that the British authorities in Palestine sought to win over and calm the Arabs and that only a small group of notables and landowners, united in the National Committee, op-

* Here and above: D. Gurevich, *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1929*, Jerusalem, 1930, p. 88; *Statistical Handbook of Jewish Palestine, 1947*, Jerusalem, 1947, pp. 121, 129; also see A. Oksanin, "The Palestine Problem", *Problemy ekonomiki i istorii stran Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka*, Moscow, 1966, p. 168.

posed the establishment of a "national home"; the mass of Arabs, on the other hand, sympathised with Jewish immigration or took no interest whatever in socio-political questions.* However, even the official history *Great Britain and Palestine* admits that the Arabs were united in their opposition to the Mandatory and its policy of encouraging the activities of the Zionist bourgeoisie, and that liberative ideas began to spread among them.** The national liberation movement of the Arab masses was undermined by the constant hereditary hostility among the Arab aristocracy, which was adroitly used by the British. By bribing this section, the British authorities were able to intensify their arbitrary rule and suppress every manifestation of a striving for autonomy on the part of the Arab population. In Palestine the Arab community was headed by the Supreme Moslem Council, whose outward appearance of autonomy was created by the electivity of its members. But as from 1926 the members of the Council were appointed by the British High Commissioner and they pursued a policy in line with the interests of the Mandatory. The Council was dissolved in 1937 on suspicion of fermenting an uprising.

By 1935 there were the following Arab political parties: the Palestine Arab Party, the National Defence Party, the Reform Party, the National Bloc, the Congress Executive of Nationalist Youth and the Istiqlal (Independence) Party.***

Each of these parties had its own political programme and, in one way or another, was involved in the national liberation movement in Palestine and in the Arab East generally.

The Arabs demanded the termination of the British Mandate, and independence for Palestine. They were opposed to any strengthening of the Zionist positions in the country, to Jewish immigration and to the acquisition of land by the Jews from the Palestinian fellaheen.

While supporting the idea of creating a "Jewish Home", which, under the influence of the bourgeois na-

* Josef Cohn, *Op. cit.*, pp. 123, 126.

** *Great Britain and Palestine, 1915-1945*, London, 1946, p. 25.

*** A patently biased description of these parties is given by Norman Bentwich in *Palestine*, London, 1946, p. 178.

tionalists, i.e., the Zionists, could be turned into a British stronghold in the Middle East, the British authorities could not ignore the massive Arab national liberation movement of the close of the 1930s. They needed Arab assistance in the Second World War, which had broken out by then. For their part, the Zionist leadership felt that the time was ripe for more resolute action against the Arabs. According to the testimony of the bourgeois historian Earl Berger, "extremism and ruthlessness became the characteristics of Zionist policy from this time forward".* The most reactionary of the Zionists went over to acts of open violence against the Arab population, forming terrorist groups in 1942.

When the Second World War broke out the Jewish Agency Executive pressed the Mandatory authorities to agree to the formation of a Jewish fighting force for service with the British forces under its own national name and flag. The Zionist bourgeoisie counted on using this force to achieve its aims relative to the Arabs. The British gave their consent to the formation of a Jewish Brigade, but fearing the indignation of the Arabs did not allow it to serve under its own flag.**

3. The USA and the Palestine Problem. Anglo-US Contradictions

Until the outbreak of the Second World War there was a long period of sharp rivalry between Britain and the USA in the Middle East, notably in Palestine.

Bourgeois historians assess as "inactive" the USA's policy toward Palestine from the signing of the Anglo-American Convention of 1924 to the very outbreak of the Second World War, asserting that in those years the USA was nothing more than an "observer" in Palestine.

However, this was only an outward neutrality on the part of official US policy relative to Palestine. Actually, the USA pursued a very intricate and cautious policy in

* Earl Berger, *The Covenant and the Sword. Arab-Israeli Relations, 1948-56*, London, Toronto, 1965, p. 10.

** Israel Cohen, *Britain's Nameless Ally*, London, 1942, pp. 8, 41, 44.

the Middle East, seeking to strengthen its oil positions in that part of the world. It secured its big oil interests by obtaining concessions in Bahrein in 1932 and an exclusive right to oil concessions in Saudi Arabia in 1933 (until 1999). The large Arabian-American Oil Company became active in Saudi Arabia in 1939. This explains why the USA was careful not to antagonise the Arab countries. But in the face of the mounting competition with Britain, the USA counted on the Zionist bourgeoisie to help it weaken the British positions in the Middle East.

The tactics employed by the US ruling circles conformed to these aims and tasks. The US Government abstained from official protests to Britain or open support of the Palestine Zionists, but missed no opportunity to stir anti-British feeling. Protest and petition campaigns were organised with the utmost scrupulosity—not without the knowledge of the White House. In most cases, these campaigns were sponsored by American Zionist organisations.

An insight into this tortuous and secret diplomacy is given by Frank E. Manuel, who wrote that the guidelines of United States policy of the isolationist period were "to spurn complex situations which entailed political commitments and to back to the hilt the rights of expansive American business in foreign countries. It was a highly selective isolationism".*

How did these tactics work out in practice? There was no official reaction in the USA to the British-provoked Arab-Jewish massacres in 1929. But the US Ambassador in Britain General Charles G. Dawes was instructed to broach the idea that American cruisers might be moved nearer to Palestine "for the protection of American lives in case of a renewed outbreak".** The USA did not react officially to the British White Paper of 1930, but the American Zionist organisations conducted a massive protest campaign against the restriction of Jewish immigration to Palestine. The US State Department remained outwardly unmoved even when the British increased their military

* Frank E. Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations*, Washington, 1949, p. 303.

** Ibid., p. 302.

contingent in Palestine in 1936-1937. But seven American Zionist organisations sent the Peel Commission in Palestine a memorandum stating American interests in Palestine, while the US Ambassador in London Robert W. Bingham raised this question in a correspondence with Anthony Eden, then Foreign Secretary. In a letter dated August 4, 1937 Bingham made it clear that the USA insisted on its right to be fully informed of any proposals for the modification of the Palestine Mandate and mentioned the USA's "obligation and purpose to provide for the protection of American interests in Palestine". Yet, to all outward appearances the USA remained "indifferent".

Neither was there official American reaction to the British White Paper of 1939, which retracted the Balfour Declaration and nullified the pertinent articles of the Mandate, but there were turbulent protests by American "public opinion". For instance, 28 Senators issued a statement declaring: "It is well to make clear and to emphasize at this time that the American Government is not unrelated to the modern history of Palestine."* A declaration of protest was made by 15 members of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.

During the Second World War the USA continued this policy of make-believe "non-interference" while carrying on energetic backstage activities.

The Biltmore Programme, adopted by the American Zionist Organisation in May 1942, went much farther than the Balfour Declaration, demanding, in particular, unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine, the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish state and the creation of a Jewish army. According to the American researcher George Lenczowski, the Zionist bourgeoisie were now of a mind that "a policy of moderation did not pay, that Britain could no longer be relied upon, and that it was expedient to seek the support of the United States. . . . Hand in hand with the Biltmore Programme went intensive Zionist activity among the leading politicians in the United States".**

A statement made in November 1943 by the US As-

* Reuben Fink, *America and Palestine. . .*, p. 61.

** George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, 2nd ed., Ithaca, New York, 1956, p. 327.

sistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long to the effect that Palestine had a larger significance and that the USA could not remain indifferent to the situation in that country was an indication of a change in US policy. In January 1944 Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote Senator Maybank: "... the Department maintains a close interest in the Palestine problem."* In March 1944 President Franklin D. Roosevelt explained that the American Government had never given its approval to the British White Paper of 1939. Dr. Stephen S. Wise and Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, leaders of American Zionist organisations, were authorised to make the relevant statement on behalf of the US President. In May 1944 a motion was made to obtain the passage of a joint resolution in the Senate and House of Representatives stressing that the USA would render its "good offices" in the adoption of the "appropriate steps" to create the conditions for unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and to convert Palestine into a "free and democratic Jewish commonwealth". The voting was postponed at the last moment due to the "unfavourable military situation" in the Middle East and the unsuitable general international situation. Nonetheless, the very fact that this resolution was tabled showed that the USA was only waiting for a propitious moment to act openly.

Losing no time, the US ruling circles began moulding public opinion in favour of possible political action relative to Palestine by launching a propaganda campaign to "reiterate" the "ideological and historical foundations" of American interest in Palestine and in the destiny of its Jewish population. Many of the assertions were extremely questionable or utterly absurd. For instance, in a voluminous study published in 1944, Reuben Fink seriously maintains "that the American Indians represent the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel". American sympathy for the Jews, he says, dates back to the time of the first presidents, notably John Adams, and the first settlers in the New World had been brought up on intense love of the Old Testament, which "led to a love of the Holy Land itself".** That,

* Frank E. Manuel, *Op. cit.*, p. 310.

** Reuben Fink, *America and Palestine...*, pp. 12, 14, 20.

Fink argues, was why America became "New Canaan" and many of the towns and cities were given Hebrew names or were named after Biblical places such as Salem, Palestine, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. This brings him round to a conclusion dovetailing with US policy, namely that "the Federal Government repeatedly demonstrated its friendship for the Jewish people all over the world"* and that therefore the American interest in Palestine was justified and legitimate. Fink was not alone in propagating pseudo-scientific assertions of this kind, assertions that pursued obviously practical objectives.

The US ruling circles had also to reckon with the situation in the USA itself in 1944, which was the eve of the Presidential elections. The Zionist big bourgeoisie in the USA had considerable political influence, which accounts for the fact that the Zionist demands were included in the election programmes of both the Democratic and the Republican party. The Democratic Party,** in particular, declared that ways and means would be found to satisfy the demands of the Zionist bourgeoisie. Thus, one of the aims of the US ruling circles, most fully conforming to the interests of American foreign policy in the Middle East, was to enlist the active support of the Zionist bourgeoisie.

The Second World War brought about a change of the balance of strength in the world, resulting from the emergence of the community of socialist states and the further weakening of the imperialist camp. Britain's position was sharply undermined by the disintegration of the colonial system. The uneven development of capitalism was another reason giving the USA stronger positions at the expense of its partners. In a situation witnessing a fresh aggravation of Anglo-US contradictions, the USA embarked on vigorous action in the Middle East. In Palestine it staked on the Zionist bourgeoisie and now openly supported its demands for the creation of a Jewish state.

In August 1945, US President Harry S. Truman wrote to the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, insisting on the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants

* *Ibid.*, p. 18.

** The Biltmore Programme was included almost word for word in the election programme of the Democratic Party. See above, p. 43.

into Palestine. Britain rejected this demand on the grounds that the "situation in Palestine was unsuitable", but had to begin talks with the USA on setting up an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine.

This committee was formed in November 1945 to study all the aspects of the Palestine problem, including the Jewish problem in Europe and Jewish immigration from non-European countries. In this way the USA and Britain sought to settle the Palestine problem in their own interests, circumventing the United Nations Organisation. The committee was instructed that any political settlement concerning the Middle East had to take into consideration the factor of the "Soviet threat", in the face of which the USA and Britain had to act in concert. With this brand of demagoguery the ruling circles of the USA and Britain tried to disguise their expansionist aims in Palestine and the adjoining area. While the contradictions between them steadily mounted, the USA and Britain found their interest drawing closer together on an anti-Soviet platform.

In April 1946 the Anglo-American Committee presented a report which, among other things, recommended the admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and the lifting of the restriction on the purchase of land by the Jews in that country. Britain would retain the Mandate until the question of a UN trusteeship was decided. In May 1946 a memorandum and a duplicate of the committee's report were sent by the US State Department to the Arab countries and to Zionist organisations. Frank E. Manuel says that the American ruling circles thereby stated that their interest in the Palestine problem was "legitimate". A new Anglo-American committee was set up in June 1946. The USA suggested partitioning Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. The British wanted a federation of four provinces—Arab, Jewish (which would be given all the external trappings of autonomy) and the provinces of Negev and Jerusalem (which would be under British administration).

The diplomatic tug-of-war between the British and Americans went on. In October 1946 the USA was deep in a Congressional election campaign. In the drive for Jewish votes the leaders of the rival political parties

pledged their support for the Zionist claims in Palestine. President Truman repeated the demand for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine and offered US financial support for the project. The USA thus carried on with its determined offensive.

Unable to continue administering Palestine and opposing US pressure at the same time, Britain turned the Palestine problem over to the UN in April 1947, in the hope that with UN assistance she would curb the USA's expansionist aspirations in Palestine and in the Middle East as a whole. Touching on Britain's real plans, Weizmann wrote in his memoirs: "It was not in Mr. Bevin's plans that the UN should express itself in favour of the creation of a Jewish state, which it did in its historic decision" on November 29, 1947.*

In the House of Commons debate in February 1947 the Secretary of State for the Colonies Creech Jones declared: "We are not going to the United Nations to surrender the Mandate. We are going to the United Nations setting out the problem and asking for their advice as to how the Mandate can be administered. If the Mandate cannot be administered in its present form we are asking how it can be amended."***

4. The Palestine Problem Before the UN. Proclamation of the State of Israel

The UN General Assembly considered the Palestine problem at two sessions in 1947. When Britain turned this problem over to the UN the centre of the struggle between the two imperialist powers shifted from London to New York.

Britain manoeuvred during the preparations for the special session of the General Assembly and at the routine session. By taking the Palestine problem to the UN the British Government did not tie itself to any commitment and felt that matters would not go beyond recommendations. It counted on getting a respite in which to use

* Chaim Weizmann, *Op. cit.*, p. 452.

** Jacob Robinson, *Palestine and the United Nations. Prelude to Solution*, Washington, 1947, p. 44.

Arab nationalist dissatisfaction with the US policy, reach agreement with the Arabs and thereby preserve its position in Palestine. That was its motive when it insisted on a limited preliminary agenda for the special session of the General Assembly.

The Arab states, on the contrary, submitted a proposal touching on the substance of the problem, i.e., on the "termination of the Mandate and the proclamation of Palestine's independence". This proposal thus envisaged the creation of an Arab state in Palestine despite the obvious fact that Palestine existed as a unit of two autonomous regions with an Arab and Jewish population respectively.

While adopting an outwardly vague stand at the special General Assembly session, the USA in fact pursued a clear-cut political line. In the beginning, for example, it did not favour inviting representatives of the Palestine Jewish community to take part in the work of the UN but later insisted on this. It moved various proposals for the post-independence organisation and development of Palestine, but in all cases its eye was on strengthening its positions in the Middle East. The Zionists—representatives of the Jewish Agency—would hear of nothing except the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

A fundamentally different attitude to the Palestine problem was adopted by the Soviet Union in the UN. It favoured granting Palestine immediate independence, its guideline being its recognition of the right of all nations, big and small, to self-determination and its policy of safeguarding peace and security. It pressed for the creation of an Arab-Jewish state founded on a federative basis, with Arabs and Jews enjoying equal rights. In the event it was found that, as a result of the imperialist policy of stirring hostility, the Arabs and Jews could not live in one state, Palestine could be partitioned into two independent states: an Arab and a Jewish state.

A UN committee* was set up to study the situation in Palestine and submit its recommendations to the General Assembly. The committee recommended terminating the

* Consisting of representatives of 11 countries: Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.

Mandate as soon as possible, and proclaiming the independence of Palestine with the preservation of its economic integrity. It was envisaged that there would be a transition period under UN observation prior to the attainment of independence. The committee's majority plan* called for Palestine's partition into independent Arab and Jewish states with Jerusalem placed under international control. In Recommendation XII it was underlined that no settlement of the Palestine problem could be regarded as a solution of the Jewish problem as a whole. The minority plan** envisaged the creation of an independent federative state consisting of two autonomous regions—an Arab and a Jewish region—with Jerusalem as the capital.

The discussion of the Palestine problem in the General Assembly in September and November 1947 brought to light two basically different attitudes, that of the imperialist powers, on the one hand, and of the Soviet Union, on the other. Britain used every pretext to circumvent the UN decisions, holding that these decisions were mandatory only if the country's Arab and Jewish communities concurred with them. Since there could be no question of these communities giving their agreement, Britain would continue to have a free hand. The USA supported the majority plan, but went on manoeuvring. It insisted that Britain abide by the UN recommendations and, at the same time, urged the formation of a "volunteer" police force, which would remain in Palestine during the period of transition to independence. It was intended that the USA should play a prominent role in this project, thus giving American imperialism every possibility of solidly entrenching itself in Palestine. At the final stage of the discussion, guided by this calculation the USA made a new proposal, namely, that Britain retain the Mandate until the independence of the Arab and Jewish states was proclaimed. Since no date was set for Palestine's independence, this would, in the long run, wreck the solution of the problem and enable the USA to achieve its imperialist objective. Representatives of

* Supported by Zionist organisations, including the Jewish Agency.

** Supported by the Arab countries.

the Arab countries stressed that in its approach to the Palestine problem the USA was guided by political and economic considerations with a view to consolidating its positions in the Middle East.*

On November 29, 1947 the General Assembly passed, by a two-thirds majority,** a decision to terminate Britain's Mandate over Palestine, which was to be partitioned into two independent states (Arab and Jewish) linked economically. The adopted resolution stated: "The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than August 1, 1948. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than August 1, 1948.*** The Arab state was to have a territory of 11,100 square kilometres (42 per cent) embracing Western Galilee with the towns of Acre and Nazareth, the central and eastern parts of the country from the Esdraelon Valley to Beersheba, and the coastal strip along the Mediterranean running from a point north of Ashdod and farther to the south of Gaza to the Red Sea along the Egyptian frontier. Jaffa was to be an enclave in the Arab state. The Jewish state (territory—14,100 square kilometres, or 56 per cent) was to contain the port of Haifa, Tel Aviv, Eastern Galilee and the Esdraelon Valley, the coastal region south of Haifa up to Ashdod, and most of the Negev Desert.

The towns of Jerusalem and Bethlehem and the adjoining area (2 per cent) were to be independent administrative units with an international status (under the Trusteeship Council). The population of Palestine was distributed by nationality,**** but it was planned that in the Arab state it was to consist of 725,000 Arabs and 10,000

* *Pravda*, October 14, 1947.

** The voting was as follows: 33, including the Soviet Union and the USA, for; 13 against; and 10, including Britain, abstentions.

*** *United Nations. Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly. Resolutions. September 16-November 29, 1947*, New York, 1948, pp. 132-33.

**** At the close of 1947 Palestine only had a population of 1,845,000: 1,237,000 Arabs (67 per cent) and 608,000 Jews (33 per cent). At the time the UN passed its decision to partition the country, the arable land was owned as follows: 93 per cent by Arabs, and 7 per cent by Jews.

Jews, and in the Jewish state—498,000 Jews and 407,000 Arabs. The population of Jerusalem was established at 105,000 Arabs and 100,000 Jews. Moreover, the UN resolution provided for a number of measures which were to be carried out by the provisional councils of the two states not later than two months after the withdrawal of the British forces, namely, elections to a Constituent Assembly, the drawing up of a democratic Constitution, and so on.

However, subsequent developments showed that Britain and the USA were least of all interested in carrying out the UN decisions. They made an attempt to predetermine Palestine's destiny during the transition period. As a result of backstage British and American intrigues, armed clashes broke out in December 1947, which exploded into open war at the beginning of 1948. The situation threatened peace and security in the Middle East.

In this context the Palestine problem was put before the Security Council, which debated it in the course of March and April 1948. The US and British representatives declared that Palestine's partition was not feasible, and on March 19 the USA proposed a UN trusteeship over Palestine under a governor-general appointed by the UN. The USA had the voting machine at its beck and call and, therefore, the governor-general could only have been a United States protégé. A day before the trusteeship plan was proposed US President Truman assured Weizmann, the Zionist leader, that no modification of American policy towards Palestine was contemplated.

The "American reversal", Frank E. Manuel writes, "was merely a switch from force against the Arabs to force against the Jews."** Actually, United States diplomacy operated on the principle of utilising every opportune turn in the situation. When in April 1948 Senator Warren Austin urged removing the threat of war in Palestine, he meant that a US police force should be used in that country "legitimately"*** (under the guise of UN forces or instead of them). It was obvious that a UN trusteeship would in all probability become a United States trusteeship.

* Frank E. Manuel, *Op. cit.*, p. 346.

** *Ibid.*, p. 348. For the plan to use United States troops in Palestine see Sidney B. Fay, "Arabs, Zionists and Oil", *Current History*, Philadelphia, May 1948, p. 276.

At the special session of the General Assembly, convened on United States initiative, in April-May 1948 the American delegation insisted on its trusteeship plan. In the course of the debate the USA proposed various projects for a provisional regime for Palestine under a high commissioner. In the Security Council and at the General Assembly the Soviet representative exposed the objectives behind the American project, pointing out that under a trusteeship the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine would have only one right, that of meekly taking their orders from the governor-general.

In view of the American reservation that the trusteeship would be exercised until the authorities, i. e., the governor-general, secured co-operation between the Arabs and the Jews and until this co-operation led to a self-administration acceptable to both sides,* the "provisional" nature of the trusteeship could drag out endlessly. The purpose of the US project was thus to wreck the General Assembly decision on the formation of two independent states in Palestine and thereby engineer a further aggravation of the struggle between the Jews and the Arabs. This would only have led to a threat to peace and to increased tension in the Middle East.**

In the Political Committee and the General Assembly in May 1948 the Soviet representative drew attention to the fact that Britain and the USA had done all they could to torpedo every proposal aimed at settling the Arab-Jewish conflict.***

Britain, which had from the very beginning refused to carry out the General Assembly decision on Palestine's partition, suddenly declared that she would surrender the Mandate and withdraw her troops from Palestine. Her calculation was obvious: in the Arab-Jewish war that had in fact broken out the Arabs would win with British assistance and then agreement would be reached between the British bourgeoisie and Arab nationalist circles.****

Failing to secure acceptance of their trusteeship plan

* *Pravda*, March 25, 1948.

** *Ibid.*, April 23, 28, 1948.

*** *Ibid.*, April 6, 7, 11, 1948.

**** In July 1948 Sir Alan Cunningham, the last British High Commissioner in Palestine, wrote of some nuances of British-Arab relations.

and in view of the new situation, the US ruling circles quickly modified their tactics. The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was found to be more in line with US political aims in the Middle East at the time. On May 13 Truman met with Weizmann and reached agreement on the immediate proclamation of a Jewish state in Palestine. On May 14, the same day that Britain surrendered the Mandate and before the news had had time to spread, the National Council (Moetzet Hadam), consisting of representatives of the Jewish Agency, proclaimed the creation of the State of Israel. It was at once recognised by the USA.* The pertinent State Department statement declared that the US Government had been informed of the proclamation of a Jewish state in Palestine and had recognised the Provisional Government as the *de facto* administration of the new State of Israel. Abba Eban, the Israeli Ambassador in the USA (he represented the Jewish Agency in the UN), subsequently wrote that "in five minutes President Truman announced that the State of Israel and its Government were recognised by the United States".** The news of this recognition reached Lake Success late that evening and came as a surprise even to the United States delegation, which was still peddling the trusteeship project.

Before leaving the USA to take up his duties as head of the new state, Weizmann had another meeting with the American President. Later he wrote in his memoirs: "We ... discussed the economic and political aid which the State of Israel would need in the critical months ahead."*** He laid particular emphasis on the fact that the "President showed special interest in the question of a loan for development projects, and in using the influence of the United States to insure the defence of Israel if possible, by preventing Arab aggression through United States action, or if war continued to be forced upon us, by insuring that we had the necessary army". His conclusion from this was that "the ideals of the State of Israel and the

* The USSR recognised the State of Israel *de jure* on May 17, 1948.

** Abba Eban, *Voice of Israel*, New York, 1957, p. 86.

*** Chaim Weizmann, *Op. cit.*, p. 481.

policies of Great Britain . . . were brought into bloody conflict".*

Soon after the State of Israel was proclaimed, Britain and the USA provoked war in Palestine between Israel and Arab countries—Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Egypt (members of the League of Arab States). Saudi Arabia and Yemen declared their participation in the war on the side of the Arab countries. In this armed conflict most of the territory of Palestine designated by the UN for the establishment of an Arab state was occupied and annexed by Israel, namely: Western Galilee, Western Negev and part of Jerusalem (New City)—altogether 6,600 square kilometres; Transjordan annexed Eastern Palestine and part of Jerusalem (Old City)—altogether 5,500 square kilometres; and Egypt annexed the small region of Gaza (258 square kilometres). The General Assembly decision of November 29, 1947 on the establishment of two states in Palestine, one of which was to be an Arab state, thus remained unfulfilled. Israel carved out for herself 20,700 square kilometres (or nearly four-fifths of Palestine) in defiance of the UN decision.

After the war had lasted more than a year the Arab countries were compelled, by a UN decision, to sign an armistice with Israel recognising the status quo (these armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab countries—Egypt, Lebanon, Transjordan and Syria—were signed in the period from February to July 1949,** but due to obstructions by Israel they did not lead to the conclusion of a lasting peace as envisaged by the UN decision). Israel's Zionist leaders used the Arab-Israeli war to fan chauvinism and expansionist aspirations in foreign policy, and to suppress the democratic movement in Israel herself. In occupied territory the Israeli authorities established a terror regime. Part of the Arab population was physically exterminated, and over 900,000 Arabs had to leave the country through fear of terrorist acts by Israeli extremists and, partially, under the influence of Arab nationalistic propaganda. Over 70 per cent of the Arab po-

* Chaim Weizmann, Op. cit., p. 481.

** For details of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949 see L. N. Kotlov, *Jordan in Modern Times*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1962, pp. 81-99; Earl Berger, Op. cit., pp. 21-39.

pulation of Palestine lost their homes. This gave rise to a problem, which on account of Israel's adamant refusal to carry out the UN 1948 decision on the return of the Palestinian refugees, has been a source of Arab-Israeli tension for over 20 years.

In this period the USA rendered Israel substantial support.* On the eve of the presidential elections in 1948 Truman declared that the Israeli Government would not be compelled, without its own consent, to reduce the size of its territory.** In January 1949 the United States gave *de jure* recognition to Israel and granted her a large loan.

The USA's military and political objectives in the Middle East after the Second World War merit closer attention. In July 1945, two months after Nazi Germany was defeated, the following assessment of US policy in the Middle East was given in a semi-official broadcast over the American radio network: "... the Middle East is about the strongest candidate for the beginning of the next war. . . . For that reason . . . we ought to have a strong policy in the Middle East."*** The broadcast ended on the note that Palestine was the key of United States policy in the Middle East.**** Another factor guiding the American strategists, who exerted a direct influence on the Palestine conflict, was, according to Frank E. Manuel, that, because of its proximity to the Soviet Union, the Middle East was a potential base for future military operations against the USSR. For this purpose "Palestine had a unique combination of strategic characteristics."*****

After the war the USA's positions in Palestine grew stronger. In 1945 American investments in that country

* Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden was in Palestine as United Nations mediator from May to September 1948. For his attempt to make Israel relinquish the Negev territory he was assassinated by Israeli terrorists. The new UN mediator Ralph Bunche helped Israel to maintain her grip on the occupied territories.

** The American Laurence Griswold wrote that in this period the US "opposed any reduction of the size of the State of Israel unless Israel should itself consent" (Laurence Griswold, "This Sword for Allah", in *Tension, Terror and Blood in the Holy Land*, p. 19).

*** Carl J. Friedrich, G. Landis, W. White, *The Middle East: Zone of Conflict?*, No. 383, July 22, 1945, Chicago, p. 1.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 15.

***** Frank E. Manuel, Op. cit., p. 336.

exceeded the prewar figure four-fold.* Right until the termination of the Mandate, 60 per cent of Palestine's expenditures in foreign currency were covered by "donations", investments and other capital transfers, chiefly from the USA. As from the second half of 1947 the USA became the principal supplier of goods for the Palestinian, Lebanese and Iraqi markets.

The formation of the State of Israel enabled the USA to gain the upper hand in its long struggle for a redivision of spheres of interest in the Middle East. But this also marked the beginning of a further exacerbation of the contradictions between the USA and the old colonial powers—Britain and France—in the Middle East. These contradictions are mounting under conditions witnessing the third stage of the general crisis of capitalism and the downfall of the colonial system.

The role which the USA played in the creation of the State of Israel strengthened the ties between US imperialism and Israel's Zionist leaders. These ties, whose foundations were laid during the Yishuv period in Palestine, influenced Israel's economy, politics and ideology, in short, all aspects of her life.

5. Population of Israel from the Formation of the State to the End of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949

At the time the Balfour Declaration was made (November 1917) there were only 56,670 Jews in Palestine (census of 1916-1918). This was 10 per cent of the population. Five years later, in 1922, when Britain received the Mandate for Palestine, Jews comprised 11.1 per cent of the population.** In 1931 they comprised 16.8 per cent.***

It is necessary to bear in mind the composition and size of the population at the time the UN General As-

* I. A. Genin, *The Palestine Problem*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1948, p. 12.

** *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-1945*, Jerusalem, 1946, p. 16; *Government of Palestine. General Monthly Bulletin of Current Statistics*, September 1946, p. 431.

*** E. Mills, *Census of Palestine, 1931. Population of Villages, Towns and Administrative Areas*, Jerusalem, 1932.

sembly passed its decision (November 1947) on Palestine's partition into two states. The following table gives an idea of the size, distribution by religion and growth of the population according to the figures for December 1945 and November 1947* (in thousands):

	Total	Moslems (chiefly Arabs)	Jews	Christians (chiefly Druses)	Others
1922 Census	752.0	589.1	83.8	71.1	7.6
End of 1945	1,810.0	1,101.5	554.3	139.3	14.8
November 1947	1,845.0	1,237.0	608.0	...*	...*
Increment in 1945 over 1922	1,075.9	512.4	470.5	67.8	7.2
of which natural increment %	64.0	96.0	28.0	72.0	90.0
migration incre- ment %	36.0	4.0	72.0	28.0	10.0

* Under the heading: *All religions*.

The Jewish population in Palestine thus increased mainly through immigration. It was concentrated chiefly in the regions of Jaffa, Ramle and Haifa. In Galilee, later annexed by Israel, only 15.6 per cent of the population were Jews, and in the region of Beersheba, likewise occupied by Israel, only 2 per cent (including Gaza). In December 1948 Israel had a population of 867,000, of whom 759,000 were Jews and 108,000 Arabs.

The Arab-Israeli war led to a change of the composition, size and geographical distribution of the population (with the occupied territories, Israel embraced 77 per cent of Palestine). At the close of 1949 the population of Israel numbered 1,173,900, of whom 86.4 per cent were Jews and 13.6 per cent Arabs.

Thus, prior to the formation of Israel, the population of the northern region (Galilee) consisted of 84 per cent Arabs and 16 per cent Jews; in 1951 the population of this region was: 43.5 per cent Arabs and 56.1 per cent Jews. In the southern region (Beersheba) Jews had earlier com-

* *Statistical Abstract of Palestine, 1944-1945*, pp. 22-23.

prised 2 per cent of the population, while in 1951—79 per cent, the Arab population falling from 98 to 21 per cent. In Haifa, where in 1948 the population was predominantly Jewish, Arabs nevertheless comprised 38.1 per cent, while in 1951 only 6 per cent were Arabs.

The swiftest growth of the Jewish population in Israel was observed in the period from 1948 to 1951, chiefly through immigration (in thousands):*

	1948 (15.V)	1948	1949	1950	1951
		(end of year)			
Total	649.6	758.7	1,013.9	1,203.0	1,404.4
Population increment		109.1	255.2	189.1	201.4
Through immigration		101.8	239.0	169.4	173.9
%		93.3	93.6	89.5	86.3

The Jews who went to Palestine in the period from 1919 to 1948 came from: Europe—87.5 per cent; Asia and Africa—10.7 per cent; America—1.8 per cent. In 1948 local-born Jews comprised only 35 per cent of the Israeli population.** This is a relatively high figure, inasmuch as it includes children born in recent immigrant families. The three-year massive immigration into Israel ended in October 1951 mainly on account of the difficult economic situation. Moreover, "selective immigration" was introduced at the close of 1951.

* *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1959/60, 1960, No. 11, pp. 7-9.*

** Moshe Sicon, *Immigration to Israel, 1948-1953, Jerusalem, 1957, pp. 28, 31.*

1. Structure

Israel is a bourgeois republic with the division of power and formal bourgeois-democratic freedoms intrinsic to this form of government. In Israel, as in any other bourgeois state, the executive power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie, which enables the bourgeois leadership to use the state machine as a vehicle to strengthen its positions and govern, oppress and exploit the working people.

The reactionary, nationalistic ideology of Zionism predominating in Israel permeates all aspects of life, including the state apparatus, the bourgeois political parties and public organisations. In other words, painstakingly concealed behind a façade of parliamentary democracy reaction manifests itself not only vigorously but in the most subtle forms.

No written Constitution exists. There are so-called fundamental laws,* which determine the foundation of the state system, the division of power and the formation, structure and competence of the organs of state power. These laws are: Transition Law of February 16, 1949; Second Knesset Elections Law of April 12, 1951; State President (Tenure) Law of December 3, 1951; Knesset Elections

* The absence of a Constitution makes it easier for the ruling circles to pass all kinds of anti-democratic laws and introduce reactionary amendments into the existing legislation. The basic rights and freedoms of Israeli citizens are devoid of constitutional guarantees.

Law of February 17, 1955; Basic (Knesset) Law of February 12, 1958; Basic State President Law of June 16, 1965.*

It is claimed by the ruling circles that this absence of a written Constitution has been borrowed from British tradition. Actually, the Constitution that was drafted accorded fairly broad economic and social rights to the Israeli working people. This did not suit the ruling Zionist-bourgeois elite, with the result that the question of a Constitution was shelved and, as Yehezkel Dror notes, the official mind is that there is no need "to replace the present arrangement with a written formal Constitution".**

Legislative power is exercised by the Knesset, a one-chamber parliament consisting of 120 members elected for a four-year term. Suffrage is formally enjoyed by all citizens over the age of 18 (eligibility for election is attained at the age of 21). The electoral system is founded on proportional representation, the voting being conducted in accordance with party lists. The seats in the Knesset are distributed in accordance with the number of votes given for each of the party lists individually.

Knesset members, who must be Israeli citizens, enjoy immunity and various rights.*** Persons holding certain official posts, for example, the President, the State Inspector, judges, rabbis or the Chief of the General Staff, may not be Knesset members. The Knesset may be dissolved before the expiry of its term only by its own decision, in which case a special law is passed. However, a Knesset whose term has expired continues to function until the new Knesset is convened. The Knesset elects the President (and may relieve him of this post), approves the Government's composition, after endorsing its programme and political line, dissolves the Government in the event of a

* *Laws of the State of Israel, 5709—1949, Vol. III, pp. 3-4; 5711—1950/51, Vol. V, pp. 99-117; 5712—1951/52, Vol. VI, pp. 4-5; 5715—1954/55, Vol. IX, pp. 30-52; 5718—1957/58, Vol. XII, pp. 85-89; Israel Government Yearbook, 5725 (1964/65), p. 27.*

** Yehezkel Dror, "Structure and Working of the Israeli Government", *India Quarterly*, New Delhi, October-December 1960, Vol. XVI, No. 4, p. 321.

*** Under the Knesset Members (Immunity, Rights and Duties) Law of June 25, 1951; see *Laws of the State of Israel, 5711—1950/51, Vol. V, pp. 149-52.*

vote of no confidence, ratifies agreements, adopts the Budget, fixes taxes and so forth.

Legislation may be initiated by the Government, individual Knesset members or groups of members. In practice, however, bills initiated individually become laws only in exceptional cases.

Passed by a simple majority in the Knesset, laws come into force only after they are signed by the Prime Minister and the Minister responsible for their execution, sanctioned by the President, and published (within ten days) in *Reshumot*, the official gazette.

The agenda for Knesset proceedings is proposed by the Government without consulting the Opposition.

The Opposition is represented by several parties, each of which usually acts on its own. Upon reaching temporary agreement the Opposition parties can compel the Government to resign, but they cannot form the alternative Government. The Communist Opposition group uses the Knesset to expose the anti-popular policies of the ruling circles.

Although formally the Knesset has wide prerogatives, it does not control the Government in key spheres such as foreign policy and military questions. The Western researcher Scott D. Johnston says that the government occupies a controlling position also in legislation.*

The Knesset has standing committees in whose hands most of the work is concentrated; the posts in these committees are distributed in accordance with the influence enjoyed by the parties represented in the parliament. Nonetheless, the ruling circles have barred the Communist group from the key security, foreign affairs and finance committees. Relative to these committees a limited representation rule has been established under which only those parties may be represented which have at least eight seats in the Knesset. This rule was laid down expressly "to keep the Communist deputies out of the two committees with access to confidential security information".**

* Scott D. Johnston, "Party Politics and Coalition Cabinets in the Knesset of Israel", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, New York, Vol. XIII, No. 5, 1962, p. 133.

** Marver H. Bernstein, *The Politics of Israel. The First Decade of Statehood*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1957, p. 98.

The state is headed by a President elected by the Knesset for a term of five years. However, even bourgeois authors find that "Israel's President is purely a formal head of State". His functions are mostly of a representative nature. He has the right to nominate the candidate for the premiership but cannot veto the passage of a law. In the sphere of foreign relations he signs international agreements, appoints diplomatic and consular representatives (on the recommendation of the Foreign Minister) and receives foreign diplomatic representatives. In home affairs he appoints the State Inspector, has the right to grant amnesties, appoints the judges of the Supreme Court and of the courts of other instances, accepts the resignation of the Government, and signs all the laws passed by the Knesset with the exception of laws concerning his own competence.

Actually, in Israel all the power is in the hands of the Government. This highest organ of executive authority is formally subordinated and responsible to the Knesset. Every new Government must receive a vote of confidence in the Knesset and resign in the event a motion of no confidence is carried. The Government is formed, by commission of the President, by the leader of the party with the majority of the seats in the Knesset. Ministers (including the Prime Minister) may be members or non-members of the Knesset. There is no limitation on the numerical composition of the Government. Ministers may appoint one or two deputies with the transfer to them of part of the functions within their competence. The Government has the right to vest all or most of its authority and competence in the Prime Minister or individual Ministers. A Government that has resigned remains in office until a new Government is formed.

The Government directs foreign policy, draws up the Budget, controls the country's finances and economy, determines military policy, supervises the fulfilment of laws and Government decisions by administrative agencies and co-ordinates their operations. The Israeli author Benjamin Akzin clearly shows the division of power in Israel. He writes: "...since the Cabinet is generally composed of the

* Marver H. Bernstein, *Op. cit.*, p. 144.

leaders of the parties forming the majority in the Knesset, it is also the body that guides and directs the work of the Knesset itself. Thus, both as regards the executive powers vested in the Cabinet and as regards the powers belonging to the legislative body, the supreme direction of national affairs is, to all intents and purposes, in the hands of the Cabinet."

Emergency legislation ("delegated legislation") is another vehicle giving the Government enormous power. Official Israeli circles themselves admit that in practice the Government "may enact urgent legislation in the form of emergency regulations".** Application of the principle of collective responsibility of the Government members gives the Prime Minister (since the numerical composition of the Government is not established constitutionally) exceptionally wide powers, enabling him to compel the resignation of objectionable or dissentient Ministers, or change the Government at his discretion.

A Basic Law passed in 1949 and reaffirmed in the programmes of all the Governments since 1951 makes the Government collectively responsible to the Knesset.

Under this principle, on the one hand, the Government is collectively responsible to the Knesset and, on the other, individual Ministers have to abide by a Government majority decision even when they disagree with that decision. Ministers must have the Government's sanction to vote in the Knesset against Government majority decisions or to abstain from voting, otherwise they have to resign before voting in the Knesset. In the Government programme of January 12, 1966, the individual responsibility of a Minister for his vote in the Knesset was extended to responsibility for the voting of the Minister's party group in the Knesset. Moreover, the Government is the sole body determining the questions on which freedom to vote or to abstain from voting is granted.

In a coalition Government the discipline imposed by the coalition greatly extends the powers of the Prime Min-

* Benjamin Akzin, "The Structure of Government in Israel", *Public Administration in Israel and Abroad*, 1960. An Annual Collection of Translations from Hebrew Articles, Jerusalem, 1961, p. 8.

** *State of Israel. Government Yearbook 5711 (1950)*, Jerusalem, 1950, p. 62.

ister and of the majority party represented by him. These powers become particularly discretionary in view of the Prime Minister's essentially unlimited possibility of using the right to resign, which automatically leads to the resignation of the Government.

As we have noted, the absence of a law establishing the Government's numerical composition and the possibility of increasing the powers of individual Ministers and, particularly, of the Prime Minister, give the governing party an effective means of exerting political pressure. This has grown into a source of a bitter struggle between the parties and of backstage manipulations in the coalition Governments. This struggle comes to the surface when a new Government is formed, when the Prime Minister holds preliminary talks with representatives of the other parties in the Knesset. The Prime Minister has the final say in the distribution of ministerial portfolios on an inter-party basis when the Government and its programme are submitted for approval by the Knesset.

This concentration of executive power is particularly evident in the functions of the Government's standing committees. To use the evidence of Yehezkel Dror, the Government is the "central (integrated) policy-making organ; especially important in this respect are the Government committees, to which significant authority has been delegated by the Government, and which operate as central co-ordinating machineries on economic policy, legislation, etc."* In emergencies the Prime Minister has the right to form *ad hoc* committees, heading most of them. Such committees are set up to look into questions such as acts of terrorism, strikes, a threat to the nation's security, military policy, and breaches of coalition unity in the Government. By invoking the prerogatives given him by his office and by the majority party headed by him, the Prime Minister can thus form "mini-Governments" in the Government and delegate Government affairs to them.

With the Government wielding immense power, State Inspector appointed by the President for a term of five years and formally accountable to the Knesset plays only a nominal role. His powers to exercise supreme and in-

* Yehezkel Dror, *Op. cit.*, p. 324.

dependent control, particularly over the country's finances, are in fact only a screen for the activities of the Government.

Let us again try to trace how Israel's ruling élite exercises unrestricted power. Joseph Badi, for instance, has drawn a diagram showing how under Ben Gurion power was exercised through an "unofficial system". This was a chain of authority consisting of 12 links: 1) Ben Gurion; 2) Havéreyanu—a non-official group of Ben Gurion's inner circle, consisting of Mapai Ministers and the Mapai Secretary General (i. e., of the party represented by Ben Gurion), and also of the Secretary General of the Histadrut, the Mapai-influenced central trade union organisation; 3) the Secretariat General of Mapai; 4) the Central Committee of Mapai; 5) the Mapai leadership in the Knesset; 6) the Mapai faction in the Knesset; 7) the coalition leadership in the Knesset; 8) the Central Committee of the Histadrut; 9) the Presidium of the Knesset; 10) the Coalition Government, with Mapai holding the majority of the ministries; 11) the coalition majority in the Knesset; and 12) the Civil Service, with most of its key positions in Mapai's hands.

This brings Badi round to the conclusion that "through this chain of command Ben Gurion virtually controls the entire life of Israel".*

There is every justification for writing that the "most important issues—war and peace, relations between Israel and the imperialist countries, questions of foreign policy generally—are decided not by Parliament and not even by the Government as a whole, but by the military clique closely associated with the ex-premier Ben Gurion".**

The pattern of the period of British rule in Palestine underlies the administrative structure in Israel.*** There are three kinds of local authorities: municipal corporations, local councils and rural district councils. On De-

* Joseph Badi, *Op. cit.*, p. 177.

** *World Marxist Review*, January 1964, Vol. 1, No. 1, p. 24.

*** See, for instance, Edwin Samuel, *British Traditions in the Administration of Israel*, London, 1957, p. 14. On British traditions in Israel's state administration and on the question of a Constitution also see L. F. Rushbrook Williams, *The State of Israel*, London, 1957, pp. 150, 152, 153.

ember 31, 1967 there were 26 municipalities (24 Jewish), 114 local councils (76 Jewish) and 47 district councils comprising 683 villages (666 Jewish).*

The legal system is represented by secular and religious courts. As the highest appellate court and the high court of justice, the Supreme Court handles cases concerning members of the Government and the top echelon in the Civil Service without, however, having the right to adjudge the actions of the Government as illegal.

The area courts are appellate courts of first instance; the lower courts are the magistrate and municipal courts. The rabbinical courts have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and the family, and in religious matters. They function on the basis of the ancient Talmudic laws that humiliate human dignity and are of a highly reactionary nature. The fact that the essentially reactionary laws of the Rabbinate are broadly applied is mentioned by Shabtai Rosenne, of Israel, who writes: "Whenever our experts find in Jewish law a provision which we can adapt to the needs of our modern . . . country, we give it priority over the provisions of other law systems."** Moreover, there are Moslem (functioning on the basis of the Shariat) and Christian religious courts, and special military courts.

Israel's voluminous and steadily expanding legislation*** mirrors the intricate mechanism of a developed bureaucratic state machine. The large number of emergency laws bears out the expansionist nature of Israel's foreign policy and shows the monopoly concentration of power in the hands of the Government. Since no Constitution exists in Israel, but only a number of organic laws, a sharp political struggle rages over the determination of the nature of laws, i.e., over the breakdown of laws into basic, ordinary, extraordinary and so forth.

* *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1968, No. 19, pp. 32-33.

** Shabtai Rosenne, *The Constitutional and Legal System of Israel*, New York, October 1957, p. 11. The fundamentals of Jewish law are studied as a compulsory subject at the Law Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

*** The Provisional State Council passed 98 laws, the First Knesset 231, the Second 281 and the Third 292.

The absence of a Constitution opens the door wide for political arbitrary rule and all sorts of lawlessness and abuse of power by the Israeli rulers.

2. Classes in Israeli Society

In line with Zionist theory, Israel's ruling élite claims that no antagonistic classes or antagonistic class contradictions exist in Israel, maintaining that a harmony of class interests reigns in Israeli society. Official propaganda holds that Israel is a homogeneous Jewish state, whose unity rests on the "historical and specific mission" and "general tasks" of Jewry as a whole. Therefore, it argues, in Israel society is not and cannot be divided into antagonistic classes: the Israelis are brothers in blood, brothers in origin, in other words, a united people, while "Israel is a society of workers", and so on and so forth.

An effort to substantiate the reactionary idea that Israel is a classless Jewish state was made, for example, by David Ben Gurion, former leader of the governing Mapai Party. In the foreword to the *Government Yearbook* for 1961/1962 he wrote: "There has never been a feudal class amongst us; on the contrary, it is our pleasant and progressive tradition that all the children of Israel are sons of kings."* He described capitalist Israel as "a society of workers, reliant on the labour of hand and brain, without exploitation, deprivation or discrimination".**

The spirit of this Zionist propaganda is sustained not only in Israel. Edwin Samuel, for instance, writes: "The Welfare State presupposes a one-class society."*** The American researcher M. Roshwald argues that "it is hardly possible to speak of social classes in Israel in the sense attached to this term in Western Europe".****

However, while trying to prove the social integrity of Israeli society, bourgeois authors have to acknowledge the existence of definite leading groups. For all his arguments,

* David Ben Gurion, "Achievements and Tasks of Our Generation", *Israel Government Yearbook* 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. LIX.

** *Ibid.*, p. LXII.

*** E. Samuel, *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

**** M. Roshwald, "Political Parties and Social Classes in Israel", *Social Research*, July 1956, p. 201.

Edwin Samuel, whom we quoted above, had to admit that "an administrative class is slowly coming into existence and securing adequate differentials".* Yehezkel Dror, also quoted above, is more emphatic on this point, writing: "...the political élite become more recognised and defined, contacts between the political élite and other sectors of the population become more formalised."** An unbiased assessment of the situation in Israel was made by the British author S. Alexander, who wrote as early as 1949 about a growing consciousness of class division and antagonism amongst the people of Israel.***

Social differentiation and also the concentration of wealth in the hands of the minority with the simultaneous impoverishment of the majority are progressing swiftly in Israel.

According to the classification accepted in Israeli statistics, 50 per cent of the national income comprises the wages and salaries of the employed population. This corresponds to the individual income within the limits of the minimum cost of living. However, if we take into account dependents (roughly 10 per cent of the total number of employed) and exclude civil servants who usually have a slightly higher salary, we shall find that the income of those directly engaged in production usually falls short of the cost of living.

The other half of the national income is accounted for by entrepreneurs, artisans and members of co-operatives (moshavei ovdim) and kibbutzim. The incomes of the small artisans are usually very inconsiderable. The tenant-farmers in the agricultural co-operatives are mostly working peasants whose incomes at best do not exceed the cost of production. Lastly, the kibbutzniks cannot in fact be taken into account because the lion's share of their income remains in the safes of a small group of leaders of the kibbutz movement. Consequently, half of Israel's national income is made up mainly of the revenues of a small group of capitalists, who do not directly participate in the production process. In 1963 this group comprised 11,000

* E. Samuel, Op. cit., p. 28.

** Yehezkel Dror, Op. cit., p. 316.

*** S. Alexander, "Developing Class Struggles in Israel", *World News and Views*, Vol. 29, No. 21, May 21, 1949, p. 242.

people. In other words, most of the country's national wealth belongs to a handful of bankers, industrialists, big farmers and kibbutz leaders, and also to foreign monopolies.

The following figures, given in percentages, show the share of the taxes (including income taxes) paid by the main groups of tax-payers in 1963/64:*

Self-employed	34.9
Companies	23.9
Employed	41.2

In other words, the capitalists pay less than one-fourth of the taxes.

The Government's practice of according substantial subsidies and, in some cases, the entire needed capital to industrialists, including foreign industrialists, and, above all, its policy of granting all sorts of privileges to monopoly, chiefly American, capital are to a large extent promoting the growth and strengthening of the big bourgeoisie. The top echelon in the administration is recruited from the big bourgeoisie. The interests of the Government closely intertwine with those of private local and foreign capital and this has a definite influence on the official home and foreign policy.

Lately, the Israeli middle bourgeoisie has markedly gained in strength and been showing a tendency towards more independence from foreign capital. However, it is still dependent on Government credits and, in the long run, on overseas credits. This is slowing down its development. In the sphere of export its possibilities are restricted by the high cost of production and inadequate markets, thus making it more dependent on Government grants-in-aid.

The working people consist of the working class, small holders and tenant farmers and the working intelligentsia (workers by brain, civil servants and people in the liberal professions). In the struggle against monopoly domination the artisans and the small shopkeepers are joining the working class, the working farmers and the working intelligentsia.

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5725 (1964/65), December 1964, p. 144.

A point to be stressed again is that Israeli society is divided into antagonistic classes. The ruling élite is doing everything to obstruct the growth of the class struggle with measures such as turning the trade unions into state agencies. To some extent the class struggle is hindered by the fact that a large section of the immigrants, particularly from European countries, consists of middle- and petty-bourgeois elements. This also gives rise to opportunist tendencies.

The 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel had full grounds for stating: "The realities of the situation in Israel are the following: the swift pace of capitalist development as well as the policy deliberately pursued by the Government have led to accelerated social polarisation. On the one hand, the formation of a small stratum of millionaires making super-profits and getting richer every day, and, on the other, the impoverishment of the working class and all working and popular strata accompanied by the creation of a large distressed section of the population living in extreme poverty. This process of enrichment of the rich and impoverishment of the toiler has been particularly stepped up in recent years."^{*}

3. Political Parties

The system of political parties mirrors the alignment of class forces. A feature of political life in Israel is the existence of a large number of parties. For instance, at the 1959 Knesset elections there were 26 party electoral lists, while at the 1965 elections there were 17. The Communist Party, which champions the interests of the Israeli working people, is the only party pursuing a Marxist line. Uniting Jews and Arabs in its ranks, it has been for decades a model of friendship and co-operation on a class basis between these two principal peoples of Israel. So-called labour parties include Mapam, Achdut Ha'avoda (a Right-wing organisation) and the social-reformist Mapai, the principal ruling party. In 1965, Rafi (Israel Labour List)

^{*} *The Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress* (31.V-3.VI.1961, Tel Aviv-Jaffa), pp. 57-58.

emerged from Mapai as an ultra-Right organisation. In 1968, Mapai, Achdut Ha'avoda and Rafi merged to form Mai (Israel Labour Party). The Liberal Party, the Independent Labour Party, the extremist fascist Herut and the religious parties are bourgeois organisations.

All these parties (with the exception of two orthodox religious parties) are Zionist.

In addition, there are three small Arab parties.

Bourgeois authors attribute the existence of this large number of political parties to the "cultural and linguistic diversity within the international Zionist movement... Zionists were also divided between varying shades of secularists and orthodox religious Jews."^{**} Robert F. Lamberg, of West Germany, speaks also of "socio-political factors" determining the party structure in Israel. These factors, he says, include immigration and religious influences not only in specific and social interests but also in inner-party political life.^{**}

The large number of political parties reflects, above all, the class heterogeneity of the social pattern. Moreover, the main parties were formed and began to function long before Israel was created. Also of significance is the circumstance that since 1948 there has been considerable immigration from different countries and different social strata, and these immigrants constitute "the huge majority of the voting population".^{***}

Many bourgeois authors characterise Israel as a "party state". Alfred Sherman, of the USA, for instance, quite rightly says that all aspects of life in Israel are "politicised and 'partified'".^{****} People find that formal party membership is the only way to enjoy benefits and conveniences.^{*****} The Zionist parties influence political and social life, some of them controlling economic, public and cultural organisations, thereby giving their leaders weight in the everyday life of Israeli citizens, particularly in the decision of

^{*} Marver H. Bernstein, *Op. cit.*, p. 54.

^{**} Robert F. Lamberg, "Die politischen Parteien Israels", *Politische Studien*, Munich, January 1961, No. 129, p. 21.

^{***} Oscar Kraines, *Op. cit.*, p. 61.

^{****} Alfred Sherman, "Israeli Socialism and the Multi-Party System", *The World Today*, London, Volume 17, No. 5, May 1961, pp. 218, 220.

^{*****} Marver H. Bernstein, *Op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

questions like employment, housing and so forth. As a result, one-fourth of Israel's voting population are formally party members. On the basis of Zionism the ruling elite can usually maintain relative political stability.

The differences between the Zionist parties and their leaderships do not, as a rule, go beyond the framework of home policy, and chiefly concern over spheres of political influence. Moreover, their basic programme demands are similar. For instance, in economic policy they are agreed on the question of attracting foreign private capital, US capital in particular. In foreign policy there is no disagreement, for example, on the question of consolidating relations between Israel and the USA, or on the question of intensifying expansionist plans relative to the Arab countries (this is borne out by the unprovoked aggression against Arab countries in June 1967). In the ideological field they preach nationalism which hamstrings the class struggle of the working masses.

The Israeli Zionist parties are a component of the international Zionist movement. The World Zionist Organisation, the American Oscar Kraines notes, actively "encouraged the formation of parties in support of Zionism".* The Zionist parties in Israel co-operate with "Jewish communities abroad" with the aim of receiving aid from them ostensibly for the promotion of immigration and the establishment of settlements. Most of these parties receive financial aid from Zionist and Jewish organisations abroad and have agencies in the capitalist countries. They are thus the channel providing contact with reactionary international Zionist elements, who act in solidarity with imperialism and neo-colonialism.

Let us briefly review the social nature, programmes and activities of the various political parties in Israel.

Ever since its foundation in 1948, the Communist Party of Israel has been in the centre of Israel's political life, resolutely fighting for the working people's interests in home and foreign policy and supporting the national liberation struggle of the Arab peoples. It is guided by the "unshakable ideological, political and organisational principles, stemming from the inexhaustible fount of

* Oscar Kraines, Op. cit., p. 63.

creative Marxism-Leninism".* It wages a struggle against the Israeli brand of Right reformism and opportunism, demands that Israel cease following in the wake of the imperialist powers, and presses for national independence, a neutralist policy, a just, peaceful settlement of Arab-Israeli relations, equal rights for the Arab community in Israel, and improved relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.** The Israeli Communists regard the struggle for democracy as part and parcel of the struggle for socialism. They make it clear that they uphold the right of the Arab population of Palestine to self-determination and favour the peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues in the Middle East. The CPI "advocates the nationalisation of the big foreign monopolies and of Israel's national wealth in natural resources".***

These programme aims were formulated at the CPI's 14th Congress in June 1961, and reaffirmed by the 16th Congress which sat from January 30 to February 1, 1969. The latter congress assessed the situation in Israel itself and in the Middle East, showed the reasons behind the Arab-Israeli conflict and denounced the aggression that was unleashed by the Israeli rulers in June 1967. It defined the CPI's tactics and its tasks (including the task of averting another war and creating an anti-imperialist front). It reasserted the Party's basic programme proposition—the creation of a socialist system of administration in Israel—and passed a resolution under the heading "The Jewish Question and Zionism in Our Day", which exposes the dangerous character of the bourgeois-nationalist ideology and policy of Zionism, which has been placed entirely in the service of imperialism.****

After the 14th Congress (and until 1962) the CPI membership increased 24 per cent,***** while since 1966, i. e., after the split in the party, the membership has risen 12.5 per cent. At the Knesset elections the CPI's backing grew from 15,148 votes in 1949 to 42,111 votes in 1961.

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 129.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 109-10.

*** *Who's Who in Israel, 1965*, Tel Aviv, January 1965, p. 673.

**** "Materials of the 16th Congress", Tel Aviv, 30th January-1st February, 1969, *Information Bulletin*, 1969, No. 3-4, Special Issue, pp. a, 36, 72, 186-214.

***** *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 5, June 1962, No. 6, p. 39.

A split occurred in the CPI in May 1965 with the breakaway of the Mikunis-Sneh group. This split was chiefly due to the aggravation of the political situation in the country as a result of bourgeois-nationalist and Zionist passions. This affected the views of vacillating elements in the CPI making them depart from Marxist class and internationalist positions.

The Mikunis-Sneh group embraced undisguised nationalism, and in June 1967 made common cause with the Israeli ruling circles in the aggression against the Arab countries. Its newspaper, *Kol Ha'am*, prints anti-Soviet propaganda.

Headed by Meir Vilner, Secretary of the CC Political Bureau, the Communist Party of Israel firmly adheres to Marxist-Leninist positions.

Its press organs are the weekly *Zu Haderech*, the newspaper *Al-Ittihad* and the journals *Information Bulletin* and *Der Weg*.

Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda, which style themselves social-democratic, Left-Zionist parties, propagate Zionism, ignore the class interests of the Israeli working people and pursue a policy of conciliation with the Israeli nationalist and monopoly élite. Setting class solidarity at naught, they have shut the door on the Communist Party and refused to form a united workers' front. Moreover, their leaderships, particularly that of Achdut Ha'avoda, have closed ranks with the bourgeois parties and also with Mapai on the basis of anti-communism.

In line with the misguided thesis that influence must be brought to bear on the Israeli Government from within, Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda have taken part in Mapai-headed coalition governments. For many years the Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda leaders have served as "Left-wing" cover for the Ben Gurion Cabinet.* These parties were in the Coalition Government formed in 1965 and then in 1970. In fact, they have become menials of the Israeli ruling élite with its dangerous pro-imperialist, expansionist policy of further undermining the country's economic and political independence. The aims pursued by the

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 125.

reformist and opportunist leaderships of Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda have nothing in common with the interests of the overwhelming majority of these parties' members, who are working people.*

Mapam (Mifleget Hapoalim Hameuchedet or United Workers' Party) was formed in 1948 as a result of the merging together of three Left-wing workers' Zionist parties: Hashomer Hatzair (Young Guard), Achdut Ha'avoda (Unity of Labour) and Poalei Zion Smol (Left Workers of Zion). Prior to the proclamation of the State of Israel Mapam was called Hashomer Hatzair and tried to adapt some Marxist principles to Zionism, advocated the creation of a bi-national Jewish-Arab state in Palestine and adopted a friendly attitude to the Soviet Union. In the initial years after the State of Israel was proclaimed Mapam's demands were of a democratic nature: nationalisation of private enterprises, renunciation of the policy of subordinating the country's interests to US monopoly capital, and normalisation of relations with the Arab countries. But then, degenerating into conciliation, it in effect renounced these demands.

Mapam advocates "a regime of progress and economic planning to further the absorption of new immigrants in the native land of the Jewish people" and "the formation of a united labour front at the head of a coalition government".** Its conciliatory attitudes, equivocation and inconsistency are the reason for the declarative nature of its programme. In words, it demands, for instance, equality for the Arab community and the abolition of the military regime in the Arab settlements in Israel. But on account of its co-operation in the Coalition Government, which proclaimed a "firm Zionist" line, the Arabs, as even bourgeois authors find, "have hardly responded to Mapam's appeals".***

In 1967, as a component of the Coalition Government, Mapam took part in the June aggression against Arab countries. Mapam's bloc with Mai (Israel Labour Party) in January 1969 was the logical outcome of its entire policy.

* *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 119.

** *Who's Who in Israel, 1965*, p. 672.

*** Oscar Kraines, *Op. cit.*, p. 69.

For Mapam this signified its elimination as a political factor and its total discrediting in the eyes of the working people.

Mapam, it must be noted, has its own "theory" about the class struggle, maintaining that in Israel the chief role is played by rural workers—kibbutzniks—who must give leadership to the urban proletariat. Zionist ideas, which Mapam shares, are expounded in its new *Political Platform*,* adopted in 1959, in which it is stated that Mapam is part of the international Zionist movement and should be active in the national Zionist movements of all countries. Mapam has a number of printed organs, including the newspaper *Al Hamishmar* and the weekly *Israel Stimme*. Its General Secretary is Meir Ya'ari.

Achdut Ha'avoda (Unity of Labour) was formed in 1946 by the fusion of two parties: Gatnula Leachdut Ha'avoda (Movement for Labour Unity), which until 1944 was the Left wing of Mapai, and Poalei Zion Smol (Left Workers of Zion). In 1948 Achdut Ha'avoda merged with Mapam, but in 1954 it again came forward as an independent party. It is a Left-Zionist petty-bourgeois organisation, which, like Mapam, preaches Zionist socialism with, unlike Mapam, a heavier accent on nationalism. Its motto, "active self-defence"*** relative to the Arab countries, brought its leadership into one and the same camp with Israel's bourgeois rulers in a programme of expansion. Achdut Ha'avoda is hostile to the Soviet Union.

Lately, this party has been moving steadily towards social-reformism, becoming a tributary of Mapai ideologically and politically. There is little to choose between their policies.*** Achdut Ha'avoda's national conference in May 1961 showed that the leadership was bent on turning the party into a modified variant of Mapai and ultimately fusing with it.**** The fusion took place in 1968. Merged with Mapai and Rafi, Achdut Ha'avoda openly displayed its nationalism. Its printed organs are the news-

* *Platform of the World Union of Mapam (Mapam-Left Poalei Zion-Hashomer Hatzair)*, Tel Aviv, August 1959, pp. 8-10; *Who's Who in Israel*, 1960, p. 613.

** *Who's Who in Israel*, 1965, p. 670.

*** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 127.

**** *Ibid.*

paper *Lamerhav* and the weekly *Folksblat*. Its General Secretary is Israel Bar-Yehuda.

The main ruling party with the largest membership is Mapai, which calls itself a labour party but is actually a social-reformist, Right-Zionist organisation. Mapai (Mif-leet Poalei Erets Israel—Labour Party of Israel) was founded in 1930 through the merging of the Zionist Ha-poel Hatzair (Young Worker) and Poalei Zion (Workers of Zion), which subscribed to the nationalistic ideas of the Bund. It was active during the Yishuv period in Palestine, and since 1939 has been prominent in the international Zionist movement.

After the creation of the State of Israel Mapai quite easily took over the key posts in the country's administration. Since then it has been the leading party in the Government coalition. As a rule, the head of Government is the Mapai leader. Defence, foreign affairs, finance and other key ministries are likewise headed by Mapai members. State policy on major issues is charted by Mapai political circles. In its programme Mapai calls itself a labour and socialist party. The third session of its 9th Convention in October 1963 was devoted to "a restatement of the basic socialist ideas of Mapai".* At the 10th Convention in February 1965 its former General Secretary Reuven Barkat "emphasised that Mapai's fundamental aim was a socialist society in Israel, and the party would utilise government and public means to reduce the gap between the various income groups".**

In bourgeois literature Mapai is characterised as a socialist Zionist party working for "a state-planned economy based on the development of the co-operative sector in co-ordination with the development of constructive private enterprise".*** Edwin Samuel writes that "Mapai frankly puts nationalism before Marxism".**** Oscar Kraines was closer to the truth when he called it an opportunist, "non-Marxist socialist Zionist party". Roshwald

* *Socialist International Information*, London, Vol. XIII, November 2, 1963, No. 44, p. 639.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, February 17, 1965.

*** *Israel Background*, Washington, 1954, p. 6.

**** Edwin Samuel, *Problems of Government in the State of Israel*, Jerusalem, 1956, p. 6.

says that both Mapai's leadership and ideology are becoming petty-bourgeois and that its top echelon is recruited from a relatively well-to-do social stratum.* Some bourgeois authors, for instance, A. Shermann characterise Mapai as combining a party and 'establishment'*** and as uniting the ruling classes with the working masses. The purpose of these characterisations is to conceal the real substance of this pro-bourgeois party.

Actually, as was justifiably stressed at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel, what characterises Mapai is that as the ruling party it pursues an anti-national and anti-working-class policy in the interests of imperialism and in the interests of monopoly capital—foreign and local.*** While declaring that they are a centre force, the Mapai leaders are consolidating their alliance with the Right-wing bourgeois parties, particularly in an aggressive foreign policy. After the aggression of June 1967 the Mapai leadership intensified its abetment of international Zionism. Their motto is "that every effort must be made to attract investment capital from abroad".**** Mapai uses its coalition with Left-wing Zionist parties as a screen for an anti-national domestic policy. This party bears the direct responsibility for the aggression against Arab countries in 1956 and 1967.

Mapai's numerical strength grew rapidly during the period of massive immigration (1948-1951). As the governing party, it has considerable means of compulsion, giving handouts and brainwashing the population, particularly new immigrants. The higher officials, the top military, the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the workers' aristocracy are broadly represented in Mapai, which currently has 200,000 members. No convention was held between 1949 and 1956 and "party control became highly centralised and undemocratic".***** All power is in the hands of the Secretariat. In the World Zionist Organisation, Mapai and its associated member parties of the Ihud

* M. Roshwald, Op. cit., pp. 209, 217.

** A. Shermann, Op. cit., p. 221.

*** Communist Party of Israel. *The 14th Congress*, p. 114.

**** *Who's Who in Israel, 1955*, Tel Aviv, p. 370.

***** Marver H. Bernstein, Op. cit., p. 62.

Olami (World Union of Zionist Socialist Parties) hold 34 per cent of the mandates.*

The third session of Mapai's 9th Convention, the Israeli newspaper *Naroden Glas* reported, distinctly showed that there were two pronounced wings in the party.** In July 1965 this led to the withdrawal from the party of the extreme Right militarist minority group headed by Ben Gurion (after its formal expulsion by the Mapai leadership this group formed the Rafi [Israel Labour List] party).

Recent developments indicate that Mapai has swung farther to the Right. Its leadership is bent on establishing a dictatorship and has started an offensive on the remnants of democratic freedoms.

The following Marxist assessment of present-day social-reformism fully applies to Mapai: "Modern Right-wing Social-Democracy remains the bourgeoisie's principal ideological and political mainstay in the working-class movement."**** Mapai's printed organs include the weekly *Hapoel Hatzair*, the journal *Molad* and the newspapers *L'Information* and *Vieta Noastra*. In 1968 Mapai was incorporated in Mai (Israel Labour Party) with Pinhas Sapir as General Secretary.

Rafi (Rishimat Poalei Israel), formed in July 1965 by the Mapai Right wing, existed until 1968. "The emergence of Rafi," the journal *The Israel Economist* wrote, "has... strengthened the forces opposed to Left-wing policies".**** In fact this was a group of arch-reactionary politicians led by Israel's former Prime Minister David Ben Gurion. Its programme, adopted in October 1965, combined Israeli social-reformism with bellicose Zionism and unconcealed militarism. The programme demands included: 1) a bigger military potential and the build-up of a strike force with the utilisation of all technological and scientific achievements and the spending of one per cent of the national income for the promotion of technology and science; 2) the institution of a majority system to

* *Who's Who in Israel, 1965*, p. 87.

** *Naroden Glas*, October 24, 1963.

*** *22nd Congress of the CPSU*, Verbatim Report, Russ. ed., Vol. III, Moscow, 1962, p. 268.

**** *The Israel Economist*, September 1965, p. 124.

supplant the existing electoral system based on proportional representation.*

According to *The Jerusalem Post*, Rafi had 20,000 members. Amalgamated with Mai in 1968, it was bitterly opposed to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its General Secretary was Shimon Peres.

Of the bourgeois parties, the largest is the Liberal Party, formed in March 1961 as a result of a merger between the General Zionist and Progressive parties. The General Zionist Party (Mifleget Hatzionim Haklalim) was founded in 1907 by Chaim Weizmann. Representing big capital, it is an arch-conservative political organisation. After Israel was created it demanded maximum opportunities for private enterprise, opposed any government control of the economy and advocated the broadest enlistment of foreign capital and the promotion of relations with the West. During the aggression against Egypt in 1956 and against the Arab countries in 1967 it propounded extreme nationalism, aligning itself with the ultra-nationalist, extreme Right-wing Herut Party. It acts on the principle that Israel cannot exist without being the source of the spread of Zionism,** and has close ties with the association of industrialists, big businessmen, real estate magnates and owners of citrus plantations.***

The Progressive Party emerged in 1918 from the General Zionist Party and called itself Aliya Hadasha (New Immigration). This numerically small party owed its influence to the fact that its membership included prominent Zionist leaders. It also represented big capital but, as distinct from the General Zionist Party, it used a more liberal phraseology and showed more moderation in foreign policy. It is claimed that "the Progressive Party sought a middle road between private enterprise and socialism".**** However, a more objective appraisal is that this party "rejects the class struggle and asserts the supremacy of national over class interests".*****

* *The Jerusalem Post*, October 3, 1965.

** *Who's Who in Israel, 1955*, p. 370.

*** K. Ivanov, Z. Sheinis, *The State of Israel, Its Position and Politics*, 2nd Russ. ed., Moscow, p. 113. See *Ibid.* on Israeli parties.

**** Joseph Badi, *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

***** Oscar Kraines, *Op. cit.*, p. 76.

The same applies to the present Liberal Party and the Independent Liberal Party, which separated from it in March 1965. The emergence of the Liberal Party stemmed first and foremost from the basic needs and interests of the Israeli big bourgeoisie, who are inextricably bound with the interests of foreign monopoly capital.* During the period of its organisation it adopted a liberal Manifesto demanding some improvement of relations with East-European countries in order to camouflage its real programme and, particularly, counter Ma-pai.**

In the mid-1960s the Liberal Party openly strengthened its ties with the ultra-nationalists in the Herut Party by joining, in May 1965, Herut in a bloc (Gahal), whose programme envisages unlimited opportunities for private enterprise, the country's further militarisation, the placing of the President at the head of the armed forces, and so on.*** Today, alongside the Herut Party the Liberal Party openly calls for the creation of a "Greater Israel". Prior to its bloc with the Herut Movement the Liberal Party had about 60,000 members. Its mouthpiece is the newspaper *Haboker*.

The Independent Liberal Party was formerly the Left wing of the Liberal Party. The split was caused by the Liberal Party's intention to form a bloc with Herut. The small Independent Liberal Party likewise champions the interests of big capital.

The bourgeois ultra-extremist, ultra-nationalist and pro-fascist Herut Party (Tenuat Ha'heruth or Freedom Movement) was formed in 1925 by a revisionist group in the World Zionist Organisation. It upheld big capital interests in Palestine, demanded the creation of a Jewish state on both banks of the Jordan and was opposed to the partitioning of Palestine. In 1948 Herut incorporated the Irgun Tsvai Leumi and Stern Yang terrorist groups. In 1950 it entered the World Union Herut-Hatzohar, which united the Zionist revisionist organisations in the Diaspora. Its programme may be summed up as follows: the

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 122.

** Carl L. Guggmos, "BG Schach geboten", *Vorwärts*, Bonn, May 24, 1961, p. 9.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, April 28, 1965.

right of the Jewish people to the territory of Israel in its "historical boundaries" is immutable and inalienable; the re-creation of the Jewish nation in the land of its forefathers; the day-to-day life of the Jews is to be guided by the Torah.* It called for a preventive war against the Arabs, and since 1967 has been against a peaceful settlement of the conflict with the Arab countries.

Herut has the direct backing of the big industrial and finance magnates. To maintain the party's prestige its leaders have lately begun to camouflage their aims. Hence the Herut-Liberal bloc. Herut has 43,000 members and its printed organs are the newspaper *Herut Daily* and the journals *Al Hurriya* and *La Liberté*. The party's General Secretary is M. Begin.

Bourgeois interests are championed also by clerical parties: the Orthodox Zionist Misrahi and Hapoel Hamizrahi and the ultra-Orthodox non-Zionist Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel parties.** The first two are distinguished from the latter chiefly by their Zionist ideological orientation. The programme of each has its own shades, but all are clearly reactionary. Misrahi and Hapoel Hamizrahi united in 1956 to form the National Religious Front. Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel form the Torah Religious Front, but act separately at elections. All the clerical parties are opposed to democratic reforms and to the adoption of a Constitution. They subscribed to the Government's decision to attack the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan in June 1967.

According to the bourgeois writer Akiba, in Israel "the reactionary and chauvinist forces inside the Zionist movement are basically equivalent to the clerical parties and tendencies".*** The clerical parties draw their members from immigrants from Asian and African countries, who follow a profoundly patriarchal way of life and have Orthodox traditions. These parties are maintained chiefly by American Zionist organisations and Orthodox commu-

* *Who's Who in Israel, 1965*, p. 671.

** See Joseph Badi, *Religion in Israel Today. The Relationship Between State and Religion*, New York, 1959, pp. 130, 131.

*** Akiba, "Clericalism in Israel", *The Freethinker*, London, February 10, 1950, No. 7, p. 71.

nities. Their influence on social life is far in excess of their numerical strength.

The Mizrahi Party (Spiritual Centre Party) was set up in 1902, and Hapoel Hamizrahi (Spiritual Centre Workers' Party) was founded in 1922. Both parties are Zionist and propound clerical reformism ("one cannot be a Zionist unless one accepts the whole corpus of Judaism") and differ only to the extent they express clericalism. Mizrahi's members are mainly the middle-bourgeois urban strata of Orthodox Jews. It has powerful connections abroad.** Hapoel Hamizrahi represents the most backward section of the urban and rural poor. Its motto is "The Bible and labour".

Being non-Zionist organisations, Agudat Israel (Association of Israel, founded in 1913) and Poalei Agudat Israel (Workers of the Association of Israel, founded in 1925) are pronouncedly Orthodox. Agudat Israel is highly reactionary and most rabidly opposed to the secular way of life. It holds supreme the laws of the Torah and wants Israel to become a theocratic state with a purely religious way of life. It unites the religious substrata of the big and middle bourgeoisie. The programme of Poalei Agudat Israel is more flexible in the interpretation of religious standards, and the party itself represents the poorer section of Orthodox Jews.

There are three small Arab parties: Arab Democratic Party, Progress and Development Party and Co-operation and Fraternity Party, which usually act together with Mapai. There are shades of difference in their formal demands, but on the whole they represent the interests of the Arab nobility.

The largest of the public organisations is Histadrut (the General Federation of Labour). It is the main trade union corporation and was founded in 1920 as a "national instrument of Zionism", combining trade union functions with colonisation.*** Its guideline is "co-operation between workers and entrepreneurs".**** Regarded as a non-political organisation, Histadrut unites about 900,000

* *Ibid.*

** *Ibid.*

*** *The Palestine Economic Annual*, Jerusalem, 1948, p. 91.

**** *Ibid.*

people together with their dependents, including housewives, and in addition to workers its members are middle- and petty-bourgeois elements. This is one of the reasons why "the spirit of the class struggle is weak" in Histadrut.

This organisation deceives the working people and diverts them from the class struggle. The key posts in it are held by members of Mapai, which charts its policy. It co-operated in the aggressions of 1956 and 1967, and continues to help the Mapai ruling clique. The actions of the Israeli working people take place more and more often in spite of and beyond the control of Histadrut, which is an auxiliary weapon in the hands of the Government.

1. Mapai Assumes Power. The First Kneset (1949-1951)

The solemnly adopted Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel*, proclaimed the principles of freedom, justice and peace, the complete equality of the social and political rights of citizens and freedom of conscience, language, culture, and so on. These were to be the guidelines on which the new state was to function. In line with the principles of peace and co-operation, it was to join the community of nations and promote relations with the neighbouring Arab countries. Many of these principles proved to be merely of a declarative nature.

Until the formation of permanent state institutions, all power was vested in the People's Council that was hastily set up with Washington's connivance in March 1948. The actual composition of the Government of the as yet unproclaimed state was thus known and approved beforehand. The People's Council was henceforth to be known as the Provisional State Council. Provisional powers of government were vested in the People's Administration, the executive body of the People's Council. The Declaration of Independence, dated the year 5708 (by the Judaic calendar) was signed by 37 members of the People's Council.

* Ernst Goldberger, *Preisbewegungen in Israel 1949-1953. Eine Studie zu den Grundproblemen der Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik Israels*, Zurich, 1956, p. 89.

* *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. I, Ordinances. 5708—1948, Jerusalem, 1948, pp. 3-5 (further—The Declaration of Independence).

The Provisional Council of State and the Provisional Government consisted of the leaders of the former People's Council* of the Yishuv in Palestine, and of the Jewish Agency, which was simultaneously the executive body of the World Zionist Organisation. Among them were Chaim Weizmann, David Ben Gurion, Golda Meir and other leaders of Palestine Zionist political parties and communities. Twelve political parties were represented in the Provisional Council of State. The leading place was occupied by Mapai with 12 seats. The other seats were distributed as follows: General Zionists—7; Mapam—4; Herut—3; Mizrahi, Hapoel Hamizrahi and Agudat Israel—6; clerical and Zionist communities (New Immigration, Sephardim and Yemenites)—3; Communist Party—1.

The Provisional Government was formed on a narrower party basis. The key posts (Foreign Affairs, Finances, Home Affairs) went to Mapai, while its leader Ben Gurion occupied the offices of Prime Minister and Defence Minister.

The other parties with representatives in the Provisional Government were the General Zionists, Mapam and a clerical bloc composed of Mizrahi, Hapoel Hamizrahi, Agudat Israel and the Sephardim Party.

The Provisional Government was thus, first and foremost, an alliance of the top-echelon bureaucracy in the person of Mapai and the big bourgeoisie (General Zionist Party), whose leaders had long been connected with British, French and United States imperialism. Moreover, it represented a firm coalition with the clericals, thus giving the Mapai leadership the possibility of pursuing, from the very outset, a policy of combining Zionist ideas with the postulates of Judaism with the objective of attracting the broad masses of religious Jews to Zionism. The fact that there were clericals in the Provisional Government ensured for it the support of religious Jewish communities in Israel and other capitalist countries, the USA in particular. While increasingly adapting their policy to the interests of big capital, the Mapai leaders needed the support of the clericals and to this end they

* Functioned until April 1948.

made considerable concessions to the clerical parties. This intensified reaction in the country. The role of "Leftist" signboard was assigned by the Provisional Government to the "Left-Zionist" Mapam, which had the support of a considerable section of the working people, especially in the kibbutzim.

The Mapai leaders included representatives of various parties in the Provisional Council of State to create the impression that a broad national front was being formed. Assessing the situation in the country at that period, the Israeli Communists wrote in the Sofia newspaper *Yevreiski vesti*: "Reactionary circles are demagogically speaking of the People's Council as a national front in which all parties are represented, from the revisionists to the Communists. Actually, it is not a democratic national front because it includes representatives of reactionary anti-national forces."*

Thus, as soon as the State of Israel was established power was seized by reactionary circles of the big bourgeoisie, the clericals and the bureaucratic party élite, which, far from promoting the country's democratisation, flouted the UN decision of 1947 by instituting police practices, planting militarism and steering a course towards a closer alliance with imperialist powers, above all with the USA.

Already then the Communist Party of Israel was making vigorous efforts to unite the working class and all other progressive forces and set up a united front with Mapam against reaction with the aim of winning genuine independence for Israel. Interviewed by *Yevreiski vesti* as far back as April 1948 the leadership of the Palestinian Communists declared that the Communist Party was trying to create a broad democratic front with the political parties, organisations and groups standing for national independence and friendly relations with the Arabs. It was underscored that the struggle of the Yishuv in Palestine for national independence was inseparable from the national independence movement of the Arab masses.**

When the State of Israel was created the conditions

* *Yevreiski vesti*, Sofia, July 11, 1948.

** *Ibid.*, April 11, 1948.

were favourable for uniting progressive, democratic forces and forming a broad democratic front, but the opportunity was missed on account of disunity in the country's working-class movement itself. In the resultant situation the CPI set itself a minimum programme calling for genuine independence, a democratic state system, the safeguarding of the interests of all working people, the promotion of Jewish-Arab friendship, and orientation on the democratic forces throughout the world.* But from the very beginning of Israel's existence the democratic movement was weakened by Mapam's conciliatory attitude to the Right-wing forces. This allowed reaction to unite and institute arbitrary rule.

In September 1948 *The Palestine Economist* wrote that the state apparatus had become a powerful body with a mass of departments, sections, subsections, divisions and responsible officers "in charge", and a "multiplicity of 'competent authorities'".** During the transition period the concentration of all power in the hands of the Provisional Government enabled the Mapai leaders to make broad use of the state machine at the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The parliamentary elections, originally set for October 1948, were postponed several times allegedly on account of the military situation. Actually, the Zionist bourgeoisie and the Mapai leaders were mustering forces for the struggle for power.

During the Arab-Israeli war the Israeli ruling élite used every pretext to fan chauvinistic passions and persecute democrats. Efforts were made to divert public attention from the impending elections. To this end a draft Constitution was published in October 1948 (by the decision of the UN General Assembly of November 29, 1947, it should have been adopted by that time). The election struggle continued unabated until election day on January 25, 1949.

Throughout January, the magazine *The Israel Economist* reported, there were endless sittings of the Council of State. The Right-wing factions demanded maximum freedom for private enterprise, while the clerical parties

* *Yevreiski vesti*, July 11, 1948.

** *The Palestine Economist*, September 1948, p. 121.

demanding the import of kosher meat and the opening of religious schools under rabbinical control.*

In January 1949 *Yevreiski vesti* wrote that "only the Communist Party unequivocally and consistently exposes the intrigues of United States imperialism in Israel, its irrepressible economic penetration into the country and the varying degrees of the country's dependence on it to which the nationalistic parties have stooped".** The two "labour" parties—Mapai and Mapam—were deftly manipulating with socialist verbiage and injecting disunity into the working class.***

On the eve of the parliamentary elections the Mapai leaders obtained a large loan—100 million dollars—from the USA. This substantially strengthened the position of the ruling clique. *The Israel Economist* pointed out that "from the political aspect" this loan "symbolises the final recognition of our State by the Western World".**** It would be more correct to say that it symbolised US imperialism's approval of the Israeli leaders' Zionist aggressive policy. The mouthpiece of Israeli business circles confirmed that the terms of the bargain made by the Mapai leaders with United States capital were that the aggressive alliance with the USA would be furthered, Israel would be brought into economic and political bondage to the US monopolies and the Mapai socialist slogans would remain a dead letter. This hit the country's national interests and the interests of the working masses.

The general elections, the Israeli Communists said, had been neither free nor democratic.***** In the election campaign the ruling parties had used their privileged position in the army. Hundreds of new immigrants who had not had time to register had been barred from the elections.

In this situation the largest number of votes—35.7 per cent—was amassed by Mapai. The bourgeois and clerical parties won fairly strong positions (the clerical parties polled 12.1 per cent of the votes, Herut 11.5 per cent, General Zionists and the Progressive Party 9.3 per

* *The Israel Economist*, January 1949, p. 3.

** *Yevreiski vesti*, January 23, 1949.

*** *Ibid.*

**** *The Israel Economist*, February 1949, p. 27.

***** *Yevreiski vesti*, February 12, 1949.

cent).^{*} The Left-wing Zionist parties received 14.7 per cent of the votes. Over 15,000 votes were polled by the Communist Party. In accordance with the results of the voting the seats in the Constituent Assembly were distributed as follows: Mapai 46, Mapam 19, clerical bloc 16, Herut 14, General Zionists 7, Progressive Party 5, Communist Party 4, Arab parties siding with Mapai 2, other political groups—7. The first Israeli parliament was extremely indicative. The following trades and professions were represented:^{**}

Farmers (chiefly landowners)	35
Labour union officials (mostly Mapai-influenced)	19
Writers	18
Lawyers	12
Businessmen and bank directors	13
Politicians	8
Rabbis	5
Mayors	2
University professor	1
Teachers	2
Manual labourers	5

The representation of the workers and working intelligentsia was thus reduced to a bare minimum in the first Israeli parliament. On the other hand, the interests of private business and the clericals were broadly represented.

The Constituent Assembly began its sittings on February 14, 1949. Under the Transition Law^{***} it became known at the Knesset. Chaim Weizmann was elected President, and after the Provisional Government resigned he charged the Mapai leader David Ben Gurion with the formation of the new Government. Following a three weeks' fight over ministerial portfolios, a Government was formed on the basis of a coalition of four parties. Of the 12 portfolios, seven of the most important went to Mapai. Also represented in the Government were four clerical parties united in a religious front, the Progressive Party, which had broken away from the General Zionist Party, and the Sephardim Party. Mapam refused to participate in the coa-

^{*} Twenty-one political parties and groups were involved in the election campaign.

^{**} Marver H. Bernstein, *Op. cit.*, p. 39.

^{***} *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. III, 5709—1949, p. 3.

lition on account of its disagreement with the Government's foreign policy programme, while the General Zionist Party demanded more guarantees for proprietorship rights.

Bourgeois political observers subsequently wrote that Ben Gurion "planned to form as broad a coalition as possible, excluding only the Communists ... and the ... 'Freedom Movement'".^{*}

In view of the militarisation and the economic difficulties in a country hit by inflation, dislocation and an acute food shortage, the Mapai leaders had to conceal their objectives behind a screen of "democracy". Moreover, it was felt that a semblance of the "national" significance of Zionism had to be created as the ideology and political guideline not only of the Israeli people but of wide sections of Jews in the Diaspora. This was regarded as a cornerstone of the home and foreign policy of the Israeli rulers.

On the other hand, the anti-national, pro-United States line, which in this period the Mapai leadership regarded as the key factor strengthening their position in the country, could be pursued only on the basis of a firm alliance with the big bourgeoisie.

A motion of confidence in the Government formed by Ben Gurion was carried in the Knesset on March 10 by 73 votes to 45. The Government programme, officially called *Basic Principles*, contained a number of important provisions (for instance, republican form of government) and reiterated the fundamental rights and freedoms of Israeli citizens; in foreign policy it called for friendly relations with all states and for Jewish-Arab co-operation. The programme stressed the point that there was to be joint responsibility of all members of the Government and formulated home policies, in particular, the encouragement of private enterprise with special facilities for foreign capital, the implementation of a number of democratic reforms, and so on.^{**} The programme was drawn up by the Mapai leadership with the aim of giving a "democratic"

^{*} P. Bat-Yediyah, "Profile of Israel's Government", *Israel and Middle East*, Vol. XXI, No. 2, 1949, p. 29.

^{**} *State of Israel. Government Yearbook*, 5711 (1950), Jerusalem, December 1950, pp. 50-51.

façade to their administration and diverting public attention from the question of a Constitution. Further developments showed that many of the Ben Gurion Government's programme promises were not worth the paper they were written on.

The ruling clique soon buried the question of the Constitution. Following the elections to the Constituent Assembly, Ben Gurion felt himself no longer bound by the General Assembly's decision on the Constitution. In June 1950 the Government obtained a majority vote (51 to 39 with 10 abstentions) for the Knesset's so-called compromise decision stating that it was "premature" to adopt a Constitution and postponing this act indefinitely.

According to the assessment that was made of the situation by the Israeli Communists, the Mapai-led Government was harnessing itself more and more irrevocably to the chariot of US imperialism.* This assessment was reaffirmed at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel, which was held on October 21-26, 1949.

The backstage struggle between the Mapai social-reformists and the General Zionists, in which both sides made all sorts of compromises, became more acute after the Coalition Government was formed.

Throughout 1949 Ben Gurion tried to give the impression that he wanted agreement with Mapam. In November and December of that year the pro-Mapai press carried articles under headings like "Controversy Between Brothers" and "Talks Between Brothers". But this was only a screen for the Mapai leadership's intention to include Right-wing elements in the Coalition Government and, at the same time, pressure them into moderating their terms for an "agreement". The Mapai leaders were forced into these tactics by popular action caused by the sharp economic decline. In the period from March 1949 to February 1950 there were large strikes and also demonstrations by immigrants.

Political manipulation on the pretext of forming coalitions became a favourite practice of Ben Gurion's. One of these stratagems was the Government's resignation on October 16, 1950, which Ben Gurion motivated as due to

* *Yevreiskí vestí*, September 15, 1949.

divergences with the clerical parties and to the Government's lack of a firm majority in the Knesset.* Actually he wanted new elections that would allow the Mapai leadership to act unchecked until a new Knesset was convened. The "mini-Government", remaining as a temporary replacement, would consist exclusively of Mapai leaders. Moreover, new elections would make Mapai's political rivals more tractable. However, the motion for new elections was defeated by the other factions in the Knesset.

In the CPI's statement in connection with the Government crisis of October 1950 it was pointed out that the US financial magnates had demanded the formation in Israel of a strong Right-wing Government with a close-knit Mapai core, on which they could rely when they would launch their aggressive plans.** The statement stressed the need for a united front of all workers' parties and the middle strata of the population.***

The two weeks' bickering between Mapai and its coalition partners ended in a sudden compromise. The curtain on this lightning "agreement" was lifted by *The Economist* of London, which wrote, without mincing words, that in Israel "a general election seemed inevitable until the wires from Washington grew busy".**** On November 1 Ben Gurion submitted to the Knesset a new Coalition Government consisting of representatives of the same four parties as before. This Government was approved on the same day by 69 votes to 42 with 2 abstentions.

Ben Gurion failed to draw the General Zionists into the coalition because the Zionist big bourgeoisie demanded more and more concessions from Mapai, regarding its policy as being much too "socialist".***** For their part, the Mapai leaders had to act cautiously to avoid exposure.

In February 1951, following his defeat in the voting on the question of religious education for the children of immigrants from Eastern Jewish communities, Ben Gu-

* *State of Israel. Government Yearbook*, 5712 (1951/52), Jerusalem, October 1951, p. 3.

** *Pravda*, October 28, 1950.

*** *Ibid.*

**** *The Economist*, November 4, 1950, p. 688.

***** *The World Today*, London, Vol. VII, No. 12, December 1950, p. 508.

tion again announced the Government's resignation. Mapai's divergences with the clerical parties were over the complex problem of the relationship between the state and religion (the Rabbinate). The Rabbinate's influence mounted swiftly after Israel's formation. The 4,000-year-old code of the Torah—the Law of Moses—and religious ritual were officially confirmed.*

The Rabbinate (the supreme ecclesiastical authority lies with the two Chief Rabbis, Sephardic and Ashkenazic**), has supreme authority in matters related to family law, particularly, marriage and divorce.

The role of religion, which in Israel is growing steadily more militant, is dealt with by Joseph Badi. In *Religion in Israel Today*,*** he analyses the reasons for the growing influence of the Orthodox factions and the inordinate demands of the clericals. For instance, though the Orthodox factions comprise only 12 per cent of the state they "dominate the civic life of the whole community from the cradle to the grave. The entire family life is controlled by the rabbis. They have more rights in that life than the Government." Badi notes that although the clerical bloc does not formally control the state, clerical circles openly declare that they do not consider as binding the laws passed by the Knesset and seek to turn Israel into a theocratic state. The clerical parties, Badi writes, are aware that without their support Mapai cannot predominate in the Government and they are, therefore, demanding more and more power. The relationship between religion and the state is characterised by a

* Postulates of the Torah such as the eating only of kasher meat, the use of the religious calendar, the re-institution of ancient holidays, the banning of pig-breeding and of the eating of pork, the banning of traffic on Saturdays, and so on, have also been legalised.

** Sephardim are the descendants of the Jews who lived in Portugal and Spain. There are Sephardim communities in the East and the Mediterranean basin, chiefly on the Iberian Peninsula, from where they moved to Holland. They speak a Hebrew dialect. Ashkenazim are descendants of the Jews who settled in Germany and Poland. They speak a dialect based on Middle High German. Both divisions use Hebrew as the language of prayer (see M. Myure, *The Jewish Intellect*, Russ. ed., St. Petersburg, 1902, p. 21). The rabbinical elections in both communities were held on March 17, 1964.

*** Joseph Badi, *Religion in Israel Today. The Relationship Between State and Religion*, New York, 1959, pp. 45, 51.

steady strengthening of the position of the Orthodox factions through further concessions by the Mapai leadership.

A noteworthy point is that the bourgeoisie and the governing social-reformists are extremely interested in maintaining petty-bourgeois and nationalistic ideology and in fostering mystical and religious prejudices among the population, especially among new immigrants. They feel that this effectively diverts the working people from the class struggle.* That is why, while partly reflecting the dissatisfaction of the democratic forces over the rising reaction, Mapai's divergences with the clerical parties contain, as they have always done, the seed of further concessions to the clericals.

In February and in early March 1951 Ben Gurion had talks with representatives of various parties, but since he was unable to form a Government it was decided to hold new parliamentary elections. Ben Gurion achieved his aim by ensuring an almost certain prospect that the new coalition would be advantageous to Mapai.

The Government that had resigned continued to exercise authority until the formation of a new Government. This enabled Mapai to operate practically unchecked for a long time.

2. The Second Knesset (1951-1955). Reactionary Laws and Reinforcement of the Compact with the Imperialist Powers

The elections to the second Knesset were held in July 1951 amid a sharp political struggle. Once again Mapai used all the advantages of its position as the party in power, but it polled fewer votes than at the 1949 elections.

There was a sharp increase (nearly five-fold) of the votes received by the General Zionists, the reason being that a considerable number of propertied immigrants, particularly from Western Europe, had arrived in Israel during this period. Besides, during these years the General Zionists had acted as a counterbalance to Mapai, which

* See *Haderech—the Way*, Transl. from the Hebrew into English, 1951, No. 2, p. 2.

experienced immense difficulties in providing employment for the tens of thousands of poor immigrants pouring into the country.

At the 1951 elections the Communist Party was supported by a large section of the indigent immigrants. The number of people voting for its candidates rose by 80 per cent. The CPI called for an intensification of the peace struggle and for the mobilisation of the people in opposition to the attempts of the US and British imperialists to turn Israel into a base for aggression.*

The new Knesset was convened on August 20, 1951, but Ben Gurion was able to submit the new Coalition Government for its approval only on October 7. The Mapai leaders thus ruled the country without parliamentary control for more than seven months. They took advantage of this situation to sign on August 23 an essentially unequal treaty of friendship, trade and navigation with the USA. This time Ben Gurion managed to restore the coalition only with his former principal partner—the bloc of clerical parties. The Progressive Party refused to join the coalition on account of a temporary fall-out with Mapai.** The Government was formed after further concessions had been made to the clerical parties. The elections to the second Knesset were therefore quite correctly assessed as a "movement to the Centre Right".*** Despite the new Government's small majority in the Knesset, Ben Gurion had sufficient freedom of action. In questions related to domestic policy he had the support of Mapam, which adopted a conciliatory attitude on the common ground of Zionism, while his foreign policy programme was approved by the General Zionists.

A New Economic Policy was announced in February 1952 as a way out of the economic difficulties. This poli-

* *Izvestia*, August 2, 1951.

** The Progressive Party rejected the Mapai proposal for establishing a mandatory 10 per cent minimum of votes from the electorate for a party's participation in the Knesset. This would have deprived the numerically small parties, the Progressive Party among them, of the right to participate in the parliamentary elections and form a faction in the Knesset.

*** Marver H. Bernstein, *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

cy envisaged measures to check the inflation, which had assumed catastrophic proportions, improve the balance of payments and equilibrate supply and demand. It was planned to carry out these measures mainly through foreign investment, both state and private. Some economic stabilisation and a relaxation of the inflation were achieved but they were only of a temporary nature and brought no improvement of the standard of living. Israel found herself more dependent on the US monopolies than before.

The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel, held on May 29-31, 1952, summed up the results of the bourgeois administration under Mapai. The CPI Programme, adopted at this Congress, stated: "The bourgeois-Mapai Government of Ben Gurion from the first day took the way of high treason ... by turning Israel into an American estate and into a strategic base of the American warmongers."*

The Ben Gurion Government's drive to bring Israel into the USA's expansionist plans, the Programme underlined, was directed against the camp of peace, democracy and socialism. More than ever before this accentuated the need for an anti-imperialist front of workers, farmers, the petty-bourgeoisie, the working intelligentsia and part of the national bourgeoisie.

In July 1952, ignoring national interests, the Israeli Government signed a mutual security agreement with the USA, thereby formalising Israel's commitment to take part in US imperialism's military gambles in the Middle East. This was followed in September 1952 by an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany on so-called reparations, which can only be assessed as a deal between Israel's Zionist rulers and the West German revanchists. The decision to sign this agreement received the backing of Mapai's coalition partners. The Communist Party voted against the decision.**

After the death of Chaim Weizmann in November 1952, Izhak Ben-Zvi, a prominent Mapai leader, was elected President. To some extent, this mirrored the align-

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 12th Congress*, June 1952, Tel Aviv, p. 1.

** The decision to begin talks with the FRG was adopted by the Israeli Government on February 18, 1952.

ment of political forces since Weizmann had represented the General Zionists. In December the talks that Ben Gurion was conducting on the inclusion of the General Zionists and the Progressive Party in the Government entered the decisive stage. A condition stipulated by the General Zionists was that private enterprise should have maximum freedom in the country.* The coalition between Mapai and the General Zionist Party was formed and on December 16, 1952 approved by the Knesset. But this did not prevent Ben Gurion from announcing the Government's resignation three days later. He resorted to this stratagem in order somewhat to shear the demands of his coalition partners and strengthen his own position. The new Government, formed on December 22, was assessed as a further "push towards the Centre and the Right".** Represented in it were Mapai, the General Zionists, the Progressive and two clerical parties (Hapoel Hamizrahi and Mizrahi).

This coalition had the largest-ever majority in the Knesset—87 of the 120 mandates. In the *Government Yearbook* it is stated that "this balance of forces between the Coalition Government and the Opposition gave a broad and stable parliamentary basis".*** The fourth Coalition Government under Ben Gurion encouraged the influx of foreign private capital, attacked democratic freedoms and made further concessions to the Orthodox factions. On this basis Ben Gurion strengthened Mapai's alliance with the Right-wing bourgeois and clerical parties, thus giving fresh impetus to reaction at home and to expansionism in foreign policy.

The Coalition Government formed in December 1952 was described by a Mapam representative as an alliance of "the reformists of the working class with the enemy of the working class".**** The Communist group in the

* In particular a reduction of income and property taxes, removal of currency control, and so on. For more details see *The Jerusalem Post*, December 14, 1952.

** Scott D. Johnston, "Early Politics and Coalition Cabinets in the Knesset of Israel", *Middle Eastern Affairs*, New York, Vol. XIII, No. 5, May 1962, p. 134.

*** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5714 (1953/54), November 1953, p. 56.

**** *The Jerusalem Post*, December 23, 1952.

Knesset declared that the changes in the Government were a further step towards bringing Israel under the control of the US State Department and Wall Street.*

The formation of this Coalition Government marked the end of the first phase of Israel's administration by Mapai and Ben Gurion. During this period the Mapai leaders bent every effort to set up a "strong" Government, in other words, they continued reinforcing the alliance of the Right-wing reformists with the big bourgeoisie, the clericals and other reactionary elements. This period of almost five years—from May 1948 to December 1952—had witnessed the building of the foundation for a political line that led to Israel's dependence on US capital, a policy for which the people had to pay dearly.

Grave economic difficulties triggered demonstrations and strikes at the beginning and especially in the spring of 1953. The Government responded by increasing police terror and starting a campaign against the Communists. The Communist press, including the weekly *Al-Ittihad*, was banned; this evoked strong public protests. A draft law on crimes against the state was submitted to the Knesset in March. This was obviously directed against the democratic forces in Israel.** At the same time, to confuse public opinion, Mapai somewhat relaxed the police regime (for instance, on May Day permission was granted to fly flags in the schools of the working-class districts and to sing the *Internationale*). But even these concessions were bitterly opposed by the reactionaries. The General Zionist Party announced its withdrawal from the Government. The Progressive Party intended to follow its example. To bring the General Zionists back into the Government Mapai had to retract its concessions. This, the Communist *Information Bulletin* wrote, signified the "complete surrender of Mapai to the big bourgeoisie".***

The restored governing coalition gave businessmen, including foreigners, further privileges.**** Moreover, under the law of August 26, 1953 rabbinical courts were

* *Ibid.*

** *Information Bulletin*, 1953, No. 5-6, p. 16.

*** *Ibid.*, No. 7, p. 4.

**** Specifically, in August 1953 an income tax law was passed, as *The Jerusalem Post* put it, specially to encourage investment.

instituted with exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and the family. This was a major victory of the reactionary clerical parties.

Frontier incidents grew more frequent in the second half of 1953. On October 14 there was an armed clash near Kibya. Bellicose threats appeared in the Government press.

The Communist Party of Israel denounced the Ben Gurion Government's actions, saying they were undermining Israel's security, creating tension in Arab-Israeli relations and threatening peace in the Middle East.*

Public indignation and protests compelled the Mapai leaders to ease the situation somewhat. But they used this relaxation to regroup their forces for a fresh assault. Ben Gurion had to be "temporarily" sacrificed. After five years at the helm of state, "Iron Chancellor" and "near-dictator" Ben Gurion used "ill-health" as the excuse to resign on December 7, 1953, and Moshe Sharett, another Mapai leader, was entrusted with the formation of a Government. Actually, there were other reasons, mainly disagreement on policy with the other members of his party.**

After Ben Gurion's resignation the General Zionists demanded more privileges for private enterprise as a condition for their further co-operation in the coalition. The Mapai leaders countered this by threatening to demand new elections if their coalition partners went on insisting on "impossible conditions" in return for their support of the coalition.*** At the close of 1953 the most massive demonstration in Israel's five-year history took place in Tel Aviv causing the Government coalition to close ranks. Ten thousand workers belonging to different parties demonstrated their class unity. New immigrants from various countries, they carried slogans demanding national independence. This was a warning to the mounting reaction.

After fairly long haggling, the Coalition Government was re-established on January 26, 1954 with hardly any

* *Information Bulletin*, 1953, No. 9, p. 6; No. 11, p. 6.

** Edwin Samuel, *Problems of Government in the State of Israel*, Jerusalem, 1956, p. 51.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, December 17, 1953.

changes. The posts of Prime Minister and Defence Minister went to Moshe Sharett and Pinhas Lavon, who represented a more moderate wing in Mapai. At the debate in the Knesset in January 1954 on the formation of a new Government, the Communist group declared that the Government crisis had been precipitated not by Ben Gurion's resignation but by the fact that the former Government as well as the "new" one is unable, owing to its nature and composition, to solve any of the basic problems of the people in the country".* The situation remained difficult: in Haifa 6,000 workers demonstrated, demanding bread, employment and peace. In June 1954 the Mapai leaders made another effort to secure the passage of the witch-hunting "Crimes Against the State" law in order to intimidate and persecute progressives.

With the regrouping of the reactionary forces, which drew steadily closer to the extremists in the ultra-nationalistic Herut, war hysteria mounted in Israel. In the summer of 1954 the Israeli ruling circles engineered a series of acts of espionage and terrorism in Cairo.** This was the first step that led to the aggression against Egypt in the autumn of 1956. The real objectives of the "operation" were revealed by its direct organisers much later, but in the summer of 1954 its failure was used by the reactionaries to discredit and then remove Pinhas Lavon from the post of Defence Minister. Ben Gurion became Minister of Defence on February 21, 1955, the argument in favour of his appointment being "the darkening of the international skies"***

A week after Ben Gurion's return to the Government, the bloodiest incident since the end of the Arab-Israeli war was provoked near Gaza on the Egyptian frontier. This armed provocation, like the earlier massacre in Ki-

* *Information Bulletin*, 1954, No. 2, p. 21.

** According to reports in the bourgeois, including Israeli, press, a group of Israeli terrorists was infiltrated into Cairo in 1954. After they had perpetrated a series of subversive acts, they were captured and tried by an Egyptian court. Senior officers of the Israeli army blamed the Defence Minister Lavon for the failure in Cairo. This was exactly what was wanted by the most extremist elements headed by Ben Gurion (see *Sovietskaya Rossiya*, January 7, 1961).

*** G. Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, New York, 1957, p. 353.

biya, was assessed by the UN Security Council as an act of aggression by Israel.* Regarding the political aims of "Operation Gaza", the journal *Information Bulletin* wrote that the Israeli Government was eager to be associated with the anti-Soviet military bloc that the West was trying to form at the time. Moreover, it sought to divert the people from acute problems like unemployment, the high cost of living, the rising taxes and all sorts of social restrictions.**

There was further bloodshed near Gaza on the Egyptian frontier in May 1955. In 1954 and 1955 a number of laws were passed in Israel to prepare the country for a "preventive war" against the Arabs.

In this situation resulting from the war hysteria fanned by official propaganda, the Israeli Government found itself facing an international scandal. The trial of Israel (Rudolf) Kastner in Budapest in May 1955*** confirmed the fact that prominent Israeli Zionist leaders had collaborated with the nazis in the criminal extermination of Jews during the Second World War, in Hungary in particular. The wave of stunned shock that swept across Israel forced the Government to resign on June 29, 1955.

The Mapai leaders blamed the General Zionists for the split in the coalition and for the Government's resignation. But they said nothing of the fact that they already had definite plans for the next Government coalition. A "minor Coalition" Government was set up without the General Zionists to function until the new elections. In this Government Mapai received the largest number of portfolios and control of the key ministries.

During the pre-election period Ben Gurion made every effort to modify the electoral system in order to replace the multi-party with a two-party system. Under the pretext of forming a "united" labour party he sought to se-

* Resolutions of the Security Council of November 24, 1954 and March 29, 1955.

** *Information Bulletin*, 1955, No. 1, pp. 9-10.

*** During the Second World War Kastner was the Jewish Agency representative in Hungary and headed the so-called Rescue Committee. The trial brought to light his collaboration with the nazis in the destruction of the Jewish population, and also the complicity of other Zionist leaders.

cure Mapam's absorption in Mapai, strengthen his own hand and ultimately establish a personal dictatorship. He stated his credo in an "Open Letter to the Voter": "Only a stable Government will have the power to continue building up our Defence Forces."** Sharett warned against "a dictatorship in Israel";** thereby revealing the existence of two lines in Mapai as a result of the policy crisis. However, Ben Gurion's position was not strong enough to enable him to fight the somewhat more far-sighted section of the Mapai leadership who were opposed to his policy of military gambles. Later this allowed Ben Gurion to decide the question of Israel's participation in the triple aggression against Egypt.

3. The Third Knesset (1955-1959). Conciliatory Attitude of the Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda "Labour" Parties. An Openly Expansionist Policy

The elections to the third Knesset were held on July 26, 1955 with lists of candidates from 18 parties. The Mapai leaders manipulated with the electoral lists. In *The Jerusalem Post* it was reported that nearly 100,000 Mapai activists pressured electors by writing letters, calling them by telephone, and so on.*** The CPI's *Information Bulletin* wrote that the 1955 elections had reaffirmed the CPI's forecast that the ruling classes would do everything "to prevent a free expression of the will of the masses".****

Although Mapai polled the largest number of votes, it lost five mandates as compared with 1951. The number of votes cast for the General Zionists diminished by nearly one-third, with the result that the party lost almost half of its mandates. This was a defeat for these two parties. Their prestige among the immigrant masses, who were in great distress materially, fell drastically. The Gen-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, July 26, 1955; also *The Israel Economist*, 1954, June 25.

** *Ibid.*, July 25, 1955.

*** *Ibid.*

**** *Information Bulletin*, August 1955, No. 2, p. 1.

eral Zionist Party aroused the hostility of the working people by its bellicose defence of the interests of the big capitalists. In subsequent years it did not recover its lost positions until the Israeli bourgeoisie regrouped its ranks.

The extremist Herut Party gained considerable ground. In August 1955 the CPI Central Committee noted that the strengthening of the Herut Party had likewise confirmed the CPI's earlier assessment of the situation. The CPI foresaw that the Government's anti-national and anti-popular policy would weaken its own positions and throw certain sections of the middle strata and the poor into the arms of the social demagogy of Herut, the party of fascism and war. That is exactly what happened.* The stronger positions won by Herut reflected the growing influence enjoyed by the most extremist elements in the ruling camp.

Despite the intensive campaign of slander, nearly two and a half times more people voted for the Communist Party than at the preceding elections. Support for the Communist Party increased among the urban proletariat, the transit immigrant camps, the Arab villages and the agricultural settlements, where for many years the Zionist leaders had pursued a policy of "uprooting communism".

The Left-Zionist Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda** turned down the CPI's offer of a united front at the elections. In fact this rejection meant action not only "without the Communist Party, but against it".*** The policies pursued by these parties split the ranks of the Israeli working masses and in many ways determined the further course of events in that country. They joined the Mapai Government, betraying the interests of the Israeli working people. Throughout the ignominious six-year history of Israel, a period that brought the masses immense hardship and suffering, these two parties served as a cover for the reactionary plans of the Israeli ruling élite.

In the new Government, nine of the 16 portfolios went to Mapai, two each to Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda, two

* *Information Bulletin*, August 1955, No. 2, p. 3.

** Before the election campaign they separated into independent parties.

*** *Information Bulletin*, 1955, No. 2, p. 6.

to the clerical Hapoel Hamizrahi and one to the Progressive Party. As before, the Government programme expressed essentially the interests of the capitalists, and contained a new point that eloquently revealed the nature and aims of the coalition. This point stated that the "Government will persist in determined efforts to increase our military preparedness and improve the organisation, equipment, training and morale of the Israel Defence Forces both in the Regular Army and the Reserves, as well as in border settlements".* The collective responsibility of the ministers in the ruling coalition was strongly emphasised.

The most violent clash since 1949 took place in the night of December 12, 1955 near Lake Tiberias on the Syrian border. This incident demonstrated that the Israeli ruling circles were determined to start a "preventive war" against the Arab states. A series of laws was passed to prepare the country for war. During this period Ben Gurion worked feverishly to form, under his own leadership, a "young Mapai" group consisting of the most extremist elements in the Mapai élite. Further evidence of the expansionist ambitions of the Israeli rulers was Moshe Sharet's removal (in June 1956) from the post of Foreign Minister. He had urged moderation.** The ruling élite was only waiting for an opportune moment to attack the Arab countries. It found that its expansionist aims could be served by the aggressive conspiracy of the colonial powers against Egypt, which had, on July 26, 1956, nationalised the Suez Canal Company that for almost a century had been a major outpost of imperialism in the Middle East.

In a period witnessing a far-reaching change in the destinies of the peoples of this region, Israel was accorded the role of a colonialist weapon against the Arabs. The Anglo-French-Israeli aggression was launched on October 29, 1956 with an Israeli invasion of Egyptian territory in the Sinai Peninsula and the occupation of Gaza. The Suez Canal was deactivated for a long time. However, world public opinion and the firm stand adopted by the

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5717 (1956), Jerusalem, December 1956, p. 28.

** *The Israel Economist*, July 1956, p. 129. He was replaced by Golda Meir.

Soviet Union forced the aggressors to cease hostilities and withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory. The Sinai adventure deepened Israel's difficulties at home and abroad. The responsibility for this devolved primarily on the Mapai leaders. However, they tried to pull the wool over the eyes of the people. For instance, during the Knesset debates on the question of the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory in March 1957, Ben Gurion declared that at the time Israel was much stronger than it had ever been before.*

A more realistic attitude was adopted in the Knesset by Meir Ja'ari of Mapam, who, speaking of the results of the "Sinai operation", said: "As never before we are now subject to the mercy of American policy".**

These debates gave a clearer picture of the balance of political forces in Israel. A military withdrawal from Egyptian territory was opposed by Herut and the General Zionists. Herut tabled a motion of no confidence in the Government, while the General Zionists demanded an immediate halt to the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Solomon's Bay.*** Both motions were overwhelmingly defeated.

The CPI representative told the Knesset that his was the only party that had the right to express no confidence in the Government inasmuch as it alone had, from the very beginning, been opposed to Israel's participation in the aggression in the Sinai Peninsula. He declared: "Even a blind man could see that the way of war had failed. Herut and the General Zionists bore equal responsibility with the Government for the campaign".**** The Communist motion of no confidence in the Government, which had involved the country in a military gamble, was not adopted.

In their efforts to extricate the country from the financial, economic and political difficulties caused by the Sinai adventure, the Israeli rulers appealed to the USA for assistance. The conspiracy against the Arab countries took final shape when Israel aligned herself with the ag-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, March 7, 1957.

** Ibid.

*** Ibid.

**** Ibid.

gressive Eisenhower Doctrine in May 1957. The debates on this issue were started only after the Mapai leaders had neutralised Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda with the threat that they would be expelled from the Government if they opposed the adoption of the aggressive doctrine. Mapai, the Progressive Party and all four clerical parties, altogether 59 deputies, i.e., less than half the deputies in the Knesset, voted for alignment with the Eisenhower Doctrine. The bloc of the big bourgeoisie and extremists, i.e., General Zionists and Herut, abstained, feeling that the Eisenhower Doctrine was not effective enough. The "Left" parties—Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda—likewise abstained, while the Communist Party alone voted against joining the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was not only dangerous but ran counter to Israel's national interests. Its motion of no confidence in the Government was again defeated. This further surrender by Mapai and Achdut Ha'avoda prevented a Government crisis and enabled Ben Gurion not only to remain in power but to activate his policy.

At its 13th Congress (May 29-June 1, 1957), the Communist Party of Israel showed that the Sinai fiasco was evidence of the bankruptcy of the political line followed by the ruling circles. It called for a fundamental change of the country's policy towards one of neutrality and independence. Israel's road was "not with imperialism, which has no place in the Middle East, but only together with the peoples of the East fighting for their independence".*

Police terror was stepped up as the ruling circles continued their persecution of democratic sections of the population headed by the Communist Party. In July 1957 a Penal Revision (State Security) Law further curtailing democratic freedoms was passed by the Knesset.** The emergency decisions adopted by the Government showed that war hysteria was being whipped up at the same time.

Ben Gurion was determined to remove Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda from participation in Government deci-

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 13th Congress, Documents*, Tel Aviv, 1957, p. 2.

** *Laws of the State of Israel*, Vol. 11, 5717—1956/57, pp. 186-95.

sions. He planned a new Government coalition with the Right-wing parties, which, he felt, would be a step towards a dictatorship. At the close of 1957 the Mapai leaders concentrated on strengthening their ties with the aggressive NATO bloc, and maintained a tacit alliance with the Federal Republic of Germany. These intrigues were kept dark and surfaced only when Achdut Ha'avoda's newspaper *Lamerhav* gave the details of a discussion of them at a closed sitting of the Government and complained that it and the Mapam Party had been the last to be informed of the secret plans.

The Communist group in the Knesset tabled a motion of no confidence in the Government on the grounds that Ben Gurion's actions were fraught with danger to peace and to the future of Israel. This motion was defeated, the Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda factions abstaining from voting. Nevertheless, on October 31, 1957 Ben Gurion resigned, allegedly over disagreements in the Government. Actually, he took this step in order to win time and save his prestige that had been undermined by the disclosure of plans for a detente with Bonn. In a Statement to the President, the CPI group in the Knesset declared that there was an "urgent necessity for a basic change in Israel policy".* However, Mapai, the Progressive Party, the clerical parties and the General Zionists wanted Ben Gurion to form a new Government. But Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda insisted on preserving the former coalition and the Government was restored in its former composition.

The Communist Party called on the people to demand a radical change of policy. On March 31, 1958 the Knesset Communist group submitted a minimum programme as the basis for national unity in the drive for a change of Israel's policy. The main points of this programme were: the conversion of the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone, the attainment of agreement with the Arab countries on the basis of respect for legitimate national rights, an improvement of relations with the Soviet Union and the safeguarding of democratic freedoms.

In Middle Eastern developments in the summer of

* *Information Bulletin*, 1958, No. 1, pp. 6, 11.

1958, namely the imperialist aggression against the Lebanon and Jordan, Israel again acted as a weapon of the colonialist forces against the Arab peoples, at the same time giving effect to its own expansionist plans. Giving "security" as their motive the Israeli Zionists became direct accomplices in the imperialist aggression in the Lebanon and Jordan. Ben Gurion adopted decisions at his own discretion, without referring them to the Knesset. The decision on Israel's participation in the Western aggression was adopted at a closed Government sitting on July 17. Speaking of this in the Knesset, Ben Gurion declared: "We must do what we can ... to reinforce our strength and seek to increase the number of our friends."**

At a plenary meeting on July 30-31, the CPI's Central Committee exposed the actions of the Ben Gurion Government, which had become a "direct assistant in aggression and colonialism". This policy, it was pointed out, was fraught with immense danger for Israel and inevitably "led to hatred of Israel and Israel's complete isolation in the Arab East and in the international arena". All patriotic forces in the country were called on to unite against Ben Gurion's pro-imperialist policies.**

The fact that the law on compulsory military service was amended by the Knesset during its summer session showed that Israel was moving towards further militarisation and preparing for war. Other military problems were debated at this session. A spate of statements was made by Israeli officials to the effect that there might be a repetition of the Sinai campaign. At the same time, the attacks on democratic freedoms continued. In December 1958 the Mapai faction moved a draft law supplanting the existing electoral system of proportional representation by a truncated reactionary majority system.*** The passage of this law would have allowed Mapai to use all the advantages of its position at the helm of state to con-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, July 22, 1958.

** *Information Bulletin*, 1958, No. 8-9, p. 1.

*** Under the proportional electoral system the seats in the parliament are distributed among the parties in accordance with the number of votes polled by them, while under the majority system predominance is attained by the party receiving the absolute majority of votes for its list of candidates as a whole or for individual candidates.

concentrate more power in its hands. The Communist and all other Left-wing parties would have been removed from political life, thus giving Ben Gurion and his immediate associates a freer hand to achieve their dictatorial designs.

While attacking democratic freedoms, the Zionist ruling circles endeavoured to prove to the people that the setbacks suffered by Israel's official policy were due not to its vicious, anti-popular substance but to the "party system" and the "obsolete" system of democratic elections, which did not allow establishing a firm and stable power in the country.*

This intensification of anti-democratic tendencies stemmed from the aggravation of the crisis of the pro-imperialist policy of blackmail and military adventures after the failure of the Suez aggression.** A result of the concentration of power in the hands of the Mapai-bourgeois-clerical triumvirate was that the Knesset passed a decision to introduce the study of "Jewish consciousness" in schools. This was nothing less than another concession to reaction. In the opinion of official circles the teaching of this subject was "an effective educational means for preserving the unity and historical continuity of the Jewish people".*** The Zionist preaching of the "exclusiveness and unity" of the Jewish people diverted the Israeli working people from the class struggle and sought to raise the morale of the Israeli army.

In June 1959 Ben Gurion and his associates signed an agreement with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany for the sale of Israeli armaments to the FRG. This deal was shrouded in secrecy until the last moment. The fact that Ben Gurion had not found it necessary to inform Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda of the deal was further evidence of what the participation of the "Left-wing Labour" parties in the Government was really worth. The Communist group in the Knesset called for a vote of no confidence in the Government, but the motion was defeated. Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda limited them-

* *Sovremenny Vostok*, 1959, No. 4, p. 19.

** *Ibid.*

*** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5720 (1959/60), 1960, p. 99.

selves to insisting on an immediate debate in the Knesset. The Herut Party tried to use the scandal to strengthen its own positions and demanded the cancellation of the deal. The National Religious Party and the General Zionists adopted a wait-and-see attitude, counting on forming a coalition with Mapai in the event of a Government crisis or after the Knesset elections. Nonetheless, the sale of arms to the Federal Republic of Germany was discussed by the central committees of all the political parties.

Ben Gurion had urgent talks with the leaders of all the extreme Right-wing factions and obtained assurances of support in the Knesset debate of his own draft resolution permitting the sale of Israeli arms to the FRG. The agreement was approved by 57 votes (with 45 against and six abstentions), or by less than half of the deputies present. Fear of incurring total discredit in the eyes of the masses made Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda vote against the motion.

Disagreements in the coalition forced the Ben Gurion Government to resign on July 5, 1959. Due to widespread public indignation it was found impossible to form a Government "which would have the support of a stable majority"*** in the Knesset. It was therefore decided to hold new parliamentary elections with the Government that had resigned remaining in office until the end of the elections.

4. Split in Mapai. Ben Gurion's Attempts to Establish a Dictatorship. The Fourth Knesset (1959-1961)

Massive demonstrations and rallies protesting against the Government's actions swept across the country, merging with the many solidarity strikes that were staged in 1958 and 1959. In 1959 the number of strikers nearly doubled. The large demonstration staged by North African immigrants in Wadi Salib in July 1959 and the clashes between immigrants and the police in Haifa, Beersheba and Migdal-Ha'emek were the subject of debates in the Knesset.

* *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Automatically remaining in power, Ben Gurion and his associates made considerable headway towards their aim. It was a repetition of the old story of the Mapai leader (and Government) resigning before elections and creating a sustained power vacuum. With the Government that had formally resigned exercising administrative functions, the Mapai leadership was able to act without control throughout this period. This was of immense importance in the 1959 election campaign.

An election campaign under the slogan of "A coalition Government with Mapai" was launched by the General Zionists, who had swung so far to the Right that for some time their leaders had been discussing a merger with the ultra-nationalistic Herut.* This distinctly showed that the Israeli big bourgeoisie had become more aggressive. *The Economist* wrote that the door to such a merger had opened because, allegedly, "Herut has lost much of its aggressiveness".** Actually, this was only a screen: Herut never relinquished its aim of starting aggression against the Arab countries.

The Progressive Party entered the election fight with a programme upholding the interests of private capital. The Communist Party was the only party that went to the elections with a programme of struggle for a policy of peace, independence and neutrality.***

At the elections (they were held on November 3, 1959) Mapai took advantage of the disunity among its political opponents. Twenty-four parties and groups took part in the elections. The working-class front remained weak on account of the refusal of Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda to act jointly with the Communist Party.**** Mapai managed to hold its ground with a somewhat larger number of seats. Half of the disunited parties and groups failed to poll the necessary number of votes for representation in the Knesset and were, to all intents and purposes, removed from the political scene. President Ben-Zvi, who

* *The Jerusalem Post*, January 17, 1959.

** *The Economist*, January 17, 1959, p. 231.

*** *Pravda*, October 7, 1959.

**** For details of the elections of November 3, 1959 see G. S. Nikitina, "An Unconvincing Victory", *Sovremenny Vostok*, 1960, No. 1, pp. 39-40.

had been re-elected for a second term in October 1957, empowered Ben Gurion, as the leader of the majority party, to form a new Government.

The new ruling coalition consisted of Mapai, the National Religious Party, Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda. The General Zionists refused to sit in the same Government with the "Lefts". Another reason why Ben Gurion failed to reach agreement with the General Zionists was that his actions did not have the undivided support of his own party. The widening differences in Mapai itself were an obvious symptom of a crisis of the leadership's policies. Ben Gurion and his immediate associates—the Young Mapai comprising the "military caste" in control of the army, the intelligence service, the police, part of the administrative apparatus, the press, the radio, and so on*—were opposed by a group of "veterans" (Lavon, Eshkol and others) representing chiefly the Mapai Party apparatus, the Histadrut leadership and most of the lower echelon organisations. The latter pursued a more moderate political line in opposition to Ben Gurion's dictatorial ambitions. The divergences in Mapai soon developed into a sharp political struggle.

Ben Gurion did everything to strengthen his own position and that of his immediate entourage. In the summer of 1960 he co-opted into the coalition the orthodox Poalei Agudat Israel, whose Higher Council is in the USA. This step was motivated by his desire to receive fresh guarantees from the Western powers.

The Israeli leaders steered irrevocably towards a stronger aggressive alliance with NATO. A milestone on this road was the specially arranged meeting between Ben Gurion and the FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in the USA, which the CPI and all other democratic forces in Israel assessed as a blow to the country's national interests.

In the second half of 1960 Ben Gurion set in motion

* Shimon Peres, former Deputy Minister of Defence; Moshe Dayan, former Minister of Agriculture and Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli Army, and Minister of Defence from June 1967; George Josephtal, former Mapai General Secretary and Minister of Labour; Abba Eban, former Minister of Education and Culture, and Minister for Foreign Affairs from January 1967.

his plan of establishing a dictatorship. In September of that year he trumped up the so-called Lavon affair in an effort to paralyse the opposition from the "veteran" faction in Mapai. However, the Lavon affair shed light on the most unseemly aspects of the Ben Gurion Government's activities, in particular, the above-mentioned terrorist-espionage operation in Cairo planned in 1954 by the Israeli secret service. As the Defence Minister at the time, Lavon, General Secretary of Histadrut, was, as we have pointed out, blamed for the failure of that operation. Ben Gurion counted on relieving Lavon, one of the top leaders of the "veteran Mapai" group, of his office and thereby gaining control of the rather influential Histadrut organisation and, in effect, paralysing the strong opposition. By placing all power in the hands of the Young Mapai, Ben Gurion would have cleared the road to a personal dictatorship.

Despite his desire to give no publicity to the "Lavon affair" and settle it inside the party, it was considered by special Knesset commissions, which found Lavon unimplicated in the "shameful business". This was the first time in Israel's history that a serious conflict within the ruling Mapai Party was brought into sharp relief. The aggressive "positions of strength" policy and "tough line" pursued by Ben Gurion and his supporters were countered by the more moderate policy advocated by the "veterans".

After the Government endorsed the decision of the commission of seven ministers, which exonerated Lavon, Ben Gurion tendered his resignation. Soberly assessing the situation, the Mapai leadership found that further inner-party differences were fraught with the most serious complications up to the total loss of the party's prestige and an explosion of dissatisfaction in the country. On January 15, 1961 the Mapai leadership therefore passed a resolution calling on Ben Gurion to continue his "historic" mission. In the Knesset the Herut and General Zionist motion of no confidence in the Government was defeated. Nonetheless, Ben Gurion resigned on January 31, 1961. Naturally, this involved the resignation of the Government. Four days later, by decision of the Mapai CC, Lavon was relieved of his post as General Secretary of Histadrut.

The Government's resignation only 14 months after

the Knesset elections was evidence of the deep-rooted organic crisis of the Mapai leadership's home and foreign policy. In the decisions adopted by the Political Bureau of the CPI Central Committee in February and March 1961 it was pointed out that the latest and most serious Government crisis was due to the general crisis of the Ben Gurion line of military gambles and was making Israel dependent on foreign capital, a policy leading to the impoverishment of the working people and to the break-down of the foundations of a democratic system. The CPI Central Committee urged the formation of a broad working-class front against the policies of Ben Gurion and his party.*

The country now witnessed an upsurge of the class struggle. The growing contradiction between the Ben Gurion policy and the vital interests of the people** was awakening the workers, farmers, intellectuals and youth. The most massive popular actions in the country's history took place in January 1961, when thousands of demonstrators poured into the streets. The slogans at the political rallies and demonstrations were: "Democracy is in danger—everybody to its defence!" and "Down with Ben Gurion!" Moreover, the people demanded that the Eichmann trial*** should be turned into a trial of fascism. The big teachers' strike in March was the subject of a debate in the Knesset.

Throughout February and March 1961, in this situation which the triple crisis (in the Knesset, in the party and in public life) had complicated for the Mapai leadership, Ben Gurion doggedly refused to form a Government in the calculation that there would be a long power vacuum in the event new parliamentary elections were announced. That is exactly what happened. On March 27 the Knesset decided on self-disbandment, and parliamentary elections were set for August 1961.

In view of the coming elections Ben Gurion hastily applied himself to forming a bloc of reactionary forces. For its part, the big bourgeoisie took advantage of the situation to profit politically at Mapai's expense, regroup

* *Pravda*, February 3 and March 26, 1961.

** *Information Bulletin*, January 1961, No. 1, p. 6.

*** Eichmann's capture was officially announced on May 23, 1960.

its ranks under liberal slogans, win more prestige and strengthen its position. In the course of April and May the General Zionists hurriedly merged with the Progressive Party to form the Liberal Party. On this score the journal *Information Bulletin* wrote that the "Right-wing bourgeois parties have understood the situation and are seeking ways of uniting and reorganising in order to exploit public dissatisfaction with Mapai policy to their own benefit".* The bourgeoisie, the journal said, sought to swing the awakening of the people to the Right, into the channel of bourgeois liberalism.

The class unity of Israel's ruling circles was mirrored in the 10-month-long trial of the nazi criminal Adolf Eichmann, which began on April 11, 1961 in Jerusalem. Through the opposition of these circles the Eichmann trial did not grow into a genuine trial of fascism. It did not expose the fiendish crimes of the nazi butchers or the former nazis currently in high position in the FRG and NATO and controlling the FRG's policy and economy. This was due chiefly to the secret agreement between Ben Gurion and Adenauer. At the outset and during the Eichmann trial, Ben Gurion was mostly concerned with avoiding any move detrimental to the relations between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, despite the fact that Israel public opinion demanded the trial of nazism as a whole.**

The political situation in Israel and Israeli society was analysed at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party, held in the period from May 31 to June 3, 1961 in Tel Aviv and Jaffa. The Congress noted that after four years in power Ben Gurion had found his policy in the throes of a grave crisis. A group emphatically opposed to the leadership's line had taken shape in the Mapai Party itself. These political changes stemmed from popular dissatisfaction with the Ben Gurion regime and its policies. A mass movement of urban and rural working people, in-

* *Information Bulletin*, May 1961, No. 2, pp. 13-14.

** Adolf Eichmann was indicted on 15 counts in connection with the killing of six million Jews. He was sentenced to be hanged, and was executed on May 31, 1962. For the Eichmann trial see: *Pravda*, April 28, 1962; S. A. Andreyev, *Israel*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1962, pp. 112-18; *Six Millions Accuse*, Speech by the Israeli Prosecutor-General, Jerusalem, 1961.

tellectuals, students and young people had sprung up against the Ben Gurion administration,* initially as a movement in defence of democracy and then as criticism of various aspects of the Government's policy.

In its appeal "To the Working Masses, to the People of Israel",** the CPI Congress stressed that a change in policy was a national necessity for Israel. The Ben Gurion regime had turned democracy into a farce, and flouted the rights of the Knesset and the Government, while the corrupt ruling circles were pushing Israel into military gambles in foreign policy and onto the road of militarisation in home affairs. The appeal called for a broad national-democratic front to unite all working people, all patriotic forces, in the struggle for peace, for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, for Israel's independence, for a higher standard of living and democratic reforms.

The Communist Party, the Congress noted, had been stirring the exploited and the oppressed to fight for their rights in the difficult conditions of police, political and economic terror. A result of the tireless efforts by the Communists was the passage of a number of laws on labour, the most important of which were the Hours of Work and Rest Law (1951), the Women's Equal Rights Law (1951), the Employment of Women Law (1951, 1952, 1954) and the National Insurance Laws (1953, 1958 and 1959). This spurred the struggle of the Israeli working people for their rights, democracy and national independence.

5. The Fifth Knesset (1961-1965). Further Attempts by Ben Gurion to Establish a Dictatorship

Giving the Eichmann trial and the widespread agitation as their motives, Ben Gurion and his supporters tried to postpone the parliamentary elections to a later date. Actually, they were desperate for a respite in which to reassemble their ranks that had been disorganised as a result of the "Lavon affair".*** In the election fight, Mapai's chief

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 6.

** *Ibid.*, pp. 185-87.

*** *Rheinischer Merkur*, Cologne, April 14, 1961.

adversary, as was to be expected, was the Liberal Party. Behind a screen of slogans calling for "liberalisation", "the defence of freedoms" and so on, it upheld the interests of the Israeli bourgeoisie, demanding, in particular, every possible facility for private enterprise, the conversion of the trade unions into state agencies and support for the international Zionist movement in social politics and ideology.

The CPI was the only party that opposed the Ben Gurion reactionary, pro-imperialist line with a policy of democratic development.

The elections to the fifth Knesset took place on August 15, 1961. The Mapai Party's slogan was "Above all, a strong army". To procure votes, its leaders again used the state apparatus and the propaganda machine, and had recourse to bribery, political pressure and measures of an economic nature.*

In spite of everything, the voting did not prove to be favourable to Mapai. The number of its mandates dropped to 42 as compared with 47 in 1959. Moreover, the number of seats held by the Arab parties siding with Mapai likewise diminished. The Liberal Party emerged with the second largest poll. The same number of seats (17) was won by Herut. The clerical parties failed to improve their position. Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda gained only one additional seat in the Knesset (altogether 17 mandates). The Communist Party gained a major victory. Compared with the previous elections it polled 50 per cent more votes, winning two more seats.

These elections were assessed as follows by *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*: "Instead of leading to inner consolidation and clarity, the elections ended with a growth of coalition and political difficulties."** The Mapai leaders were now paying for the stepped up militarisation, the deal with the Federal Republic of Germany and Ben Gurion's drive for a dictatorship. In the subsequent period Ben Gurion laboured in vain to find a way out of the situation and had to retire from the political limelight.

* See G. S. Nikitina, "Mapai Loses Mandates", *Afrika i Aziya segodnya*, Moscow, 1961, No. 10, pp. 60-61.

** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Zurich, August 18, 1961.

The new Government was approved only on November 8, 1961. The preceding months had been taken up by talks on the composition of a coalition. These talks were conducted by Levi Eshkol, a prominent but more moderate Mapai leader, who was officially commissioned to do so by the President. This was an adroit move by the Mapai leadership, because it had been decided by the party that the new Government would be headed by Ben Gurion. Mapai outlined the same Government programme as in 1959, only accentuating the unconditional subordination of the ministers to coalition discipline. The new Government consisted of representatives of Mapai, the National Religious Party, the ultra-orthodox Poalei Agudat Israel, and Achdut Ha'avoda. With the support of the pro-Mapai Arab parties it could count on 68 mandates (as against the former 89) and its position was even more precarious than that of the previous Government. However, Mapai secured to itself 10 of the most important ministerial posts. The most prominent Young Mapai from Ben Gurion's immediate circle received posts in the Government. Four of the portfolios went to the clerical parties for the first time. Only two minor posts were occupied by the "Left" Zionists from Achdut Ha'avoda. By agreeing to the role of adjunct of Mapai, this party, in effect, betrayed the interests of the Israeli working people.

By about mid-1963 Ben Gurion and his supporters sought to achieve the double aim of ending the unstable "labour majority", which they had in the Knesset, and establishing a regime of totalitarianism, military dictatorship and personal power. This reactionary aim was pursued by the Israeli ruling élite in home and, particularly, foreign policy. This period strikingly showed that Mapai was steering towards expansionism, stronger ties with the West and an aggravation of relations with the Arab countries, the evidence being the extraordinary laws passed at the close of 1961 and in 1962, and a series of new laws in favour of private, above all, foreign capital, for instance, the decisions on companies, on encouraging investments, on the transfer of the Dead Sea projects to foreign investors (1961), on privileges for foreign investors (1962), and so forth.

Some of the laws were adopted with the objective of

furthering the offensive against the Israeli masses and providing a legal basis for persecuting democratic forces, the ultimate aim being Israel's conversion into a fascist-type state.* In this category were the Military Jurisdiction Act, the Assault of Policemen Act (1960), and the State Security Act (1961). It was calculated that these laws would contribute towards creating the conditions for a dictatorship in Israel.

At the beginning of 1962, in its quest for a way out of the internal and external difficulties, the Mapai-led Government stepped up its efforts to gain admission to the European Economic Community.** To this end, in January and March 1962 Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol visited 14 West-European countries and, later, again visited France, Belgium and Luxemburg. *The Jerusalem Post* wrote that the Government's plan to join the EEC was inevitably linked with "short-range dislocations"*** in the economy. First and foremost, these dislocations were to be seen in the devaluation of the Israeli pound which was one of the basic measures of the "new economic policy" proclaimed on February 10, 1962 and a mandatory condition for consolidation with the Common Market. From the economic standpoint there were no tenable reasons for Israel's association with the Common Market. As the *Information Bulletin* pointed out, Israel's entry into the EEC was dictated, above all, by political motives**** and was regarded by the Israeli rulers as a form of association with NATO.

The Mapai-inspired "New Economic Policy", which hit the living standard of the people while according benefits to private capital, was another result of that party's rule and, in particular, its economic policy.

In the voting for the "New Economic Policy" Mapai was unconditionally supported by the National Religious Party. The Liberal Party criticised only "some of its shortcomings". Achdut Ha'avoda gave its agreement to the "new policy" on condition "some amendments were in-

* *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 5, June 1962, No. 6, p. 38.

** The Israeli Government had raised this question formally in July 1961.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, February 5, 1962.

**** *Information Bulletin*, 1962, No. 2, p. 8.

roduced". Mapam opposed the Government's economic programme but refused to join actively in the CPI's protest campaign.

Strikes directed against the "New Economic Policy" did not cease throughout 1961 and 1962. The working people demanded a reduction of food prices and protested against the rising cost of living. Throughout the country workers' committees organised protest rallies against "the all-out attack of the Government and the employers against the living standard of the toiling masses".*

Armed conflicts were resumed in February 1962 on Israel's frontiers with Jordan and Syria, and with Egypt in the region of Gaza. These acts of Israeli aggression were condemned by the UN Security Council. However, the Mapai leaders ignored the Security Council decision and railroaded a resolution through the Knesset qualifying this decision as "evinced one-sidedness" and asserting "that Israel's right of self-defence is an unchallengeable and sovereign one".** The second round of "local military operations", notably on the frontiers of Jordan and Syria, followed in the summer and autumn of 1962. Meanwhile Ben Gurion and his supporters took steps to strengthen their position in the Knesset and the Government. In June 1962 they engineered the adoption of a new law intensifying the collective and personal responsibility of the Ministers and of the parties represented by them in the Government. A Minister's disagreement with a Government decision or abstention from voting without the Government's sanction automatically entailed his resignation.

The actions started in 1962 by the Israeli working class and masses against the Government's policy and against the attacks of the reactionaries acquired new qualitative hues in 1963. At the beginning of the year there were turbulent demonstrations against the military regime in the Arab areas. It is important to note that for the first time mass actions against the country's militarisation closely intertwined with the struggle of the Left-wing forces in the Knesset. The struggle of the Israeli work-

* *Ibid.*, No. 9, p. 20.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5723 (1962/63), 1963, p. 80.

ing people was activated through the influence and direct participation of the Communists. Finding that "unity means success in struggle",* the Israeli working people displayed growing class-consciousness. In 1962-1963 the CPI membership increased by 20 per cent.

In face of the massive protest movement the Government had no alternative but to raise in the Knesset the question of the military regime in Arab-populated areas. The Government-moved resolution in favour of preserving the military regime for "security" reasons was passed in the Knesset by a majority of only one of February 20, 1963. The Communist motion calling for the abolition of this regime received 56 votes (against 57 with six abstentions). The abstentions were by the Achdut Ha'avoda deputies.

Armed conflicts continued on the Israeli-Arab frontiers throughout the first half of 1963. The military clique headed by Ben Gurion went to all ends "to prepare the ground for Israeli military intervention in Jordan, or at least an invasion of the west bank of the Jordan River".** In this connection on May 6, 1963 the CPI Central Committee strongly appealed to public opinion for peace on the Israeli-Arab frontiers.

On May 13 Ben Gurion addressed the Knesset, urging Israel's further armament.*** The former Bonn Defence Minister Franz-Josef Strauss was visiting Israel at the time, the visit raising a storm of public indignation. According to Western press reports, Ben Gurion discussed with him the prospects for co-operation between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany.

These developments further weakened the Government's position, and on June 16, 1963 nation-wide indignation forced Ben Gurion to resign. He gave "personal reasons" as the motive for his resignation despite the obvious fact that it was the result of the unpopular military, economic and foreign policy of the country's ruling circles. Commenting on this development, *Information Bulletin* wrote that "undoubtedly, one of the reasons for Ben

* *Information Bulletin*, 1963, No. 1, p. 4.

** *Ibid.*, No. 2, p. 2.

*** For a closer study of the situation in Israel in this period see *Vsemirnoye proisoyuznoye dvizheniye*, March 1963, pp. 14-16.

Gurion's resignation was growing American pressure against the too close relations of Israel with Bonn-Paris".*

President Zalman Shazar (elected in May 1963 after the death of Ben Zvi) commissioned another Mapai leader, Levi Eshkol, to form a Government. The Coalition Government again consisted of Mapai, Achdut Ha'avoda and National Religious Party representatives. Supported by the clerical Poalei Agudat Israel and the pro-Mapai Arab parties the Government had, as before, only a working majority of 68 mandates in the Knesset. Once more Mapai took over 10 of the 15 portfolios. The new Prime Minister declared that his Government "would persevere in the path that has been followed by the previous Governments".**

The Communist group voted against the Eshkol Government on the grounds that it was a no-change Government. Even the Western press felt that Eshkol's nomination indicated that there would be "no change in the Israeli Government's policy", but that Eshkol was "considerably more elastic" and had shown "unwillingness to take drastic steps".*** Without changing its political line or practice of political balancing, which allowed it to remain in power, the Mapai leadership adopted more flexible, masked and subtle means and methods. *Information Bulletin* warned against "continuing the old Bengurionite policy", a "catastrophic policy that has already proved its total bankruptcy".****

The strike movement aimed at improving the material, social and cultural conditions of life was gaining in breadth. Labour Ministry statistics published in September 1963 showed that in that year the strikes involved 242,700 people. In September 1963 strikes were staged by busmen in Tel Aviv, at the Yuval-Gad factory in Ashkelon and at the Zimron factory in Bnei Brak. In mid-October 6,000 people demonstrated in the streets of Jerusalem under slogans calling for freedom from religious compulsion. A one-day strike for higher pay and

* *Information Bulletin*, May-June 1963, No. 3-4, p. 28.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, June 25, 1963.

*** *The Financial Times*, June 19, 1963.

**** *Information Bulletin*, September 1963, No. 5, p. 18.

better working conditions was staged in November by 25,000 specialists with a higher education. This was evidence of the "deepening of class consciousness, strengthening of fighting unity and greater firmness in the struggle ... resulting from the class conflict between capital and workers".* Moreover, it was the answer to the Government's "New Economic Policy".

At the Mapai convention in October 1963 the leadership pursued the objective of regrouping the party's ranks and charting ways of camouflaging its aims and continuing the former pro-imperialist line. At the same time, as was pointed out by *Naroden Glas*, the newspaper of the Israeli Communists, the Mapai convention demonstrated that there were two wings in the Party and in the Government.** The Mapai leaders made another effort to draw Mapam into the Coalition Government and use it as a "Left screen" for their reactionary policies. This question was the subject of the talks between Mapai, Achdut Ha'avoda and Mapam representatives in January 1964. Mapai was particularly eager to attain this aim because the Israeli Government's statement on its unilateral decision to divert the waters of the Jordan had sharply aggravated Arab-Israeli relations at the close of 1963 and the beginning of 1964.

Despite the deteriorating situation caused by this decision, Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban declared in January 1964 that Israel would "go ahead with the National Water Carrier despite Arab threats",*** thereby indicating that Israel's ruling circles were prepared to take drastic action even if it meant starting a military conflict.

In the period from 1964 to 1966 political developments in Israel herself proceeded along the following main lines. The militarists, the big bourgeoisie and the ultra-nationalists openly continued to move towards closer unity, thus making it obvious that the Israeli bourgeoisie as a whole was swinging to the Right. Clericalism grew steadily more aggressive, creating a threat even to the formal parliamentary democracy in the country. In February 1966

* *Information Bulletin*, October 1963, No. 6, pp. 19, 20.

** *Naroden Glas*, October 24, 1963.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, January 9, 1964.

Israel's economic difficulties began to mount, this being expressed chiefly by a sharp rise of prices and of the cost of living, by the curtailment of production, by mass dismissals and growing unemployment as a result of the intensive militarisation and Israel's increasing dependence on aid from the imperialist powers. During these years the working people stepped up the struggle for their rights, against domination by local and foreign capital. In this struggle the Israeli working people, above all, the working class, demonstrated their growing class consciousness.

These developments found expression in the events of that period. Ben Gurion's resignation was only a temporary retreat. At the beginning of 1964 reaction started a counter-attack. The first test of strength was the long-drawn-out "Lavon affair", which, while creating the impression that "justice" was being done, made it possible to screen the most unseemly actions and aims. A struggle over the limits of power raged between the bourgeois parties in the Knesset from February 18, 1964 (the day on which Agriculture Minister Dayan spoke in the Knesset on the "Lavon affair" allegedly "in self-defence") to May. The motions of no confidence (in February) by the Opposition and the Communist deputies (who came out against the militarist clique with its dangerous plans for a dictatorship and expansionist leanings) was passed by a majority. The only reason that the Government survived was that Prime Minister Eshkol dissociated himself from the Dayan statement.

Nevertheless, in May 1964 there was another round of the "Lavon affair", this time on Eshkol's initiative. It was called forth by the Mapai leadership's desire to preserve at least the semblance of party unity in connection with Eshkol's pending visit to the USA. In view of the Lavon group's threat to walk out of Mapai, Eshkol and some other Mapai leaders wrote an open letter calling on Lavon and his supporters to return to the party fold in order to "contribute to strengthening Mapai".* Eshkol informed the Mapai Secretariat, including Ben Gurion, of this letter only after it had been sent to the Lavon

* *New Outlook, Middle East Monthly*, Tel Aviv, May 1964, pp. 56-57.

group. This "private clash" between Eshkol and Ben Gurion had its roots in the growing divergences within Mapai which developed into a sharp struggle between the openly militarist Ben Gurion clique, preaching Zionism as state ideology and demanding a close alliance with imperialism, and the more moderate section of Mapai and the Israeli ruling élite headed by Eshkol. Therefore, as a counterbalance to Ben Gurion, who had created a situation of "permanent alarm",* Eshkol with his somewhat more moderate but essentially same policy objectively became the figure with whom was linked the struggle for formal parliamentary democracy in the period 1964-1966, in other words, the struggle against undisguised militarism and adventurism in home and foreign policy. The rivalry between Eshkol and Ben Gurion continued even after Ben Gurion resigned his Mapai membership in August 1965. Throughout this period, therefore, the slogan "Ben Gurion has gone—may Ben-gurionism go with him" retained its topicality for the democratic forces in Israel.

Eshkol's tactics were to strengthen Mapai internally and reinforce its "Left" flank by setting up a "labour" coalition, i.e., an alliance with Achdut Ha'avoda and, if possible, with Mapam. Achdut Ha'avoda's condition for joining the coalition was Lavon's complete exoneration (Ben Gurion had opposed any sort of alliance with Achdut Ha'avoda). In face of the growing class struggle of the working people and also in order to provide a screen for the intensive militarisation that had been started at the beginning of 1965, it was of the utmost importance for Mapai to create a "Left" covering detachment. Another factor behind this step was that the Knesset elections were to be held in the autumn of 1965.

In May 1964 motions of no confidence in the Eshkol Government were made by the CPI and Mapam, who came out against the Government's attacks on the freedom to strike. A similar motion was tabled by the Liberal Party, but it demanded a strong hand against the strikers. Eshkol explained the situation** and succeeded in defeating

* *Information Bulletin*, 1965, No. 2, p. 4.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5725 (1964/65), 1964, p. 20.

the no confidence motions. However, this Knesset debate showed whose interests the Eshkol Government was actually upholding. It was far from the thought of calling on big business to "tighten its belt".

The Mapai Secretariat's decision in favour of an alliance with Achdut Ha'avoda, a decision directed, in effect, against Ben Gurion, strengthened Eshkol's position as Prime Minister and party leader. Ben Gurion and his group reacted promptly. Agriculture Minister Moshe Dayan, whom Ben Gurion had named as his natural successor, resigned from the Government on November 3 on the grounds that he did not see eye to eye with the Prime Minister.* For his part, Ben Gurion categorically demanded an amendment of the electoral system, but this was rejected by the Mapai Executive. At the same sitting the Mapai Executive voted in favour of acting with Achdut Ha'avoda in a single list at the forthcoming parliamentary and municipal elections and at the elections to the Histadrut. The question of an electoral reform was removed from the immediate agenda. In protest, Ben Gurion walked out of the Mapai Executive and sent an ultimatum to the Government, chiefly to Eshkol, demanding a re-examination of the "Lavon affair" and threatening that if that were not done he would resign from Mapai and form a separate group. The opposition parties, including the CPI, tabled a motion of no confidence in the Government for its concessions to Ben Gurion. In this situation Eshkol and, consequently, the Government, resigned on December 14.

Even *The Jerusalem Post*, the official Government newspaper, wrote that Eshkol's resignation was a tactical step.** *Information Bulletin* assessed it as a "reaction to the pressure exerted by Ben Gurion circles".*** On the same day, the Israeli Communists issued a Statement "To the People in Israel", in which it was underlined that Ben Gurion and his cronies were launching an offensive on democratic freedoms and on the sovereignty of the Knesset with the aim of establishing a personal military

* *New Outlook, Middle East Monthly*, Tel Aviv, November-December 1964, Vol. 7, No. 9, p. 93.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, December 15, 1964.

*** *Information Bulletin*, January 1965, No. 1, p. 12.

dictatorship, and that the crisis had its source in the continuation of traditional official policy by the Eshkol Government. The Statement called for the unity of all democratic forces in order to prevent the Ben Gurion junta from seizing power and for the establishment of a Government loyal to the interests of democracy, peace and the working people.* In face of nation-wide censure and also of the activation of the Right-wing opposition (Herut and the Liberal Party), which was demanding the Knesset's dissolution, the Mapai leaders had to make their final choice. On December 16 the Mapai Secretariat passed a decision (which was approved on December 17 by the party Executive) to nominate Eshkol to the premiership and rejected Ben Gurion's demand for a new inquiry into the "Lavon affair" by a vote of 16 against 8.

6. The Sixth Knesset. Offensive by Reaction and Clericalism. Further Economic Difficulties. Class Struggle of the Working People

On December 21 President Zalman Shazar formally commissioned Levi Eshkol to form a new Government. Compared with the previous Government there was no change in the one that was formed on December 22: Mapai got ten of the 15 portfolios. On December 23 the Government and its programme were submitted for approval by the Knesset.

The Communist deputies, who had bitterly condemned the Government's pro-imperialist line, voted against the "new-old Government".** At its very first sitting the Government denied Ben Gurion's demand for a renewal of the inquiries into the "Lavon affair", formally putting an end to this question. Such was the first result of the struggle between the two trends in Mapai.

Information Bulletin wrote that the Eshkol Government refused "to take even the first steps towards a new policy.... Such a solution to the most recent Government crisis does not constitute the end to the crisis affecting

* *Information Bulletin*, January 1965, No. 1, p. 12.

** *Ibid.*

the regime in Israel, but on the contrary, it heralds the continuation of the crisis and its intensification.... The danger of a dictatorship, though it has suffered a setback, still threatens".* In their platform for the Knesset elections in November 1965 the Israeli Communists raised the following fundamental issues: 1) struggle for peace, security, independence and neutrality (renunciation of the policy making Israel increasingly dependent on the NATO powers, an improvement of relations with the USSR, the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict through recognition of the rights of the Arab refugees, and so on); 2) the recovery of the national economy and the attainment of economic independence (reduction of military expenditures, cancellation of the privileges and priorities granted to foreign and local monopoly capital, nationalisation of the basic branches of the economy, and so forth); 3) protection of the rights and interests of the working class and the people, equality of rights of the Arab population, adoption of a democratic Constitution, and so on.

At the 10th Mapai convention, which opened on February 10, 1965 in connection with the "Lavon affair", Ben Gurion's solicitations were turned down once again (by a two-thirds majority) despite the fact that he was elected to the new Mapai Executive.

The struggle in Mapai "between the bad and the worse" activated the Right-wing elements. This time taking the initiative, the Liberal Party started negotiations with the ultra-nationalists in Herut with the purpose of forming a "united parliamentary bloc". This prompted the "Independent Liberals" to walk out of the Liberal Party and form an independent group. The formation of the Herut-Liberal bloc indicated that the Israeli big bourgeoisie had swung strongly to the Right, bringing its reactionary and aggressive character into the open.**

Although the balance of power in the new Mapai Secretariat elected in March 1965 remained at "66 to 34",*** Ben Gurion did not relinquish his intention of re-

* *Ibid.*

** The Herut-Liberal bloc (Gahal) took final shape on April 26, 1965 and was officially registered in the Knesset in May.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, March 15, 1965.

trieving the positions he had lost. In early May he and four of his supporters withdrew from the Mapai leadership, and on May 20 the pro-Ben Gurion Minister of Development and Housing Joseph Almogi and the Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres tendered their resignations. The crisis in Mapai once more began to develop into a Government crisis.

In order to prevent this crisis the Mapai leadership nominated Eshkol for the premiership in the event the party carried the elections. In retaliation Ben Gurion and his supporters turned their backs on Mapai on June 29 and presented an independent list of candidates for the Knesset elections and a 10-point programme aimed at intensifying reaction and militarism. Ben Gurion registered his group, including six deputies, as an independent Knesset faction calling itself Israel Labour List (Rafi).^{*} *The Israel Economist*, organ of business circles, wrote bluntly that "there has been a shift to the Right, and for the first time since 1948 the formation of a Right-Centre Government has become a real possibility. The emergence of Rafi has also strengthened the forces opposed to Left-wing policies".^{**}

During the election campaign the Mapai leaders were eager, on the one hand, to disunite their opponents by setting up various small groups with independent election lists, and, on the other, to merge with Achdut Ha'avoda in view of the fact that the National Religious Party was "a serious competitor" in the elections.^{***}

The elections to the sixth Knesset were held on November 2, 1965 with the participation of 17 parties and groups, five of which had no political platform. Eighty-two per cent of the voters went to the polls. Although the Mapai-Achdut Ha'avoda coalition won the majority, it polled 4 per cent less votes than at the preceding elections and lost five mandates. The Gahal bloc (Liberals-Herut) received the second largest number of mandates—26. The Right-wing parties and the clericals lost many votes with the result that for the second time since 1949 the religious bloc found itself relegated to third place. Rafi won ten

^{*} Ben Gurion was formally expelled from Mapai on July 24.

^{**} *The Israel Economist*, September 1965, p. 124.

^{***} *The Jerusalem Post*, October 1, 1965.

mandates: it was supported by new immigrants, part of the workers' aristocracy and also a section of the officers' corps. Mapam amassed a somewhat larger number of votes. The CPI received three mandates, and the Mikunis group one.^{*} The results of these elections thus showed that the Israeli masses were opposed to the offensive of the big bourgeoisie, the ultra-nationalists and the militarists. To prevent the militarists from seizing power, they gave their votes to the Zionist "labour parties".

In this situation the formation of a Government proved to be a difficult problem for Eshkol. After nearly ten weeks of sharp bargaining, in the course of which the Knesset was paralysed, a Government was formed on January 12, 1966. It represented an alliance of the centrists (Mapai) with the reactionaries (National Religious Party and Independent Liberals) and the "Lefts" (Achdut Ha'avoda and Mapam) and had a substantial majority in the Knesset: 75 of the 120 mandates. Of the 18 portfolios, 12 went to the coalition of Mapai (9) and Achdut Ha'avoda. The Government's programme showed that there was no change in the policy of fostering the reactionary ideology of Zionism and serving the interests of private capital. A new feature was the demagogic point concerning the adoption of so-called Fundamental Laws, which, together with those already in operation, were to comprise the elements of a Constitution.^{**} The Knesset passed a vote of confidence in the new Government on January 12. The Communists, the Gahal bloc, Rafi and Agudat Israel voted against this motion.

The Mapai leadership clung to their former political line, and the new Government was confronted with the same problems as before. First and foremost, the Right-wing parties stepped up their efforts to protect the large profits of business from taxation. This "pressure from the Right" was turned on in February 1966, when there was a sharp rise of the prices of necessities accompanied by an increase of taxes and rates. It was officially admitted

^{*} Under the New Communist List and the Mikunis group's Communist List resulting from the split in the CPI in May 1965 (see section 3 of Chapter 2).

^{**} *Basic Principles of the New Government's Programme*, January 12, 1966, *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5726 (1965/66), 1966, Suppl.

that "economic activity weakened and the Israel economy became more vulnerable during 1965"* (by mid-1966, for instance, industry was working at 30 per cent below capacity). In March there were 30,000 unemployed. In May 1966, in the so-called development towns, only 40 per cent of the heads of households had permanent employment. The Gahal bloc demanded a vote of no confidence in the Government on the grounds that there was no stability in the country.

The drastic worsening of the economic situation determined developments in Israel throughout the first half of 1966. The ruling circles claimed that the difficulties were due to the abnormal growth of consumption, to a "race for luxuries", to the workers' "exorbitant" demand for higher wages, and so on. The real reason, however, was that Israel had activated its preparations for war.

The summer session of the Knesset opened with a debate on unemployment. Representatives of the ruling coalition urged putting up with unemployment and justified it as a necessary measure for the stabilisation of the economy.** In this they were supported by Mapam and Achdut Ha'avoda.

Special mention must be made of the growing influence exercised by clericalism, which was becoming increasingly more militant. In 1964-1966 the clericals openly advanced reactionary demands. In early 1964 the National Religious Party had rendered substantial assistance to the Ben Gurion-Dayan military-political group in again whipping up the "Lavon affair", choosing that particular moment to present another of its ultimatums to Prime Minister Eshkol. During the 1965 election campaign Itzhak Rafael, leader of the National Religious Party, declared quite frankly that his programme was aimed at turning Israel into "a state of the Torah and of the Sabbath".*** He urged all religious Jews to submit only to the rabbinical courts. After the elections, as a condition for joining the Coalition Government the National Religious Party de-

* *Bank of Israel Report 1965; The Jerusalem Post*, June 2, 1966.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, May 15, 1966.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, October 4, 1965. Religious bans on the Sabbath are the subject of constant sharp debate between the clericals and the Government.

manded further concessions, this time in the field of medicine (the banning of autopsies in hospitals without the permission of relatives) and in school education (state grants-in-aid for all religious schools). In Israel more than one-third of the children go to religious schools. But even in secular schools the study of the Torah is compulsory. The Israeli youth are thus educated in a spirit of religious intolerance.

There is sharp antagonism between the communities over the question of which is more Orthodox. At the Knesset debate in the summer of 1966, it was stressed that the Ministry of Religious Affairs had grown into a state within a state. Speaking on behalf of progressive public opinion in Israel, the Communist deputies demanded the complete separation of the exercise of religious functions from the state and an immediate halt to oppression by the clericals.*

However, on June 6 the Eshkol Government passed a law on the partial observance of the Sabbath: all shops and factories were to be closed on that day. The 18-year-long struggle over this issue between the Government and the clericals thus ended in a victory for the latter.

In 1965 and the first half of 1966 there was a steady intensification of the working people's struggle against oppression, reaction and the Government's anti-national policies. The strikes in 1965 involved nearly 100,000 people. The working class became more active as the strike struggle mounted. There was a growing number of strikes that did not have the approval of the Histadrut leadership. In the summer of 1966 many veteran workers found themselves among the unemployed, mostly newly-arrived immigrants.

The strike struggle fused with political actions—massive demonstrations against the deals that the Israeli rulers were making with imperialism.

Ever since Israel's formation, its political development was thus being determined by the Mapai social-reformist leadership's policy of furthering the interests of the big bourgeoisie which has pushed the country into the vice of economic dependence on foreign capital.

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 1, 1966.

With the adoption of Zionism as the state ideology there was an intensification of reaction in all spheres of social life: militarism and militant clericalism flourished unchecked. During the 19 years of Mapai rule that party's reformists had knitted a close coalition with the big bourgeoisie, the ultra-nationalists and the clericals, attacked the rights of the working people and their standard of living, and strengthened allied ties with the imperialist powers, chiefly the USA, as the condition for remaining in power and attaining their expansionist ambitions at the expense of the Arab countries.

The Israeli proletariat and all other working people, both Jews and Arabs, clearly saw that the anti-national policies of the ruling classes were undermining the country's economy and sovereignty and activated their struggle against these policies. The only way out of the formidable difficulties was to secure a radical change of home and foreign policy. Such a change could be effected by a government loyal to peace, democracy, national independence and social progress, whose formation was hindered by the internal reaction and the international Zionist-imperialist alliance.

ALLIANCE WITH THE WEST
AND THE EXPANSIONIST
FOREIGN POLICY

1. Israel and the USA.
US-Israeli Agreements

The imperialist forces of the West, of the USA in particular, influence Israel's foreign policy even more than her home policy. Founded above all on the expansionist ambitions of the colonialists in the Middle East, the aggressive alliance between Israeli rulers and the imperialist circles of the Western powers determines the main guideline and substance of Israel's foreign policy. True, the Israeli rulers also pursue their own expansionist aims relative to the Arab countries. This is precisely the area in which their interests dovetail with those of international imperialism. An idea of the role accorded to Israel in the USA's expansionist policy in the Middle East is given in a memorandum headed "Why Israel Needs American Aid", drawn up in 1951 when Israel was included in the American Mutual Security Programme.*

This document merits close scrutiny because for many years it has determined the character of the relations between the USA and Israel. Thus, in the section headed "The Interests of the United States" it is underlined that a strong Israel is vital to the security and welfare of the United States because the "menace of new aggressions by

* *The Mutual Security Programme. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives. Eighty-Second Congress. First Session (June 26-July 31, 1951), United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1951, pp. 644-47.*

communist tyranny in Iran and elsewhere in the Near East is great. Israel is a bulwark in that area for world democracy. In the light of American self-interest, we cannot ignore the situation prevailing in those countries". Characterising the situation in the Middle East, the memorandum pointed out that the West might be denied invaluable oil resources as a result of revolutionary developments in Iran and Iraq, and noted that Egypt had stepped up its efforts to force Britain "to withdraw the last Western defences from the vital Suez Canal".

The memorandum openly defined Israel's role in any possible Western military adventures against the Arab countries. Under the heading "Israel's Strategic Importance" it is stated in part: "Israel is strategically located. A bridge between three continents, it has a relatively long coast line, with a major seaport at Haifa and a great airport at Lydda. . . . There are a number of important airports both in the north and south. Israel is 125 miles from the Suez Canal, 160 miles from the British sea and air bases at Egypt. It is adjacent to oil-rich areas." Therefore, "Israel's role as a communications centre, supply base, and production arsenal must be taken into account by those concerned with the defence of freedom".

Seven years later, in April 1958, Congressman James C. Healey stated in the House of Representatives: "I am sure that American friendship and aid have been a vital source of strength to the people of Israel during this first decade."* That same year the United States enlarged its aid programme to Israel on the spurious grounds of countering the "Arab boycott". In 1959 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives discussed the question of military aid, for Israel in particular, in order to "support significant military forces" in that country and secure its cooperation with the West.**

US congressmen made no secret of the fact that Israel

* *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 85th Congress, Second Session, Vol. 104, Part 5, March 27, 1958 to April 22, 1958, Washington, 1958, p. 6609.*

** *Mutual Security Act of 1959, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, First Session, Part 1, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1959, p. 278.*

had been assigned an important role against the anti-colonial, national liberation movement and progressive forces ("communist menace") in the Middle East, namely as a military springboard that was being strengthened against the alleged "mounting hostility" of the Arab states.

The US ruling circles invariably underscored the fighting capacity of the Israeli army and openly spoke of using Israel in possible Middle Eastern conflicts. For instance, in 1960 Congressman O'Hara told the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs that the "soldiers of Israel have established a great tradition as fighting men".*

In 1961 Senator Scott declared: "It must be recognised that Israel is America's best friend in the Middle East and that she is here to stay."** The considerable special aid granted to Israel that same year was given "on a political basis, rather than on an economic basis".***

For their part the Israeli ruling circles use every opportunity to stress and extol US-Israeli friendship and the alliance between the two countries. According to their statements, US aid had a "crucial effect upon our [i.e., Israel's—Ed.] survival."****

US-Israeli relations are eloquently described in *My Mission in Israel*, a book by the first United States Ambassador in Israel James G. McDonald. To begin with, McDonald's appointment had no precedent in diplomacy as regards speed. He was appointed by Truman personally and given official status before the Israeli Government had formally agreed to his nomination. This happened three hours after the State of Israel was proclaimed. In July 1948, before setting out for Israel, McDonald received a

* *Mutual Security Act of 1960, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, Second Session, Part 4, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1960, p. 678.*

** *Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 87th Congress, First Session, Vol. 107, Part 3, February 27, 1961 to March 15, 1961, Washington, 1961, p. 3063.*

*** *Mutual Security Appropriations for 1961 (and Related Agencies), Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, Second Session, Part II, United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1960, p. 2112.*

**** Abba Eban, Op. cit., p. 87.

personal letter from Truman stating: "In addition to your regular reports to the Department of State, I shall expect you to keep me personally informed on such matters as relate to the arms embargo, the appropriate time for full recognition, and the types of assistance as may be required by and can properly be granted to the new State."*

In September 1948 McDonald told Moshe Sharett, then Israeli Foreign Minister, that he hoped Israel would exercise a "beneficial influence" on the region adjacent to her and assured Sharett that the US Government was prepared to render "aid in every proper way in this creative development".**

The American advisers (later replaced by a special mission which functions to this day under US-Israeli agreements), flooding the country on the pretext of supervising the aid programmes, had virtually unlimited control over various spheres of life in the State of Israel. In 1957, in order to boost American influence, the United States mission was reinforced with experts invited whenever the need for them arose.

The American Jewish League for Israel was established in the USA in 1957, its honorary members including prominent American industrialists and financiers operating in Israel, for example, Joseph Mazar, founder of the paper factory in Hadera, Samuel Dorf, head of the United Jewish Appeal, and Benjamin Harris, founder of the Ampal Company. Many other Jewish organisations having ties with Israel exist in the USA. *The Jewish Yearbook*,*** published in London, lists over 50 of the principal Jewish institutions in the USA. Among them are the United Jewish Appeal, Agudat Israel of America, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Central Conference of American Rabbis, Hadassah (the Women's Zionist Organisation of America), the Jewish Book Council of America, the Jewish Labour Committee, the Jewish

* James G. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, New York, 1951, pp. 16-17.

** *Ibid.*, p. 52.

*** For example, see: *The Jewish Yearbook*, 1956 (5716-17), London, 1956, pp. 301-02.

National Fund, the Jewish Theological Seminary of America and Karen Hayesod.

In Israel the USA engages in massive ideological propaganda by means of special aid programmes in education, culture and other areas. Under the Informational Media Guaranty Programme,* an agreement on economic co-operation signed in June 1952, the USA sends various printed matter to Israel (books, periodicals, etc.), and also paper and printshop and laboratory equipment. For instance, an American credit of 4 million dollars was granted for the import of books from the USA. This allows the USA to inundate Israel with all sorts of propaganda literature, and thereby influence public opinion. Moreover, this programme is aimed at preventing the circulation of literature in the Russian language in Israel, the dissemination of the truth about the Soviet Union.

Under the Agreement between the USA and Israel for Financing Certain Educational Exchange Programmes,** signed in July 1956 with the express purpose of extending cultural and scientific aid to Israel,*** the USA sends that country information material that is paid for in local currency out of US credits. Moreover, provision was made for the establishment of departments for the study of the USA at leading Israeli higher educational institutions and for the allocation of funds for research in fields in which better understanding could be promoted between the USA and Israel. The USA has financed an exchange of specialists for scientific study, research, instruction and other activity in education. Money has been allocated for the translation and publication of American textbooks and technical manuals and for the study of the English language. The signed agreement was carried into force by the US State Department and by such Government agencies as the International Co-operation Administration and the United States Information Agency, and also by numerous American Jewish organisations. The United States Educational Foundation was established by the agreement with

* *Treaties and Other International Acts Series* (further TIAS), 2588; *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5714 (1953/54), 1954, p. 152.

** TIAS, 3612.

*** Statement by US Secretary of State John F. Dulles, July 17, 1956, *The Department of State Bulletin*, 1956, No. 893, p. 222.

Israel, the US Ambassador holding the post of honorary chairman of its board. In other words, the USA received the possibility of directly influencing the education system in Israel. When this agreement was signed, the US State Department noted its "understanding of the role played by Israel in the Middle East". The US Government was the side most interested in the adoption and implementation of this agreement.* In 1961 the agreement was substantially enlarged and in 1962 it was replaced by a new agreement.**

Under the educational and professional training aid programme,** signed in May 1957, Israel annually sends the most promising graduates of the Hebrew University for further training in the USA. Upon completion of this training course they are given appointments at the University or research institutes in Israel. Control of this programme gives the USA wide possibilities for training proponents of American influence.

According to the *Israel Government Yearbooks*, there is a constant flow to Israel of members of both houses of the US Congress, state governors, government officials, heads of American Jewish organisations, mayors, judges, trade unionists, writers, journalists, and television programme editors. In the report for 1961/62 it was noted that the "bonds between American Jewry and Israel drew ever closer. Tourism expands."****

The USA powerfully influences the Israeli press, regularly supplying it with information and bulletins of the United States Information Service and of the US Embassy in Tel Aviv. A branch of Radio Free Europe, which specialises in slander against the USSR and other socialist countries, was opened in Israel in 1956.

In 1952 the USA and Israel signed a military agreement, which was enveloped in secrecy for fear of sharp reaction in the Arab countries and of world-wide condemnation. It was first published in the official newspaper *Reshumot* only in 1961. It should be noted, however, that

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5717 (1956), p. 245.

** TIAS, 4744; 5097.

*** *Economic Review*, 1957, No. 40, p. 16.

**** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), p. 165.

for Israel there had been commitments of an obviously military nature even in earlier agreements.

For instance, the Air Transport Agreement signed on June 13, 1950, gave the USA what was termed as "a fair and equal opportunity" in Israel, in other words, the right to use Israeli territory as a strategic springboard. In the reports of the US Export-Import Bank to the US Congress it was indicated that part of the first two American loans to Israel had been spent on equipment for the port of Haifa, the maintenance of the Lydda air base and the reconstruction and commissioning of nearly 200 miles of railways.

In the Emergency Economic Assistance Agreement,** signed by the USA and Israel in May 1952, it is stated that American aid was being granted because "the unfortunate financial position of Israel is a threat to the political stability of the Near East". Israel's undertaking to maintain "political stability" in the Middle East stemmed from the US-Israeli agreements of December 7, 1951 and November 25, 1953 (on economic aid to Israel). Israel was bound to military commitments by the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement,** signed with the USA in July 1952, under which she pledged to use the aid received by her under the expansionist Mutual Defence Assistance Act adopted by the US Government in 1949 "to further the policies and purposes of that Act". Moreover, Israel was obliged: a) "to furnish equipment and materials, services or other assistance . . . to the United States"; b) along with the USA "to participate in the defence of the area of which it is a part" (i.e., the Middle East.—G.N.). In other words, in the event of a local or world war, Israel has to place her war and economic potential at the disposal of the USA.

It should be borne in mind that the military alliance between the USA and Israel took shape at a time when the West was intent on forcing the imperialist "Middle East Command" pact on the Arab countries.

The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation

* *US Treaties and Other International Agreements*, Vol. 3, Washington, 1952, Part 4, pp. 4582-4612.

** TIAS, 2571.

*** *Ibid.*, 2675.

between the United States of America and Israel,* of August 1951, gave the USA rights and privileges in virtually all spheres of life in Israel (see, for instance, Art. VII). The unequal nature of this "treaty" was so glaring that it was ratified by the Knesset only in 1954, i.e., three years after it was signed.

To this day the Israeli Government invariably stresses its co-operation and solidarity with the USA in "the common purpose—the maintenance of Middle Eastern stability and peace".**

In 1965 the USA and Israel signed a Procurement of Goods and Services Agreement under which the US Defence Department may use Israeli currency now or later available to it for the procurement in Israel of goods and services for use outside Israel for its own purposes without restriction.***

A point to be noted is that at the time the US ruling circles had to pursue an extremely intricate policy in the Arab East. On the one hand, they used Israel to attain their expansionist aims in the Middle East and, on the other, they were unwilling to spoil their relations with the Arab states because of Israel. Therefore, without publicising their military alliance with Israel, the US ruling circles were deeply interested in sustaining tension between Israel and the Arab countries. While manoeuvring in every possible way in its Middle East policy, the USA sought to give the impression that in the complex Arab-Israeli conflict it was concerned for the interests of the Arab countries as well. Actually, US imperialism uses Israel as a weapon to intimidate and pressure the peoples of the Middle East. By following in the wake of US foreign policy, the Israeli rulers are turning their country into an accomplice of colonialism and imperialism, which are odious to the Middle Eastern peoples, and this is evoking the corresponding reaction from them.

In *Israel and Dollar Diplomacy*, published in 1953, the well-known American scholar Victor Perlo wrote that in its Middle East policy the United States was

* TIAS, 2948.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. 165.

*** TIAS, 5839.

guided by "diplomatic considerations of avoiding 'favouritism' between Israel and neighbouring Arab states". Further, he noted that the "interests of the Rockefellers and Standard Oil in the Arab States are incomparably larger and more decisive for US imperialism than Wall Street investments in Israel, present and potential. . . . An Israel Government willing to be a counter in the imperialist rivalries of the Middle East cannot be more than a pawn to be sacrificed in the interests of larger profit".*

It will be recalled that during the triple aggression against Egypt, the USA, which had been for nearly a decade preparing Israel financially and militarily for just such a moment, remained in the background. However, the US ruling circles do not always manage to camouflage their true aims and intentions in the Middle East, which they are hoping to realise with Israel's assistance. The USA prepared the aggression that was launched against the Arab countries by Israel in 1967. But on that occasion its policy was unmasked. The Arab countries ruptured diplomatic relations with Washington, demonstrating their determination to give a rebuff to the intrigues of the neocolonialists. This most certainly influenced subsequent developments in the Middle East.**

2. Israel's Relations with Britain and France

In the relations between Israel and Britain, as *The Israel Economist* pointed out, the spring of 1950 marked the beginning of "a period of mutual appraisal, with each side coming slowly to the realisation that it has something to gain from a friendly attitude towards the other". The journal noted that the detente between Israel and Britain was "very gradual, and most noticeable in the economic field".*** In March 1950 Britain recognised Israel *de jure*.

By that time agreement had been reached that Britain

* Victor Perlo, *Israel and Dollar Diplomacy*, New York, 1953, pp. 29, 31.

** This is dealt with at some length in the Afterword.

*** *The Israel Economist*, July 1950, p. 3.

would defreeze part of Israel's sterling and foreign currency deposits in the London banks. This was regarded as a major step towards the promotion of trade and other relations between Israel and Britain.* At the same time, agreement was reached on claims and counter-claims arising out of the ending of the British Mandate over Palestine. It was decided to reopen the oil refineries in Haifa. Moreover, British businessmen were given the opportunity of investing capital in Israel and using part of the profit from the sale of British goods in the Israeli market.

British private capital still held fairly strong positions in Israel. The large British or partially British companies included the Palestine Electric Corporation and the Jerusalem Electric and Public Corporation. The Anglo-Israel Chamber of Commerce consisting of representatives of private capital in both countries was formed in 1950 to foster trade between Britain and Israel.

British policy towards Israel was determined by the efforts British colonialism was making to crush the growing national liberation movement in the Middle East. The normalisation of Anglo-Israeli relations proceeded in parallel with the weakening of Britain's postwar influence in the Arab countries. As long as Britain controlled the Suez Canal she felt herself sufficiently strong in the Arab East, scheming and maintaining contact with the ruling Arab nationalist circles.

After Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal Company, Britain entered into an open alliance with the Zionist rulers of Israel.

Early in 1956 the relations between Israel and Britain began to grow friendly. *The Jerusalem Post* reported that during the debate in the House of Commons in January 1956 the British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd said that definite action would have to be taken if an attempt were made to change Israel's frontiers by force.** He stressed that such action would have to be taken in line with the Anglo-French-US Declaration of 1950.

In August 1956 (after the Suez Canal Company was nationalised) Lord Killearn wrote in the *Jewish Review*

* *The Israel Economist*, June 1949, p. 129.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, January 26, 1956.

of London that in view of the vital significance of the Suez Canal "the time may have come for an Anglo-Israeli pact". Touching on Anglo-Israeli relations prior to 1956 he underscored that Britain had "supported our enemy, as Egypt proved to be, against our potential friend".*

After 1956 and, particularly, after 1958 Britain adopted a more straightforward attitude towards Israel. She began, and continues to do so to this day, to supply weapons to Israel. In 1959 *The Economist* wrote that the relations between Israel and Britain "are probably better now than they have ever been".** On the evidence of the same journal, in the summer of 1958 Britain sold Israel submarines during the period of the Anglo-US intervention in the Lebanon and Jordan.

In the *Israel Government Yearbook* of that period the relations with Britain were described as "much better"***

In August 1961 Britain signed an agreement on cooperation in the export to Israel of literature of an educational and cultural nature.**** In Britain there are more than 30 societies and Jewish institutions backing Israel. These include the Board of Deputies of British Jews (founded in 1760), the Anglo-Jewish Association (founded in 1871), the Union of Jewish Women (founded in 1902), the Zionist Federation of Great Britain and Ireland and the Federation of Zionist Youth.

Israel's relations with France began to improve in 1953 and grew particularly close after their participation in the triple aggression against Egypt in 1956. In January 1957 Ben Gurion told the Knesset that he felt it was his duty to strengthen relations with France. That same year Israel was granted a French credit of 30 million dollars.

In subsequent years Israel was officially called France's "friend and ally".*****

* *Jewish Review*, London, August 3, 1956.

** *The Economist*, London, May 16, 1959, p. 7 (Supplement *Israel Rebirth in an Antique Land*).

*** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. XLVII.

**** *Great Britain, Foreign Office Treaty Series*, 1960, No. 72.

***** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), p. XLVII.

The relations between the two countries were promoted by a cultural agreement signed in November 1959.* One of the provisions of this agreement was that French would be taught in Israeli schools. According to the *Jewish Yearbook* there are in France some 20 Jewish organisations maintaining ties and co-operating with Israel. To name a few, they are the Union des Associations Culturelles Israélites de France et d'Algerie, Association Culturelle Séphardite de Paris, Association Consistoriale Israélite de Paris, Alliance Israélite Universelle, Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Conseil Rabbiniqne Orthodoxe en France, Conseil Représentatif des Juifs de France and Conseil Représentatif du Judaïsme Traditionaliste.

As far as one can judge from the *Israel Government Yearbooks*, the relations between France and Israel began to cool in 1965. While in 1964 the above-mentioned official organ assessed the relations between the two countries as developing towards a stronger "alliance" and stressed that the French Government invariably showed "understanding for Israel's needs, particularly in the spheres of security and economy",** the following year's report of the talks which the Israeli Foreign Minister had in France contains no word about the achievement or existence of "understanding" between the two countries. The report for 1966/67 was confined to recording the existence of "economic, cultural and scientific relationships" between them. It spoke only of "wide public sympathy for Israel in France". Regarding the French Government's official attitude towards Israel, the report bluntly stated that during the previous years France "could successfully cultivate the friendship of the Arab states" and that this had "deep and far-reaching political implications".*** Subsequent developments confirmed that in her Middle Eastern policy France had departed from her unequivocal support of Israel, while in June 1967, as distinct from the USA and Britain, as we shall show below, she denounced the Israeli aggression.

* *UN Treaty Series*, New York, Vol. 377, 1960, pp. 239-59.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5725 (1964/65), 1964, p. 157.

*** *Ibid.*, 5727 (1966/67), 1967, p. 147.

3. Expansionist Aims of Co-operation with the Federal Republic of Germany

The normalisation of Israeli-FRG relations began with the signing of the reparations agreement in September 1952. In 1949 Chancellor Adenauer offered Israel a "voluntary gift" of 2,500,000 dollars, in connection with which *The Israel Economist* wrote that all settlements with the FRG could be made exclusively "in accordance with the usual procedure adopted with vanquished aggressor states".* But by 1951 the Israeli ruling circles had changed their minds. The question of compensation was raised when the imperialist powers, chiefly the USA, were busy securing the creation of a Middle East Command and were interested in Israeli pressure on the Arab countries. The Israeli rulers took advantage of this situation.

On March 12, 1951 the Israeli Government sent a formal Note to the four occupying powers in Germany, stating in part: "Crimes of such tremendous and appalling proportions as those perpetrated by the nazis in the extermination of one-third of the Jewish people cannot be atoned for by any material compensation. . . . All that can be done is to obtain reparations for the heirs of the victims and rehabilitation for the survivors." Ben Gurion wrote that the three Western powers promptly "expressed sympathy with the principle of our claim"*** and proposed direct negotiations with the Government of West Germany.

In a unilateral statement in September 1951 Chancellor Adenauer declared that the FRG Government was prepared "to arrive at a solution of the problem of material reparations, by negotiations with the representatives of the Government of Israel, which has absorbed such a large number of homeless Jewish refugees".*** Adenauer followed this up by contacting Nahum Goldmann, President of the World Zionist Organisation, and in December 1951 the latter conveyed to the Israeli Government an

* *The Israel Economist*, December 1949, p. 276.

** Here and above: *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, pp. XXXIV-XXXV.

*** *Ibid.*

FRG proposal for direct negotiations on the reparations issue.

The talks opened in The Hague on March 21, 1952, but were soon cut short over differences regarding the sum of reparations. They were resumed in June and ended in agreement on September 10. This agreement was ratified by West Germany on March 18, 1953, and by Israel on September 22, 1953, i.e., more than six months after it was signed. The delay was caused by public indignation over the talks themselves. An idea of this public resentment is given by the reports carried in Israeli newspapers representing various political orientations. Before the talks got under way the newspaper *Ma'ariv* wrote: "...those who favour restitution have apparently forgotten that German industry produced machines to make soap from their fathers' bones." Another newspaper, *Nathanya*, pointed out that the "negotiations are a moral catastrophe".*

The organisers and direct participants in the deal over reparations did their utmost to hide the imperialist substance of the conspiracy from Israeli and world opinion. To avoid acts of terrorism, even the date on which Foreign Minister Sharett was to fly to Luxembourg to sign the agreement was kept a closely guarded secret. The first official FRG representatives came to Israel under assumed names.

This "voluntary" payment of reparations to Israel by the FRG ruling circles pursued the aim of morally exonerating West German revanchism in the eyes of world public opinion. All the more was this important in view of West Germany's intention to join the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance.**

Moreover, this deal opened for West German imperialism the road to expansion in the Middle East, with Israel serving as a convenient springboard.

For their part, the Israeli rulers felt that by strengthen-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, January 7, 1952.

** The FRG joined NATO in October 1954. One of the conditions made by the USA, Britain and France was that West Germany complete the reparations payments to Israel. See: *Westdeutscher Neokolonialismus*, Berlin, 1963, p. 234.

ing relations with Bonn they would get a stronger position on the international political scene.*

The 14th Congress of the CPI had full grounds for giving the following assessment of the reparations deal: "...from the very beginning—as experience has shown—it was a step towards the formation of a close partnership between the rulers of our country and the forces of neo-nazism and German militarism, who stand at the helm of the West German State".**

Israeli-FRG relations improved markedly during the Sinai adventure of 1956. The West German experts in Israel at the time remained behind in the calculation that it would make a favourable impression in Tel Aviv. At the height of the hostilities in the Sinai Peninsula and when the question of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory was being settled, the payment of reparations to Israel was in full swing (at the time the USA had announced a temporary suspension of aid to give the impression that it was pressuring Israel). *The Israel Economist* wrote that this attitude by Adenauer "greatly strengthened Mr. Ben Gurion's bargaining position". The journal frankly made the point that the basis was being created for relations with Bonn sooner "on the solid foundation of present common interests rather than the memory of past horrors".***

West Germany, the journal pointed out, attached immense importance to Israel because of her geographical location that gave access through Eilat to the Red Sea and the adjacent countries. In view of West Germany's dependence on Middle East oil shipments via the Suez Canal, the journal wrote, and also in the event of a deterioration of East-West relations and closer relations between Egypt, Syria and the Soviet Union that would limit these supplies, "a trans-Israel pipeline... could virtually eliminate the possibility of Arab or Soviet political black-

* A. J. Fisher, "Israel and the German Federal Republic", *Contemporary Review*, No. 1099, London, July 1957, p. 100. For the FRG-Israel reparations agreement also see: G. S. Nikitina, "Why Israel Receives Reparations", *Sovremenny Vostok*, 1960, No. 1, pp. 39-40; B. I. Potapovsky, "FRG and Israel", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1963, No. 4, pp. 48-53.

** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 33.

*** *The Israel Economist*, January 1958, p. 4.

mail". By linking Eilat with the Mediterranean by a railway "Israel could serve for the transit of other commodities destined for the non-communist part of the European continent".*

From Israel's standpoint, the journal went on, "the German connection is vital not only because of the reparations angle. Of even greater significance in the long run is the dominant part played by Bonn in the European Common Market and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation". This article ended on the note that "a genuine rapprochement with West Germany ... would thus enormously strengthen Israel's political position".**

After the Sinai adventure the Western press wrote a great deal about the Israel-FRG rapprochement. A Zionist centre was opened in West Berlin with the purpose of "facilitating the creative endeavours of Israel". The establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG was openly debated in the Knesset in connection with the deal on the sale of Israeli weapons to the Bundeswehr in 1959.***

The Adenauer-Ben Gurion meeting in Washington in March 1960 was a further step towards a closer bond between the two countries. The ways of further cementing Israel-FRG ties were discussed when the reparations payments were coming to a close. According to the Western press, Adenauer promised Israel a loan of 500 million dollars for a ten-year period.**** By May 1965 this loan had been largely made in the shape of shipments of West German arms. That was when Israel established diplomatic relations with the FRG.

About ten Jewish organisations promoting ties with Israel function in West Germany. They include the Central Jewish Council in Germany, the Council of Bavarian Jewish Communities and the Jewish Communities of Lower Saxony.

* *The Israel Economist*, January 1958, p. 4.

** *Ibid.*

*** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 14, 1959.

**** *The New York Times*, March 24, 1960.

4. Militarisation. Consequences of the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949. Orientation on a Military Alliance with the West. Preparations for an Attack on Egypt

The role accorded to Israel by the imperialist powers in their Middle Eastern plans, and the Israeli rulers' own expansionist designs are two aspects of one and the same process and they have consistently manifested themselves throughout the existence of the State of Israel. Israel's expansionist foreign policy became more pronounced as the imperialist powers grew more active. Some shades in the twists and turns of this foreign policy are observed depending on what power the Zionist bourgeoisie is staking on in the given situation. Israel's expansionist appetite is whetted more and more with the growth of its military potential, the build up of weapons and military equipment and the strengthening of her army.

A high level of militarisation has been achieved. Even official circles in Tel Aviv say that Israel's reputation "among the nations" is based chiefly on the achievements of her armed forces.* In fact, present-day Israel has been converted into a large armed camp. Even the post of Prime Minister is of a military nature because he usually exercises the powers of Defence Minister. A single General Staff exists for all three arms of the service.

The Israeli Army, according to the *Israel Government Yearbook*, has gone through four stages "in the process of organising, training and equipping."** From the very beginning it included the Haganah, Jewish armed detachments formed during the Mandate period (these detachments co-operated with the British authorities and drove the Arab fellahen from their land), and the Jewish Brigade that had been part of the British Army. In the war with the Arab states in 1948 the Haganah were "well-trained, well-organised and well-versed in camouflage". Modern equipment was brought quickly from overseas.

* *The Jerusalem Post*, April 3, 1959.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. XXXVIII.

Subsequently, when Israel prepared for another war with the Arabs, Israeli "officers were sent to military colleges in France, Britain and the United States".*

The militarisation plan adopted in October 1953 envisaged intensive military training for newly-arrived immigrants, the priority development of strategic industries and other branches of the economy, particularly, civil aviation, the merchant marine and the chemical industry, the encouragement of the immigration of young people between the ages of 16 and 18 to augment the army's manpower resources, the creation of conditions for the swift mobilisation of reservists, the reconsideration of the military budget with a view to increasing the funds for the purchase of armaments, and so on. Consequently, the Israeli Armed Forces "went steadily forward in morale and in material strength, in equipment and in training".** In October 1955 *The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, the official Zionist organ in Britain, published the following comparative data:***

	Regular Strength	Full Mobilisation Strength
Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon	150,000	240,000
Israel	50,000	250,000

When, in the following year, the aggression against Egypt was launched, it was seen that the Israeli army "had grown in strength, skill and capacity"****

The fourth stage of the Israeli army's qualitative and numerical growth was observed after 1956. Naval vessels and Centurion tanks were purchased in Britain, and equipment poured in from Canada, France and West Germany. The USA supplied Israel with jet missiles at the close of 1963 and with Skyhawk aircraft and Patton tanks

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), p. XL.

** *Ibid.*, p. XLIII.

*** *World News*, Vol. 2, No. 46, November 12, 1955, p. 872.

**** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), p. XLIII.

in 1966. Israel's expansionist foreign policy was deliberately encouraged by the imperialist powers, and this gave the Arab countries serious grounds for constant anxiety.

* * *

The Arab-Israeli war that broke out immediately after the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948 and went on until the beginning of 1949 mirrored the deepening of imperialist contradictions and demonstrated that after the Second World War the balance of strength between the British and American rivals in the Middle East had changed in favour of the USA. In that war Britain aided the Arab states. The Western press writes that British weapons were supplied to the Arab countries before hostilities were officially declared. The journal *Current History* reported that according to rumours in April 1948 US President Truman was prepared to furnish Israel with arms.* Arab League leaders did not conceal the fact that they received weapons from Britain. Arab journalists even wrote of the "idea of a general alliance between the countries of the League and Great Britain", noting that "the future of Anglo-Arab relations is to be happier than their past".**

The USA, on the contrary, gave Israel every possible assistance. In *The Middle East in World Affairs*, the American researcher George Lenczowski writes of the American arms deliveries to Israel in 1948-1949, of the American military experts who joined the Israeli army as "volunteers" and of the Tel Aviv Government's large dollar stocks for the purchase of weapons.

The situation on the eve of the war was described as follows by the CPI: "The Arab and Jewish parts of Palestine are virtually in a state of siege. The wanton tyranny of the British civil administration and military is stirring up bloodshed between the two peoples and dislocating the country's economy."**** When the war broke out the CPI called upon the Jews and Arabs of Palestine

* *Current History*, May 1948, p. 272.

** *The National Review*, London, January 1949, p. 57.

*** *Yevreiski vesti*, April 11, 1949.

to turn it into a common struggle for national independence, into a struggle against imperialism.

In the course of the hostilities entire Arab villages—Dair-Yaseen, Wadi-Dioz, Pardes-Abu-Lyavan, Kfar-Tobias—were wiped off the face of the earth. The sharp conflicts in the Arab League leadership, dividing the Arab countries, were one of the reasons that more than four-fifths of Palestine (one-third of this territory in violation of the UN decision) went to Israel.

Some Arab researchers consider that the armistices forced by the United Nations (in which Britain and the USA were engaged in an angry clash) were among the reasons that the war went against the Arab countries.*

The armistices signed in the course of February-July 1949 on the basis of the *status quo* did not relax tension in that part of the world. On the contrary, they were the cause of further bitter collisions between Israel and the neighbouring states, and the situation was aggravated by the Palestinian refugee problem. In the subsequent period imperialism continued an active offensive in the Middle East, trying to form military alliances and whipping up tension. The Israeli rulers wholeheartedly supported this expansionist political line, which fitted into their own anti-Arab plans. As *The Israel Economist* wrote in April 1950, the Israeli Government was eager "to adhere to some system of semi-military alliances within the Western orbit", feeling that this would be, above all, important psychologically and, consequently, that the influence of the Western powers could be used "to wring concessions in Israel's favour from the Arabs".** On the pretext that there was a threat of attack by the Arab states, attempts were made to secure Israel's admission to the aggressive Mediterranean Bloc that had been set up in 1950.***

In the Middle East tension grew white-hot after Britain, France and the USA signed the so-called Tripartite Declaration on May 25, 1950 on the unrestricted supply of arms to the Arab countries and to Israel.**** The real aim of this agreement was bared by *The Israel Economist*

* Fayez A. Sayegh, Op. cit., p. 36.

** *The Israel Economist*, April 1950, p. 85.

*** *Yevreiski vestnik*, May 16, 1950.

**** *The Department of State Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886.

when it wrote that these weapons would allow propping up the anti-communist regimes in the Arab states and controlling the pro-Soviet elements.* The Israeli Government associated itself with the aggressive Tripartite Declaration.

The next act of the imperialists was to propose, in October 1951, a plan to set up a Middle East Command.** In notes to Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Yemen on November 21, 1951, and to the USA, Britain, France and Turkey on November 24, 1951, the Soviet Union pointed out that the "Allied command in the Middle East" pursued aggressive aims and was directed against the USSR and other socialist countries.*** The Israeli leaders were fully informed of the substance of the Western plans on October 13, 1951, i.e., a day before the setting up of a Middle East Command was proposed to the Arab countries. More, the US, British and French governments advised the Israeli Foreign Ministry that they "were not unaware of the difficulties involved in bringing Israel and the Arab states together in the same defence organisation", but it was plainly stated that "the special interests of Israel would be fully protected".**** Agreement on this had been reached when Ben Gurion visited the USA in May 1951. While the Arab countries rejected the Middle East Command plan as detrimental to their national independence, the Israeli Government made every effort to become a member of that aggressive organisation.

The existence of an arrangement between Israel and the West regarding co-operation in setting up a Middle East Command was not made public, but the character of the relations between the USA and Israel made it quite obvious that Tel Aviv had received special guarantees on this question and had worked out a plan of action.

Throughout 1952 and 1953 the Israeli leaders bent their efforts towards concluding some form of military alliance

* *The Israel Economist*, July 1950, p. 173.

** For details see O. E. Tuganova, *US and British Policy in the Middle East*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1960.

*** See *The USSR and the Arab Countries, 1917-1960, Documents and Materials*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1961, Document No. 27, pp. 103-04.

**** *State of Israel. Government Yearbook*, 5713 (1952), 1952, p. 128.

with the Western powers, making a series of trips abroad and conducting summit talks.

Foreign Minister Sharett visited Britain in February-March 1952 and had meetings with Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. As a result of these talks Israel received a loan and British armaments. At the same time, in February 1952, the Israeli Ambassador in the USA Abba Eban had talks with leading State Department officials on questions linked with the political and economic developments in the Middle East. In the summer of 1952 Sharett undertook a trip to the USA where he had meetings with President Truman and State Secretary Dean Acheson. These meetings resulted in the above-mentioned US-Israeli Agreement of July 23, 1952. In December Abba Eban and a high-ranking American official Henry Morgenthau discussed the question of "more co-operation from the Israeli Government".* Meetings on these levels continued in 1953. When the campaign for an Israeli Independence Loan was started in March 1953, Eban confirmed Israel's concurrence with a statement by Morgenthau on the possibility of Israel placing 200,000 soldiers at the disposal of the USA in the event of a war with the Soviet Union.** This statement aroused the indignation of the Israeli people, who staged numerous protest rallies at which Eban was told that if he wanted a war he could fight it himself.

During his next visit to Washington, in April 1953, Sharett discussed "general defence arrangements" with President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He said that to "attempt a system of regional defence without Israel is to construct a wheel without a hub".*** After a tour of the Middle East in May 1953, the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discussed Arab-Israeli and US-Israeli relations with the Tel Aviv leaders. A plan was hatched out of including Israel in an aggressive Western bloc in the Middle East in connection with a possible military alliance with Turkey. During this period the Israeli press had grounds

* *The Jerusalem Post*, December 4, 1952.

** *Information Bulletin*, 1953, No. 4, p. 4.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, April 10 and 12, 1953.

for the commenting that the "US needed Israel's friendship no less than Israel needed that of the US".*

Closer ties with Washington drove Tel Aviv into further gambles: the clashes on the Arab-Israeli frontiers began to grow in scale. Early in 1954 *The Israel Economist* began a campaign for a preventive war against the Arabs. In one of its articles it wrote that "the myth of an aggressive Israel which today is but a figment of the Arab imagination, may yet become reality".** "Urgent repressions" on the largest scale were advocated, and in the summer of the same year Moshe Dayan, the Israeli army's Chief-of-Staff, went on a visit to the USA. In August the Israeli Ambassador in the USA began a series of talks with Dulles. These talks went on for 18 months and concerned Israel's military and defence commitments and American guarantees "to safeguard Israel's security"***.

Early in 1955 the Arab-Israeli clashes exploded into large-scale military operations. The bourgeois press, which was energetically whipping up a war hysteria, wrote that Israel was actively seeking "military ties"**** with the West. The newspapers carried a statement by Ben Gurion, who was Defence Minister at the time, to the effect that "Israel's army is the best in the Middle East".***** The official stand was that Israel was trying to preserve a power equilibrium by limiting the flow of arms to the Arab countries and achieving the maximum military strength herself. As tension mounted in Arab-Israeli relations, it grew increasingly evident that Israel and the USA were co-ordinating their actions. In July 1955 *The Jerusalem Post* wrote of a more friendly attitude towards Israel*) in Washington, where American arms shipments to Israel were under discussion. A list of weapons was submitted by Israel to the US State Department in November 1955. Reports that Israel was planning to attack

* *Ibid.*, May 14, June 16, 1953.

** *The Israel Economist*, February 1954, p. 23.

*** *State of Israel. Government Yearbook*, 5716 (1955), 1955, p. 187.

**** *Middle Eastern Affairs*, New York, March 1955, Vol. VI, No. 3, p. 99.

***** *Ibid.*, May 1955, Vol. VI, No. 5, p. 174.

*) *The Jerusalem Post*, June 8, 1955.

Egypt appeared in the Western press. A major armed collision took place in December 1955 in the vicinity of Lake Tiberias.

In view of the worsening situation in the Middle East the Soviet Union issued a warning to the Western powers in April 1955, saying that the growing tension was due to the fresh attempts of the Western powers to draw the countries of that area into military groups that were being set up as branches of the aggressive NATO bloc, and that underlying this policy was the aspiration of the imperialists to turn the Middle Eastern countries into colonies and achieve definite military-strategic aims. The Soviet Union stressed that the non-participation of the Middle Eastern countries in aggressive military blocs would be a major requisite for ensuring their security and the best guarantee for the preservation of peace.*

Another warning was issued to the Western powers in a Soviet Foreign Ministry statement on Anglo-US activity in the Middle East in February 1956. In this statement it was declared that under the guise of terminating the "state of tension in the relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours"*** the Western powers were stepping up activity that had nothing in common either with the national interests of the countries in that area or with the interests of peace generally.

Throughout this period the Israeli ruling circles continued transforming their country into a bridgehead for imperialism in the Middle East.*** In February 1956 Foreign Minister Sharett, who had just returned from the USA, declared that the question of US arms shipments would be cleared up within the next few weeks. From January to April 1956 the Knesset continuously debated political and military issues. Ben Gurion, who had returned to power, told the Knesset: "We had hoped to be able to avoid war, but there was now less hope that we should be able to do so."****

Significant hints that preparations to attack Egypt

* *The USSR and Arab Countries...*, Document No. 35, pp. 116-20.

** *Ibid.*, Document No. 42, pp. 127-30.

*** *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!*, January 27, 1956, No. 4, p. 4.

**** *The Jerusalem Post*, March 7, 1956.

were under way were given by Eliahu Elath, Israeli Ambassador in Britain, in a series of lectures at Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts in April-May 1956. He declared that Israel had the role of containing the aggressor in "self-defence", in order to preserve "peace and stability in the Middle East".* In a speech at the Anglo-Israel Association in February 1957 he did not mince his words, saying: "... we could no longer leave it to him [Nasser—G. N.] to choose the most favourable moment for attacking us in force. ... we struck in Sinai."** The Israeli leaders acted in accordance with the principle: "Might is right."

Israel was ready for an attack on Egypt long before the Suez Canal Company was nationalised in July 1956. Her rulers were only waiting for a suitable time. For them the question was only the choice of the imperialist powers on which to make their stake, which of these powers were prepared in the obtaining situation to act openly and intervene in the affairs of the Middle East by armed force. The USA, which still stood to gain politically from the antagonism of the Arab countries for the old colonial powers—Britain and France—adopted wait-and-see tactics. Britain and France, on the contrary, made an attempt to improve matters for themselves in this area by force of arms. This coincidence of aims during the preparations for the Sinai gamble in the autumn of 1956 brought the Israeli Zionists into the camp of the British and French imperialists, thus determining the alignment of forces in October 1956.

5. Triple Aggression. Israel Subscribes to the Eisenhower Doctrine and Joins in the Intervention Against Lebanon and Jordan

In April 1956 in a statement on the situation in the Middle East, the Soviet Government repeated that the situation merited the closest attention of all countries and

* Eliahu Elath, *Israel and Her Neighbours*, London, 1956, p. 48.

** Eliahu Elath, *Objectives of Israel's Foreign Policy*, London, 1957, p. 9.

public circles desiring to strengthen peace and achieve a further relaxation of world tension. The Statement pointed out that in some countries there were forces out to use the Arab-Israeli conflict for purposes of aggression.*

Meanwhile, it was growing evident that the anti-peace alliance between Israel, Britain and France was being consolidated. Questions of "common interest" were discussed in April 1956 by the British Ambassador Sir John Nichols with the Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett, and at the end of the same month a report was published on shipments of British arms to Israel.**

On July 26, 1956 Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal Company. This act was recognised as legal and just by the Soviet Union.***

With the failure of political and diplomatic pressure on Egypt, the Western powers used the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company as the pretext for aggression against the Arab countries. It now remained to activate the war machine. This was also the opinion in Tel Aviv. In August 1956 *The Israel Economist* wrote: "The Egyptian example must needs make an enormous impression in Iraq, where much oil has still not been nationalised, and in Jordan where some British troops still remain." This, it was said, made it urgent for the West to arm Israel "as a counter to the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal".**** In October 1956, a week before the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Sinai, *The Israel Economist* wrote that "a totally new situation" had been created by the shipment of French and Canadian arms to Israel. In this connection, Ben Gurion later wrote that instead of giving or selling American arms to Israel, the American State Department agreed to advise Canada and France to sell Israel a number of jet aircraft.***** Such was the worth of the USA's "impartiality" in the Sinai developments in the autumn of 1956.

* *The USSR and Arab Countries...*, Document No. 46, pp. 133-35.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, April 15 and 22, 1956.

*** *The Soviet Statement on the Suez Canal of August 9, 1956*. See *The USSR and Arab Countries...*, Document No. 52, pp. 145-51.

**** *The Israel Economist*, August 1956, pp. 145-46.

***** *Israel Government Yearbook, 5720 (1959/60)*, 1960, p. 25.

The Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt, launched on October 29, 1956, was conducted with unspeakable brutality against the civilian Egyptian population. Officially, the USA was not involved, but the American ruling circles were kept informed of the actions that were planned against Egypt. US imperialism connived at the war against Egypt, counting on weakening the Arab countries and winning a stronger position in the Middle East at the expense of its compromised colonial partners.* Anthony Eden relates in his memoirs that the USA knew that Egypt was to be attacked, writing that as soon as the news came that Israeli forces had entered Egyptian territory "we also discussed the attitude of the United States". Two telegrams were at once dispatched to President Eisenhower, telling him that Britain and France had never made a secret of their intention to act against Nasser's designs, and that decisive action would afford a good opportunity for strengthening the weakest point in the line against communism. In a prompt reply, Eisenhower wrote that the United Kingdom and the United States should quickly and clearly lay out their present views and intentions before each other so that in the event of a crisis nothing would prevent them from acting in concert.**

Commenting on the Eden memoirs, Eisenhower confirmed the fact that the USA had been informed of the planned attack on Egypt but claimed that he had warned against it. To back up this story the US President said that he had had a meeting with the Israeli Ambassador Eban in October 1956 and had requested him to convey the warning to his Government. Eisenhower's statement was printed by *The Jerusalem Post* with the refutation that the Israeli Foreign Ministry had given no intimation of "a meeting between Mr. Eban and Mr. Eisenhower, nor did any news agency report any such meeting".*** When asked about it, Eban, then a member of the Government, made the terse remark: "No comment."

* *International Affairs*, Moscow, 1957, No. 1, p. 138. Also see A. S. Protopopov, *The Soviet Union and the 1956 Suez Crisis*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1969.

** Anthony Eden, *The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Full Circle*, Boston, 1960, pp. 586-87.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, January 27, 1960.

The Soviet Union unreservedly came out in defence of Egypt and demanded an end to the aggression. In the Soviet Government statement of October 31 it was noted: "The evidence is that the Israeli invasion was calculated as a pretext for the Western powers, chiefly Britain and France, to send their troops into the territory of Arab countries, the Suez Canal zone in particular."^{*}

In a message to the Israeli Prime Minister of November 5, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR expressed the hope that "the Government of Israel thinks better of it before it is too late, and ceases hostilities against Egypt".^{**} The Soviet Ambassador was recalled from Tel Aviv. In a message of November 15 it was stressed that the aggression against Egypt had unquestionably lowered Israel's international prestige, roused the animosity of the Arab and other peoples of the East, undermined Israel's relations with many countries and caused further economic difficulties in Israel herself.

The Soviet Union's determined and consistent stand was the decisive factor behind the collapse of the aggression against Egypt and the further setback suffered by imperialism. Even the Western bourgeois press had to admit that as a result of the Sinai adventure "the political damage for Israel, particularly in the eyes of the people of Asia, was very great"^{***} and that Arab-Israeli relations had been sharply aggravated.

For five months Israel refused to carry out the Security Council decision requiring her to withdraw her troops from Egyptian territory. This stubbornness was not accidental. It was largely due to the connivance and encouragement of the USA, which was seeking to use the situation to force the Arab countries to accept the aggressive Eisenhower Doctrine proclaimed soon after the imperialist débâcle in the Sinai Peninsula. The very fact that such a doctrine had been proclaimed showed that the balance of strength between the three colonial rivals had finally tipped in favour of the USA.

Israel was accorded a significant role in the implemen-

^{*} *The USSR and Arab Countries...*, Document No. 72, pp. 241-42.

^{**} *Ibid.*, Document No. 83, pp. 261-62, Document No. 89, pp. 272-74.

^{***} See *Monthly Review*, New York, February 1957, No. 10, p. 370.

tation of the expansionist Eisenhower Doctrine, whose aim was to intervene in the internal affairs of the Arab countries (under the guise of "combating communism"), suppress the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples, and strengthen US imperialism's positions in the Middle East.

In January 1957 the Israeli Government met to hear a foreign policy report from Ben Gurion. *The Jerusalem Post* was given to understand that "he touched on the Eisenhower plan for the Middle East and the withdrawal from Sinai".^{*} Golda Meir, who in this period was in New York for nearly two months as head of the Israeli delegation to the UN General Assembly, had a series of meetings with Dulles. In January 1957, in Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion had talks with the British Ambassador Nichols and the US Ambassador Lawson on "outstanding problems related to the Middle East".^{**} Commenting on these talks, *The Jerusalem Post* wrote that Lawson presented the views of his Government on the question of the Israeli withdrawal from Egypt and dwelt on the newly-expounded Eisenhower Doctrine, which, the newspaper underlined, had been evolved with the purpose of "preventing communist domination in the Middle East".^{***} The talks between Ben Gurion and Lawson went on throughout February and March 1957. Conferences between the Israeli Ambassador Eban and Dulles were held in parallel in Washington.

At this time the Soviet Union issued another emphatic warning. In its statement of January 13, 1957 in connection with the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Soviet Government pointed out that the American plan was a grave threat to peace and security in the Middle East and drew special attention to the circumstance that US interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries and the crude threat of using force against these countries could only encourage the aggressive ambitions of Israel's ruling circles. These extremist circles, the statement declared, had close ties with the US monopolies and would, with re-

^{*} *The Jerusalem Post*, January 7, 1957.

^{**} *Ibid.*, January 8, 1957.

^{***} *Ibid.*

liance on US backing, strive to carry out their expansionist plans, which, in turn, would lead to a further exacerbation of the situation in the Middle East and seriously increase the threat to peace in that area.*

After five months of procrastination, Israeli troops were withdrawn from the Gaza area in Egypt on March 7, 1957.** This step, *The Jerusalem Post* reported, was agreed with the USA.*** The newspaper described the terms on which the Israeli rulers sought to align themselves with the Eisenhower Doctrine. Ben Gurion, for instance, said that another war could be expected within the next few years.**** Walter Eytan, a high-ranking Israeli Foreign Ministry official, wrote that "there was no indication now, as there had been at the time of the Allied Middle East Command in 1951, that the inclusion of Israel [i.e., her alignment with the Eisenhower Doctrine—G.N.] was not desired. For the first time, Israel was to be directly involved.*****

On May 21, 1957 the Government of Israel formally declared its approval and support of the Eisenhower Doctrine. The reservations about Israel's desire for peace could not delude anybody. Before the debates on Israel's alignment with the Eisenhower Doctrine started in the Knesset, the talks on American aid to Israel under this doctrine had already made headway in Washington. Moreover, a delegation of the Export-Import Bank was expected in Israel in connection with a large new loan of 75 million dollars. Israel was being repaid a hundred-fold.

The Soviet Union continued its efforts to ease tension and strengthen peace and security in the Middle East. It exposed the aggressive ambitions of the imperialist powers. In Notes to the Governments of the USA, Britain and France of February 11, 1957, the Soviet Government stated that the Middle East situation following the liquidation of the aggression against Egypt had been aggravated

* *The USSR and Arab Countries...*, Document No. 93, pp. 288-94.

** Israeli troops were withdrawn from the Sinai Peninsula and the El-Arish area on January 8, and 9, 1957.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, March 21, 1957.

**** *Ibid.*

***** Walter Eytan, *The First Ten Years. A Diplomatic History of Israel*, New York, 1958, p. 155.

again through the unilateral actions of the Western powers, notably of the USA, who were clinging to their policy of setting up aggressive military blocs.*

On October 19, 1957 the Soviet Government issued a strongly-worded statement on the situation in the Middle East in connection with a reactivation of US preparations for another armed attack in this area and its intention to use Turkish and Israeli troops for an armed intervention against Syria. Under this provocative plan Israel was to keep her army in readiness on the Syrian frontier and complete her preparations to commence hostilities at the next phase of the intervention. As payment for her participation, Israel was to get another opportunity to seize the Sinai Peninsula and also the Jordan Valley and the Gulf of 'Aqaba. The Soviet Union called upon all peace-loving forces to unite in order to cut short any possible aggression.**

Israel was accorded a definite role in the armed intervention that was started by the imperialists of the USA and Britain against the Lebanon and Jordan in the summer of 1958. This is demonstrated, for example, by the Israeli Government's decision of July 17, 1958 to permit Israeli air space to be used for airlifting British troops to Jordan. Moreover, on August 1, 1958 *The Jerusalem Post* carried a report, "Israel Consulted on Western Moves", which quoted a letter by President Eisenhower, published in Washington, stating that the USA was "closely in touch" with Israel on the Middle East crisis.***

In its Notes of August 1 and September 5, 1958 the Soviet Government warned the Israeli Government of the extremely dangerous consequences of its direct involvement in US and British acts of aggression against the Lebanon, Jordan and other Arab countries.**** The aggressive designs of the USA and Britain were disrupted as a result of the resolute steps taken by all the world's progressive forces led by the Soviet Union. Following on the heels of the abortive attack against Egypt in 1956, the collapse of

* *The USSR and Arab Countries...*, Document No. 95, pp. 304-08.

** *Ibid.*, Document No. 119, pp. 394-406.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, July 1, 1958.

**** *The USSR and Arab Countries...*, Document No. 176, pp. 591-92; Document No. 189, pp. 652-53.

the Anglo-US intervention in the Lebanon and Jordan in the summer of 1958 was a further devastating blow at colonialism's positions in the Middle East.

6. Ben Gurion's Talks with the West. Israel Plans to Join NATO

After the débâcle of the imperialist conspiracy against Egypt, the Lebanon and Jordan, the USA had to adopt more flexible and secretive tactics in its manoeuvring between Israel and the Arab countries. Assessing some of the US State Department's political steps as being much too cautious and aimed at achieving a certain disengagement "from American identification with Israel",* the Israeli ruling élite decided that at that stage it would be more in their interest to achieve firmer ties with Bonn and Paris. A milestone on this road was the agreement signed with the FRG in July 1959 on the sale of Israeli arms to the Bundeswehr. The Israeli ruling circles felt that closer relations with Bonn and Paris would somewhat neutralise the USA's cautious flirtation with Nasser.** Moreover, Ben Gurion believed that the FRG and France could help to smooth the way for Israel's membership of NATO.

However, while establishing closer ties with Bonn and Paris, the Israeli leaders did not by any means intend to abandon their alliance with US imperialism. The *Israel Government Yearbook* for 1959 openly stressed that "in arriving at its Middle East policy" the US Government would help to ensure Israel's interests.*** On the other hand, Haim Laskov, then Israeli Chief-of-Staff, declared that Israel's land, sea and air forces were now much stronger than during the Sinai campaign of 1956.****

In order to strengthen the ties between Washington and Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion went to the USA in March 1960 ostensibly to receive an honorary doctorate from Brandeis University. He met with many American officials,

* *The Jerusalem Post*, April 2, 1959.

** *The Economist*, May 16, 1959, p. 8.

*** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5720 (1959/60), 1960, p. 276.

**** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, August 23, 1959.

including the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of State and his assistants, and others. The purpose of these contacts was "to make widely known Israel's stand on great world issues and on regional problems and her present real needs".*

US-Israeli post-1956 relations were most fully characterised in the *Israel Government Yearbook*, and its assessment must therefore be quoted in full: "The attitude of the US Government towards Israel is, as always, based on statements, made again and again, in which Israel's existence and prosperity are declared to be an integral part of foreign policy. The US Government welcomes Israel's endeavours to strengthen its political status and secure its economic future, and is ready to extend practical aid towards the realisation of both aims".**

As we have already noted, during Ben Gurion's visit to the USA he had a meeting with Adenauer which the Western press reported as having had an atmosphere of "complete mutual understanding". From Washington Ben Gurion flew to London, where he had top-level talks with British arms shipments to Israel as the principal subject. He returned from that visit, the Western press declared, "fully convinced that Britain and the United States regard his country as a stabilising force in the Middle East that must be kept strong".***

To obtain further guarantees from the Western powers and sustain Israel as a "containing force" in the Middle East, Ben Gurion made another round of visits in May and June 1961, this time again in the USA, Britain and France, and also in Canada. The subject of his talks with US President John F. Kennedy was predetermined by a secret Israeli memorandum handed earlier to the US Government. The text of this memorandum was later divulged to the Western press. In the memorandum it was stated that the Israeli Government did not feel the moment suitable "for a peaceful settlement of Israel's relations with the Arab states",**** in other words, it was recommended that President Kennedy should not hurry in

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5721 (1960/61), 1961, p. 214.

** Ibid.

*** *The New York Times*, March 24, 1960.

**** *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, Stuttgart, April 5, 1961.

establishing peace between Israel and the Arab countries. An additional explanation was given by the Israeli newspaper *Davar*, which wrote that "only a strong Israel can prevent Nasser from starting a war".* As a whole, the US-Israeli relations were characterised by Israeli official circles "as a continuance of traditional friendliness towards Israel".**

In the summer of 1961 Ben Gurion went to Britain where he met with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Foreign Secretary Douglas Home, and also Winston Churchill. In official quarters it was emphasised that "Britain and Israel aspire in common to maintain stability in the Middle East".*** The *Israel Government Yearbook* described the meetings in France as the "most friendly and fruitful";**** it was pointed out that friendship with France should not be confined to the purchase by Israel of French tanks, field guns and war ships but that underlying it should be "common political and strategic interests".*****

Ben Gurion's tour of the three leading Western countries was described as having "fulfilled its purposes".) Almost simultaneously Israel's Foreign Minister Golda Meir visited the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway and Denmark) and also Ireland, after which she joined Ben Gurion in his talks with the French leaders. One of Golda Meir's aims in visiting the Scandinavian countries and Ireland was to divert world and Israeli opinion from Ben Gurion's tour of the principal Western capitals.

Another trip to Europe, this time to the Scandinavian countries, was undertaken by Ben Gurion in August and September 1962 "to demonstrate Jewish-Israeli support for West German aspirations for the leading position in Western Europe" and back up the policy of arming the FRG with nuclear weapons.**)

* *Trud*, Moscow, April 1, 1961.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. 165.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 166.

**** *Ibid.*, p. 165.

***** *Industriekurier*, Düsseldorf, April 13, 1961.

) *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. 163.

** *Information Bulletin*, September 1962, No. 9, p. 12.

The agreement of September 1962 on the shipment of American Skyhawk aircraft and on the sending of experts to train Israelis to handle these weapons may be regarded as a certain turn in US policy towards Israel. According to *The New York Herald Tribune* the USA wanted Israel to have strong defensive positions against her hostile neighbours.*

In the course of 1962 the Israeli Government took vigorous measures to secure admission to the European Economic Community, giving prominence to economic motives. However, this could not conceal its prime political aim, that of joining NATO.

In 1963 and 1964 Israel's foreign policy did not undergo any notable change. She went forward with her drive towards the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG and continued to press for membership of the Common Market. Once again armed conflicts broke out more and more frequently on the Arab-Israeli frontiers. There was no interruption in the shipments of French and American arms, and Israel continued to stockpile armaments and pursue her "positions of strength" policy.**

7. Aggravation of the Arab-Israeli Conflict in 1963

Inasmuch as Israel's expansionist ambitions have always been directed, above all, against the Arab countries, the main problems underlying this conflict merit closer study. It should be borne in mind that one of the major factors influencing the relations between Israel and the Arab countries and deepening the conflict between them is the discrimination against Arabs in Israel herself. More than 11 per cent (over 300,000) of the population in Israel are Arabs.

The economic and political inequality of the Arab population is part of state policy. Despite the claims of official propaganda that Arabs enjoy equality with the

* *The New York Herald Tribune*, September 29, 1962.

** See also Preface to *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62).

Jews,* discrimination against the Arabs is observed in different spheres of political life. Arabs have limited access to political and public posts. Their representation in the Knesset (only four deputies) is in disproportion to their number.

The life of the Arab population is controlled by the military administration founded on the emergency laws instituted by the British authorities in 1945.**

The Government forcibly resettles the Arabs (under the pretext of decongesting the population) in the most unhealthy areas. On the whole, the situation is such that "the Arabs in Israel live under martial law in segregated ghettos".*** The arrest of Arabs "on suspicion" is widely practised and justified "in the interests of security".**** This screen is used to infringe upon the rights and interests of the Arab population. No Arabs are admitted to membership of the Histadrut or conscripted into the army.

In Israel many Arabs live in hovels or temporary dwellings and are not given employment according to their trades. For the Arab poor Israel is another South Africa.*****

This discrimination is by no means helping to normalise Arab-Israeli relations. Even the British journal *The Economist* admitted that "if Israel's leaders were seriously thinking of one day coexisting amicably with their neighbours, they would, perhaps, make a start with their own minority of ... Arabs".*) Israel's Communists are uncompromising in their demand for an end to discrimination against the Arab population and to the military administration.

Official American propaganda alleges that Arab-Israeli relations are kept in a state of tension by the clash between two hostile forces—political Zionism and

* See *The Arabs in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1961, p. 49; *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. 27; *Israel in Figures*, 1963, Tel Aviv, 1963, p. 28.

** In December 1966 the Government somewhat relaxed the military administration regime, which was formally replaced by a police regime, but this hardly changed anything.

*** Fayez A. Sayegh, *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

**** See *Israel in Figures*, 1963, p. 29.

***** *Information Bulletin*, 1959, No. 9, p. 11.

*) *The Economist*, London, May 16, 1959, p. 8.

Arab nationalism. Actually, the Arab-Israeli conflict has its source principally in the political aims pursued by the imperialist powers. This is mentioned, for example, by the progressive American researcher, A. Magil, who particularly stressed that the Arab-Israeli conflict did not arise out of "natural antagonism" between Jews and Arabs, but was stirred by imperialism.

This conflict revolves round three problems: the territorial issue, the problem of the Palestinian refugees and the problem, deriving out of the first two, of the utilisation of the waters of the frontier Jordan River.

Under the Lausanne Protocol of May 12, 1949, Sayegh points out, Israel and the Arab countries agreed to regard the frontiers laid down by the UN partition plan and delineated in the map appended to the Protocol as the basis for talks on the settlement of the Palestine problem.** At the time of her attack on the Arab countries in 1967 Israel held 77 per cent of the former Palestine; one-third of the territory controlled by Israel was, in accordance with the UN plan, to be turned over to the Palestinian Arab state. However, the Israeli ruling élite regards this territory as an integral part of Israel.

Sayegh says that the Arab countries took the stand that the 1949 Armistice demarcation lines were only (a) temporary, (b) provisional, (c) purely military in purpose, and (d) non-political in character.***

The American author John C. Campbell writes that on the question of Israel's territorial annexations the Arab countries demanded, first and foremost, a return to the UN partition plan of 1947, which they believed "is the only possible legal basis for any negotiation of permanent frontiers".****

The seizure of Palestinian territory, which the UN decision had allocated to the proposed Arab state, greatly complicated Israel's position, while her participation in the Sinai adventure in 1956 further damaged Arab-Israeli relations and brought the Arab countries round to the

* A. Magil, *Which Way Israel*, New York, 1956, p. 7.

** Fayez A. Sayegh, *Op. cit.*, pp. 40, 63.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 62.

**** John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East. Problems of American Policy*, New York, 1958, p. 309.

decision to enter into no negotiations with the Israeli rulers.

This was linked also with the stand of the Israeli rulers on the question of the Arab refugees. As we have noted above, more than 900,000 Arabs were forced to leave the territory occupied by Israeli troops during the hostilities of 1948-1949. The Arab refugees, who comprised over 60 per cent of the population of the territory now controlled by Israel,* went to neighbouring Arab countries, chiefly the Gaza region, Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon. The Israeli leaders, in flagrant violation of the UN General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948,** refused to allow these refugees to return to their homes.

In 1952 the Israeli Government was compelled to begin talks with the Palestine Conciliation Commission*** on the deposits of the Arab refugees frozen in Israeli banks. It agreed to pay out one million Israeli pounds, allegedly as a first step. This was a pitiful handout (until mid-1955 only two million Israeli pounds were paid to the Arab refugees).

Later the Israeli leaders repudiated even the minimum concessions to which they had earlier agreed. In March 1961 five Arab countries submitted to the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly a draft resolution calling for the return of the Palestinian refugees to their homeland. Israel ignored the just demands of the Arab countries and insisted that the refugee problem should be solved by settling the refugees in neighbouring Arab states. Moreover, Israel made counter compensation claims concerning property which Jewish immigrants had allegedly abandoned in Arab countries.**** In November 1962 the Israeli Government formally reiterated its refusal to allow the Arab refugees to return to the territory left by them.*****

The Palestinian refugee problem was debated at the

* And over 70 per cent of the Arab population of Palestine.

** The resolution obligated the Israeli authorities to allow the Arab refugees to return unhindered to their homes; those who did not desire to return had to be paid a compensation for the property left by them. The UN repeatedly confirmed its resolution on the return of the Arab refugees, but it was systematically ignored by the Israeli Government.

*** Set up by the General Assembly decision of December 11, 1948.

**** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. 164.

***** Knesset resolution of November 13, 1962.

General Assembly in the autumn of 1963. The General Assembly reiterated its former decision that the Palestinian refugees had the right to return to their homes. In reply to this the Israeli Government referred to a special decision passed by the Knesset in December 1963 and refused to negotiate the problem of the Arab refugees on the basis of the UN resolution of December 11, 1948. This did not prevent the Israeli Government from hypocritically supporting the Soviet Government's message of December 31, 1963 to the heads of state and government proposing the conclusion of an international agreement or treaty on the renunciation of force in the settlement of conflicts and frontier disputes.

There was a sharp aggravation of Arab-Israeli relations at the close of 1963 over the question of using the waters of the Jordan. This problem, it will be recalled, was caused by the Israeli Government's statement that Israel was planning to divert the waters of the Jordan. This unilateral act would have inflicted immense damage to the neighbouring Arab states.

The Arab countries strongly protested against this fresh challenge from Tel Aviv. A summit conference of 13 Arab states was held in Cairo from January 13 to 16, 1964, at which a counter-plan for the use of the Jordan waters was proposed. This plan envisaged, in particular, the damming and diversion of the Jordan headwaters: Hasbani in the Lebanon, Banias in Syria and the central tributary Yarmuk in Jordan.* At the Cairo Conference it was decided to set up a Joint Arab Command to forestall any possible Israeli military intervention with the purpose of wrecking the Arab plan for using the Jordan.**

In reply to the Cairo Conference decision Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol stated in the Knesset that in spite of everything Israel would go forward with her plan for using the waters of the Jordan and "would be forced to act if the Arab states . . . attempt to divert the Jordan headwaters".*** In Washington it was declared that the USA would not "stand idly by" if aggression is committed by any nation in the Middle East. This statement was carried by

* Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq agreed to finance this project.

** For the Cairo Conference see *Pravda*, January 21, 1964.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, January 21, 1964.

The Jerusalem Post under the heading "Jerusalem Welcomes US Warning Against Attack".*

The USA tried to act as mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict. King Hussein of Jordan, representing all the Arab States, went to the USA in April 1964 on a personal invitation from President Lyndon B. Johnson. The problems discussed were the Palestinian refugees, the utilisation of the Jordan waters and the situation in the Middle East as a whole. A month after Hussein's departure, the USA was visited by Eshkol. As *The Jerusalem Post* reported, all the details and programme of the Eshkol visit to the USA were drawn up well in advance of King Hussein's visit by Myer Feldman, deputy counsel to the US President.**

The visit of the Israeli Premier was quite eloquently commented on by the American press. On the day of his arrival *The Washington Post* wrote that his visit would cast a new ray of understanding on the long-standing friendship between the USA and Israel,*** while *The New York Times* reminded its readers that Eshkol had been the first Israeli Prime Minister to receive an official invitation to visit Washington.**** It was, thus, Eshkol who put Israel's war plans before Washington and, as it later became evident, received the corresponding guarantees from the USA.

Far from helping to normalise relations with the Arab countries, Israel's pro-imperialist foreign policy only aggravated them still further. The blame for this falls squarely on the Zionist rulers.

8. Arab-Israeli Relations in 1964-1966. Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with the FRG. American Arms. Activation of the "Positions of Strength" Policy

As we have pointed out, Israel's intention to use the Jordan waters unilaterally led to a drastic deterioration of her relations with the Arab states and complicated the situation in the Middle East. The communiqué issued by the Cairo Conference stated that it had "adopted practical

* *The Jerusalem Post*, January 22, 1964.

** *Ibid.*, April 13, 1964.

*** *The Washington Post*, June 2, 1964.

**** *The New York Times*, June 3, 1964.

resolutions necessary to ward off the existing Zionist danger in the technical and defence fields and in organising the Palestinian people to enable them to carry out their role in liberating their homeland and determining their destiny".* This step of the Arab states was their reply to the Israeli Zionists' adamant refusal to carry out the UN decisions, particularly the decision on the return of the Palestinian refugees, and their reaction to the invariable solidarity of Israel's Zionist rulers with imperialism and to the fact that they had turned their country into a mailed fist aimed at the Arabs. At the second summit conference of 13 Arab states, held in Alexandria from September 5 to 11, 1964, they discussed a concrete plan of action against the unilateral use of the Jordan waters by Israel; in particular, a plan was proposed for creating Arab armed forces that would be able to withstand an armed attack by Israel. Lastly, it was decided to begin the work of diverting the Jordan headwaters.

The conference approved Nasser's proposal that the liberation of Palestine would be the end goal of the entire Arab nation. No date was set for the attainment of this goal, but it was emphasised with full grounds that the policy of the Arab countries towards Israel should remain "strictly defensive".**

At an emergency sitting held in connection with the Arab summit conference, the Israeli Government hypocritically appealed to the "peace-loving nations of the world" and to the UN, calling upon them to withhold their solidarity with the Alexandria statement that the Arabs were fully determined to oppose Tel Aviv's new challenge. In a radio broadcast Foreign Minister Golda Meir appealed to the Great Powers to use their deterrent strength against the Arabs in the event they attacked Israel. At the other end of the scale, Israeli progressive opinion demanded that the Government should see that it was "the urgent and vital need of Israel to pursue steps in the direction of creating a pause in the tense relations and move towards a peaceful settlement with our neighbours", namely, to stop following in the wake of the

* *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Vol. XIV, 1963-1964, p. 19976.

** *Ibid.*, p. 20335.

policy of the colonialist powers, to recognise the rights of the Arab Palestinian people and abandon the intention of joining the atomic plans of the NATO powers.*

Ignoring public opinion, the Israeli Government sought to intimidate the Arab states, making it "abundantly and publicly clear that to rob Israel of its share in the Jordan waters would be tantamount to encroachment on Israel's territory and that Israel reserved its right to react accordingly" and would "defend its . . . rights with all the strength it can muster".** This political line of the Israeli leaders (who in the early 1960s steered a course towards war) determined the developments in the last quarter of 1964 and the beginning of 1965.

The Conference of Prime Ministers of Arab States in Cairo in January 1965 reaffirmed the decision regarding the Jordan project (the work on the project was started at the close of 1964).

Armed clashes broke out on Israel's frontier with the Arab countries in 1964. The incident near the villages of Dan and Dafna was discussed in the Security Council. At the close of 1964 and the beginning of 1965 there were skirmishes in the Dead Sea area on the Israeli-Jordanian border and acts of terrorism on the Jordanian, Lebanese and Egyptian frontiers. The substance of these conflicts was brought to light by the official Israeli press, which wrote at the time that "the prospects of peace in this part of the world were considerably shaken" and that a "third round" of the Arab-Israeli war was unavoidable. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol warned that "the diversion of the Jordan sources would be a *casus belli*". Moshe Dayan, then Chief-of-Staff, demanded immediate military action to prevent the Jordan waters from being diverted.***

The Arab stand towards Israel was stated in *The Jerusalem Star*, whose publication was begun in Jordan in 1966. The grounds for the rights of the Arabs to Palestine were expounded in an article headed "Palestine: A General Survey".**** These grounds were: first, the natural

* *Information Bulletin*, October 1964, No. 10, pp. 7-8.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5726 (1965/66), 1966, p. 170.

*** *New Outlook*, January-February 1965, p. 7.

**** *The Jerusalem Star*, April 13, 1966; also see S. Nofal, *Israel's Crime Record*, Cairo, 1965, pp. 3-6.

right of a people to the possession of the territory belonging to it by right of birth; second, this right stemmed from the fact that Arabs had inhabited that territory for over 1,300 years; third, the Arabs were still the legal owners of the houses and fields in which the Israelis were presently living and working. The newspaper cited the following statistics: 40 years ago the proportion of Jews in Palestine was under 10 per cent and they owned just a little over 2 per cent of the territory; at present 77 per cent of Palestine was in Israel's hands.

These arguments and figures gave grounds for understanding the "uncompromising attitude" of the Arabs towards Israel, whose leaders had been transforming her into a weapon of imperialism against neighbouring peoples. However, a point to be noted is that as a result of the extremism of some Arab leaders the Israeli people's right to self-determination was denied recognition.* The implementation of this line in practice would give rise to another problem, that of "Israeli refugees" in the Middle East. This line, naturally, cannot command sympathy.

The new incidents on the Syrian and Jordanian borders in May 1965 were the logical outcome of the attitude of the Israeli leaders. On May 27 Israeli troops made what were called "reprisal raids", crossing the Jordanian frontier and attacking villages in the region of Shuna, Qalqiliya and Jenin. The border incidents that followed one another in quick succession in June and July were investigated by the Jordanian-Israeli Armistice Commission. These inquiries showed that the blame lay with Israel.

The Arab approach to the question of war and peace with Israel was plainly put at the Arab Premiers' Conference in Cairo at the end of May and beginning of June 1965. The conference accepted Gamal Abdel Nasser's argument "that Arabs should complete their defences" before a war with Israel could break out.** Essentially, this plan of action underlay the proceedings of the third Arab Summit in Casablanca from September 13 to 17, 1965.

* For a fuller account see P. Demchenko, *The Arab East in the Hour of Trial*, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1968, p. 58.

** *Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1965, p. 501.

This conference was attended by 12 Arab states and a delegation from the Arab League led by the General Secretary Abdel Halek Hassouna. Tunisia did not send a delegation.

The plan of joint action to safeguard the diverting of the Jordan and strengthen Arab unity was again debated at the Casablanca Conference. A restrained attitude to the Palestine problem was adopted at the conference by Gamal Abdel Nasser. The journal *New Outlook* described this approach as one of "neither war nor peace".* The Arab press wrote that the purpose of this conference was to work out, in particular, concrete steps for diverting the Jordan headwaters and providing this project with armed protection. The plan called for bringing Saudi Arabian and Iraqi troops into Jordan. At the discussion of the question of military preparedness, which was one of the fundamental aspects of the problem, it was found that there was no political unity in the Arab League. The Joint Arab Defence Council presented a report from which the inference could be drawn that the Arab states could win a military confrontation with Israel only in four years' time. Thus, far from deciding on war with Israel, the Casablanca Conference regarded war as undesirable, at least in the immediate future.

An agreement on Arab solidarity and a Declaration of the Council of Kings and Presidents of Arab League States** were adopted to supplement the Arab League Charter. These documents were evidence that Arab solidarity was the main question before the Casablanca Conference, as at the two previous summit meetings in Cairo and Alexandria. In the Declaration it was noted that Arab solidarity was "the fundamental basis for unity in common action for liberation from imperialism and Zionism". The Council approved a number of plans related to the liberation of Palestine.*** The Israeli journal *New Outlook* wrote that the conference showed "a measure of realism ... but still not enough realism to recognise the fact of

* A. Kapeliuk, "Arab Meeting in Casablanca", *New Outlook*, October 1965, p. 203.

** *New Outlook*, October 1965, p. 62.

*** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, September 23, 1965.

Israel's existence",* and pointed out that the "neither peace nor war" attitude was predominant in the Arab world. However, it must be re-emphasised that the Casablanca Conference showed that the Arab states were realistically assessing the situation in the Middle East, notably from the standpoint of preserving peace and of possible quests for new ways of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Nevertheless, the reply of the Israeli rulers to the Casablanca Conference was to escalate the "small war". Armed incidents continued without let-up along the Arab-Israeli frontiers throughout the last three months of 1965 and the first six months of 1966.

In view of the serious aggravation of the situation in the Middle East, particularly on the frontier between Syria and Israel, the Syrian Government requested aid from members of the Security Council. This request was closely studied by leading circles in the Soviet Union. On May 28, 1966, TASS issued a statement in which it was noted that in Israel there had lately been an activation of aggressive extremism accompanied by provocations against neighbouring Arab states in the border regions, and that according to press reports the Israeli army had been readied for combat. This, the statement pointed out, indicated that "the neocolonialists have not renounced their aspirations to retrieve the positions they have lost in the Middle East" and that the Soviet Union could not and would not remain different to the attempts to destroy peace in an area in direct proximity to the frontiers of the USSR.**

Arab-Israeli relations continued to remain extremely tense. The Israeli drive for closer relations with Bonn still further worsened the situation. Israeli-FRG relations en-

* *New Outlook*, October 1965, pp. 3-4.

** *Pravda*, May 28, 1966. The Soviet stand on the Palestine issue was stated in the Joint Soviet-Syrian Communiqué, which underscored "solidarity with the Palestinian Arabs" and support "for their legitimate rights in the just struggle against Zionism, which the imperialist forces are using to fan tension in the Middle East" (*Pravda*, April 26, 1966). In the Joint Communiqué of May 19, 1966 on the talks between the USSR and Egypt it was likewise emphasised that the "Soviet side fully supports the legitimate and inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs" (*Pravda*, May 19, 1966).

tered a new phase when in the latter half of January 1965 West Germany began shipping modern arms, including (with US agreement) M-48 tanks, to Israel. However, on February 11 Chancellor Ludwig Erhard ordered a temporary suspension and then a total cessation of these shipments. The FRG Government had to take this step on account of the strong protests from the Arab states, which had earlier declared they would sever diplomatic relations with West Germany in the event the latter established formal ties with Israel. The official version was that in stopping the sale of arms to Israel Bonn had been guided by the principle under which no weapons were to be shipped to areas of tension. But, as it was learned later, the agreement on West German arms shipments to Israel had been reached as early as 1960 and 80 per cent of these arms had been delivered by the beginning of 1965.

When the FRG arms shipments were halted, Israeli-West German relations were discussed first by the Government and then in the Knesset. In the Knesset debate Prime Minister Eshkol protested against Bonn's decision to cease military aid to Israel and rejected the cash compensation offered by the FRG Government.

However, West Germany very soon made a new move: Kurt Birrenbach, special representative of Bonn, arrived secretly in Israel on March 7, 1965 with a proposal to establish formal diplomatic relations. Three days later he left Tel Aviv with an affirmative reply in his pocket. On March 14 the Israeli Government gave its unconditional approval to the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG. The pro-Government newspaper *Davar* wrote with unconcealed satisfaction that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the FRG was a major achievement for Israel in its experience of pursuing a "positions of strength" policy towards the Arabs.*

Two days later, on March 16, the Government's decision was debated in the Knesset, where it was endorsed by deputies from Mapai, the Liberal Party, the National Religious Party, Poalei Agudat Israel and the two pro-Mapai Arab parties. Opposition came from the Communists, Mapam and Herut. Achdut Ha'avoda abstained in

* *The Jerusalem Post*, March 15, 1965.

the voting. Massive protest demonstrations were held on the same day in Jerusalem and other towns in Israel.

The official announcement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the FRG was made on May 12, and on the exchange of ambassadors on July 7 (the Bonn and Tel Aviv ambassadors presented their credentials in August 1965). Demonstrations under the slogan of "No deals with the Bonn fascists" were held continuously in Israel.

Diplomatic relations with the FRG were ruptured by the Arab states* in the period from May 12 to 16. Economic aid talks were started between the FRG and Israel at the close of 1965; broken off early in 1966, they were resumed in May on the eve of former FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's visit to Israel. An agreement on economic aid under which Bonn undertook to grant Tel Aviv a long-term loan of 160 million dollars for a period of 20-25 years was signed on May 12, 1966.**

The relations between Israel and the USA throughout 1964-66 shed much light on Middle East developments in that period. It will be recalled that Premier Eshkol went to the USA in June 1964 and during that visit "America's informed and vigorous comprehension of Israel's interests was abundantly manifested".*** Upon his return from the USA, Eshkol declared that Israel had to maintain her defence in a state of readiness.

A series of meetings between Israeli leaders and high-ranking American officials began early in 1965. At the close of February and beginning of March a visit was paid to Tel Aviv by the US President's personal envoy W. Averell Harriman, who, according to the Israeli press, conducted talks at the highest level. These talks were secret and concerned some of the most important problems for Israel.**** The US Assistant State Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asia Affairs Philipps Talbot came to Israel at the close of April on a three-day unofficial visit.

These meetings continued in the second half of 1965 and in the early months of 1966, but in this period they

* With the exception of Tunisia, Morocco and Libya.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, May 15, 1966.

*** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5726 (1965/66), 1966, p. 174.

**** *The Jerusalem Post*, April 29, 1965.

were held in the United States. In October 1965 Foreign Minister Golda Meir discussed Middle East problems with US Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In February 1966, the new Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban went to the USA, where a secret agreement was reached on the speedy shipment of American tactical jet bombers to Israel. Upon his return he told the Government that ever since Premier Eshkol's visit to the USA in 1964, armaments had been the chief topic of all subsequent meetings between American and Israeli officials until the conclusion of a formal agreement.

Tzvi Dinstein, Israeli Assistant Defence Minister, flew to the USA in May 1966 where he signed a new agreement for the shipment of American Skyhawk aircraft to Israel.

These American-backed actions by the Israeli leaders were aimed at preventing a settlement of the conflict with the Arab states and showed that the extremists in Israel were doggedly steering towards a military confrontation. Small wonder that this was precisely the time that was chosen to publish the memoirs of Moshe Dayan, former Chief-of-Staff of the Israeli army, on the Sinai campaign. In these memoirs Dayan used every superlative at his command to extol the "fighting spirit of the Israelis", their "leap into the Sinai in 1956" and so forth.* In the official report submitted in Geneva by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Israel was listed as one of the countries with the largest defence expenditure. Also indicative is the fact that large-scale work in building "defensive" installations was conducted in the Negev throughout 1966 and the early part of 1967.

The demand of the Israeli military for "vigorous action" against the Arabs was "founded" on the "need for preventive measures". The same song was sung in the period of the Sinai adventure in 1956. Noteworthy in this connection are the revelations made by the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1965, in which he wrote of "the factors which refute the myth of inevitable Arab victory. The first of these is Israel's capacity to deter and contain the regional hostili-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 7, 1966, p. 3.

ty by maintaining a balance of military strength." He made it plain that "peace is not a condition of Israel's existence".*

In solidarity with the neocolonialists and flouting the UN decisions, the Israeli leaders pursued a foreign policy in contravention to the country's national interests. This pro-Western, expansionist line was a constant threat to peace and security in the Middle East.

The CPI was the only political party in Israel to demand "a just and lasting Israeli-Arab peace based on the right of both peoples to self-determination". It continued, as it had always done, to fight "for an Israeli policy recognising the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and first and foremost, the right of the refugees to return to their homeland".** Only a shift from the policy of "support for the forces of colonialism and aggression to one of peace, independence and neutrality" could clear the ground for Israeli-Arab peace negotiations.***

* Abba Eban, "Reality and Vision in the Middle East", *Foreign Affairs*, July 1965, p. 629.

** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 161.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 43.

IMMIGRATION AND THE STATUS
OF IMMIGRANTS

1. Immigration Policy

With Jewish immigration to Israel is linked chiefly the important problem of population. Since the creation of the State of Israel, on May 15, 1948, the Jewish population has increased by 1,299,200, i.e., by nearly 53 per cent, through immigration. By April 1969 immigration had accounted for almost 72 per cent of the Jewish population increment—1,804,600.

Another reason why the immigration problem merits a special study is that the Israeli leaders are making a political issue out of it, describing it as the practical embodiment of the principles of Zionism and linking with it far-reaching plans and calculations in both home and foreign policy. In other words, Jewish immigration to Israel is acquiring a frankly political character because it is one of the main factors underlying the problem of Arab-Israeli relations. Moreover, the Government's immigration policy is a screen for deals with US imperialism.

The approach of the ruling circles to Jewish immigration, the nature of this immigration and the standing of the immigrants expose the pharisaical and chauvinistic character of the Government's aims and policy in this matter.

In examining the political aspect of Jewish immigration it must be noted that official and bourgeois literature as a whole treats this problem as having arisen in the his-

tory of Palestine at the turn of the present century and propounds the thesis that the Jewish people are "powerfully attracted to the land of their forefathers". For instance, bourgeois authors distinguish five streams of immigration, or, to use the Hebrew word, *Aliyahs*, into Palestine.* The first *Aliyah* embraced the years 1882-1903, when from 20,000 to 30,000 immigrants arrived in Palestine, chiefly from the southern regions of tsarist Russia after the first wave of pogroms, and also from Rumania. They were the first agricultural settlers of the Yishuv in Palestine. The second *Aliyah* was in 1904-1914 and brought 35,000-40,000 people to Palestine, mostly from Russia after the pogroms of 1905-1907 and, partly, under the influence of Zionist propaganda. The World Zionist Organisation had been set up by that time. The third *Aliyah* covered the period from 1919 to 1923, when Palestine received 35,000 immigrants, most of whom sincerely believed their mission was to lay the foundation for a Jewish state.

The fourth *Aliyah*, 1924-1931, brought 82,000 Jews, mostly of the "middle class",** chiefly from Poland. They went to Palestine after being denied admission to the USA. The fifth *Aliyah*, 1932-1938, was the largest prewar stream of immigration to Palestine (217,000 people), mainly from Germany where the nazis were persecuting the Jews. During the Second World War 92,000 people, most of them refugees from nazi-occupied European countries, settled in Palestine. Finally, there was the postwar *Aliyah* from 1946 to May 1948, when 62,000 Jews filtered through the British blockade of Palestine.

An analysis of these immigration streams shows that in the course of nearly 70 years Jewish immigration to Palestine was stimulated chiefly by external causes, such as the persecution of Jews in tsarist Russia, hardships and unemployment in Poland, the genocide instituted in nazi Germany, and so on. Least of all was immigration

* See S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants (A Comparative Study Based Mainly on the Jewish Community in Palestine and the State of Israel)*, Illinois, 1955, pp. 42-44; M. Siron, *Immigration to Israel 1948-1953*, Jerusalem, 1957, pp. 21-23; R. Bachi, "Statistical Research on Immigrants in the State of Israel", *Supplement to Population Studies*, London, March 1950, pp. 46-47.

** M. Siron, *Op. cit.*, p. 21.

fostered by Zionist ideas or by the attraction of the Jews to the "land of their forefathers". This is borne out, for example, by the fact that from 1881 to 1930 3,200,000 Jews immigrated to the Americas (of this number 2,900,000 went to the USA); only 120,000 went to Palestine.*

Table 1

Jewish Immigration to Palestine and
Total World Jewish Migration
(Rough Estimates)*

Period	Number of Jews in World Inter-continental Migration, '000	Jewish Immigration to Palestine,** '000	Immigration to Palestine in % of World Jewish Migration
1920-1947	1,483	445	30
1920-1923	340	33	10
1924-1931	393	82	21
1932-1938	380	200**	53
1939-1945	081	90**	50
1946-1947	90	40**	44

* Source: M. Sicon, Op. cit., p. 24.

** Excepting persons who remained in the country illegally.

After the State of Israel was formed, the country was declared open to Jewish immigration from other countries in accordance with the Declaration of Independence. The Law of Return,** passed in 1950, granted the right of permanent residence in Israel to all persons of Jewish nationality with the exception of those whose actions were directed against the Jewish people or of persons capable of damaging public health or the security of the state. Actually, under the 1950 law the principle of free immigration was only of declarative value because the immigrant masses depended heavily on material assistance from the Zionist resettlement organisations. In addition, Jewish immigration to Israel could be restricted for various political reasons by the establishment of a quota by the Government.***

* S. N. Eisenstadt, Op. cit., p. 28.

** *Laws of the State of Israel, 5710-1949/50, Vol. IV, p. 114.*

*** For Israel's immigration policy in this period see: C. Jahlil, "Israel's Immigration Policy", *International Labour Review*, Geneva,

In 1952 the Israeli Government instituted selective immigration, according to which 80 per cent of the immigrants must be young people, notably prospective candidates for settlement in agricultural areas, and also skilled workers under the age of 35. The remaining 20 per cent, over the age of 35, are admitted into the country provided they have relatives or come as members of a family that can support them. The right of unrestricted immigration regardless of age is enjoyed only by persons of means. Thus, immigration to Israel has been given a clear-cut political aim.

The Jerusalem Post described selective immigration as "an important step towards a more realistic policy",* which in the economic survey for 1953-1954 was frankly put down to "the necessity for securing a steady population increase, particularly of fit persons of military age".** In the years that followed the Government gave every encouragement to the immigration of middle strata, i.e., well-to-do people, and drastically restricted immigration by have-nots. At the same time, official propaganda invariably maintained that it was Israel's mission to become the "national home" of the Jewish people.

Following the creation of the State of Israel, many Jews did indeed immigrate to that country under the influence of the "return home" propaganda of the Zionists. Memories of the recent fascist brutalities against the Jewish population in the nazi-occupied countries of Europe made them susceptible to this propaganda. Moreover, the promise of "justice", "equality", "fraternity" and so on in the newly-created Jewish state was extremely attractive.

However, the practice of selective immigration showed the true worth of these public declarations of the Zionists. The realities of life for the have-not immigrants in Israel dispersed all their illusions about a "homeland".

Statistics give an interesting picture of Jewish immigration to Israel.

In 1969 (at the close of April) Israel had a population

November-December 1952, p. 445; N. Lawrence, *Israel. Jewish Population and Immigration*, Washington, 1952, p. 23.

* *The Jerusalem Post*, January 1, 1952.

** Emanuel Levy, *Israel Economic Survey 1953-54*, Jerusalem, 1955, p. 81.

of 2,799,300 (2,454,200 Jews and 345,100 other nationalities). In the period from 1948 to 1969 immigration brought 1,299,300 Jews to Israel (see note** to Table 3). From this follows, firstly, that immigration increased the Jewish population of Israel by over 50 per cent, and secondly, that an average of 59,000 persons immigrated to Israel annually. However, the influx was very uneven. The largest number (or over half the immigrants) arrived during the first four years after the creation of the State of Israel, while in subsequent years there was a sharp decline. For instance, between 1952 and 1955 the number of new arrivals comprised only 11.3 per cent of the immigration influx for eight years. From 1956 to 1959 inclusively, 175,200 people went to Israel, and the annual number from 1960 to 1969 did not exceed 36,000 (see also Table 3). Despite the steady immigration, only a small part of the world's Jewish population lives in Israel. This is seen from Table 2.

Jewish Population in All Countries
and in Israel*
('000)

Table 2

Year	World total	In Palestine	%	Year	World total	In Israel	%
1850	4,800	1956	11,940	1,667.4	14.0
1882	7,700	24	0.3	1958	12,170	1,810.1	14.9
1890	...	47	...	1960	12,800	1,911.1	14.9
1900	10,700	50	0.5	1961	12,866	1,932.4	15.0
1914	13,500	85	0.6	1962	13,018	2,068.9	15.9
1925	14,800	122	0.8	1963	13,121	2,155.6	16.4
1935	...	355.2	...	1964	13,225	2,239.2	16.9
1940	16,700	467.5	2.8	1966	13,538	2,344.9	17.3
1945	11,000	563.8	5.1	1968	...	2,435.3	...
1948	11,300	649.6	5.7	1969	...	2,454.2	...
(15.V)				(IV)			

* Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1962, No. 13, p. 34; 1963, No. 14, p. 18; 1965, No. 16, p. 22; 1968, No. 19, p. 19; *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1969, No. 5, p. 8.

Bourgeois researchers who have studied the problem of immigration to Israel find that the influx during the initial years and in subsequent years was preceded by

Jewish Immigration to Palestine and Israel
by Countries of Origin
(up to May 21, 1961)*

	Before 1947	1948 to May 21, 1961
Total:		
Number	321,332	880,579
%	100.0	100.0
From Europe	80.0	42.8
From Asia	10.4	26.2
thereof from:		
Turkey, Iran	3.5	7.7
Iraq	2.4	13.1
Yemen, Aden	4.5	5.4
From Africa	2.3	23.8
thereof from:		
Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria	0.6	17.6
Egypt, Libya	1.7	6.2
America and Oceania	7.3	7.2

* Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1962, No. 13, p. 53.

active propaganda by agents of Zionist organisations. Moreover, they say that political factors such as, for instance, the deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations, have had an unquestionable impact.

Since the creation of the State of Israel, 54.5 per cent of the immigrants have come from Asian and African countries. A negligible number are immigrants from America, the fewest coming from the USA. According to R. Bachi, immigration from America totalled 50 persons annually per million of the Jewish population as compared with 2,800 persons per million of the Jewish population from other parts of the world.* The immigrants may be divided into the following age groups (figures for 1966): children—31.1 per cent; working age (from 14 to 65)—64.0 per cent; and aged—4.9 per cent.

Note must be made of another point which nullifies the Zionist postulates about the "land of forefathers". It is the constant emigration of Jews ever since the creation

* R. Bachi, "Immigration into Israel", *Economics of International Migration*. Proceedings of Conference Held by the International Economic Association, London, 1958, p. 320.

of Israel. For instance, during the British Mandate annual Jewish emigration from Palestine totalled 200 per 1,000 immigrants, or 20 per cent.* Jews left the "promised land" despite intensive Zionist propaganda. Jewish emigration from Palestine is traced in Table 3.

Table 3

Comparative Immigration and Emigration Figures*

Year	Immigration**	Emigration	
		Total	% of immigration
1948	101,825	1,154	1.0
1949	239,424	7,407	3.1
1950	169,720	9,966	5.9
1951	174,014	10,476	6.0
1952	23,408	13,500	57.7
1953	10,388	13,000	126.2
1954	17,485	7,500	43.1
1955	36,327	6,400	17.6
1956	54,996	11,400	20.7
1957	71,100	11,400	16.0
1958	26,093	11,700	45.0
1959	23,045	9,750	42.0
1960	23,644	8,800	37.2
1961	46,650	7,330	15.7
1962	59,600	7,644	12.8
1963	62,156	10,866	17.4
1964	52,456	9,121	17.3
1965	28,795	7,941	27.5
1966	13,610	7,793	57.2
1967	12,275	10,529	85.7
1968***	21,000	9,000	42.8
1969***	35,000	9,000	25.7

* Computed (as well as data on p. 188) in accordance with *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, pp. 88, 99; *The Jerusalem Post*, July 14, 1969.

** In the overall immigration (1948-1969) of 1,303,000 persons, Jewish immigration totalled (in the same period) 1,299,300 or 99.7 per cent.

*** Rough estimate.

During the 21 years from 1948 to 1969 immigration to Israel totalled 1,303,000 persons, while emigration during the same period added up to 201,600 persons. As Table 3

* M. Sicron, *Op. cit.*, p. 40.

shows, emigration from Israel has remained constant and at approximately one and the same level, without showing a decline, while in some years, for instance between 1958 and 1960, and then from 1966 onwards it was considerable compared with immigration. For instance, the number of Jews who left Israel in 1952 was about 60 per cent of the total immigration of that year, while in 1953 emigration exceeded immigration. Between 1958 and 1960 emigration topped one-third, or almost 50 per cent, as compared with immigration, while in subsequent years it exceeded one-fifth. In 1966, directly before the aggression, emigration comprised nearly 60 per cent and was almost equal (over 85 per cent) to the number of immigrants in 1967, the year the aggression was launched. But even after the aggression, emigration averaged about 33 per cent.

The emigrants include native-born Israelis, but predominantly they are newly-arrived immigrants. Most of the emigrants, the Israeli researcher Norman Bentwich notes, return to their country of origin: Rumania, Britain, Belgium, France and even Germany. The same concerns immigrants from the USA, who returned after only a few years.* Viscount Edwin Samuel writes that "on purely economic or political grounds" Israel "has very little attraction . . . for Jews either from the United Kingdom or from the United States".** This is only further evidence of the true worth of the Zionist arguments about the attraction of the Jews to the "land of their forefathers".

2. Standing of Immigrants, Doctrines and Aims

On the same level of importance in the Israeli Government's immigration policy is its attitude to absorption, i.e., to the practical integration of the new arrivals. On this problem, too, Israeli and other bourgeois researchers offer long-winded arguments of a psychological nature with the purpose of masking the real essence of the immigrant absorption policy. As an example, we can name the Israeli sociologists Carl Frankenstein and S. N. Eisenstadt, who have written major works on immigra-

* Norman Bentwich, *Israel Resurgent*, London, 1960, pp. 76-77.

** Viscount Edwin Samuel, *The Next Ten Years in Israel*, London, 1964, p. 4.

tion.* They have evolved a "theory" regarding the necessity of the immigrant adapting himself to the conditions in Israel. For instance, arguing that the relationships between the immigrants and society take shape through the psychological perception of the individual, Frankenstein writes about a "just social system", which determines the relationships between various members of the "heterogeneous population groups" in Israel. He re-emphasises that inasmuch as the perception of this system and, consequently, of the predominating thinking depends solely on the psychology of the new arrival, while, on the other hand, his "individual identification with certain collective ideals" may prove to be difficult, there are full grounds for the "use of bureaucratic machinery as a means of 'solving' the problem", i.e., the use of compulsion to subordinate the immigrant to the system of social relationships predominating in Israel. Into this pattern is fitted the idea of sustaining "the strong feeling of Jewish solidarity and a simple love for the land of Israel".

Eisenstadt goes even further than that, producing a "type" scale—an artificial division of immigrants into the "solidary and the non-solidary type", and explaining the difficulties of immigrant absorption in Israel as being due to the latter "type's" constant demands and complaints. Eisenstadt refers to negative factors such as the immigrant's (the have-not, of course) lack of organisation, apathy and backwardness, which is explained vaguely as being due to "biological criteria". From these pseudo-scientific patterns, Eisenstadt draws the conclusion that the immigrant may be opposed to the "institutional framework of the absorbing society", and so on. In other words, on account of the imperfection of his "biological" qualities the immigrant has only himself to blame if he regards his position as difficult and refuses to reconcile himself to his lot.

In fact, the life of immigrants in Israel is far from being rosy. The immigrants who came in 1948-1949 were accom-

* Carl Frankenstein, *Between Past and Future. Essays and Studies on Aspect of Immigrant Absorption in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1953, pp. 5-6, 13-14, 21; S. N. Eisenstadt, *Absorption of Immigrants in Israel (With Special Reference to Oriental Jews)*, Jerusalem, 1951, pp. 5, 29-30; S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, Illinois, 1955, p. 205.

modated in immigration camps, immigration centres or reception centres, of which at the close of 1949 there were 40 with about 300,000 people. The immigrants lived in tents, in many cases several families sharing one tent. In 1949, with the aim of giving immigrants accommodation and employment, the Government announced a "revolutionary" plan for expanding agriculture by integrating new immigrants into the country's farming population "on the basis of hired labour in existing kibbutzim".* The settlement of hazardous border regions, swampy areas and the mountainous regions to the north and east of Jerusalem and the colonisation of the barren Negev Desert with the help of immigrants were proclaimed as a political and strategic task of paramount importance.

In 1950 the immigration camps were replaced by temporary villages (Ma'abarot) with the most primitive housing. These villages "were admittedly unsatisfactory, unhealthy and unsightly".**

In 1952 some 300,000 people, or nearly 50 per cent of all the immigrants who had arrived since the creation of the State of Israel, were still living in Ma'abarots or even in tents. In 1959 these "villages of passage" were still the home of 110,000 immigrants,***, mostly from Asian and African countries.

The immigrants sent to farming areas were employed not so much directly in agricultural production as on the most arduous work such as land improvement, afforestation, irrigation, the reclamation of swamps, and road building; the immigrants used for this so-called social, seasonal or temporary work are considered as employed although actually they have no steady jobs.

The immigrants who arrived in Israel in 1963 were settled in such remote and barren areas that a large group of them boycotted the Jewish Agency.****

The economic integration of the immigrants involves their retraining, otherwise there is no work for them. Moreover, they have to submit to spiritual indoctrination,

* *The Israel Economist*, May 1949, p. 100; C. Jahil, *Op. cit.*, p. 454. This is the practice despite the ban on hired labour in the kibbutzim.

** Norman Bentwich, *Op. cit.*, p. 78.

*** *The New York Times*, January 20, 1959.

**** *The Jerusalem Post*, June 24, 1963.

in which an important role is played by the Histadrut. On top of everything young immigrants "receive military training ... and they are re-educated ideologically as citizens of the State of Israel".*

The social aspect of immigrant absorption in Israel evokes as serious thought as immigrant settlement and integration in production. First and foremost, a difference is observed in the conditions of life of the new immigrants and the old inhabitants. New immigrants live under conditions "of ecological and economic segregation".** Even Israeli sociologists admit that the socio-economic differentiation between the immigrants and the old inhabitants is steadily growing wider,** a process fostered by the Israeli ruling circles through their policy of fanning hostility between the various groups. "We have found it quite rare," says Judith Shuval, "to observe real friendship relations between Europeans and North Africans, or between Europeans and Near Easterners."**** The income of a newly-arrived immigrant family averages about 70 per cent of the income of the family of an old inhabitant, while that of new immigrant families from Asia and Africa is only two-thirds of the income of a European immigrant family.

In Israel there is glaring inequality between the economic and social position of the immigrants from Europe and America, on the one hand, and the immigrants from Asia and Africa, on the other. This holds true also in the cultural and other spheres. Immigrants from Europe and America are given better jobs and better housing. The immigrants from Asia and Africa, on the contrary, are used as unskilled labour and comprise most of the temporarily employed, low-paid workers and labourers in agriculture as well. It is by their labour that Israel is developing desert, mountainous and swampy areas. Thus, the barren Lahish Desert was developed by new immigrants, 60 per cent of whom came from North Africa and 12 per cent from Yemen.*****

* "Israel: Ein Volk der Pioniere", *Industriekurier*, Düsseldorf, August 1, 1959; *Die Zukunft*, 1950, No. 2, p. 52.

** S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Absorption of Immigrants*, p. 110.

*** *Ibid.*, p. 215.

**** Judith T. Shuval, "Emerging Patterns of Ethnic Strain in Israel", *Social Forces*, Baltimore, No. 4, May 1962, p. 328.

***** *The New York Times Magazine*, November 16, 1958, p. 74.

The "European and Oriental" (to use the terminology accepted in Israeli literature) Jews are divided also into "whites" and "blacks". During the debate in the Knesset of the big demonstration staged by the "Oriental" Jews of Wadi-Saleb, a suburb of Haifa, in 1961, an Achdut Ha'avoda deputy demanded the demolition of the "ghetto walls" dividing the different communities and separating the "Oriental" Jews from the rest of the nation.* The *Government Yearbook* for 1961/62 stressed the need for raising the living standard of the immigrants, particularly from Africa and Asia.**

Israeli and other bourgeois sociologists seek to build up a kind of "biological foundation" for the inequality deliberately fostered by the Government. For instance, Judith T. Shuval writes that "immigrants from European countries are characterised by a more active value orientation while non-Europeans tend to be more passively oriented".*** Attempts are being made to prove that immigrants from Europe and America have a most important function in the historical process of socio-economic integration in Israel.**** However, after studying the evolution in an Israeli village populated by immigrants from Morocco, Alex Weingrod could not help but draw the conclusion that "if in Morocco the immigrants were 'Jews', in Israel they become 'Moroccans' ".***** It is certainly a blow to these people to find themselves regarded as "Moroccans" in Israel. Before going to Israel the immigrants are promised a happy future and called "pioneers". But upon arrival in the "Promised Land" they find that nothing has changed as regards subordination and compulsion, for they see themselves once again in the same exploiting society. Many of their hopes, S. M. Eisenstadt writes, are blasted during the very first days after their arrival.†)

* *The Jerusalem Post*, July 14, 1959.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. 27.

*** Judith T. Shuval, "Value Orientations of Immigrants to Israel", *Sociometry*, New York, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1963, p. 258.

**** C. Tadmor, *Israel Economic Survey, January-June 1952*, Jerusalem, 1952, p. 25.

***** Alex Weingrod, "Change and Continuity in a Moroccan Immigrant Village in Israel", *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, Summer 1960, p. 281.

†) S. N. Eisenstadt, *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

What is immigration from the standpoint of the Government's policy, aims and plans? Israeli leaders have made some revealing statements on this score. As early as 1952 Ben Gurion declared that a "primary and deciding factor in our security is mass immigration in swift tempo", explaining that border settlements peopled by immigrants must serve as the first wall of defence for the state, "a wall not of stones, but of flesh and blood".* The Government's aim of increasing the country's population to five million through immigration is insistently treated as a task of paramount importance from the standpoint of defence (read: expansionist) objectives. The purpose of selective immigration is to help achieve these objectives.

The Government links other aims with immigration, but these aims are of a more covert nature. It is estimated that the economic absorption of one immigrant costs from 2,000 to 3,000 dollars.** This expenditure, it has been officially stated, requires an inflow of huge funds from Jews living abroad, mainly in the USA. On this pretext vast sums of money are accumulated through so-called donations, particularly from American Jews. Solidarity and co-operation between the State of Israel and the Diaspora is regarded as a "necessary basis" for the return of the Jews to Israel.

This does not rule out the constantly growing tax burden of the Israeli working people. From 6 to 12 per cent of their net income is deducted for immigration requirements.*** The Government's plan of increasing the population to 5,000,000 within the next ten years would, as the newspaper *Industriekurier* pointed out, draw Israel nearer to economic catastrophe.****

On what do the Israeli leaders base their calculations? According to the *Government Yearbook* for 1961/62, of

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5712 (1951/52), October 1951, pp. XII, XV.

** E. Goldberger, *Preisbewegungen in Israel 1949-1953...*, p. 84; C. Tadmor, *Op. cit.*, p. 7. Actually, a much smaller sum is spent on each immigrant, and, moreover, it is extended to him in the form of a loan.

*** *The Times*, March 12, 1958.

**** *Industriekurier*, June 23, 1959. For Israel's plan to increase her population by 1970 through immigration see *Population*, Paris, April-June 1959, p. 334.

the 12,800,000 Jews in the world 6,400,000 were in America, including 5,200,000 in the USA; in Europe, including the USSR, there were 3,700,000;* in Asia (including Israel)—upwards of 2,000,000; in Africa—540,000; and in Australia and New Zealand—68,000.**

In the West, reactionary circles harp on the "Jewish problem" in the Soviet Union and spread all sorts of insinuations. That this is an expression of a clear-cut policy is shown by bourgeois sociology's thesis of the so-called Comfortable Diaspora.*** This thesis is, in effect, applied only to the USA, where, it is alleged, Jews have a very comfortable existence. Hence the conclusion that "no Jewish problem exists" in the USA. The immigration "theories" of "collecting the dispersed", of returning the Jews to the "land of their forefathers" and so on are thus deliberately used as an ideological weapon for the most unbridled slander against the USSR and the entire socialist community. In this way the modern bourgeoisie and its sociologists place Zionism in the service of a reactionary political line aimed at undermining the principles of peaceful coexistence. Being, as the Israeli rulers themselves assert, a concrete embodiment of Zionist ideas, immigration is one of the mainstays of a dangerous policy of aggression. That is why the Arab states regard, not without grounds, Israel's immigration plans as a threat to the inviolability of their frontiers. Jewish immigration to Israel does not solve the "Jewish problem". On the contrary, it only deepens the problem for many thousands of Jewish working people and, at the same time, diverts them from the struggle for genuine emancipation. At present the Zionist leaders of Israel openly declare that they regard Jewish immigration as a means (which they are already using) of attaining their expansionist ambitions, namely, the settlement and colonisation of occupied territories.

* For facts on the return to the USSR of Jews who had immigrated to Israel see B. S. Prakhya, *The Truth About the Promised Land*, Russ. ed., Odessa, 1961.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), January 1962, p. LXXII. For the plans to integrate the Arab territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 aggression and to settle immigrants in them see Afterword.

*** J. Babel, "The Comfortable Diaspora", *Forum for the Problems of Zionism, World Jewry and the State of Israel*, Jerusalem, January 1962, p. 57.

MAIN STAGES OF ISRAEL'S
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT1. First Years (1948-1955). Significance
of US Grants-in-Aid
and FRG Reparations

As soon as the State of Israel was proclaimed it found itself confronted with the economic difficulties created by British colonial rule in Palestine. Jenny Nasmyth writes of "the failure of the Mandate to industrialise or in other ways to diversify the unbalanced economy of Palestine",* while Robert D. Ottensooser of Switzerland points out that although Jewish capital imports in Palestine totalled 45,200,000 Palestine pounds in the years 1940-1945, this money was not invested in production; it was transferred to London, where it accumulated in the shape of sterling accounts.**

The British authorities, *The Palestine Economist Annual* writes, "neglected their responsibilities towards local industry" particularly during the last year of the Mandate.*** According to Alex Rubner, a Briton who was adviser to the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Israel, when the British pulled out of Palestine they left "chaos behind them".****

Another factor behind the enormous economic difficulties of the first years was that almost all of Israel's re-

* Jenny Nasmyth, "Israel's Distorted Economy", *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, Autumn 1954, Vol. 8, No. 4, p. 391.

** Robert D. Ottensooser, *The Palestine Pound and the Israel Pound*, Geneva, 1955, p. 55. In *The Middle East in World Affairs* (p. 342), George Lenczowski likewise states that "during the mandatory period the Jewish Yishuv had a deficit economy".

*** *The Palestine Economist Annual*, 1948, p. 83.

**** Alex Rubner, *The Economy of Israel. A Critical Account of the First Ten Years*, London, 1960, p. 18; E. Goldberger, Op. cit., p. 37.

sources went into the war with the Arab states. Israel's direct war expenditures alone amounted to 80,000,000-100,000,000 Israeli pounds; in 1949 the national income totalled only 260,000,000 Israeli pounds.* Moreover, there was massive immigration: in the period from May 1948 to the close of 1949 the Jewish population increased 50 per cent, while by the end of 1951 it showed an increment of nearly 120 per cent.

Bentwich characterises the initial phase of Israel's economic development as follows: 1948—military struggle; 1949—political struggle; 1950-1951—economic struggle.** Actually, this was a formative period in which were created the economic foundations for Israel's further existence. As Rubner notes, from the very beginning the Government's paramount tasks were to arm and equip the army and settle and provide for the immigrants.

In that period attention was focussed chiefly on the balance of payments, which "had become a nightmare". From May to November 1948 exports licenses (issued only for 1,600,000 Israeli pounds) amounted to only 2.6 per cent as compared with imports. In 1949 exports were less than one-eighth of imports. Almost 70 per cent of the imports were food, fodder and fuel: local resources covered only 10 per cent of the grain requirements.***

At the close of 1948 only one-fifth of the Israeli banknotes in circulation had convertible currency backing. In 1949 the actual value of the Israeli pound (the official rate was I £1=US \$2.80) was only about one-third of the face value.**** The Israeli ruling circles feverishly looked for money to pay for the war and current expenditures. Taxes were raised to the maximum level and Government loans were floated internally. Nearly 70-80 per cent of the annual budgets for 1948-1951 was covered by indirect taxes.

* Robert D. Ottensooser, Op. cit., p. 104; Eretz Saaki, "Israel's New Economic Policy. The Background", *Public Finance*, The Hague, 1954, Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 277.

** Norman Bentwich, "The Fourth Year of Israel", *Fortnightly*, April 1952, p. 249; *Israel Resurgent*, p. 83.

*** All figures are from the official report of the United States Mission in Israel (*Foreign Commerce Weekly*, August 22, 1948, p. 17; February 28, 1949, p. 24).

**** *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, February 28, 1949, p. 25; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1966, No. 17, p. 519.

More than 40 per cent of the budget allocations in 1948-1951 were for direct military expenditures.* Most of the revenue from short-term Government loans floated between 1948 and 1951 was likewise used to finance a secret military budget (basic expenditures for the upkeep of the army). The heavy tax burden fell principally on the shoulders of the working people.

To obtain funds, notably for military needs, the Government had recourse to deficit financing, which badly hit the economy. The short-term Treasury bills issued as legal tender in 1948 and the Government's new loan commitments, so-called land bonds guaranteed by mortgages, were the chief means for the development budget (financing economic development) and the secret military budget. In 1949-1951 land bonds covered one-third of the expenditures from all three budgets**—current, development and secret military.

However, all these measures were only a temporary palliative and soon led to greater financial difficulties which erupted into inflation. From the close of 1949 to December 1951 the amount of money in circulation more than trebled, and only 22.7 per cent was covered by convertible currency.***

The disorganisation of finances was aggravated by the practice of imports without payment. Existing until 1952, this practice was characterised as an "international variant of a black market". It was based on the free purchase and sale of bills of exchange in the black market and then the re-sale of imported goods that were likewise sold at prices about 30 to 40 per cent higher than those obtaining in the world market.**** This brought the value of the Israeli pound down catastrophically. In 1951

* Ernst Goldberger, *Preisbewegungen in Israel, 1949-1953*, Eine Studie zu den Grundproblemen der Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft und Wirtschaftspolitik Israels, London, 1956, p. 48. Israel's State Budget is broken down into current and development budgets. Military expenditures come from the current budget.

** Ernst Goldberger, *Op. cit.*, pp. 55-56, 75; Eretz Saaki, *Op. cit.*, p. 283.

*** Ernst Goldberger, *Op. cit.*, pp. 55, 75.

**** For a detailed study of the import without payment system see *The Israel Economist*, July 1949, p. 154; Ernst Goldberger, *Op. cit.*, pp. 133-36; C. Tadmor, *Israel Economic Survey, January-June 1952*, p. 59; E. Saaki, *Op. cit.*, pp. 294-95.

imports without payment comprised one-fifth of Israel's total imports.

From the winter of 1950 onwards even the minimum food ration established by the Government could not be ensured. Norman Bentwich wrote of the increasingly critical economic situation.

At this crucial moment the safety valve for the Israeli ruling clique proved to be the big 100 million-dollar loan from the USA in January 1949. In December 1950, when, as Rubner put it, there was "bread and flour for only a few days", the USA granted another loan of 35 million dollars. The sale of Israel Independence Loan bonds was started in the United States stock exchanges in May 1951. At the same time Israel was included in the US "aid" programme. Of the 822 million dollars imported into Israel in 1949-1951, only 161,200,000 dollars were private investments. Thus, "Israel avoided bankruptcy and economic collapse only by dint of a huge annual inflow of capital".*

The Israel Economist openly wrote of the Israel Government's eagerness to attract foreign investment and urged the creation of "an economic system that will be positively attractive to Jewish capitalists abroad". Specifying its idea, the journal suggested that taxation should be kept at a moderate level, that economic controls should be reduced to a minimum and that every encouragement should be given to private enterprise.** It stressed that the possible demands of US private investors, in particular, should be satisfied. The Government helped to place the country into economic bondage to foreign capital by adopting, in March 1950, a law encouraging investments and according substantial benefits and privileges to foreign investors.

The following official statistics give a picture of Israel's economic development in 1948-1951. The national income during these years was 1,900 million dollars,*** and capital imports amounted to 822 million dollars, or to

* E. Saaki, *Op. cit.*, p. 274.

** *The Israel Economist*, July 1949, pp. 149, 157.

*** The national income is given according to the actual rate of exchange; under the official rate the national income comes to 2,200 million dollars. See Eretz Saaki, *Op. cit.*, p. 277.

approximately 40 per cent of the national income. In the total investments, the share of foreign financing was: 1949—55 per cent; 1950—42 per cent, and 1951—41 per cent.* Actually, these figures were much higher. According to statistics compiled by the UN, in 1951 Israel's domestic savings represented only 17 per cent of net investment,** the remainder of the capital coming from abroad. The lion's share of foreign capital comprised US state grants-in-aid and donations from American Zionist organisations. The USA thus helped to lay Israel's economic foundation and build up her military potential.

With considerable financial support from the USA, Israel's rulers launched a series of measures in an effort to stabilise the economy. In February 1952 they announced a New Economic Policy, which marked the beginning of the second phase of Israel's economic development (from 1952 to the first quarter of 1956). Alex Rubner described this policy as the watershed between two periods in Israel's economic development. There were some signs of an economic upsurge only in 1954-1955 when intensive preparations were made for armed aggression against Egypt.

The new policy proclaimed by the Government was defined as a "number of measures intended simultaneously to curb inflation and to improve the balance of payments".***

The first of these measures was the devaluation of the Israeli pound. Then followed the planning of measures aimed to balance Israel's budgets, chiefly through regular current revenue, and in this connection the issue of Treasury bills and land bonds was stopped.

Moreover, it was planned to enlarge the administrative apparatus. Selective immigration was proclaimed in 1952 as an addition to the New Economic Policy.

However, the failure of this policy became quite obvious at the close of 1952. From February to December 1952 the consumer price index rose 48.3 per cent: 60 per cent for bread, over 80 per cent for garments and foot-

* *The Israel Economist Annual*, Jerusalem, 1952, p. 94.

** *Economic Developments in the Middle East 1945 to 1954*, United Nations, New York, 1955, p. 122.

*** C. Tadmor, *Op. cit.*, p. 8; Alex Rubner, *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

wear; the wholesale price index soared 48.9 per cent. Real wages fell by 14-20 per cent.* In 1952 approximately 80 per cent of the population had to use the black market, where, for instance, the price of sugar was 24 times higher than the official price. Two new "unofficial" rates of exchange—£1.8=US\$1 for exporters and foreign tourists, and £2=US\$1 for capital transfers from foreign countries—were instituted only a few months after devaluation.

Touching on the state of Israel's economy in this period, *The Economist* wrote: "Israel's difficulties make an economist's nightmare... the Government still faces a financial situation which is nearly desperate... Israel has kept its head above water by expedients ranging from borrowing to begging."***

By the end of 1953 Israel's external debt amounted to 400 million dollars.

Taxes weighed down heavily on the population. The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* wrote that income taxes swallowed from 20 to 50 per cent of people's earnings, and in addition there were the steadily increasing state dues.*** In 1953 roughly 10 per cent of the able-bodied population was unemployed, and emigration exceeded immigration.

The New Economic Policy foundered mainly because the USA, which was heavily financing Israel, was interested in that country's economic development only so far as this allowed building up chiefly its military potential. Noteworthy in this respect is, for example, the assessment of Jenny Nasmyth in an article headed "Israel's Distorted Economy". She wrote that Israel developed what was more or less a war economy and that "all war economies are distorted... The effects on Israel are many, various and far-reaching".****

Nonetheless, it may be placed on record that from 1954 until the beginning of the aggression against Egypt in October 1956 there was a trend towards economic sta-

* C. Tadmor, *Israel Economic Survey*, July-December 1952, pp. 12, 14.

** *The Economist*, London, April 25, 1953, pp. 202-03.

*** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 30, 1953.

**** Jenny Nasmyth, "Israel's Distorted Economy", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 4, p. 393.

bilisation in Israel. Alex Rubner says that this stabilisation was relative. This view is corroborated to some extent by the "Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Programme" for June 30, in which it is likewise stated that the Israel economy had made progress toward stabilisation and noted that the mutual security programme in Israel had shifted from emergency supply to basic development projects.* This fact is noteworthy because the Israeli rulers embarked on particularly intensive preparations for a "preventive war" against the Arab states precisely in 1954.

A major factor contributing towards economic stabilisation in Israel and the build-up of her war potential was the agreement signed in September 1952 with the FRG, under which West Germany undertook to pay Israel, in the course of 12 years beginning in 1953, reparations amounting to 822 million dollars as compensation for the losses inflicted on Jews by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. This agreement, as we have noted above, was concluded not without the help of the USA. In 1953, *The Banker*, a well-informed journal, made the forecast that the reparations agreement "may prove to be a decisive turning point in Israel's economic development".**

In only 1953, the first year of the agreement's operation, Israel's imports at the expense of these reparations amounted to 75 million dollars, or the equivalent of one-fourth of the country's foreign currency requirements. Bentwich characterised the upgrade of Israel's economy in 1954 as follows: "...the most radical improvement in Israel's economic position ... is due not to her increased productivity, but to the regular delivery of reparations by the Federal German Government."**** In the period up to the start of the aggression against Egypt, Israel received reparations from the FRG amounting approximately to 300,000,000 dollars exclusively in the form of means of production, capital equipment and raw materials.

* *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Programme for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1954*, Washington, 1954, p. 25.

** *The Banker*, London, Vol. C, No. 324, January 1953, p. 45.

*** Norman Bentwich, "Israel—The Sixth Year", *The Fortnightly*, London, June 1954, pp. 405-06.

However, the largest proportion of the "aid" received in 1953-56 came from the USA. In the above-mentioned "Report to Congress" it is pointed out that nearly half of Israel's development budget was financed from "counterpart funds" provided by American aid.*

Of the more than 2,500 million dollars received by Israel from foreign countries in the first nine years (from May 15, 1948 to March 1957), not less than two-thirds** came from the USA as gratuitous grants-in-aid, loans, donations, private investments and so on. In relation to Israel's national income, which, according to official figures, totalled 8,000 million Israeli pounds or 4,400 million dollars between 1949 and 1956, the capital imports during these years came to 57 per cent.*** The net annual capital imports per head of the population in 1949-1957 were 219 dollars. According to UN statistics for those years, two-thirds of the population in the capitalist world had a per capita annual income of less than 200 dollars.****

Lastly, the investments in Israel's economy in 1949-1957 totalled 1,900 million dollars (3,500 million Israeli pounds).***** Bearing in mind that capital imports in this period totalled 2,500 million dollars, consumption exceeded production by 600 million dollars. Israel's economic development requirements were thus covered chiefly from foreign sources. This was a kind of "deficit financing" on a nation-wide scale and was testimony of unhealthy trends in the economy. The inflow of huge sums of money from abroad is also the answer to how Israel was able to surmount the economic difficulties of her first years so rapidly and prove to be ready, without an adequate production potential, to participate in the imperialist aggression against Egypt.

* *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Programme for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1954*, p. 26.

** J. Ramati, "Israel's Economic Problem", *The Banker*, April 1958, p. 244.

*** Computed on the basis of the figures given in *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, February 1958, p. 159; *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5719 (1958), 1958, p. 212.

**** S. Riemer, "Israel: Ten Years of Economic Dependence", *Oxford Economic Papers*, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 1960, p. 152.

***** *The Economy and Agriculture of Israel*, Jerusalem, June 1959, p. 57.

2. Consequences of Militarisation and Aggression. Dependence on Foreign Capital (1956-1965)

War preparations were stepped up directly before the Sinai adventure. This is borne out by the fact that in the current budget for 1955/56 the overt allocations for military purposes amounted to 44 per cent (157,800,000 Israeli pounds) of the total expenditures.

In 1956, Don Patinkin writes, this proportion reached more than one half.* Parallel with this, drives for "defence" funds followed one after another in the course of 1956.** A "defence month" was organised in June 1956. The figures published by *The Jerusalem Post* showed that in 1955-1956 the Israeli war industry had increased output 250 per cent; this industry's budget rose threefold and its staff was enlarged 50 per cent.*** All in all, from May 1948 to March 1957 Israel's direct military expenditures added up to 2,000 million Israeli pounds, or 1,100 million dollars.****

In October 1956 *The Financial Times* of London noted that in Israel there was no clear-cut demarcation line between defence and economic development. Of the total of 600,000 workers, 105,000 were engaged in farming, while in the border regions most of them were armed and constantly on the alert.***** Lastly, according to the assessment made later by Alex Rubner, the marked growth of Israel's foreign trade deficit in 1956 was due to "stockpiling in anticipation of the Sinai campaign in the autumn. . . . Much of Israel's industry was employed during these months in preparation for the impending military clash".

The unleashing of the Sinai adventure, its course and consequences may be regarded as the third phase of Israel's economic development. Her direct expenditures on

* Don Patinkin, *The Israel Economy. The First Decade*, Jerusalem, December 1960, p. 55.

** A "defence" fund campaign was conducted in February, and a special "war tax" was introduced in May. By April 1956 Israel had renewed nearly 60 per cent of her navy (see B. Boxer, *Israel Shipping and Foreign Trade*, Chicago, 1957, p. 46).

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, September 1, 1957.

**** *Israel Weekly Digest*, 1958, No. 19, p. 2.

***** *The Financial Times*, October 31, 1956.

the military actions against Egypt are estimated at 432 million Israeli pounds or 240 million dollars (official sources give the figure as 350 million Israeli pounds*).

Table 4 shows the changes in Israel's financial position in the course of 1956 and 1957.

Table 4

Changes in Israel's Financial Position*
(*000,000 dollars)

	1955	1956	1957
Convertible currency and gold reserves, Bank of Israel	54.4	58.8	57.4
thereof: gold reserves	—	3.6	1.6
Short-term debts to accounts in the USA	10.4	16.4	23.6
State debt in foreign currency (figures for March 31)**	413.0	457.0	507.0
Internal state debt (figures for March 31), I£ million***	297.7	348.9	502.5
Government debt to the Bank of Israel, I£ million	199.5	367.7	365.0

* Source: *International Financial Statistics*, 1960, pp. 168-69; 1961, pp. 168-71; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1959/60, pp. 355-59, XL-XLI.

** Exclusive of the debt to the USA in local currency, and also of current commitments to foreign insurance, transport and fuel companies.

*** These figures give only the Government's debt as shown in the budgets and constituting only three-fourths of the total internal debt; the remaining debt comprises the Government's current commitments.

The expenditures on the war against Egypt more than halved Israel's gold reserves. In the period after 1955 the Government's debt to the Bank of Israel more than doubled, while the internal state debt (exclusive of current commitments) increased 70 per cent.

The structure of Israel's foreign currency debt amply testifies to the USA's broad participation in financing Israel during the Sinai campaign. By the spring of 1957 Israel's foreign debt had increased more than 22 per cent, with the short-term debts, chiefly to the USA, rising more

* *The Jerusalem Post*, November 26, 1957.

than 130 per cent. On the whole, the state debt grew almost exclusively through the sale of Israeli bonds abroad, principally in the USA. In two years the receipts from the sale of these bonds increased almost 50 per cent. Thus, the second stage of the sale of the Israeli Independence Bonds commenced at the very height of the fighting in the Sinai Peninsula (in only one day, November 5, the subscriptions in the USA yielded 600,000 dollars in cash). In November and December 1956 the sale of Israeli bonds brought 28 million dollars; during the preceding 29 months (from May 1954 to October 1956) the receipts only amounted to 102 million dollars. Moreover, in 1956 Israel got 125 million dollars in the form of "donations" from American Jewish organisations. *The Israel Economist* noted "the amazing response of World Jewry, and especially of American Jews, to the present emergency".*

At the same time, wishing to demonstrate its "loyalty" to the Arabs, the US Government temporarily suspended its official financial "aid" to Israel. However, this was sheer hypocrisy, because "aid" was resumed within a few months.

Israel's participation in the triple aggression affected her economy. While in the years from 1949 to 1953 industrial output grew by approximately 100 per cent, and in 1954 the growth was 15-20 per cent** as compared with the previous year, no growth at all was registered in 1956. If 1955 is taken as the base, the industrial production index for November 1956 was equal to 90.*** In a Knesset speech in the autumn of 1957 Eshkol admitted that the Sinai campaign and the preparations for it had strongly affected the Israeli economy.**** The Israeli rulers made every effort to conceal the consequences to Israel of her participation in the aggression against Egypt and sought a way out of the situation chiefly by emptying the pockets of the working masses. New loans were floated and new taxes were

* *The Israel Economist*, February 1957, p. 26.

** *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1955-1956*, New York, 1957, p. 66.

*** *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1957, No. 7, p. 221.

**** In his capacity of Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol addressed the Knesset on the additional budget on November 25, 1957. *The Jerusalem Post*, November 26, 1957.

instituted at the beginning of 1957. The sale of "defence loan" bonds amounting to 40 million Israeli pounds was started in January. In April the "defence tax" was prolonged for a year in the calculation that it would yield 50 million Israeli pounds, while in July, i. e., nearly six months before the end of the fiscal year, the Government had to adopt an additional budget. At the 8th Conference of the Farmers' Federation of Israel in May 1957, the Federation's president Izakson said that taxes were swallowing 72 per cent of the farmer's income.*

Unemployment rose from 34,000 to 49,000. The military gamble of the Israeli ruling circles in alliance with the imperialist powers had thus hit the economic condition of the working people above all.

The years from 1958 to 1960 may be characterised as the commencement of the fourth phase of Israel's economic development. Agriculture and industry made some headway due to the huge inflow of foreign capital. This period (up to mid-1966) witnessed Israel's largest expansion of the crop area and the development of irrigation. Advances were made in overcoming mono-crop farming and in the intensification of agriculture, particularly in the cultivation of industrial crops. Industry registered some growth due to the building of a number of new branches. There was an increase in exports.

However, the laws governing Israel's economic development came to the fore most distinctly in this period. The crucial question was: Was the country moving towards lesser dependence on foreign financing or, on the contrary, was this dependence growing? Of unquestionable interest is the assessment by the Israeli economist Don Patinkin. His summing up of Israel's economic development in the first decade brought him round to the conclusion that Israel had developed through continued dependence on foreign capital.**

In subsequent years this dependence was mirrored by the following statistics: in relation to the country's total expenditures, the GNP in 1958-1964 amounted to only 71.8 per cent, while the national income came to only

* *Economic Review*, 1957, No. 40, p. 8.

** Don Patinkin, *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

Table 5

Dependence of the Israeli Economy on Foreign Financing*
 £ million (at the rate of £1.8=US\$1 for 1962
 and 1963; £3=US\$1 and £3.5=US\$1 for 1967 and 1968)

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1967	1968
1. Redemption of loans,** pay- ment of interest and divi- dends remitted abroad	283.2	322.2	310.0	324.7	623.7	884.7	1,548	1,447.6
thereof: interest and divi- dends	60.0	68.7	92.2	124.2	205.8	217.2	431.5	472.5
2. New loans** and private investment from abroad	409.5	388.9	417.4	480.4	1,079.1	1,178.1	2,238.5	1,925.0
3. Non-repayable receipts (gifts, reparations and res- titution from the FRG, "donations" from Zionist organisations abroad)	483.3	445.5	572.4	637.5	992.1	1,051.5	1,883.1	1,569.0
thereof: exclusive of resti- tution from the FRG and private transfers	280.0	255.0	323.2	347.4	389.4	357.6	758.8	1,000.0
4. Net capital investments	623.0	677.0	675.0	897.0	1,497.0	1,444.0	1,865.0***	2,437.0***
5. Import surplus over export, including services	504.4	444.8	592.0	842.0	1,368.0	1,274.0	1,619.5	2,166.9

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1967	1968
6. Redemption of loans and payment of interest and divi- dends remitted abroad in proportion to new loans and investments from abroad, %	69.1	82.1	74.3	67.5	57.8	75.3	69.1	75.2
thereof: payment of inter- est and dividends in pro- portion to new loans and investments from abroad, %	14.7	17.6	22.1	25.9	16.5	18.4	19.2	24.5
7. Payment of interest and dividends remitted abroad in proportion to net invest- ments, %	10.0	10.3	13.6	13.3	13.7	15.4	23.1	19.3

* Sources: *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1959/60, No. 11, pp. 259, 268; Bank of Israel, Annual Report 1961, Jerusalem, May 1962, pp. 30-31, 58; Bank of Israel, Annual Report 1963, Jerusalem, 1964, pp. 28, 34-35, 63; Statistical Bulletin of Israel, 1969, No. 5, p. 25.*

** Exclusive of commercial credits.
 *** Gross investments.

56.6 per cent.* The remaining expenditures were covered by funds from abroad. It is to be noted that state consumption, which rose steeply through the increase in military spending during the aggression year and dropped in 1957, again showed a trend to rise as early as 1958.**

The fact that from 1952 (1952 = 100) to 1962 state consumption increased to 249.5, while private consumption rose to 240.7 distinctly showed that expenditures on state consumption exceeded private consumption. This is plain evidence of militarisation, especially if it is considered that state consumption is growing faster than private consumption chiefly as a result of increasing military spending.

As a consequence of the distorted, one-sided economic development in the preceding period, Israel has to pay growing sums of money in interest on foreign loans and as dividends on invested capital. On the one hand, she is finding herself more and more dependent on foreign financing, and, on the other, there is a growing gap between the nominal total of the foreign loans granted to her and the sums left after the deduction of redemption payments on loans and also of interest and dividends remitted abroad. Table 5 illustrates the steady growth of Israel's immense financial burden.

The figures in the table show that loan redemption and the payment of interest and dividends remitted abroad reach more than three-fourths and even four-fifths of the new loans and private investments from overseas. The size of interest and dividends remitted abroad is steadily growing (7.8-fold between 1958 and 1968); in 1967 they totalled almost one-fourth of the net investments.

The ruling élite plans economic development mainly in terms of capital imports. Regarding the prospects for

* Computed according to the figures in *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, pp. 160-61. According to Israeli statistics, the GNP includes the national income, indirect taxes and depreciation. Total expenditures include private and state consumption, investments and imports.

** For the 100 per cent growth of state consumption during the first decade (including 1957 and 1958) chiefly as a result of extraordinarily high military spending, see Alex Rubner, *Op. cit.*, p. 28; Don Patinkin, *Op. cit.*, p. 55.

industrial development in 1962-1966, Pinhas Sapir, Minister of Commerce and Industry, said that "the amount which the state itself is investing in industry is quite modest" and indicated that it was necessary to mobilise more capital overseas.* The prospects for ensuring investments in the Israeli economy are as follows. The final FRG reparations payments were made in 1966. Moreover, the receipts from the sale of Israeli loan bonds abroad fell to 40-30 per cent of the sums actually realised (minus the redemption instalments and minus the interest being paid out). These factors, the Israeli ruling circles admit, still further complicate the investment problem. Thus, the unhealthy trend towards heavier dependence on foreign financing is growing increasingly more pronounced in the Israeli economy.

Table 6 shows Israel's national income.

In the officially computed national income** the revenues from farming, industry and construction added to only somewhat above one-third; the remaining about two-thirds are accounted for by the non-productive sphere, including circulation. The ratio between production and circulation was: 41.1 to 58.9 per cent in 1955; 41.1 to 58.9 per cent in 1959; 44.6 to 55.4 per cent in 1964; and 38.2 to 61.8 per cent in 1967. More than one-fourth of the national income is derived from Government and non-profit institutions (the latter are financed from foreign sources, for instance, the Jewish Agency and others). While the national income increased 4.1-fold from 1955 to 1964, the per capita income increased only 2.6-fold within the same period.

The development pattern of Israel's capitalist economy may be likened to an inverse pyramid. In other words, it rests on a narrow production base (industry and agriculture yield only 33-35 per cent of the national income as against the 51 per cent yielded by the non-productive spheres). This is the inescapable consequence of dependence on foreign capital.

* Pinhas Sapir, "The Task of Industry in 1962-66", *Israel Industry and Commerce*, Jerusalem, Vol. XIII, April 1962, No. 3-4, p. 2.

** For computations of Israel's national income see D. Creamer, *Israel's National Income 1950-54*, Jerusalem, 1955, pp. 37-42.

Table 6

National Income*
(in current prices)

	1955		1959		1964		1967	
	I£ mln	%	I£ mln	%	I£ mln	%	I£ mln	%
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	209	11.5	377	11.7	683.5	9.4	983.5	9.0
Manufacturing and mining	399	22.0	712	22.2	1,808.9	24.8	2,205.4	22.2
Construction	137	7.6	260	7.2	759.6**	10.4	695.8**	7.0
Public utilities	29	1.6	56	1.7				
Transportation and communication	121	6.7	232	7.2	608.2	8.3	889.6	9.0
Finance, insurance and real estate	144	7.9	260	8.1	868.7	11.9	1,238.4	12.5
Trade and services industry	391	21.6	656	20.5	1,310.8	17.9	1,781.9	18.0
Government and non-profit institutions	382	21.1	688	21.4	1,265.6	17.3	2,218.4	22.3
Net national product	1,812	100.0	3,211	100.0	7,305.3	100.0	9,923.0	100.0
National income (minus depreciation)	1,726		3,047		6,956.9		9,454.2	

* Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1959/60*, No. 11, p. 126; 1968, No. 19, p. 161.

** Including public utilities—approximately 2 per cent.

This growing dependence on capital from overseas, as well as the lack of economic equilibrium, was traceable as early as 1965. That year, says the official report of the Bank of Israel, there was a shrinkage of business activity and the economy became more vulnerable. Moreover, increasing inflation became evident, production diminished in almost all industries and there was no prospect whatever of essentially reducing the trade balance deficit. Publishing this report, *The Jerusalem Post* qualified it as a "sad story of wasted resources, lost opportunities and accumulated problems".*

It would not be superfluous to see how the prospects for Israel's economic development are viewed by Israeli and other bourgeois researchers. Don Patinkin acknowledged in 1960 that "there is little likelihood . . . in the near future" of "any possible decrease in the burden of defence expenditure".** He held that there were two ways for solving the problem of capital accumulation in Israel: first, by narrowing the sphere of investment and, second, by reducing the consumption norm per head of population. In other words, he suggested resolving the difficulties at the expense of the working masses by further lowering their standard of living.

The Swiss economist Ernst Goldberger wrote that Israel had to have "an economic policy that would help to diminish economic dependence. Evidently, the question of Israel's existence will sooner or later be decided in connection with whether the way will be found for such a policy."*** This is a more unbiased and sober evaluation.

Some bourgeois researchers, it must be noted, describe Israel as an undeveloped country but with a higher standard of living. Alex Rubner debunks these theories as "sheer nonsense", writing that Israel's standard of living has been and is now below that of Western Europe.****

Israel's economy is studied in more detail in the next chapter. Here we shall note the economic development trends arising out of the policy followed by the ruling circles, who rely chiefly on support from monopoly capital.

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 2, 1966.

** Don Patinkin, *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

*** Ernst Goldberger, *Op. cit.*, p. 209.

**** Alex Rubner, *Op. cit.*, p. 65.

This orientation has led to the break-up of Israel's entire economic structure and made the attainment of economic independence a matter of the remote future. Despite the considerable growth of production and export, there has been a chronic growth of the balance of payments deficit, which in its turn inevitably leads to more capital imports in order to cover this deficit.

Typical features of the Israeli economy such as constant inflation, the steady decline of the exchange rate of the Israeli pound, the unchangeably rising cost of living and tax burden, chiefly through indirect taxation, and the diminishing local capital investments in the national economy, are the direct result of the colossal military spending and the country's militarisation. The huge growth of the profits of the big finance corporations and their fabulous enrichment are accompanied by the impoverishment of the working people.*

* *Marxist Review*, 1962, No. 6, pp. 35-36.

As we have partially shown in the previous chapter, during the past 22 years large-scale foreign financing could not but facilitate a certain economic advance in Israel. However, the unprecedented financing, above all by the USA, pursued aims other than the country's economic development. Political objectives received priority and this has had injurious consequences. The economy was adversely effected by the rupture of economic relations with the neighbouring Arab countries, because for long years Palestine and these countries had constituted an integral economic mutually supplementing complex.

In spite of a number of favourable economic indices, Israel remains a country where citrus fruits continue to play a key role in export and production. To this day agriculture has been unable to satisfy the country's requirements in many foodstuffs. Israel has been transformed from an agrarian into an agrarian-industrial country, but her raw material base is totally inadequate and this makes her hopelessly dependent on the external market. The main industries (with the exception of the war and allied branches) are poorly developed and production capacities are small. Small-commodity production exists alongside big capitalist industry with its high level of capital concentration. The centralisation and concentration of banking capital continues in a situation witnessing the further impoverishment of the majority of the population and

the accumulation of wealth by a handful of big entrepreneurs. In view of Israel's heavy dependence on foreign financing, the external and internal state debt is continuously growing and the foreign trade deficit remains enormous.

A point to be borne in mind is that compared with 1948 Israel's population is now four times larger. This could not but benefit the country's economy.

However, it is a fact that Israel's development is determined primarily by the trend towards enlarging her military potential. This leads to the development of the corresponding industries and also of branches that give private, including foreign, capital the largest dividends, for instance, the exploitation of the wealth of the Dead Sea and so on. Naturally, this only adds to Israel's difficulties.

1. Agriculture. Distribution of the Crop Area. Hydroprojects, Basic Crops. Arab Farms

In 1967, 12.6 per cent of the working population was engaged in agriculture (as against 13.8 per cent in 1949).^{*} After 1955 there has been some diminution of the percentage of the population employed in agriculture, but since 1960 this diminution has been expressed also in absolute figures, chiefly on account of the difficulties which the Government is encountering in its policy of directing as many immigrants as possible into farming, particularly into the development of desert areas.

According to official statistics, agriculture accounted for 9 per cent of the national income in 1967.

In Israel agriculture has passed through two phases of development. At the first phase the principal task was to provide food for the rapidly growing population, in particular, foodstuffs that would not have to be imported: milk, eggs, vegetables and fruit. At the second phase the main effort was directed towards the growing of industrial crops and, to a lesser extent, grain.

^{*} *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, p. 305; 1968, No. 19, p. 260; C. Tadmor, *Israel Economic Statistics*, Jerusalem, 1953, p. 16.

In 1965 one-fifth of the total exports consisted of farm products.

The considerable enlargement of the cultivated area in Israel since 1948 and the change in its distribution pattern are shown in Table 7.

The cultivated area has been enlarged by improving land usage and also by developing neglected land. The biggest land-improvement projects were carried out in the region of Lake Hule in the Eastern Galilee. Desert and semi-desert land has been developed in the Northern and Southern Negev and in the region of Lakhish. The further development of the Negev Desert, which occupies nearly half of Israel, will become possible only upon completion of the hydroprojects now under construction.

A major project, the Yarcon-Negev water pipeline (completed in 1955), has made it possible to irrigate the Northern Negev, the southern part of the coastal strip and the region of the Judea Mountains. The Western Galilee-Qishon hydroproject envisages the link-up of the springs and reservoirs of the Western Galilee and also the waters of the Qishon River for the irrigation of the Zebulun and Esdraelon valleys.^{*}

However, it has been decided to make the Jordan-Negev pipeline (the first section of which became operational in June 1964) the country's central water-supply system. Under this project it is planned to divert considerable water resources from the frontier Jordan River. As we have noted, this is bitterly resented by the Arab states. It was calculated that upon the completion of this project in 1968 the cultivated area in the Negev would be enlarged by 800,000 dunams^{**} with the pipeline annually conveying 320 million cubic metres of water from the Jordan to the Negev Desert over a distance of 185-200 kilometres.^{***} The economic effect of the three large hydro-projects would thus be expressed in the piping of an additional 625 million cubic metres of water. For the sake

^{*} J. Prushansky, "Water Development", *Israel Today*, 1960, No. 11, pp. 19-20.

^{**} *Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel*, Ed. by J. Ben-David (Jerusalem), UNESCO, Paris, 1964, p. 19.

^{***} J. Prushansky, Op. cit., pp. 24-25; *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), 1962, p. 46.

Table 7

Enlargement and Distribution of Cultivated Area*
(1,000 dunams)**

	1948/49	1949/50	1958/59	1964/65	1965/66	1967/68
Total (irrigated and non-irrigated)***	1,650	2,480	4,105	4,190	4,220	4,190
thereof: irrigated	300	350	1,235	1,555	1,580	1,640
Distribution:						
Field crops	1,130	1,854	2,915	2,800	2,800	2,775
thereof:						
wheat, barley, sorghum, maize, rice	568.3	938.4	1,242	1,551.6	1,300.1	...
Industrial crops (cotton, sugar-beet, tobacco, flax) other field crops	8.7****	27.1****	146.5	283.9	195.3	...
Fallow	553.0	888.5	1,526.5	964.3	304.7	...
Vegetables, potatoes, groundnuts	70	133	259	283	280	280
Fruit plantations	355	377	680	848	881	877
thereof:						
citrus fruit	125	131.8	295	420	455	447
Fish ponds	15	22	46	59	61	58
Miscellaneous	80	94	155	175	173	175

* *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1952/53, No. 4, pp. 57-58, 69; 1959/60, No. 11, pp. 140-41, 144-45; 1963, No. 16, pp. 364-68; 1966, No. 17, pp. 356, 358-60; 1968, No. 19, pp. 313-16.* The figures in the table are for the agricultural year from October to September.

** One dunam equals 0.1 hectare.

*** This figure is for the crop area. Due to repeated harvests, the area under irrigated crops, vegetables and potatoes is usually about 80 per cent of the crop area.

**** Only tobacco.

of comparison it may be noted that in 1961/62 Israel's water consumption amounted to 1,420 million cubic metres.


Citrus fruits remain the main crop in Israel. With the rise of the value index of the entire farm product (1948/49=100) from 131 in 1949/50 to 743 in 1966/67 (in 1948 prices), the value index of citrus fruits rose only from 108 to 385;* in other words, while the gross farm product grew more than 5.6-fold, the share of citrus fruits grew only 3.6-fold. Nevertheless, citrus fruits account for over two-thirds of the total value of the farm exports and represent about 20 per cent of the value of agricultural production.**

In addition to citrus fruits, Israel grows vine, apples, pears, dates, apricots, almonds, bananas and pineapples.

Industrial crop farming is being intensively developed. While the total farm product, in terms of value, has increased 2.5-fold since 1955/56, industrial crops have grown

* *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1968, No. 19, pp. 322-23.*

** *Ibid., 1957/58, No. 9, pp. 130, 142; 1965, No. 16, pp. 366, 375.* The figures for the citrus harvest are given on the basis of the average for 1962-65.



MAP 2. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Table 8

Output of Jewish and Arab Farms

	1948/49		1963/64		1964/65		1966/67	
	thous. tons	£m	thous. tons	£m	thous. tons	£m	Value index (1948/49 = 100)	£m
Total value	(44.4 mln I£)	...	1,248.5	...	1,345.9	610	1,493.5	260.8
Field crops								
wheat	21.2	126.5	33.5	150.1	39.5	...	57.6	5.4
barley	20.0	116.6	22.5	67.4	13.5	...	5.1	0.8
sorghum	3.0	79.5	15.1	67.0	13.3	...	55.7	108.1
maize	7.3	4.8	1.4	3.2	0.9
Forage (hay, green fodder)	413.4	1,836.3	51.8	1,593.4	50.5
Industrial crops								
thereof:								
groundnuts	0.3	9.5	7.1	13.5	11.4	...	13.1	64.3
cotton	—	15.5	36.1	21.5	49.6	...	9.5	...
cottonseed	—	24.5	4.4	35.4	6.4

	1948/49		1963/64		1964/65		1966/67	
	thous. tons	£m	thous. tons	£m	thous. tons	£m	Value index (1948/49 = 100)	£m
tobacco	0.6	0.9	2.8	1.7	5.4	...	1.2	16.0
sugar-beet	—	256.0	16.2	294.6	18.9	...	122.6	282.2
Potatoes and vegetables	106.0	424.1	115.2	415.4	121.5	393	157.5	155.7
Citrus fruit	272.7	838.9	185.4	878.3	227.9	326	158.2	266.5
Other fruit	39.2	272.5	148.1	249.4	160.1	907	38.4	5.3
Milk, thous. litres	85.9	365.7	126.7	383.8	136.0	472
Eggs, mln.	242.5	1,278.5	131.0	1,296.0	126.4	568
Meat (live weight)	7.5	116.9	246.7	116.7	254.5	1,555
Fish	3.5	18.9	32.5	19.3	33.7	598
Honey	0.5	1.2	3.3	1.5	4.1	289

3.4-fold.* For the first time in her history Israel is growing crops like groundnuts, cotton, sugar-beet and flax. Cotton, whose cultivation was started in 1953, now occupies an area of 219,300 dunams, this covers approximately two-fifths of the country's requirements.

Groundnuts (grown since 1954) are an important export commodity. The area under sugar-beet has been increased to 61,200 dunams.

There are plantations under tobacco (chiefly at Arab farms) and also sugar-cane. Flax is grown on an area of 7,500 dunams.

To overcome the consequences of mono-culture (citrus), attention is given to the growing of grain, notably to extending the area under wheat and barley and also sorghum. In 1964-1967 the area under these crops averaged 1,400,000 dunams as against the average of 1,100,000 dunams in 1949-1951. However, in the total crop area, the area under wheat, barley and sorghum dropped from 45 per cent in 1949-1951 to 23.5 per cent (1961-1963)** on account of the considerable development given to the cultivation of industrial crops. On the whole, there is a trend towards reducing the intensity of grain farming.

Other notable grain crops in Israel are maize, and also rice, which is grown in the irrigated lands near Hule.

Noteworthy advances have been made in the production of vegetables and potatoes, the output fully satisfying the home demand with a surplus for export.

The volume, value and growth of farm output are shown in Table 8.***

The following gives an idea of how far domestic production satisfies the country's requirements; in 1965, in percentage of the total consumption, the output of staples was: grain (wheat, barley, rice, millet, maize)—33.8;

* Computed in accordance with *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, pp. 378-79.

** Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1952/53, No. 4, p. 57; 1959/60, No. 11, pp. 156-57, 162-63; 1965, No. 16, pp. 369, 374-75, 378-79.

*** *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1966, No. 16, pp. 366-67, 370-71, 382; 1968, No. 19, p. 327.

wheat—40.2; vegetable oils and fats—60.0; sugar—31.1; and meat—82.3.*

In some staples consumption is thus met very inadequately.

The pattern of the Jewish farms is changing: the share of poultry and livestock-breeding is diminishing.

For example, in 1948 poultry, meat and dairy cattle and other domestic livestock accounted for nearly two-thirds of the production on the Jewish farms, and the crop area and plantations (excluding citrus fruit) for somewhat over one-third. In recent years the share of poultry and livestock-breeding has dropped to nearly 50 per cent (in the total farm output excluding citrus fruits).**

The overall growth of the livestock population at the Jewish farms is shown by the following figures.***

	1948	1964	Growth, %	1968	Growth, %
Cattle, thous. head	33.5	191.0	470	205.6	7.6
Poultry, million	1.4	7.8	457	7.8	—
Sheep and goats, thous. head	26.9	152.0	463	150.0	0.1
Draught animals, thous. head	7.3	14.5	226	12.0*	—

* Excluding asses.

Livestock are bred chiefly in the north, and also in the Esdraelon Valley and around Safed and Sheron.

The following, briefly, is the situation in the Arab villages. When the State of Israel was proclaimed in 1948 there were 88 Arab villages with a total land area of 1,200,000 dunams.**** The land taken over from the Arab refugees by the Government consisted of 1,300,000 dunams suitable for cultivation and 140,000 dunams of built-up area with 50,000 dwellings. The property left behind by

* Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1959/60, No. 1, p. 274; 1963, No. 14, pp. 201, 342; 1965, No. 16, p. 374; *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1966, No. 1-2, p. 89, No. 11-12, pp. 159-60.

** Computed in accordance with *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, pp. 378-79.

*** Computed in accordance with *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, p. 400; 1969, No. 20, p. 353.

**** Haim Halperin, *Changing Patterns in Israel Agriculture*, London, 1957, p. 56.

the Arab refugees has been valued at 500 million dollars.*

The distribution of arable land in the Arab villages and per head of population (compared with the period of the Mandate) was:**

	Average population per village	Area per capita, dunams	Cultivated area per capita, dunams	Average area per village, dunams
1945	1,089	15.1	8.4	16,492
1951	1,244	11.8	5.3	14,707
1964	1,637	5.5	2.2	6,650

These figures eloquently show how quickly the Arab fellaheen were rendered landless.

Under various pretexts more than 650,000 dunams of land have been confiscated from the Arab fellaheen.*** The remaining area of approximately 500,000 dunams is held by 55.5 per cent of the Arab population in the villages; the remaining 45.5 per cent (76,300) of the fellaheen have lost their land. As a result of the Government's policy, in the Arab villages land has become a "question of life or death".**** Many Arab fellaheen have been driven off their land to so-called closed zones, i.e., border areas where, at best, they have been given plots in a barren desert.

According to official statistics, in the northern and central areas, where most of the Arab population is concentrated, there are 14,340 Arab farms with a population of 95,000. Of these only 28 per cent have land holdings exceeding 30 dunams, which is regarded as the minimum

* Alex Rubner, Op. cit., p. 33; E. Saaki, Op. cit., p. 269.

** Haim Halperin, Op. cit., p. 58. Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1959/60, No. 11, pp. 15, 140; 1963, No. 14, pp. 25, 216; "Facts and Figures on the Expropriation of Arab Lands", *The Information Bulletin*, 1965, No. 1, pp. 18-19.

*** Here and below: "Facts and Figures on the Expropriation of Arab Lands", *The Information Bulletin*, 1965, No. 1, pp. 18-19. Land was confiscated from the Arab fellaheen under the 1951 law on abandoned land property (it was applied to Arabs living in Israel) and the 1953 law on the acquisition of land, and also from the Moslem waqf, and on various other pretexts.

**** Communist Party of Israel, Central Committee. Press Release, Tel Aviv, January-February 1957, p. 6.

required to make a Jewish farm self-supporting.* The vast majority of the Arab farms hardly make ends meet or exist on the borderline of beggary. Arabs get little or no support from the Government. The Arab villages have a shortage of water, little is being done in the way of building roads, developing electrification and so forth. Reality gives the lie to official propaganda about the "new horizons of development", the "rising standard of living" and so forth in the Arab villages in Israel.**

Most of the Arab population (75 per cent) in Israel are rural inhabitants. According to the statistics for 1964, Arabs (and a small part of other non-Jewish nationalities) comprised 42 per cent of the country's rural population, but the Arab farms yielded only 6.2 per cent of the total farm product. No change has taken place in their pattern of production. As before, field crops and vegetables account for 50 per cent; there has been almost no increase in the share of livestock-breeding, while the fruit plantation economy has even somewhat diminished.*** Although the cultivated area under field crops increased 50 per cent at these farms from 1951 to 1962, the harvest yield (with the exception of barley) remained almost on the same level, while in some cases it diminished. With few machines at their disposal and almost entirely lacking in modern methods, the Arab farms are run mainly on an extensive basis. Irrigation covers less than 3 per cent of the cultivated area, while at the Jewish farms 43 per cent of the cultivated area is irrigated.

Arab plantations grow mostly olives (nearly 70 per cent) and, to a lesser extent, vine. Output is sold at prices established by the Government, which, as a rule, are lower than the prices set for the output of the Jewish farms.

On the whole, a mixed pasture-grain agriculture predominates in Israel.

As late as 1960 it was noted that Israel had "not achieved full stability and security" and that agricultural pro-

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5724 (1963/64), 1964, p. 57.

** There is similar discrimination against the Arab urban proletariat and part of the Arab intelligentsia. Arabs usually receive smaller pay than Jews. They are discriminated against in the trade unions, the health services, and so on.

*** Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, pp. 242-43; 1965, No. 16, pp. 378-79.

ductivity was still low.* This, it should be noted, was a period witnessing the highest level of intensification in Israel's agriculture. The situation has hardly changed to this day. Israel's agriculture has been badly hit by the flood of American agricultural surpluses shipped to that country in the form of "aid". This has closed the market to some local products.

The appearance of a crisis of overproduction of a number of farm products, it was pointed out at the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel, stemmed not from an abundance of agricultural produce but from the sharp decline in the purchasing power of the masses and from malnutrition, which is the lot of the urban poor.**

2. Main Forms of Agricultural Production. The "Thesis" of the Socialist Nature of the Kibbutz

In Israel the pattern of land ownership is as follows:***

	%
Government and Government agencies	76.5
Jewish National Fund (Jewish Agency)	18.0
Private Jewish landlords	3.0
Private Arab landlords	2.5
Total	100.0

The Government and the Jewish National Agency together own 94.5 per cent of the land. This is so-called national land, and it is jointly run by a Government agency (overall direction) and the Jewish National Fund. It is inalienable**** but may be leased for a term of up to 49 years with an option for an extension of the lease.

A very small percentage of the land is owned privately. Some of the privately owned Jewish citrus plantations

* Avraham Harman, "Agricultural Settlement", *Israel Today*, No. 2, Jerusalem, January 1960, p. 35.

** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, pp. 79, 82.

*** Haim Halperin, *Op. cit.*, p. 37; Alex Rubner, *Op. cit.*, p. 101.

**** There have lately been cases of Government land sold to private individuals.

are fairly large; there are no landed estates. The privately owned lands are chiefly large farms employing hired labour or small farms. Land-owning farmers and individual tenants (mainly from among well-to-do immigrants), who employ hired labour and are called middle-class settlers, are emerging as a rich segment.

In Israel land is leased mainly to groups of people.* There are two kinds of group farms. The first are communal farms (kibbutzim), where the land is cultivated and the produce distributed on a collective basis, and hired labour is officially prohibited. Part of the income is used to enlarge production, but on the whole it is regarded as belonging to the lessor.

The second are co-operative farms called moshavei ovdim (or workers' settlements). Here the land is worked by individual families and the products sold through the co-operative. It is considered that all the work must be done by the lessee and his family, but the use of hired labour is permitted. After the rent (which is quite high) and the money used for the purchase of the commonly-owned farm implements are deducted, the income, or what little is left of it, goes to the lessee.

The few moshav shitufim or partnership settlements, where labour is remunerated and individual consumption is practised as distinct from the kibbutzim, are the intermediate form of group lessees between the kibbutzim and the moshavei ovdim.**

Private owners and individual lessees form moshavim settlements.

Middle-class moshavim are the intermediate type of settlement between the moshavei ovdim and the villages of private landowners. They are characterised by private land ownership and the use of hired labour, although the co-operative remains the medium through which output is sold and means of production purchased.***

The kibbutzim are the numerically largest and most

* This is dealt with at length by Haim Darin-Drabkin in *Patterns of Co-operative Agriculture in Israel*, Tel Aviv, 1962, and in *The Structure of the Agricultural Co-operative Movement*, Tel Aviv, 1965.

** M. Lanir, *The Way of Life in a Moshav Shitufi*, Tel Aviv, 1963.

*** For a detailed description of these kinds of settlements see Haim Darin-Drabkin, *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

socialised type of farms. The elements of collectivism intrinsic to the kibbutzim are used by Zionist and other bourgeois ideologists to laud the so-called Israeli variant of socialism.* The Zionists advertise the kibbutz movement as "the pioneering force of national revolution".** Lately, Israeli propaganda has been making an all-out effort to put over the idea that as a form of agricultural production the kibbutz is suitable for the developing countries, particularly in Africa. In this connection it is asserted, for example, that Israel is a "sociological laboratory"*** for co-operative farming. This calls for a closer study of the social nature of the kibbutz.

The first kibbutzim were set up in Palestine in 1909. In face of the stern conditions in which the first Jewish colonists lived, the kibbutz was the cheapest and most effective form of farming. With the history of the kibbutzim, which acquired the nature of military settlements, is linked the practice of illegally alienating land from the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. Darin-Drabkin notes that the first kibbutzniks were concerned only with practical tasks and were far removed from experimentation of a sociological order.**** Indeed, to this day the rank-and-file kibbutzniks are by no means convinced that their mission is to effect a socialist transformation in Israel's capitalist reality, whose laws govern the very existence of the kibbutzim.

In a Government-sponsored study prepared in 1954 the kibbutz is defined as an agricultural commune founded on common ownership of property and the pooling of labour.***** In a somewhat more extended definition the kibbutz is described as a voluntary socio-economic as-

* See: Haim Halperin, Op. cit., p. 225; M. Spiro, *The Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*, Cambridge, 1956, p. 187; A. Kishayar, "Socialism in Palestine", *Indian Review*, December 1948, p. 630; W. Preus, "Politik und Wirtschaft Israel im Brennpunkt der Neugestaltung der Asio-African Kontinent", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 1961, No. 3, p. 250.

** "Basic Facts About the Kibbutz", *Hashaomer Hatzair. Great Britain*, Tochnit Tsofim Bogrim, August 1960, p. 18.

*** Haim Darin-Drabkin, Op. cit., p. 6.

**** Ibid., p. 9.

***** *Israel. Monograph on Community Settlements and Report of the Survey Mission on Community Organisation and Development*, New York, 1954, p. 3.

sociation founded on common property, production and work, on the one hand, and on common consumption and living arrangements, on the other.*

The principles underlying the organisation of a kibbutz are, according to the above-mentioned study, 1) all work is performed exclusively by the members of the kibbutz; 2) no wages are paid for labour, and food and clothes are distributed; 3) the kibbutz is managed by its members. No private ownership exists in the kibbutz: all the means of production, the land, the houses and items of consumption are owned in common. Private commercial enterprise of any kind by the kibbutz or its members is ruled out. Lastly, the kibbutznik acts only as a member and on behalf of the commune.

However, what in reality are the principles underlying the relationships in the kibbutz from the standpoint of the social essence of this form of labour organisation in Israel? Membership is voluntary, but preference is given to young and, where possible, well-to-do candidates, whose means become the common property of the kibbutz in perpetuity.** Have-not immigrants are, as a rule, made to set up kibbutzim in desert and, particularly, border regions, where these settlements are of a military nature.

Further, regardless of how long a person has been a member of a kibbutz, he has no share of the common property and does not receive any share if he resigns. This is the standing rule because all the means of production in the kibbutz and the leased land belong to the Zionist "national" foundations and the banks and are, in fact, concentrated in the hands of the big Zionist bourgeoisie, who, in the long run, dispose of the income from the labour of the kibbutzniks.

In addition to having no personal property of any kind, the rank-and-file kibbutzniks have to surrender even earnings on the side to the common fund. In the distribution of work the personal interests of the kibbutznik are not taken into account, the guiding principle being need

* "Basic Facts About the Kibbutz", p. 2.

** The very few wealthy people who joined the kibbutzim in recent years retained their right to recover their property upon their resignation from the kibbutz.

and not individual interest.* The bourgeois author H. Viteles says that to immigrants life in a kibbutz is anathema."

According to an American-sponsored survey, there is social stratification in the "classless" kibbutzim. The aristocracy consists of old-timers, from among whom executives and other officials are selected.*** The middle echelon of the management is elected from a "middle stratum". The "lowest stratum" has no rights and consists of unskilled, migrating workers, most of whom are new immigrants.

Equality is non-existent in kibbutzim. The rank-and-file are subordinated to the élite in all respects. Moreover, the individual depends on elected officials for the satisfaction of his material needs, and this puts the rank-and-file member in a humiliating and difficult position.****

Inequality is observed in the difference in housing, the possibility to receive an education and special training, the way of life, and so forth. On the other hand, the élite in many cases have no knowledge of what life really is in a kibbutz.*****

These evaluations of the social relationships in the kibbutzim, given on the pages of even bourgeois American journals, are a far cry from the idyllic picture painted by Israeli propaganda.

Naturally, we must not overlook the positive fact that the collective principle exists in the kibbutz, and from that angle, the kibbutz as a form of agricultural production (producers' co-operative) lightening the conditions of life and facilitating the struggle of the working people under a capitalist system could be regarded as preferable. But the whole point is that the kibbutzim are part of a capitalist economic system. For instance, Raul Teitelbaum says that the kibbutzim are clearly adapting themselves to the development of capitalism in Israel.†

* "Basic Facts About the Kibbutz", p. 17.

** H. Viteles, "Co-operative Agricultural Settlements in Israel", *Sociology and Social Research*, January-February 1955, p. 175.

*** Eva Rosenfeld, "Social Stratification in a 'Classless' Society (Kibbutzim in Israel)", *American Sociological Review*, December 1951, p. 769.

**** Ibid., p. 770.

***** Ibid., p. 772.

†) Raul Teitelbaum, *The Kibbutz in Contemporary Israeli Reality*, Tel Aviv, 1954, p. 7.

Noting that so long as capitalist society exists it has laws of its own which it is difficult to withstand, he points out that the recent practice of using hired labour in the kibbutzim "is the price the kibbutz movement is forced to pay in order to preserve the place of kibbutz economy in the country". He draws the conclusion that "not only has the kibbutz movement failed to bring about the elimination of exploitation on a general social scale, but it has not even succeeded in preventing the capitalist exploitation of kibbutz members themselves". The individual exploitation of hired workers has been replaced in the Israeli kibbutzim by collective exploitation.*

While recording the fact that due to collectivism in some kibbutzim labour organisation and productivity are on a higher level than in other types of farm settlements, it should be borne in mind that from its inception the kibbutz movement has been used by its leaders to embody Zionist ideas, whose principal aim is to divert the working people from the class struggle. This remains the main objective of the kibbutz movement and gives it a purely nationalistic orientation whether the rank-and-file kibbutzniks like it or not. For that reason labour organisation on collective principles cannot and does not predetermine the social relationships obtaining in the kibbutzim, particularly in Israeli capitalist reality, to which the kibbutz is in fact adapted precisely as the most suitable object of exploitation.

In this situation the idyllic "society of equality and labour", such as the kibbutz is given out to be, is sharply at variance with the capitalist relations of production existing in Israel and, consequently, it is far from reality and serves the Zionist leaders as a convenient screen for the brutal and extremely effective exploitation of the working people belonging to kibbutzim.** The voluntary nature of the association of working people in the kibbutzim, especially after the creation of the State of Israel, is conspicuously conditional. Therefore, we can only re-emphasise that in the kibbutz the lot of the rank-and-file

* Raul Teitelbaum, Op. cit., pp. 7-8, 12, 16.

** For a Soviet study of the kibbutzim see V. Ilyin, "Agricultural Co-operatives in Israel", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1965, No. 3, pp. 190-98 (a review of Haim Darin-Drabkin's works).

is to be a cheap labour force enriching the Zionist élite of the kibbutz movement. Even official propaganda declares that a kibbutz is a place to work, and not a medium for accumulating wealth.*

At the 14th Congress of the CPI it was recorded that the "reality of collective agriculture, too, refutes the anti-Marxist theory of the kibbutz's ideologists, according to which the kibbutz constitutes an 'island' of socialism, with no exploiters or exploited. The means of production in the hands of the kibbutz settlements do not, in actual fact, belong to them, but to the banks and other creditors. . . . This fact knocks into a cocked hat the 'thesis' that the kibbutz is a socialist enterprise. . . . The fact that the kibbutz is subjected to collective exploitation, as an organised body, does not alter the fact of the exploitation of each kibbutz member."***

The social contradictions intrinsic to the kibbutzim are evident in the economic field, too. The kibbutz movement is plunging deeper into a crisis. The kibbutzim's share of the total population is tending to drop, as the following figures testify:***

	Total population, '000	Jewish rural population, '000	Population in kibbutzim		
			'000	% of total population	% of Jewish rural population
1949	1,173.8 (1,013.8)*	161.4	63.5	5.4	39.5
1959	2,088.6 (1,590.5)	321.1	77.9	3.7	24.2
1962	2,331.8 (2,068.9)	303.1	79.5	3.4	26.2
1964	2,525.6 (2,239.2)	294.7	80.8	3.6	27.4
1967	2,773.9	272.9	83.3**	3.0	30.4***

* The figures in parenthesis give the Jewish population.

** Including 200 non-Jews.

*** Only the Jewish population. See Note above.

* "Basic Facts About the Kibbutz", pp. 4-5.

** Communist Party of Israel. *The 14th Congress*, p. 104.

*** Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, pp. 25, 27; 1965, No. 16, pp. 21, 29; 1968, No. 19, p. 24.

A point worthy of note is that of the 230 kibbutzim in Israel in 1964, 176 or 77 per cent had been set up prior to May 1948, 37 prior to 1952, and only 17 or less than 6 per cent after 1952.* On the other hand, since 1948 there has been a rapid growth of the number of moshavim: by 1964 the population of the moshavim had increased 158 per cent, from 48,200 to 123,700.** The Israeli Government has had to admit that the kibbutzim have lost their attraction as centres of production.***

Further, there is a trend towards a decline of the share of the co-operative sector in the national economy. While in 1948 the co-operative sector embraced 76 per cent of the rural population, in 1967 it contained only 42.2 per cent.**** The crisis of the kibbutz movement stems from the accelerated capitalist development of Israel and its growing dependence on foreign monopoly capital.*****

How effective the kibbutz is as a form of agricultural production is seen from the following figures. In 1962 the kibbutzim had approximately 37 per cent of the cultivated area and about 50 per cent of the field crop area. Although grain farming is the principal form of production in the kibbutzim, they only account for some 25 per cent of the country's output. The kibbutzim have about 6 per cent (and over 12 per cent together with the moshavim) of the country's employed labour. However, the agricultural co-operative sector as a whole (the kibbutzim and the moshavim) hardly account for 12 per cent of the national income.*)

A kibbutz, Haim Darin-Drabkin writes, achieves relative financial stability only after 20-30 years. To this day the debt of even the old kibbutzim, set up prior to 1936, adds up to 106 per cent of the output value; as regards kibbutzim organised after 1948, this debt amounts to 222 per

* Computed according to J. Shatil, *L'économie collective du kibbutz israélien*, Paris, 1960, p. 213; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, p. 27; 1965, No. 16, p. 29.

** Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1950/51, No. 2, p. 14; 1963, No. 14, p. 27; 1965, No. 16, p. 29.

*** *Israel. Monograph. . .*, p. 11.

**** Computed according to Haim Darin-Drabkin, *Op. cit.*, p. 42; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, p. 27; 1968, No. 19, p. 24.

***** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 126.

*) Here and above: Haim Darin-Drabkin, *Op. cit.*, p. 155.

cent.* To this day the interest paid by the kibbutzim on loans comes to from 11 to 40 per cent, while loans and credits eat up anything up to 90 per cent of the working capital.** In other words, even the old kibbutzim cannot show a profit. As is noted by the bourgeois author Shatil, the kibbutzim "could never exploit times of prosperity as could individual farms".***

In an effort to create additional sources of income and provide their members with work, the kibbutzim have lately begun to combine farming with small-scale industry. The working conditions in these industries resemble those of a hired labourer at conventional private enterprises.**** Even bourgeois economists, Ernst Goldberger among them, find that today the kibbutzim are on the road to being converted into capitalist enterprises.*****

The kibbutz movement is represented by four "national organisations": Ihud Hakibbutzim Vehakvutzot, Hakibbutz Haartzi Hashomer Hatzair, Hakibbutz Hameuchad and Hakibbutz Hadati, all of which are linked with various Zionist political parties in Israel and with the Jewish National Fund, owner of the land leased to the kibbutzim. All of them are controlled by the Jewish Agency, which is the executive body of the World Zionist Organisation. Through the WZO threads lead from these "national organisations" to big American Zionist capital, which is likewise eager to have a smokescreen in the shape of a "theory" about the socialist nature of the kibbutzim.

The Israeli Communists, who call on the working people of town and countryside to activate the class struggle, consider it possible to turn the Histadrut's enterprises and also agricultural co-operatives and collectives of any type into strongpoints of the working people in their day-to-day and coming class battles.*)

* Haim Darin-Drabkin, Op. cit., pp. 85, 87.

** *Information Bulletin*, 1959, No. 1, p. 5.

*** J. Shatil, *Communal Farming in Israel, Land Economics*, New York, 1956, p. 121.

**** Haim Darin-Drabkin, Op. cit., pp. 82-83; Raul Teitelbaum, Op. cit., pp. 9-10.

***** Ernst Goldberger, Op. cit., p. 96.

*) *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 105.

3. Industry and Transport. Uneven Development. Raw Material and Power Resources. State-Co-operative and Private Sectors. The Histadrut "Labour" Sector

In Israel the rate of industrial development is fairly high. For instance, between 1949 and 1962 the industrial product was nearly quadrupled with the number of workers increasing 2.6-fold.* The following figures illustrate the growth of industrial output (1958=100):**

1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963
91.4	100.0	114.0	128.7	149.1	168.8	192.7

1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1971
219.7	241.7	239.7	237.4	305.6	317.7

However, while until 1965 the annual rate of industrial growth averaged from 12 to 14 per cent, in 1965 it was equal to only 10 per cent, and in 1966-1967 there was a decline. This decline, *The Israel Economist* explains, was due to a certain hesitancy and uncertainty in business circles, which may be ascribed to the prolonged election period, wildcat strikes, wage increases and rumours of increased taxation.*** In fact, the slower rate of business activity since 1965 and the production decline in 1966-1967 were due to the unhealthy development of the Israeli economy, to the intensified war preparations which caused a deceleration of the civilian industries, and, lastly, to the aggression in June 1967. The production growth in 1968 was caused by the rapid development of the war industry.

* *Israel in Figures 1963*, p. 81.

** *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1966, No. 11-12, p. 593; 1969, No. 5, p. 63. The figures for 1964-1966 are overstated: the index for these years, though based on 1963=100, is artificially joined (see in the source) to the index 1958=100. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that in the course of only 1965 the price increase of manufactured goods averaged 3.5 per cent. See *The Israel Economist*, June-July 1966, p. 157.

*** *The Israel Economist*, April 1966, p. 85.

Table 9

	Share in % of 1965 value	Volume of industrial output (average, 1958-100)				Growth, % of Dec. 1968
		1955	Average for 1965	Growth, % of 1965	Dec. 1968	
Mining and quarrying	4.2	36	283.5	687.5	357.0	25.9
Food (including tobacco and beverages)	16.4	84	167.0	98.8	208.0	24.5
Textiles	11.4	80	258.5	223.1	380.0	43.1
Clothing	2.8	98	238.0	142.8	360.0	51.2
Woodworking	6.2	91	279.5	207.1	403.0	45.3
Paper and paper products	2.5	94	243.0	158.5	362.0	48.9
Printing and publishing	4.1	—	211.0	111.1*	359.0	70.1
Leather and leather products	1.6	189	180.0	-5.0	192.0	6.6
Rubber and plastic products	4.0	76	286.0	276.3	452.0	58.0
Chemical and petroleum products	8.2	86	241.5	180.0	390.0	61.4
Non-metallic minerals	7.9	86	202.0	234.8	193.0	-4.6
Diamond industry	3.0	99	324.0	227.2	354.0	9.2
Basic metal industries	2.9	—	251.5	151.5*	330.0	31.2
Metal products	6.5	89	214.0	140.4	261.0	22.8
Machinery	4.3	89	240.0	170.0	343.0	42.9
Electrical machinery and electronic equipment	3.7	73	291.0	300.0	609.0	109.2
Transport equipment	8.0	58	294.5	287.0	353.0	20.1
Miscellaneous manufacturing	1.5	55	234.0	312.7	379.0	19.2

* Growth since 1958.

Table 9 (see p. 238) traces the uneven development of the different branches of industry in Israel and shows their share and the growth of output from 1955 onwards.*

Until 1965 a high rate of growth was observed notably in mining and quarrying, in the electrical and electronics industry, the transport equipment industry and also in the rubber industry. The next in order to show rapid growth rates were the diamond, non-metallic minerals, basic metals, metal products, textile and chemical industries. Here it is necessary to note that the metal products industry includes war production.** The production of electronic equipment and of transport means and equipment is geared to meet the country's military requirements. The mining, rubber and chemical industries are developing chiefly through foreign investment. Traditional industries such as textiles and diamond-working are financed mainly by local capital, this being evidence of the stronger positions held by the Israeli bourgeoisie.

The food, leather and other industries catering for the requirements of the population lag behind the overall growth of industrial production. In 1968 the economy received a boost as a result of an accelerated expansion of industries linked with war production.*** These were, above all, the electrical equipment, chemical, machinery (including equipment for aircraft factories), clothing (supplies for the army) and rubber (tire production) industries. Civilian industries showed hardly any growth (diamond-working) or a further curtailment (leather). Yet, since 1955, there has been a considerable population increment.

The largest share is held by industries such as food and textiles; a slower development is registered in the mining (including mineral raw materials) and chemical industries. The share of the key industries (basic metals—2.9 per cent; machinery—4.3 per cent; electrical machinery—3.7 per cent; rubber and plastic products—4.0 per cent) is very small and shows the low level of industrialisation.

The output of individual products is illustrated in Table 10.

* Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, pp. 284-85; *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1966, No. 11-12, pp. 590-92; 1969, No. 5, pp. 64-65. Also see footnote on p. 237.

** *Economic Annual*, 1956/57, p. 145.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, March 27, 1970.

Table 10

Industrial Output*
('000 tons)

	1949	1956	1965	1967
Electric power, mln kwh	1.1**	2.6	4.1	4.6
Petrol, mln litres	—	45.4	233.6	152.0
Potash	—	25.5	481.0	492.0
Salt	9.3	25.9	54.7	57.0
Flour	158.1***	242.0	245.1	290.0
Canned fruit	1.3	3.1	27.1	42.3
Canned and pickled vegetables	5.1	12.0	15.8	19.5
Milk, mln litres	—	37.3	116.4	120.7
Butter	...	0.8	3.2	...
Refined sugar	—	1.9	36.9	31.3
Refined vegetable oil	10.6	21.8	31.7	33.2
Yarn	...	7.9	23.3	21.7
Nails and rivets	...	2.8	4.0	2.2
Superphosphates	...	95.5	107.2	119.0
Sulphuric acid	...	73.3	158.2	166.0
Cement	241.3	612.8	1,259.9	805.0
Tires	—	5.0	14.9	13.9
Soap	5.3	8.9	8.1	7.8
Plywood, thous. cu m	...	21.2	88.3	75.9

* *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1959/60, No. 10, pp. 182-88; 1963, No. 14, pp. 294-99; 1968, No. 19, pp. 385-90; *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1966, No. 11-12, pp. 156-60.

** For 1951.

*** For 1950.

Low capacity small-scale commodity production predominates. Most of the factories are small semi-primitive or primitive enterprises, or even repair workshops employing from 1 to 49 workers. According to the statistics for 1963/64 these comprised 94.2 per cent of all the factories and employed 52.8 per cent of the industrial workers. At the same time, industry is being concentrated in the hands of a small group of monopolies. For example, only 2 per cent of the enterprises employ from 100 to 300 and more workers, but these have about one-fifth of the industrial workers. Moreover, 73, or 0.7 per cent, of the factories have over 300 workers, and together these

employ more than 20 per cent of the industrial workers.* Most of these big factories are foreign-owned. The official explanation for the large number of small enterprises is that this helps to give immigrants employment. The Government, therefore, encourages the development of small handicraft industries, which account for one-third of the output value.** Some 60 per cent of the factories are in Haifa and Tel Aviv.

Table 11 (see p. 243) gives an idea of the number of factories and workers and of the gross output of the main industries in Israel (1963/64).***

In Israel, as we have already mentioned, considerable expansion has been observed in the food, textile, clothing, leather, woodworking, paper and diamond-working industries, which account for 54 per cent of the GNP and employ nearly 50 per cent of the industrial workers. Together with the chemical and mining industries, they yield nearly three-fourths of Israel's output. The basic metals and machinery industries are still small. Low capacity, inadequate equipment, low productivity and high costs,**** particularly in key industries, are a feature of most of Israel's factories. The level of industrialisation is thus not high. Israeli economists themselves admit that Israel is still only "on the threshold of industrialisation".*****

Official sources declare that in industries like metals and electrical equipment there is a "disorganised fragmentation of small producers", a "limited market", and that "skilled manpower is short"; in the diamond industry there is a "shortage of skilled hands" and the certain rise of profitability has been achieved "at the expense of quality"; in the leather industry there is "a demand to make production cheaper".*) In 1966 *The Jerusalem Post* wrote that small enterprises of the repair workshop type are generally not mechanised.**)

* *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, p. 415.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5721 (1960/61), 1961, p. 111, *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5725 (1964/65), 1964, p. 69.


*** *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, pp. 417-19.

**** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5722 (1961/62), January 1962, p. 75.

***** A. Marcus, *Industry in Israel*, Jerusalem, November 1959, p. 16.

*) *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5725 (1964/65), December 1965, pp. 72, 74-75.

**) *The Jerusalem Post*, May 30, 1966.



MAP 3. LOCATION OF INDUSTRY

Table 11

	No. of factories	%	No. of workers	%	Average number of workers	Gross output I£	%
Total	10,430	100.0	166.5	100.0	15.9	4,188	100.0
Mining and quarrying	92	0.9	3.7	2.2	40	104	2.5
Food (including tobacco and beverages)	1,199	11.6	24.8	14.9	20.6	995	23.8
Textiles	703	6.7	21.9	13.2	31.1	460	11.0
Clothing	779	7.4	6.9	4.1	7.5	119	2.8
Woodworking and furniture	1,507	14.5	11.9	7.1	7.9	258	6.1
Paper and paper products	149	1.4	3.1	1.8	20	101	2.4
Printing and publishing	521	5.0	7.5	4.5	9.2	119	2.8
Leather	568	5.4	3.5	2.1	4.4	64	1.5
Rubber and plastic products	188	1.8	5.2	3.2	27	143	3.4
Chemical and petroleum products	251	2.5	7.8	4.7	51	249	6.0
Non-metallic minerals	472	4.5	10.6	6.3	22	288	6.9
Diamond industry	351	3.3	7.6	4.5	22	214	5.1
Basic metals	103	1.0	4.0	2.4	39	550	13.1
Metal products	1,115	10.7	12.0	7.2	11		
Machinery	604	5.7	7.3	4.3	12		
Electrical equipment	340	3.2	7.7	4.6	22.7	171	4.1
Transport equipment	1,112	10.6	17.7	10.6	16	306	7.3
Miscellaneous manufacturing	376	3.7	3.3	2.3	9	48	1.2

The food industry occupies first place in gross output and the number of employed workers, while the traditional textile industry occupies fourth place. Israel's largest paper mill, at Hadera, is controlled by United States capital.

The glass and cement industry is centred in Haifa.

The diamond-working establishments are small and operate wholly on imports from Africa. The main centres of this industry are Tel Aviv, Nethanya and Jarusalem.

The metalworking industry is of an ancillary nature (kitchen equipment, nails, rivets and such like), but includes the war industry which has recently been expanding quickly (anti-tank guns, machine-gun ammunition, small-calibre automatic cannon, mines, rifles). Akko is the centre of the iron and steel industry. There is a copper-smelting plant in Timna. The American Kaizer-Frazer Company runs a large car-assembly plant. The chemical industry is mostly in Haifa.

Compared with 1947, there has been no change in 1964 in the percentage of the Jewish population employed in industry.* However, with the 255 per cent population increase between 1947 and 1965 (from 630,000 to 2,239,000), the number of Jewish workers employed in industry, including transport and construction, rose by 200 per cent in that period. This is evidence of the relative decrease of the number of Jewish industrial workers. From 1965 to 1967, as a consequence of the aggression, the total number of employed Jews dropped by 5.2 per cent, and the number of Jewish industrial workers by 68.2 per cent.**

Some idea of the prospects and orientations for the development of Israeli industry is given by the raw material and power resources (See Map 3 on p. 242). Israel's natural wealth consists chiefly of non-metallic minerals: chemical salts in the Dead Sea, phosphates at

* N. Landsberg and G. Parazich, *Productive Use of Nuclear Energy. Report on Nuclear Power and Economic Development in Israel*, Washington, 1957, p. 22.

** Computed according to *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5713 (1952), p. 234; *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, pp. 306-09; 1968, No. 19, pp. 262-63.

Oron and building sand in the Negev. She also produces fire clay (Makhteish-Ramon), various types of marble (Ramon), feldspar and asphalt (Ein-Bokek). Semi-precious stones are mined near Timna.

There is some iron ore in the Eastern Galilee (Mount Ramim). Copper deposits estimated at 23 million tons have been discovered at Timna. There are considerable reserves of peat near Lake Hule and also near Nakhal-Poleg. Oil is produced in Heletz-Brora, south of Ashkelon (the reserves are estimated at 7,200,000 tons). Oil prospecting has been placed in the hands of private capital.

The Haifa-Eilat and Haifa-Tel Aviv oil pipelines were placed in operation in the period between 1957 and 1960. The 305-kilometre Eilat-Ashdod oil pipeline became operational in 1970.

Natural gas has been discovered in the Rosh-Zogara area near the Dead Sea and a gas pipeline has been built from Zogara to Sedom.

In 1968 the power stations had an aggregate capacity of 1,012,000 kw. Total power consumption was equal to 4,600 million kwh (1,617 kwh per head of the population) and was distributed as follows: industry (including other consumers paying according to the industrial tariff) 33.7 per cent, irrigation 23.9 per cent and household consumption 42.4 per cent.* Atomic reactors were built in Tel Aviv and Beersheba in 1960-1961.

The private sector (1961/62 census) embraces nearly three-fourths of the industrial enterprises and about two-thirds of the workers employed in industry, while the state-co-operative sector, including the Histadrut, has 26.7 per cent of the factories with 37.5 per cent of the workers. These figures are evidence of the growth of the private sector, which in 1955 had two-thirds of the factories and somewhat over half of the workers.**

On account of the foreign capital imports, chiefly through Government channels, the state sector's share in the economy is rather large. The share of state capital

* *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1969, No. 20, p. 391.

** Here and above according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, p. 283.

investment in industry is incomparably smaller. Table 12 shows that the share of state and "public" (Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund, Keren Haesod) financing reaches 50 plus per cent of the total investments. At the same time, the development of state capitalism is slowing down, while private, principally foreign, capital is winning stronger positions. The share of state capital in the total investments, above all in industry, is visibly decreasing. This is seen in Table 12.

Share of State and Public Financing in the Total Investments by Key Branches*

Table 12

	1958 %	1961 %	1962 %	1963 %
In the economy as a whole	54	45	41	41
Agriculture and irrigation	74	82	77	84
Industry	42	33	23	24
Minerals	75	19	10	25

* According to *Bank of Israel, Annual Report*, Jerusalem, 1961, p. 65; 1963, p. 73.

The following figures give an idea of the share of state financing in agriculture and industry (in %).*

	1961	1962	1963	1964
In the total investments (under the development budget) thereof:	32.3	24.3	28.6	25.5
in agriculture and irrigation (without the trunk pipeline)	62.4	26.3	30.6	
in industry	25.3	22.7	19.4	

From 40 to 50 per cent of the development budget are loaned out to private enterprises,** thus helping to enlarge the private sector. In 1964 the Government loans granted to private firms amounted to 48.5 per cent of the total investments, but the Israeli bourgeoisie wants a still greater field.

* Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, pp. 171, 543. The figures for 1964 are approximate.

** *Economic Annual 1961/62*, Jerusalem, 1962, p. 203.

"State ownership," it is stated, "is not a matter of principle with the Government";* which sells enterprises partially or entirely to private investors, including foreigners, "at dirt-cheap prices".**

State capital serves the interests of local private and foreign monopoly capital. The state sector is bound hand and foot to foreign monopoly capital.***

A feature of Israel today is independent enterprise by Histadrut, the trade union association, which, to use the terminology of Israeli bourgeois economists, forms a "labour" sector. Like the kibbutzim, the Histadrut's establishments are publicised as evidence of the development of socialism in Israel.

However, even bourgeois economists find no difference between Histadrut's enterprises and conventional capitalist enterprises: the Histadrut's enterprises are patterned on private joint-stock companies.**** The American researcher M. Plunkett, for example, draws the conclusion that the Histadrut enterprises operate "in part on co-operative principles and in part in accordance with strictly capitalist methods".*****

As at capitalist enterprises, the workers take no part in the management of Histadrut enterprises, have no shares and take no part in the distribution of profits. The Histadrut does nothing to protect the interests of its workers. Alex Rubner writes that at the large corporations run by the Histadrut the managers' "power to rule is more absolute, ruthless, unchallenged and continuous than that of the heads of private enterprises in Israel or, for that matter, elsewhere".*) For the Zionist upper echelon of the social-reformist Mapai, which controls the Histadrut, the so-called labour economy is a well-camouflaged source of enrichment and a means of preserving leading posts.

In 1963 the labour sector accounted for about one-

* *Ibid.*, p. 148.

** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 102.

*** *Ibid.*

**** *Economic Review*, 1958, No. 25, p. 3.

***** M. Plunkett, "The Histadrut. The General Federation of Jewish Labour in Israel", *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, 1958, pp. 161-62.

*) Alex Rubner, *Op. cit.*, p. 44; G. Ziderovitz, "The Labour Economy", *The Israel Economic Bulletin*, December 1958, p. 88.

fourth of the country's product and employed one-fourth of the workers.* In 1963 its share of the GNP by individual branches was (%):**

Agriculture	58.1	Transport	36.5
Industry	22.7	Commerce, finances, ser-	
Construction	39.0	vices	15.3

The Histadrut sector's share of the employed labour force reached 56.5 per cent in 1950, then dropped to 27 per cent in 1957*** and to 25 per cent in 1963, which clearly mirrors the relative dwindling of this sector's sphere of activity.

The Histadrut's partnership with private capital in mixed enterprises may be demonstrated on the example of Solel Boneh Ltd. In 30 mixed building enterprises, Solel Boneh's share was:****

- with private capital on a 50-50 basis in 15 enterprises;
- with state capital—over 50 per cent in 7 enterprises;
- with foreign capital—under 50 per cent in 8 enterprises.

Thus, where foreign private capital is invested the Histadrut enterprises are virtually controlled by foreign monopolies. American and West German capital is invested in the Koor group enterprises. This sort of partnership still further turns the Histadrut into an instrument for pumping high profits out of the enterprises which it runs together with the private capitalists.*****

Under no circumstances can the Histadrut's enterprises be regarded as a "nucleus of socialism". Lenin wrote that in a bourgeois state co-operatives remained capitalist enterprises even in cases where they were founded as producers', consumers' or credit co-operatives. Capitalist co-operatives have never and cannot serve as an alternative to the class struggle, whose aim is to overthrow capitalism and replace it with socialism. As has been pointed out by the Israeli Communists, the nature of the relations of

* *The Israel Economist*, August 1964, p. 143.

** Ibid.

*** According to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1959/60, p. 302; *The Israel Economic Bulletin*, December 1958, p. 90.

**** J. Levav, "The Industry of Labour Economy", *Israel Economic Forum*, 1957, No. 1/2, pp. 50-51.

***** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 55.

production at the Histadrut's enterprises has always been capitalist.*

The assertions of the Right-socialist Mapai leaders that socialism is advancing in Israel or that the conditions for socialism are being created in that country are linked with the existence of a considerable state-capitalist sector and of the enterprises run by the Histadrut and with the development of agricultural co-operatives. However, even the ruling Mapai social-reformists are by no means categorical in their statements about the building of socialism in Israel. One of them, Mosche Sharett, for instance, wrote that "our society is mixed . . . a heterogeneous society" with a wide range from the frontiers of socialist realisation to crude capitalist forms.** David Ben Gurion openly described the Histadrut as an organisation whose mission was to embody the state's guideline most fully.*** It must be made clear that socialism can be successfully built in Israel only when power passes to the hands of the working people. The untenable "theories" about the existence of socialism in Israel must be regarded in the general context of the attempts of the bourgeoisie to hide the increasing decay of the capitalist system, to bolster that system and conceal the exploiting nature of bourgeois society.****

In Israel transport is developing intensively. The investments in this sphere amounted to 13 per cent of the total for 1961-1964, and in 1964 they equalled the investments in industry.*****

In the period from 1948 to 1964 the motor roads were lengthened more than two-fold, from 1,905 to 3,885 kilometres. The railway network has been more than quadrupled, reaching a total of 700 kilometres.

In 1964, as compared with 1948, Israel's merchant marine increased from eight vessels with a total displacement of 23,800 tons to 83 vessels aggregating 563,000 tons.

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 124.

** Mosche Sharett, "Socialism in Israel", *Socialist International Information*, November 12, 1955, p. 822.

*** *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, January 1958, p. 182.

**** *Pravda*, September 25, 1959.

***** Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1959/60, No. 11, p. 125; *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5721 (1961/62), p. 318; *Bank of Israel Bulletin*, 1963, No. 19, p. 93; 1964, No. 21, pp. 122, 129.

4. Foreign Trade. Changes in Pattern. The Market Problem. Geography of Foreign Trade

During the first years of Israel's existence imports accounted for nearly 90 per cent of the foreign trade; in 1968 they were in excess of 50 per cent. The foreign trade deficit has added up to I£11,400 million.* The following figures show Israel's dependence on imports: in the GNP imports came to 26.1 per cent in 1950, 39.5 per cent in 1962, 39.2 per cent in 1963-1965, and 36 per cent (including services and dues) in 1967.

In the period from 1948 to 1965 Israel's exports increased more than 15-fold, while imports registered a 3.3-fold growth. However, the share of exports in the national income was only 17.1 per cent in 1950-1962, 16.4 per cent in 1962, 15.5 per cent in 1963-1965, and 20.3 per cent in 1967.** The share of manufactured goods exports in the total value of industrial output was about 12 per cent in 1962, somewhat over 20 per cent in 1965 and approximately 25 per cent in 1966.

The following gives an overall picture of Israel's foreign trade in 1963-1965 and a comparison with 1949 and 1956 (I£ mln):***

	1949	1956	1963	1965	1967	1968
Total	844.7	1,412.0	2,991.6	3,793.4	4,632.0	6,024.2
Imports*	759.3	1,100.0	1,983.6	2,503.9	2,689.8	3,783.5
Exports**	85.4	312.0	1,008.0	1,289.5	1,942.2	2,240.7
Deficit	663.9	788.0	975.6	1,214.4	747.6	1,542.8
Exports in % of imports	11.2	28.3	57.7	51.4	74.8	59.2

* Gross imports.

** Without re-export.

* Exchange rate in 1963-1965: I£3=US\$1.

** Here and above computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, pp. 174-75, 422, 432; 1968, No. 19, p. 139; *Bank of Israel Bulletin*, 1965, No. 23, pp. 82-83, 88. Estimated figures are given for 1964-1965.

*** *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, p. 412 (computed at I£3=US\$1; from 1967 I£3.5=US\$1; 1968, No. 19, p. 200; 1969, No. 2, p. 31; *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1965, No. 1-2, p.93; 1966, No. 1-2, pp. 88, 93.

Thus, despite the increase in exports the foreign trade deficit remains enormous. While food imports (in terms of value) amounted to about one-fourth of the foreign trade at the end of the first five years (1954), they dropped to one-fifth during the five years between 1956 and 1960. The share of raw materials rose to one-third; more than half were, as before, semi-manufactured and manufactured goods. From 1961 to 1965 there was a further decrease in the import of food and an increase of raw materials imports. Manufactured goods imports remained at their former level. The import pattern thus demonstrates Israel's continued dependence on the import of key industrial raw materials and manufactured goods (see Table 13).

Grain, butter, meat and sugar remain the principal items on Israel's import list. Of raw materials there has been a substantial increase of the import of rough diamonds. Crude oil is also imported. A sharp increase has been noted in the import of manufactured goods and machine equipment. Ferrous and non-ferrous metals, petroleum products and lumber continue to hold a prominent place among the imports. In recent years Israel has been importing increasing numbers of aircraft and ships, this being the chief cause of her growing foreign trade deficit.

Compared with the first five-year period, the export of farm produce has dropped approximately from 50 to 33 per cent, with the citrus fruits monopoly remaining unchanged. The share of finished products has increased to 66 per cent, but, as before, consists mainly of polished diamonds; together with citrus fruits, textiles, garments and chemicals they comprise (1965) nearly 70.9 per cent of the total industrial export. Thus, exports likewise do not mirror any substantial change in the economy.

Citrus fruits and polished diamonds yield over 60 per cent (62 per cent in 1965 and 56.1 per cent, including all other fruit and vegetables, in 1967) of the export revenue.

Table 13 gives the pattern of Israel's foreign trade.

To secure a further expansion of exports, the Government is taking steps to boost the competitive value of Israeli goods and to find markets for them.

In practice the question of exports and imports is resolved through the establishment of large monopolies.

Table 13

Foreign Trade Pattern*

	1954		1960		1965	1967
	thous. tons	I£m/n	thous. tons	I£m/n	I£m/n	I£m/n
Total import	—	515.7	...	904.5	2,503.9	2,689.8
Foodstuffs	—	119.6	—	129.6	305.3	390.3
thereof:						
grain (wheat, sorghum, barley, maize, rice)	347.4	49.3	588.1	84.4	115.6	186.9
Raw materials, fuel, chemicals	—	122.8	—	275.8	842.5	1,187.0
thereof:						
rough diamonds (mln carats)	0.5	24.7	1.5	88.8	334.5	482.7
crude petroleum, mazout	767.3	27.1	—	55.8	150.3**	184.5**
Manufactured and semi- manufactured goods	—	270.4	—	499.1	844.2	1,074.8
thereof:						
machinery and transport equipment	559.7

	1954		1960		1965	1967
	thous. tons	I£m/n	thous. tons	I£m/n	I£m/n	I£m/n
Miscellaneous	—	2.9	—	—	511.9***	37.7
Total export	—	153.0	—	387.1	1,289.5	1,942.2
Farm produce	—	71.1	—	129.4	259.5	468.7
thereof:						
citrus fruit (mln cases)	8.2	60.2	8.6	69.5	175.6	313.3
Raw materials and manufac- tured goods	—	81.9	—	257.7	1,030.0	1,473.5
thereof:						
polished diamonds (thous. carats)	185.0	28.3	690.7	110.4	462.6	677.7
chemicals, fertilisers, medicines	22.2	1.3	139.1	17.0	54.5	181.4

* Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1955/56, No. 7, pp. 164-75; No. 12, 1961, pp. 320-29; 1968, No. 19, pp. 204-09; Statistical Bulletin of Israel, 1966, No. 1-2, pp. 86-95.*

** Including petroleum products.

*** Including manufactured goods, etc.

**** For all three groups of goods.

Of the 1,047 export firms 58 (or 5 per cent) handle 78 per cent of all the exports, with 21 per cent shared among the other 989 firms.* The Government gives the monopolies large grants-in-aid and loans. The largest of these export monopolies are Citrus Marketing Board, Product and Canning Association, and Nesher Cement Co., which operates jointly with the Solel Boneh group. Through General Tire and Rubber Co., Ltd., the latter is linked with the American General Tire and Rubber Co., Ltd., and the Palestine Economic Corporation. Also ranking among the major exporters is Alliance Tire and Rubber Co., Ltd., an enterprise run jointly by Solel Boneh and a group of private American investors.**

For Israel the problem of markets is acute chiefly on account of the absence of economic and trade relations with the Arab countries.

The Israeli ruling elements are developing the expansionist theory of Israel becoming the "Middle Eastern Lancashire" with the role of agricultural suppliers accorded to the Arab states. In actual fact, however, Israel and the Arab countries could form a mutually supplementing economic complex. The Arab countries could provide a reliable market for many Israel goods, in the same way as goods from the Arab countries could be sold in Israel.

Lately, the Israeli Government has tried to solve the market problem in two ways: by joining the European Economic Community and by a more intensive expansion in Africa. In Israel it is held that the European market would remain of paramount importance even if relations with the Arab countries were normalised because with progress in industrialisation the latter would have the same commodity output as Israel and would thus become formidable competitors. The argument offered in favour of Israel's membership of the Common Market is that the EEC countries absorb 60 per cent of Israel's exports and account for 50 per cent of her imports.

Even Israel's indirect integration with the Common Market on the basis of the three-year unilateral trade agreement signed with the EEC in June 1964 involved

* *The Jewish Agency's Digest of Press and Events*, 1957, No. 38, p. 1178.

** P. Dagan, *Pillars of Israel Economy*, Tel Aviv, 1955, p. 325.

harsh terms. One of these terms was that Israel would revise her economic policy substantially. This was mentioned as early as 1959-1960 by *The Israel Economist*, when a "definite assurance" was received on future trade between Israel and the European Common Market countries. Israel's membership of the Common Market, the journal wrote, would imply co-ordinating Israel's import policy with the policy of the countries importing goods from Israel.* The recommendations made by a delegation of parliamentarians from EEC countries, which visited Israel in 1962, were decisive in inducing the Israeli Ministry of Finances to devalue the Israeli pound.** This step was taken in February 1962. Israel had to cut production costs by 25 per cent and take steps to freeze wages and prices.***

In her eagerness to reach agreement with the Common Market countries at any price Israel has abolished licences for many import items and for approximately 70 per cent of the export items.****

From the very beginning Israel's membership of the EEC was linked by the leaders of that organisation with the neocolonialist ambitions of the imperialist powers, who, because Israel is active in the African countries, are seeking to use her as the vehicle for spreading Western influence in these countries. For their part, the Israeli rulers are trying to penetrate the Asian and, particularly, the African market with far-reaching objectives of their own, and to this end they are making use of the African peoples' legitimate aspiration to win not only political but also economic independence.***** Western bourgeois literature offers all sorts of arguments to prove that a small country like Israel is not dangerous to the African states. Israel, it is contended, is not burdened with past or present colonialism and her social experiment is attractive for the

* *The Israel Economist*, August 1959, p. 120; June 1960, p. 120.

** J. E. Palman (Tel Aviv), "Israel ringt um wirtschaftliche Selbständigkeit", *Geist und Tat*, Frankfurt, April 1, 1962, p. 110.

*** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 26, 1962.

**** *Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf*, May 17, 1962.

***** Also see: G. S. Nikitina, "Israeli Expansion in Africa and Neocolonialism", *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 1963, No. 3, pp. 36-44.

African countries.* These arguments are also offered by Israel's rulers to conceal their real aims. Although they are acutely short of means and are developing their own economy chiefly through foreign financing, they sign agreements on all sorts of aid, including technical and financial, to African countries. This is a paradox but its explanation is that American monopolies acting through a network of branches in Israel use the signboards of Israeli firms to penetrate African countries.

There has been a considerable expansion of trade between Israel and African countries: between 1955 and 1965 Israel's exports to these countries increased more than 26-fold, while her imports grew 3.6-fold.

For Israeli exports the largest markets in Africa are Ghana, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Nigeria, while the continent's biggest exporters to Israel are the Republic of South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Gabon. In the African countries Israel sells mainly manufactured goods and purchases all sorts of raw materials and food. With a number of African countries Israel has trade agreements on a most-favoured-nation basis.

In Asia Israel has established commercial relations with Burma, Indonesia, the Republic of the Philippines, Nepal, Japan and Hongkong. She sells these countries chemicals, cement, textile goods, and garments; and buys mostly raw materials. In some Southeast Asian countries Israel is building various projects. The only Middle Eastern countries with which Israel has trade relations are Turkey, which is the principal importer of Israeli cement and a large supplier of Western arms and ammunition, and Iran, which exports petroleum to Israel.

Table 14 gives the geographical distribution of Israel's foreign trade.

Israel has trade relations with more than 90 countries, but the US remains her principal foreign trade partner.

The USA's share of Israel's foreign trade, which formerly amounted to over one-third, has in recent years

* See: C. Imhoff, "Israel—Mentor der farbigen Welt", *Aussenpolitik*, 1961, No. 3, p. 184; M. Brecher, "Israel and 'Afro-Asia'", *International Journal*, Toronto, Spring 1960, p. 128; W. Preuss, "Politik und Wirtschaft Israels im Brennpunkt der Neugestaltung des Asiatisch-Afrikanischen Kontinents", *Zeitschrift für Politik*, 1961, No. 3, p. 246.

decreased to almost one-fifth, but the USA is still the biggest importer of Israeli goods and as an exporter to that country it outstripped Britain as early as 1965.

A firm place in Israel's foreign trade is now occupied by the FRG, which has pushed aside chiefly Britain and, partly, the USA. The USA, Britain and the FRG had roughly 50 per cent of Israel's foreign trade in 1965 and almost 60 per cent in 1967. In effect, Israel is a market for the American, British and West German monopolies. The major portion of Israel's trade balance deficit is owed to these countries. Israel has a favourable balance only with Asian countries.

Bourgeois economists hold the view that "Israel's economic future depends on the acquisition of new and varied markets that will provide profitable outlets for her expanding industrial economy".* Be that as it may, a beneficial effect can only be achieved by trade free of political strings and, above all, by normal good-neighbourly relations with the Arab countries.

5. Finances. The State Budget and Modifications of Its Components. Role of Foreign Financing. Concentration and Centralisation of Banking Capital

An analysis of Israel's financial position vividly reveals the weak sides of her economic development. A chronic budget deficit is a feature of Israel, and the adoption of additional budgets is a standing phenomenon. While the allocations for the day-to-day needs of the working people are decreasing, the huge military expenditures are growing steadily. The state is having to pay more and more in redemption of domestic and foreign loans, while the share of foreign financing remains unchangeably high.

Israel's state budget consists of the current budget formed of revenue from taxes and customs dues, and the development (investment) budget formed of money received from overseas and from the sale of internal loan bonds. Table 15 traces the changes in the Israeli budget over seven years.

* Baruch Boxer, *Israeli Shipping and Foreign Trade*, Chicago, April 1957, p. 148.

Table 14

Israeli Foreign Trade
(1949, 1958, 1965, 1967)*

	I m p o r t								
	1949		1958		1965		1967		
	%	£m/ln	%	£m/ln	%	£m/ln	%	£m/ln	
Total	100.0	760.7	100.0	2,503.9	100.0	2,689.8	100.0	2,689.8	100.0
Europe	46.7	382.9	50.2	1,419.6	56.7	1,476.6	54.9	1,476.6	54.9
thereof:									
Britain	9.3	89.7	11.7	492.3	19.6	511.8	19.0	511.8	19.0
FRG	—	115.6	15.1	223.3	8.9	217.9	8.1	217.9	8.1
France	—	29.3	3.8	106.7	4.2	113.3	4.2	113.3	4.2
America: USA	31.2	222.1	30.0	633.8	25.3	689.8	25.6	689.8	25.6
Asia	4.7	17.6	2.2	170.5	6.8	95.7	3.6	95.7	3.6
Africa	7.1	25.4	3.2	79.3	3.2	95.9	3.6	95.9	3.6
Other countries	10.3	112.7	14.4	200.7	8.0	331.8	12.3	331.8	12.3

	E x p o r t								
	1949		1958		1965		1967		
	%	£m/ln	%	£m/ln	%	£m/ln	%	£m/ln	
Total	100.0	253.1	100.0	1,289.5	100.0	1,942.2	100.0	4,632.0	100.0
Europe	81.1	175.9	69.5	795.6	61.7	1,171.1	60.3	2,647.7	57.1
thereof:									
Britain	53.8	53.3	21.0	150.8	11.7	246.7	12.7	758.5	16.6
FRG	—	19.7	7.8	120.1	9.3	207.3	10.7	425.2	9.1
France	—	10.1	3.9	47.8	3.7	82.8	6.1	196.1	4.2
America: USA	15.5	35.1	13.9	185.1	14.4	314.7	16.2	1,004.5	21.6
Asia	0.7	19.5	7.7	170.5	13.2	251.6	13.0	347.3	7.5
Africa	0.7	8.2	3.2	64.7	5.0	85.5	4.4	181.4	3.9
Other countries	2.0	14.4	5.7	73.6	5.7	119.3	6.1	451.1	9.9

* Source: *Israel Government Yearbook, 1951/52*, p. 415; *Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1959/60*, No. 11, pp. 281-82; 1968, No. 18, pp. 211-12; *Statistical Bulletin of Israel, 1966*, No. 1-2, pp. 96-99.

Of the receipts in the current budget the share of indirect taxes (fluctuating between 46 and 57 per cent) is far in excess of the share of the income tax.

The tax burden falls chiefly on the shoulders of the working people. As we have noted above, only about one-fifth of the income tax comes from private capitalist enterprises.*

	1960/61	1691/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	1965/66	1969/70
Indirect taxes, %	57.3	46.5	54.1	50.4	52.5	46.2	53.8*
Income tax, %	31.0	30.1	33.2	37.1	36.6	42.4	41.3*

* Exclusive of transfers in the total current budget, see footnote** to Table 15.

Of the expenditures in the current budget direct military allocations unchangeably comprise nearly 40 per cent (46 per cent in 1965/66). Together with the allocations under the headings Special Budget and Reserve (in the development budget; see Table 15) the military expenditures amount to 42-53 per cent of the current budget. In 1969, i. e., after the aggression, the military expenditures totalled 54.1 per cent of the current budget. Israel's direct military expenditures for twelve years beginning with 1948 came to 14 per cent of the national income (as against 12.5 per cent in the USA).** In 1961 the share of military expenditures in the national income equalled 17 per cent, in 1962-1963—16 per cent and in 1967—25.2 per cent.***

Considerably more money is allocated for military purposes than for health, social welfare, insurance and the wages fund. From 1960 to 1965 (see Table 15), while military expenditures totalled I£4,800 million

* *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1961, No. 12, p. 422; 1965, No. 16, pp. 544-45.

** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 64.

*** Computed according to *Proposed Revenue and Expenditure Budget and Development Budget Expenditure for Fiscal Year 1963/64* (April 1, 1963-March 31, 1964), Jerusalem, 1962; *Bank of Israel. Annual Report*, 1964, p. 14.

Table 15

	Budget* (I£ million)						1969/70
	1960/61	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	1965/66	
							estimate
Current budget	1,043.6	1,261.5	1,501.0	1,857.1	2,402.0	2,665.0	5,797.0**
thereof:							
income tax	323.3	380.5	498.7	690.1	880.0	1,120.0	1,828.0
indirect taxes	599.0	587.5	812.1	936.0	1,263.3	1,231.0	2,396.0***
Development budget with equivalent funds, loans and revenues for loan redemption	523.8	866.8	919.0	1,145.1	1,298.0	1,335.0	1,892.0
thereof:							
revenue from external loans and other foreign sources	264.0	348.5	581.3	596.4	720.0	668.0	1,367.0
Total****	1,728.8	2,271.9	2,476.4	3,113.8	3,945.9	4,373.0	7,850.0
Current budget	1,048.4	1,235.6	1,397.9	1,705.9	2,402.0	2,665.0	5,797.0
thereof:							
military expenditures (Ministry of Defence, police, special budget, reserve)*****	384.0	444.7	480.1	630.2	1,108.0	1,225.4	3,142.0

continued

	1960/61	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	1965/66	1969/70
education, health, social welfare, insurance, pensions and other payments	251.6	290.6	352.5	403.6	478.5	578.6	829.0
grants-in-aid for price stabilisation	67.5	69.1	125.9	145.7	210.0	160.0	269.0
grants-in-aid to encourage exports and open new markets	135.9	115.2	24.5	6.0	6.5	9.0	280.0
payment of interest	86.7	117.1	190.5	249.4	280.0	325.0	585.0
Development budget (investment, loan redemption and special expenses)	540.5	862.7	904.0	1,186.9	1,298.0	1,335.0	1,892.0
thereof:							
loan redemption and special expenditures	146.1	343.8	283.0	386.0	370.0	345.0	717.0

continued

	1960/61	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/65	1965/66	1969/70
expenditures under headings of special budget and reserve ¹⁾ (actually for military purposes)	—	—	104.0	123.7	176.4	176.4	—
basic expenditures on development (investment)	385.5	503.4	505.8	667.3	736.6	818.6	1,059.0
Total	1,728.8	2,271.9	2,476.4	3,113.8	3,945.9	4,373.0	7,850.0

^{*} Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, pp. 536-43. The fiscal year is from April 1 to March 31; *The Jerusalem Post*, January 7, 1969.

^{**} Including I£1,348,000 transferred from the development budget.

^{***} Including a war loan of I£300,000,000.

^{****} The difference in the budgets when summing up the components (i.e., current and development budgets) is due to allocations not shown in the budgets for the corresponding fiscal year under the heading Receipts from Commercial Enterprises; the difference in the budget for 1969/70 is due to I£160,000,000 that were not transferred from the current to the development budget.

^{*****} Allocations under the heading Special Budget and Reserve are in fact spent on military requirements.

¹⁾ The Special Budget is not to be confused with the special secret (independent) budget.

the allocations for social requirements only amounted to I£2,400 million. In 1969 this ratio (I£1,000 million) was 3.1 to 0.8. Military expenditures greatly exceeded the total budget investments, which in the indicated years totalled I£3,500 million; in 1969 the difference was almost three-fold.

The Government invariably allocates large sums in grants-in-aid for the stabilisation of prices, but these grants have not been able to halt the inflation, with the result that the Israeli pound has been devaluated for the fifth and sixth times in February 1962 and in November 1967 respectively.

The development budget mirrors the low level of economic development. The share of foreign capital in this budget is very high. The share of the receipts from external loans and from other foreign sources in relation to the investments under the development budget from 1960 to 1965 and in 1969 (fiscal year) was (%):

1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1969
68.5	69.2	115.1	89.3	97.7	81.6	91.3

In recent years, the development budget was thus almost entirely covered by revenue from foreign sources. One-third of the funds in this budget is invariably spent on the redemption of debts. This is evidence of Israel's increasingly heavy financial dependence on foreign countries, chiefly on the leading Western powers.

Moreover, the development budget reflects the uneven distribution of investments by branches of the economy.

The allocations (until 1965) for transport were almost double the investments in industry, and this was not accidental because these allocations were indirect military expenditures. In Israel, as Alex Rubner points out, the "published I£ budgets . . . do not give a full picture of the Israeli resources devoted to the army, investment, export promotion and agricultural colonisation".* Table 16

* Alex Rubner, Op. cit., p. 48.

Table 16

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	Total from 1960 to 1965	1969
Agriculture	99.5	124.7	69.3	80.8	66.5	89.3	530.1	32.0
National waterscheme	31.8	40.0	73.5	99.5	51.6	43.2	339.6	51.0
Industry and crafts	68.1	62.4	74.3	75.9	22.0	15.0	317.7	168.0
Mineral development*	10.4	7.4	26.6	36.6	41.9	33.8	162.1	92.0
Power project development	20.0	8.0	10.6	35.6	42.0	56.0	172.2	46.0
Transport and communications	51.8	82.0	138.7	176.7	211.0	278.3	938.5	251.0
Housing**	103.9	178.9	112.8	156.9	301.5	303.0	1,157.0	419.0
Total	385.5	503.4	505.8	667.3	736.6	818.6	3,617.2	1,059.0

* Including oil development and the building of oil pipelines.

** Including Government and public buildings, and also campings and other facilities for tourists.

decreased to almost one-fifth, but the USA is still the shows the distribution of the budget allocations in 1960-1965 and in 1969 in absolute figures (£ million).*

Periodically the state budget is drawn up with a deficit, which in the period from 1960 to 1965 totalled nearly £350 million,** i.e., about £60 million annually. If it is considered that the additional budget is an ordinary occurrence, the annual state budget deficit will be found to be 50 per cent greater.

The principal allocations under the additional budget are for military purposes, the enlargement of the bureaucratic apparatus and promotion of private enterprise. All this increases the tax burden of the working people, because the money comes mainly from indirect taxes.

Don Patinkin writes that "there are some classified defence expenditures which are probably not reflected in the figures at all. . . . This is the fact that defence requirements impinge on expenditures in many other parts of the economy. This is true for the construction of roads, the establishment of frontier settlements, the dispersion of population, the subsidisation of high-cost defence industries, and the like. No estimate is available of the costs involved in these additional defence activities, but there are grounds for believing that they are substantial."***

Indicative in this respect is that while between 1960 and 1965 the current budget, under which military allocations are made, increased 158.1 per cent, the investments under the development budget rose only somewhat over 100 per cent, and between 1965 and 1969—117.5 per cent. Investment allocations in 1969 mirror the drastic cuts in expenditures on civilian production (for instance, on agriculture, the building of power stations, and so forth) and the increase in expenditures on industries linked directly or indirectly with war production, the growth of the war industry, the building of oil pipelines the extraction of oil in occupied Arab territory, the heavy appropriations for transport, and so on.

* See source for Table 15.

** *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1965, No. 16, p. 536; *The Israel Economist*, October 1966, p. 235.

*** Don Patinkin, *Op. cit.*, pp. 56-58.

Israel's difficult financial position is reflected in the growth of the internal and external debt. In only the period from 1956 to 1967 the national debt increased 7-fold, reaching £7,600 million, excluding current commitments, which comprise one-fourth of the debt. The growth of the national debt is illustrated in Table 17.

This situation shows no improvement, mirroring the trend towards a chronic increase of Israel's debt.

A factor contributing to Israel's financial difficulties is the increase of the quantity of money in circulation: the growth was 10-fold between 1948 and 1962, almost 2-fold* from February 1962 to September 1964, and 1.4-fold from 1964 to 1967. In February Israel's rulers had to devalue the Israeli pound; this was proclaimed as the second variant of the "New Economic Policy". The exchange rate of £3=US\$1 reduced the value of the Israeli pound by 66 per cent. The Government's new 18-point programme** accorded further substantial benefits to private, particularly foreign, entrepreneurs. Moreover, all the measures protecting the Israeli home market were, in effect, lifted, and foreign monopolies were given the broadest opportunity for penetrating that market.

Table 17

National Debt*			
£ million (£3=US\$1)			
	1956	1964	1967
Total**	1,084	5,185	7,585
thereof:			
internal debt	400	2,291	3,808
external debt with redemption in foreign currency	628	2,256	3,045
external debt with redemption in Israeli currency	56	638	732

* Source: *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1968, No. 19, p. 486.

** Excluding current commitments. The debt is shown for March 31 of the corresponding year.

* Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, p. 363; 1968, No. 19, p. 461; *Bank of Israel Bulletin*, March 1965, p. 97.

** *The Israel Economist*, February 1962, pp. 19-20.

As we have noted, devaluation was predicated as a requisite for further talks on the question of Israel's membership of the EEC.* As a result of the devaluation in November 1967 the exchange rate of the Israeli pound dropped to I£3.5=US\$1.

In Israel there is a pronounced trend towards the concentration and centralisation of banking capital and this manifests itself more and more obviously with the strengthening of the positions of local and foreign capital. This is also a consequence of the country's intensive militarisation.

The number of commercial banks increased (by the end of 1965) to 47 as against 22 in 1948, while the number of their branches reached 494, i.e., a more than 10-fold growth. On the other hand, the number of credit co-operatives diminished from 96 to 20, or almost 4.8-fold, this being due solely to competition from the newly-established banks and their branches. The three largest banking groups are: Bank Leumi Le-Israel (in which US, British, Swiss and FRG capital participates), the Israel Discount Bank (which is linked with the Discount Bank of New York) and the Workers' Bank, Hapoalim (which is run by Histadrut and linked with the American Israel Corporation, Ampal). These three groups handle two-thirds of the big banking business in Israel.**

According to *The Israel Economist*, the trend towards higher banking profits is due chiefly to the inflationary character of the Israeli economy. In 1963 the net profit of the banks amounted to 34.2 per cent of their equity capital (20.1 per cent in 1964). In 1963 the interest and commission on loans equalled 44.8 per cent of the operating income.*** There is thus a broad base for the emergence of a big financial oligarchy linked with monopoly capital.

Another feature is that parallel with the enrichment of the propertied classes, the small proprietors are facing ruin, evidence of this being the rise in the number of

* J. E. Palmon, *Israel ringt um Wirtschaftliche Selbständigkeit*, p. 108.

** Here and above: *Economic Annual 1962/63*, pp. 57-58; *The Israel Economist*, April 1966, p. 82.

*** *The Israel Economist*, April 1966, pp. 82-83.

bankruptcies among them. This is reflected by the following figures:*

Bankruptcies (1955-1960)						
	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960
Total	39	65	91	137	168	181
thereof:						
in industry	15	29	22	44	38	50
in trade	8	16	26	39	35	35

These figures, the *Bank of Israel Bulletin* points out, do not include ruined farmers and liquidated co-operatives, who form the largest number of bankruptcies.

Israel is developing along capitalist lines, and although only a short period has passed since her formation, the inevitable contradictions intrinsic to the system of exploitation and oppression have already come to the fore. In pursuing a policy serving the interests of the bourgeoisie, the Israeli ruling circles are hitting the working masses. This incontestable fact cannot be hidden by the specious Zionist slogans of the "common Jewish" interests of all Israeli citizens.

* *Bank of Israel Bulletin*, 1964, No. 21, p. 17.

AMERICAN AID, WEST GERMAN REPARATIONS
AND FOREIGN PRIVATE
CAPITAL IN ISRAEL

1. Forms and Size of American Aid

What is the size of the aid rendered Israel by the USA and what is its nature? What positions does foreign private capital hold in Israel as a result mainly of American aid?

It is quite obvious that no Arab state has ever received American aid in the same proportions as Israel. Between 1948 and 1955 American aid to all Arab countries amounted to 163 million dollars, while Israel received 367 million dollars.* In 1954, according to figures published in *The Jerusalem Post*, American aid per Arab came to only 2.59 dollars, while in terms of per Israeli it was nearly 100 times larger.**

In 1962 the grants-in-aid from the USA (including donations from Jewish organisations) totalled 1,000 dollars per Israeli, while if foreign financing is taken as a whole it will be found that this sum rose to 3,000 dollars in 1965.

Israel has been included in all the main US aid programmes to foreign countries. In February 1951 a General Agreement for Technical Co-operation was signed be-

* George Lenczowski, *Op. cit.*, pp. 349, 356.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, February 17, 1959.

tween the USA and Israel under Truman's Point Four Programme.*

Since May 1952 Israel has been receiving US aid under the 1951 Security Programme and on the basis of the Emergency Economic Assistance Agreement signed on May 1, 1952.** In November 1953 Israel was included in the Programme of Special Economic Assistance of the United States of America to the Near East and Africa (signed between the USA and Israel on November 25, 1953).***

Since 1955 Israel has been receiving aid under Public Law Act 480 on the sale of surplus agricultural commodities (agreement between the USA and Israel of April 29, 1955).**** Another form of aid are grants through the Export-Import Bank.

All this aid goes through official channels, i.e., in the shape of Government grants-in-aid in cash or goods. Moreover, Israel receives loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Israel gets enormous sums of money from unofficial sources in the USA, namely: the sale of loan bonds in US stock markets; donations from Jewish organisations; gifts from private American philanthropic societies such as the Rothschild Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation and so on.

Table 18 gives an idea of the sums received by Israel from the USA through official and unofficial channels.

Thus, the money that flowed from the USA to Israel between 1948 and 1962 totalled 3,188 million dollars.

* TIAS, 2401. This agreement was supplemented on May 9, 1952 (TIAS, 2570), August 17, 1952 (TIAS, 2750), March 11, 1953 (TIAS, 2788), June 21, 1954 (TIAS, 3010), June 29, 1954 (TIAS, 3045) and on July 25, 1958 (TIAS, 4157). In the course of 1950-1951 the USA gave Israel a special "grant" of 23 million dollars in the form of surplus agricultural commodities for the settlement of immigrants. See *Security and the Middle East. The Problem and Its Solution. Proposals Submitted to the President of the United States by Twenty Distinguished Americans*, 1955, pp. 165-66.

** TIAS, 2571.

*** TIAS, 2884. This agreement was supplemented in January 1955 (TIAS, 3189).

**** TIAS, 3228. This agreement is renewed annually.

Table 18
American Aid, Remittances to Private Individuals,
and Private US Capital in Israel, 1948-1962*
(million dollars)

I. Through official channels (US Government grants-in-aid) thereof:	920.2
a) gratuitous grants, loans, technical aid, agricultural surpluses, special aid	698.5
b) Export-Import Bank loans	221.7
II. Loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development**	74.5
III. Through unofficial channels thereof:	1,419.7
a) sale of Israeli loan bonds in the USA	559.5
b) donations from American Jewish organisations and private foundations	860.2
IV. Private cash and goods transfers***	371.8
V. Private capital from the USA****	402.0
Total	3,188.2

* Sources: *Mutual Security Act of 1959. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, 86th Congress, First Session, Part III, p. 692; Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Programme for Fiscal Year 1960, 1961, pp. 51, 89, 103; Facts About Israel, 1961, p. 82; Middle East Economic Digest, September 16, December 9, 1960; The Jerusalem Post, January 7, February 1, 1960; March 6, 1962; Bulletin of International Commercial Information, January 19, 1960; February 24, April 4, May 25, November 23, 1962; August 20, 1963; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Sixteenth Annual Report 1960, 1961, p. 20; Israel Government Yearbook 5722 (1961/62), p. 165; 5726 (1965/66), p. 132; 5727 (1966/67), pp. 123-24; Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1963, No. 14, p. 408; Bank of Israel Bulletin, November 1963, p. 108.*

** In 1960-1962 the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development granted loans at a 5.75 per cent interest rate.

*** With a small part from other countries (data since 1952).

**** With a small part from Canada and exclusive of private short-term credits.

US Government grants are distributed as follows (million dollars; same sources as for Table 18):

	Economic aid		Technical aid	Agricultural surpluses	Export-Import Bank loans	Special aid	Total
	Gratuitous (grants)*	Loans (including development loans)					
1949	—	—	—	—	100	—	100
1950	—	—	—	—	35	—	35
1951	—	—	0.084	—	—	—	0.084
1952	63.5	—	0.9	—	—	22.7**	87.1
1953	72.8	—	3.5	—	—	—	76.3
1954	52.5	—	1.4	—	—	20.7**	74.6
1955	20.4	20.0	1.5	13.1	—	—	55.0
1956	14.2	12.5	1.5	27.9	—	—	56.1
1957	17.3	10.0	1.8	10.7	—	—	39.8
1958	2.3	15.0	1.5	41.0	24.2	7.5	91.5
1959	2.3	5.0	1.6	38.3	3.4	7.5	58.1
1960	—	25.0	1.3	30.2	10.3	7.5	74.3
1961	10.4	10.0	1.0	26.0	25.0	...	72.4
1962	10.9	29.5	—	28.1	23.8	7.5	99.8
1963	—	45.0	—	25.0	5.3	...	75.3
1964	—	45.0	—	25.0	70.0
1965	—	20.0	—	35.0	55.0
1966	—	10.0	—	34.0	44.0
Total	266.6	247.0	16.0	334.3	227.0	73.4	1,164.3

* Including additional agricultural surpluses.

** Additional agricultural surpluses.

The first two largest loans from the Export-Import Bank (US\$100 million and US\$35 million) were granted for a term of 12 years at a 3.5 per cent interest rate, with the first to be redeemed in 1963 and the second in 1965.* The mandatory terms were that equipment and goods were to be purchased in the USA. Israel paid the last instalment on the two loans at the close of 1965. These loans were used mainly for the settlement of immigrants and

* Export-Import Bank of Washington. Tenth Semi-Annual Report to Congress. For the Period January-June 1950, p. 13; Eleventh Semi-Annual Report to Congress. For the Period July-December 1950, p. 9.

for the development of transport. They indirectly helped to increase Israel's war potential.*

The next loans from the Export-Import Bank, in 1958 (at a 5.25 per cent interest) and in 1960-1965, were granted for the expansion of the water supply, agricultural development, the building and equipping of power stations and the modernisation of ports. Part of this money was used for the building of an atomic reactor.** The interest on the loans granted in 1964 and 1965 was raised to 5.75 per cent per annum. In 1965 Israel's debt to the Export-Import Bank totalled 90 million dollars.

US economic aid assumes various forms (grants, credits, agricultural surpluses). Of the first three American gratuitous grants,*** roughly 122 million dollars were used exclusively for the settlement of immigrants and for meeting Israel's urgent requirements (chiefly in food imports), and over 15 million dollars went to cover short-term debts, principally to the USA; part of the money was used for military purposes.**** Thus, the bulk of the three first gratuitous grants was not spent on production development in the proper meaning of the word. Moreover, of the total of 188,800,000 dollars, half went into a so-called counterpart fund which comes under the direct supervision of the United States Operations Mission in Israel.*****

In order to conceal Israel's heavy, notably financial, dependence on the USA, the ruling circles put out the slogan, "Trade, not assistance", in 1955. Beginning in that year part of the American aid to Israel has taken the form of loans, chiefly so-called development loans. In the period

* See *Export-Import Bank of Washington. Report to Congress. For the Period July-December 1950*, pp. 9-10; C. Tadmor, *Israel Economic Survey, July-December 1952*, p. 22.

** *Export-Import Bank of Washington. Report to Congress for the Twelve Months Ending June 30, 1960*, pp. 22-23; *Middle East Economic Digest*, March 7, 1958, p. 5; *Export-Import Bank of Washington. Report to Congress for the Twelve Months Ending June 30, 1960*, pp. 168-72; ... *Ending June 30, 1962*; ... *Ending June 30, 1963*, p. 16; ... *Ending June 30, 1965*, pp. 28, 90.

*** *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Programme for the Six Months Ended December 31, 1952*, p. 10; ... *Ended June 30, 1953*, p. 33; ... *Ended December 31, 1953*, p. 29; ... *Ended June 30, 1954*, p. 26.

**** *The New York Times*, January 6, 1953; *Fortnightly*, April 1952, p. 250.

***** *State of Israel. Government Yearbook, 5715 (1954)*, 1955, pp. 120-21.

from 1955 to 1966 the "development" and other loans amounted to 247 million dollars, almost reaching the same proportion as the so-called gratuitous grants. The terms of the "development" loans grew harsher in 1962, one of them being that they have to be redeemed exclusively in dollars. The interest, which was 0.75 per cent per annum in 1962, was increased to 2 per cent in 1963 and to 3.5 per cent in 1964.*

Since 1955 aid in the form of agricultural surpluses has been granted chiefly under Public Law 480.** Approximately one-third of the total comprised (see p. 273) shipments of fodder, and another one-third wheat; one-quarter was spent on foodstuffs (meat, cheese and vegetable oil). The receipts from the sale of these agricultural surpluses in the Israeli market go into the counterpart fund. During the first six years of the programme they were distributed as follows (according to official data): 60 per cent as loans to the Government for 30 years for the financing of new industrial projects, chiefly with the participation of foreign capital; 20 per cent, in accordance with the 1950 Cooley Amendment to the Surplus Agricultural Commodities Agreement between the USA and Israel,*** were allocated for loans to United States firms or their branches in Israel (for instance, Alliance Tire and Rubber Co., Ltd., American-Israeli Paper Mills, Rassco); the rest of the money was placed at the disposal of the United States Government for the maintenance of the United States Information Service in Israel, direct financial assistance to Israeli ruling circles during election campaigns, and so forth.**** Actually, the receipts from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities were distributed somewhat dif-

* *State of Israel. Government Yearbook, 5726 (1965/66)*, 1966, p. 132.

** American aid to Israel under the agricultural surplus programme is dealt with in detail by F. Ginor, *Uses of Agricultural Surpluses, Analysis and Assessment of the Economic Effect of the US Public Law 480 Title 1 Programme in Israel*, Jerusalem, 1963.

*** Under the Cooley Amendment, 25 per cent of the receipts (in Israeli currency) from the sale of agricultural surpluses have to be transferred as loans to private enterprises, entirely or partially belonging to US citizens, or enterprises that use the loans to enlarge the market for the sale of American agricultural surpluses. Moreover, 15 per cent of the receipts have to be put at the disposal of the US Government.

**** Here and above: *The Jerusalem Post*, February 10, 1961.

ferently: instead of the initially earmarked 20 per cent, nearly one-third of the allocations went into loans to US firms, while the US Government obtained the use of 25 per cent of the receipts instead of the 15 per cent originally established.*

The agreements signed in the period 1962-1965 provided that 50 per cent of the counterpart fund (i.e., receipts from the sale of agricultural surpluses) should be regarded as a loan to Israel repayable over 30 years at 0.75 per cent, and 20 per cent should be regarded as a grant. In 1966 the loan was increased to 65 per cent of the counterpart fund at up to 4 per cent per annum.**

From 1951 to 1962 Israel received 15 million dollars in technical aid. However, according to Henry Chalfant, Acting Director of the United States Aid Mission, the actual impact of this form of aid is not measured in terms of dollar value. He noted that technical experts had been trained in Israel for African, Asian and South American countries and that in these countries they were working hand in hand with American experts.*** Technical aid was designed to finance development projects, but during the first two years actually only two-thirds of the money under this programme was spent for this purpose; the rest of the funds was used to pay the salaries and managerial expenditures of the US Technical Co-operation Administration Mission in Israel.**** In the next year, 1952/53, only 26 per cent of the aid was used for development projects, and the remaining 74 per cent went to pay for the upkeep of the US mission's 88-man staff and 71 experts.***** In the course of 10 years the number of American experts in Israel increased 5-fold and although the technical aid programme ended in 1962, some 340 American experts remained in Israel.†)

Since 1958 American gratuitous grants to Israel have taken the shape of special aid and development fund

* *The Jerusalem Post*, February 10, 1961; *The Economic Annual*, 1960, p. 219.

** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5726 (1965/66), 1966, p. 132.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, April 15, 1962.

**** C. Tadmor, *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

***** *Ibid.*, pp. 73-74.

†) *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Programme for the Fiscal Year 1960*, 1961, p. 51; *The Jerusalem Post*, April 15, 1962.

loans. The first form of aid is officially described as special assistance to meet Israel's raw material requirements, and the second—to pay for the plant shipped from the USA.* However, the real destination of this aid was revealed in 1959 at hearings before the US House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, where it was said that it was "designed to maintain or promote political or economic stability in countries in which US support is essential to continued independence or identification with the free world and to support economic growth where, for political and economic reasons, the use of the Development Loan Fund would be inappropriate". Moreover, it was stressed that "special aid" was being extended to Israel to maintain a stable government in that country.**

The conclusion to be drawn from this is that most of the so-called official United States aid to Israel has been directed into non-productive expenditures. Part of it goes into loans to American firms operating in Israel, thus helping American private capital to strengthen its foothold in Israel. The spending of large sums of money from the counterpart fund solely with the consent and on the direct instructions of the US Operations Mission gives the United States Government an additional means of pressuring Israel. Lastly, for the US monopolies aid to Israel is a means of surmounting their own difficulties, particularly a means of getting surplus farm products off their hands. Unofficial aid comes, above all, from the sale of Israeli loan bonds in the United States. The first of these, the Independence Loan—was issued in May 1951 for the sum of 500 million dollars at 3.5 per cent per annum for a term of 12 years. The next, issued in 1954, was the First Development Loan for 350 million dollars at a higher interest rate—4 per cent.***

* "Decade of Mutual Economic Co-operation", *The Jerusalem Post*, July 4, 1958. In 1955 Israel received special aid for the building of an atomic reactor in accordance with the agreement between the USA and Israel on co-operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy of July 3, 1955. See *TIAS*, 3311.

** *Mutual Security Act of 1959. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, 86th Congress, First Session*, Part 1, 1959, pp. 278, 276.

*** *The Israel Economist*, October 1955, p. 176.

The Second Development Loan was floated in 1959. The total receipts from the sale of these three loans added up to 673,200,000 dollars, of which 80 per cent came from the USA.* The Third Development Loan for 400 million dollars was floated in 1963. By the beginning of 1965 the receipts from the sale of these latest bonds had aggregated 84,700,000 Israeli pounds. By that time bonds totalling US\$298,200,000 (in all the four loans) had been redeemed.** The Fifth Development Loan was issued in 1967 on the eve of the June aggression.

Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz, the Executive Vice-President of the Israel Bond Organisation, has frankly declared that the "Bond Drive's major achievement was to create a favourable climate for direct investments in Israel".*** The funds received from the sale of bonds are channelled, via the development budget, into loans to private investors. As Victor Perlo points out, these loans are received mostly by American companies operating in Israel.**** Under the terms of the subscription, these bonds may be freely converted into shares in Israeli enterprises. In this way, *The Jerusalem Post* reported, shares in the American-Israeli Paper Mills and the Alliance Tire Factory went to foreigners.*****

American capitalists receive large additional profits in the form of commission (6 per cent under the terms of the 1951 loan) for the sale of Israeli bonds. Moreover, Israel pays for all the expenses connected with the issue and registration of the bonds, and so on, and all the sales taxes and dues. As a result, Victor Perlo writes, "the Israel Government gets less than \$94 out of every \$100 Bond for Israel bought by an American. But it pays 3.5 per cent interest on the full \$100, including the part it doesn't get."**)

"Donations" from American Jewish organisations are another source of unofficial aid from the USA. In size these "donations" exceed US Government aid. The collec-

* *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. US Senate, 87th Congress, Part 1, 1961, p. 537.*

** *Israel Government Yearbook, 5726 (1965/66), p. 134.*

*** *The Jerusalem Post, January 7, 1960.*

**** Victor Perlo, *Op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

***** *The Jerusalem Post, January 7, 1960; March 6, 1962.*

*) Victor Perlo, *Op. cit.*, p. 20.

tion of these donations is supervised by the United Jewish Appeal, which unites many other similar societies, for instance Joint Distribution Committee, United Palestine Appeal, and so on. According to official figures, between 1948 and 1962 the donations for Israel amounted to US\$1,327,400,000, of which US\$860,200,000 were received directly from American Zionist organisations and private Jewish foundations.* In the period from 1966 to 1968 these donations amounted to nearly 600 million dollars.

Like the Israeli bonds sold in the United States, the "voluntary donations" from American Zionist and Jewish organisations are an extremely convenient screen allowing the United States ruling element, first, to conceal the real dimensions of the aid to Israel, second, to help the Israeli rulers in every possible way under the guise of philanthropy and, third, to create the impression of impartiality in their relations with the Arab countries.

Israel gets American aid on fettering terms, which are written into the corresponding agreements. For instance, under the Point Four General Agreement for Technical Co-operation of February 26, 1951, the USA obtained access to all information on the state of the Israeli economy with the possibility to direct the spending of the aid funds granted to Israel and also to enjoy immense benefits and privileges. Israel's obligations were widened still further under the Emergency Economic Assistance Agreement of May 1, 1952.** Article 4 of this agreement obliges the Government of Israel to provide information "covering the most authoritative data on Israel's foreign exchange income and expenditures, its internal budgets and fiscal procedures, its relationships with external non-governmental assistance agencies, the projected rate of economic development, and such other information which have a bearing upon Israel's economy". This, in effect, places Israel's economy, finances and foreign economic ties under US control.

Under the Special Economic Assistance Agreement of November 25, 1953*** Israel undertook to substantiate every application for aid with such information and data

* *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations. US Senate, 87th Congress, Part 1, 1961, p. 538.*

** *TIAS, 2571.*

*** *TIAS, 2884.*

as might be required by the US Government in order to determine the possibility of granting such application (Note No. 71, Paragraph 1).

The Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty signed on August 23, 1951, established "equal rights and opportunities" for the "citizens and corporations" of the two countries. In view of Israel's status of dependence, these formal "equal rights and opportunities" become obligations for Israel and privileges for the USA.

The enormous sums of money received by Israel from overseas, above all from the USA, could not, as we have already pointed out, help but yield a definite economic effect. They helped to build up Israel's economy, but only in the direction desired by the country's American patrons, namely, towards the expansion of the war potential. It would be interesting to trace the share of the subsidies from the USA and also of all overseas receipts that went directly into the Israeli economy.

For instance, between 1949 and 1954 only 23 per cent (420 million dollars) of Israel's foreign currency expenditures (totalling 2,020 million dollars) were covered by exports and services. The remaining 1,600 million dollars came from abroad as capital imports and loans, with the USA accounting for approximately 50 per cent.*

Israel's own resources covered the following proportion of her foreign currency expenditures in the period from 1956 to 1968 (%):**

1956	1957	1960	1961	1962	1963	1967	1968
29.1	36.3	36.4	38.6	38.1	44.1	63.0	61.2

Foreign capital imports and American aid form a considerable sum in proportion to the national income. By way of comparison, the following shows the total capital imports from 1948 to 1965 and from 1966 to 1969:

* Computed by headings according to *L'Evolution économique au Moyen Orient 1945-1954*, New York, 1955, p. 159.

** Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1955-1963, No. 7-14; *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1969, No. 5, p. 25, data on the balance of payments; *Bank of Israel. Annual Report 1963*, Jerusalem, May 1964, pp. 34-35.

Table 19

Total and Sources of Capital Imports*
(million dollars)

	1948-1962	1963-1965	1948-1965	1966-1968
1. Donations from American Jewish and other Jewish organisations, and also from individuals and private foundations**	1,327.4	619.0	2,866.6	578.1
2. US grants-in-aid and Export-Import Bank loans	920.2			183.8
3. FRG reparations	736.1	68.0	804.1	—
4. Personal compensation to Israeli citizens by the FRG	583.5	419.0	1,002.5	373.8***
5. Liquidation of sterling balances and other foreign security holdings****	150.0	—	150.0	—
6. Sales of Israel Government securities abroad (80 per cent in the USA)*****	667.2	259.0	926.0	538.5
7. Long-term foreign loans (partially from the USA)	338.4	377.0	893.7	487.1
8. Short-term foreign credits (including from the USA)	178.3			753.1
9. Immigrants' personal property and other private transfers in cash and kind (including from the USA)	371.8	257.0	628.3	338.1
10. Approved direct investments by foreign residents	651.7	412.0	1,063.7	202.0
Total	5,924.6	2,411.0	8,335.1	3,454.5

* See source for Table 18 and also *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1955-1963, 1968, Nos. 7-14, 19; *Statistical Bulletin of Israel*, 1969, No. 5, pp. 25-27 for data on the balance of payments. Data for 1963-1965 according to *Bank of Israel Bulletin*, 1965, No. 23, p. 86. Data for 1964 and 1965 are approximate.

** For data up to 1960 inclusive see *Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 87th Congress, First Session on S. 1983*, Part 1, 1961, p. 538. Data for 1961-1962 according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, p. 408.

*** Including a small share (about 3 million dollars) from Austria.

**** Up to 1957 according to *The Banker*, April 1958, p. 244.

***** Without redemption.

According to official Israeli statistics the national income for the period from 1950 to 1962 was equal to 28,600 million Israeli pounds or 9,500 million dollars (at £3=US\$1), and from 1950 to 1965—to 49,800 million Israeli pounds or 16,600 million dollars* (at the same rate of exchange). In proportion to the national income overseas receipts and US aid were:

	1948-1962	1948-1965
Total receipts from the USA (1,000 million dollars)	3.2	
Proportion of capital imports from the USA to Israel's national income, %	33.7	
Total capital imports, (1,000 million dollars)	5.9	8.3
Proportion of capital imports to Israel's national income, %	62.1	50.1

It should be borne in mind that the circulation sphere is included in the official computation of Israel's national income.

Israel's rulers do not conceal the fact that Israel is dependent on American aid. In the *Yearbook* for 1956 it is stated clearly that "there is hardly a scientific institution or a major industrial plant in Israel which has not availed itself of this help".** The *Yearbook* for 1961 states that the "US Government welcomes Israel's endeavours to strengthen its political status and secure its economic future, and is ready to extend practical aid towards the realisation of both aims".*** This is official acknowledgement of the political nature of American aid.

However, this aid has very adversely affected Israel's economy. Compulsory imports from the USA have firmly tied Israel to the American market. Moreover, Israel has

* Computed according to *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1963, No. 14, pp. 174-75; *Bank of Israel Bulletin*, 1965, No. 23, p. 89. Data for 1964 and 1965 are approximate.

** *State of Israel. Government Yearbook*, 5717 (1956), December 1956, p. 61.

*** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5721 (1960/61), p. 214.

to pay in excess of the world market price for the goods purchased in the United States. For instance, for 70 per cent of the industrial raw material purchased in the United States, it paid 30 per cent above the world price.* US agricultural surplus shipments are likewise hitting the Israeli economy.

The presence of the United States Operations Mission in Israel is likewise an indication of Israel's dependence on the USA. According to the *Yearbook* the American experts are engaged in a variety of fields, ranging "from cattle-breeding to wood pulp manufacture, from public administration to librarianship and from fish canning to milk hygiene".** Besides, the US mission openly intervenes in Israel's internal affairs.***

The more far-sighted section of the Israeli bourgeoisie is aware of the real aims behind US "philanthropy" and so-called aid. Expressing the concern of this section, in 1955 *The Israel Economist* asked who was going to pay for this aid, adding that, according to the old axiom, nothing was given free.**** Israel's price for this aid is her utter dependence on the USA.

2. West German Reparations

The so-called reparations which Israel received (until 1966) under an agreement signed with the Federal Republic of Germany in September 1952 were a source of revenue. As distinct from American aid, most of which is expended on current consumption, the reparations went directly into the productive branches of the Israeli economy.

These reparations were paid by the FRG as compensation for the Jewish victims of the Nazi policy of mass extermination during the Second World War. However, Israel had neither legal nor moral rights to such compensation because it does not represent the interests of all the European Jews who suffered from fascism. Most of

* Alex Rubner, *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

** *State of Israel. Government Yearbook*, 5717 (1956), p. 61.

*** *The Israel Economist*, June 1958, p. 100.

**** *Ibid.*, July 1955, p. 127.

the Jews victimised by the nazis continue to live in Europe, including socialist countries, and Israel has nothing to do with them. As the GDR journal *Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut* pointed out, the legality of the FRG-Israel reparations agreement was disputed by all Jewish organisations outside Israel. One of the points made was that of Israel's 1,400,000 citizens at the time the agreement was signed not more than 80,000 had come from Germany. "Therefore", the journal emphasised, "the significance of the compensation is actually so small that it is tantamount to non-existence altogether."^{*}

Under the agreement the FRG undertook to pay Israel DM 3,500 million (822 million dollars) over a period of 12 years in the form of goods shipments and services. The term of payment could be shortened by the FRG by increasing the annual instalments at her own discretion, but they were not to fall below the sum of DM 250 million (US\$60 million).^{**} Any further Israeli claim on the FRG was ruled out, but individual Jewish victims of nazism could present individual claims and demand restitution. The restitutions were estimated at over DM 4,000 million, of which a considerable portion was earmarked for Israel (amounting to 1,000 million dollars in 1965).

It was planned that one-third of the shipments would constitute fuel; the remaining two-thirds were as follows: 80 per cent—equipment, means of production and raw materials; 20 per cent—consumer goods and services.^{***} The FRG shipped to Israel mainly heavy equipment, constructional sections, industrial raw materials, rolling stock, ships and so on.

The shipments received by Israel in 1959-1960 under the reparations agreement were: 47 per cent steel and base metals, and items made from them, 14 per cent chemicals, 3 per cent farm machinery, equipment and products, and 6 per cent services. Moreover, 30 per cent

^{*} *Deutsches Wirtschaftsinstitut, Bericht 15/16*, Berlin, August 1956 pp. 36-37.

^{**} *United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 162, 1953, No. 2137, pp. 205-311.

^{***} *Israel Economist Annual*, 1956/57, pp. 12-13.

of the shipments were oil from sterling areas.^{*} The last instalment was paid in 1966. According to the *Israel Economist Annual*, the shipments from the FRG comprised over 25-30 per cent of the annual Israeli import. Moreover, thanks to reparations Israel was able to renew her navy (17 per cent of the reparations consisted of ships), supply agriculture with modern machinery, and modernise and enlarge industry.^{**} Lastly, the reparations allowed reducing Israel's imports and, consequently, saved foreign currency.^{***}

The 736 million dollars of reparations received by Israel by 1962 amounted to 23 per cent in ratio to American aid for the same period and equalled 80 per cent of the US grants-in-aid to Israel by 1962 (and 70.6 per cent by 1966, the year the last of the reparations were paid). The FRG reparations were thus highly instrumental in promoting Israel's economic development.

Of the total of 3,500 million dollars (10,500 million Israeli pounds) invested in the national economy in 1950-1962, 21 per cent comprised reparations from the FRG. A point to be noted is that these reparations were used for military requirements. For instance, *The Israel Economist* wrote that they were a life-belt for Israel when she had to allocate huge sums of money for defence needs, particularly in 1956.^{****}

For FRG capital the reparations agreement was a means of penetrating the Israeli economy.

Israel Economic Development bonds are being successfully sold in West Germany since 1960.^{*****}

The Israeli Communists pointed out that as a result of the reparations agreement Israel was converted into "an important market for West-German products, for goods and capital exported by the West-German monopolies, and a springboard for the renewed expansion of German imperialism in the direction of the Middle East. . . .

^{*} *Bulletin of International Commercial Information*, March 10, 1959; April 9, 1960; *Middle East Economic Digest*, London, March 11, 1960, Vol. IV, No. 10, p. 112.

^{**} *Bank for International Settlements*, 1958, July 18, p. 1.

^{***} *Israel Economist Annual*, 1956/57, p. 13.

^{****} *The Israel Economist*, January 1958, p. 3.

^{*****} *Bulletin of International Commercial Information*, December 13, 1960.

American 'aid' and West-German 'reparations' have become levers for the domination of our country by foreign capital, for the impoverishing militarisation of Israel in the service of the aggressive plans of NATO.*

3. Foreign Private Capital in Israel

Although American private investments are far smaller than the US grants-in-aid and other forms of assistance. American private capital holds a monopoly position in Israel (owning 60 per cent of the total foreign investments). Thus, in the period from 1948 to 1962 American aid amounted to 2,400 million dollars, while private investments totalled only 402 million dollars.

This is only further evidence of the fact that for the USA Israel is, first and foremost, a strategic springboard, and only after that a sphere for private investment.** However, the growth rate of private American investments far exceeds the rate of growth of aid through the various channels. Thus, American grants-in-aid increased from 140 million dollars in 1948*** to 2,400 million dollars in 1962, i.e., 17-fold, while private American investments during the same period grew from 2,000,000**** to 400 million dollars, or 200-fold. American aid is thus the battering ram for the penetration of the Israel economy by private capital. Moreover, Israel has become one of the principal international centres attracting new private investment from the USA.*****

The flow of foreign capital into Israel became organised with the institution of the Government-sponsored Investment Centre set up in accordance with the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments of March 29, 1950. Though a Government agency, the Investment Centre was in effect controlled notably by the American companies operating in Israel.

In 1960 the Investment Centre was placed under the

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, pp. 22, 33.

** See G. S. Nikitina, "Israel and US Imperialism", *Sovietskoye vostokovedeniye*, 1958, No. 5, pp. 71-79.

*** *Israel Economic Statistics*, 1953, p. 87.

**** *Survey of Current Business*, August 1955, p. 16.

***** *Israel Digest*, January 7, 1955; A. B. Magil, *Which Way Israel*, New York, 1956, p. 10.

jurisdiction of the New Investment Authority that was, in effect, established to co-ordinate all direct investments from the USA.*

Within a span of eight years (1954-1962) total foreign investments in Israel increased 4.3-fold, while American investments showed a more than 8-fold growth. It is interesting to note that over one-fifth of the foreign investments are ostensibly from Latin American countries. Actually, a considerable portion of this capital is from the USA. The share of private American investments in the total capital investments in Israel was: 56 per cent in 1956, 70 per cent in 1958, 71.5 per cent in 1960 and 60 per cent in 1962. British capital is finding its foothold in Israel growing steadily narrower. Its share of the investments in 1960-1962 was only 6 per cent; the share of French capital during these years was 1.8 per cent.

Lately there has been a growth of the volume of foreign capital investments.

The heaviest inflow of foreign capital was in 1960-1962 on account of the many privileges accorded to foreign investors. For example, the 105,800,000 dollars of foreign investments in 1960 were an increase of 173 per cent as compared with the preceding year and came to over 30 per cent of all the approved investments from 1950 onwards.**

Table 20
Dimensions and Growth of Foreign Investments in Israel*

	1954 US \$, mln.	Total for 1950-1962 **		
		Projects	Approved capital, US \$, mln.	%
Total	124.7	1,363	658.8	100.0
thereof (%):				
USA (including a small share from Canada)	39.4***	563	385.7	59.1
Europe	...	539	127.3	19.4
thereof:				
Britain	11.6
France	3.2
Latin America	...	142	116.2	17.7
Other countries	...	119	29.6	3.8

* *New York Herald Tribune*, January 11, 1959.

** *Israel Economic Bulletin*, May 1961, p. 7.

continued

1960		1961		1962	
Approved capital, US \$, mln.	%	Approved capital, US \$, mln.	%	Approved capital, US \$, mln.	%
105.8	100.0	158.4	100.0	173.6	100.0
75.8	71.5	93.8	60.0	103.9	60.0
21.2	20.0	30.9	20.0	27.8	16.0
8.0****	7.6	13.0****	8.2	4.7****	2.7
1.8	1.7	4.1	2.0	2.1	1.2
4.3	4.0	29.2	18.5	39.5	22.7
4.5	4.5	4.5	1.5	2.4	1.3

* Sources: *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5716 (1955), p. 85; 5724 (1963/64), p. 71; *Israel Economic Bulletin*, May 1961, p. 7; *The Israel Economist*, November 1963, p. 205.

** Of the approved projects 85 per cent were put into effect in 1959-1962. The figures from 1960 onwards include approved investments in the enlargement of enterprises.

*** The US share was 43.5 per cent in enterprises carrying out investment plans.

**** Britain together with other countries of the sterling zone.

The following figures give the balance between foreign and local capital in Israel:

	1950-1965* US \$, mln.	Share of local capital, %
Total investments (approved)**	1,300.8***	
thereof:		
local capital (approved)	355.9****	27.3

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5725 (1964/65), p. 71; 5726 (1965/66), p. 65; 5727 (1966/67), p. 63.

** Including approvals for the enlargement of enterprises.

*** Including 944,900,000 dollars of foreign capital.

**** Exchange rate: 1£3=US\$1.

Within a 15-year period the share of Israeli capital was thus less than one-third of the total of approved in-

vestments. This is further evidence that foreign capital is strengthening its position in Israel.

The Israeli Government itself clears the way by financing private enterprises with the purpose of encouraging private initiative. For instance, the Government loans to approved enterprises from 1950 to the end of 1959 amounted to 47.6 per cent of the total investments, i.e., including local capital, and 73.1 per cent of the foreign investments, while in 1963-1965 they amounted to 55 per cent of the foreign investments.*

Under the Encouragement of Capital Investment Law of March 1950,** foreign investors enjoy many benefits and privileges such as exemption from income tax on buildings and other property and other taxes, and exemption from customs dues in the import of machinery, raw materials and so forth. They are allowed to transfer capital in the shape of shipments of machinery, equipment or raw materials.

They enjoy the right to transfer abroad profits, interest or depreciation in foreign currency amounting to 10 per cent of the investments annually.

Further privileges and benefits were granted to foreign investors by a number of amendments, approved in August 1959, to the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investments of March 29, 1950.

One of these new privileges was the right freely to transfer profits abroad in foreign currency.***

In March 1960 foreign investors were exempted from income tax on dividends from Israeli shares and bonds and received the right to repatriate, at any time, dividends and interest at the official rate of exchange.**** The amendments to the Capital Investment Encouragement Law made in December 1962 extended from five to ten years the period during which foreign investors are

* Computed according to *The Jerusalem Post. Economic Annual* 1960, p. 229; *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5725 (1964/65), p. 71; 5726 (1965/66), p. 65.

** *The Israel Economist*, May 1950, pp. 134-36.

*** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5720 (1959/60), pp. 164-65; *Economic Annual* 1960, pp. 308-10.

**** *The Financial Times*, June 3, 1960.

exempt from income tax.* Further amendments in July 1966 gave private entrepreneurs new benefits.**

The US-Israeli Private Investment Guarantee Agreement signed in 1952 gives American monopolies further guarantees for the maximum enjoyment of all the benefits and privileges accorded to private investors in Israel.*** In 1957 more guarantees given to American investors.****

The Golden Era of foreign private enterprise in Israel was fostered, as we have mentioned above, by the sale of state enterprises to overseas monopolies. This mainly concerns state-owned industries that are of interest to foreign investors because they "have already established markets and have profitable operations".***** In this way industries that are of importance to the national economy pass into foreign hands. For instance, as we have already noted, shares of the Fertilisers and Chemicals Ltd., described as the cornerstone of the chemical industry planned by Israel,* were sold to American investors. In August 1959 the Eilat-Haifa oil pipeline was leased for 49 years to Tri-Continental Pipe Lines Ltd., which includes the Bothschild group, PEC, the Miami group, the Discount Bank, Ampal, Israel Investors Corporation, and others. Shares of Delek, Israel Fuel Corporation Ltd., were sold in 1969.**)

Thus, in order to ensure monopoly capital with profits, the Israeli Government betrays the country's vital economic interests.

The following facts may be cited to illustrate how in Israel the foreign monopolies are raking in wealth. Delek, the petroleum concern, yields dividends of up to 35 per cent. The dividends of the American Israeli Paper Mills Ltd. reach 12 per cent, while its share capital grows

* *Middle East Economic Digest*, January 4, 1963.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, July 4, 1966.

*** *United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 181, 1953, pp. 37-43; *TIAS*, 2686.

**** *TIAS*, 3892. This agreement was renewed in February 1963, *TIAS*, 5316.

***** *New York Herald Tribune*, January 11, 1959.

*) *The Jerusalem Post*, December 17, 1958.

***) *Economic Review*, July 1959, p. 6; *The Jerusalem Post*, November 21, 1969.

uninterruptedly. Alliance Tire and Rubber Company, which is linked with Dayton Rubber Company of Ohio, USA, gets a net profit of 15 per cent.*

Israel has become "an earthly paradise"*** for private, particularly foreign, enterprise reaping large profits and monopoly superprofits. This is the substance of the Israeli Government's "economic policy". To quote the *Economic Annual*, "foreign investors can be sure of finding in Israel an administration fully conscious of the necessity to attract private investments ... and ready to listen attentively to the special wishes and worries of each individual investor".****

The "process of concentration of capital", "an increasingly marked tendency towards monopolist agreements, towards a *bank trust*",***** is plainly in evidence in Israel, confirming the process of capitalist development noted by Lenin. This is strikingly borne out by the formation of such powerful groups as American Israel Corporation (Ampal) and Palestine Economic Corporation (PEC), which have grown into trusts. The former was set up as early as 1941, but became particularly active as soon as the State of Israel was proclaimed. In the course of only 1949 it doubled its assets from 5 to 10 million dollars, increasing them in 1966 to 34,500,000 dollars, i.e., nearly 7-fold. Together with its branch—Israel Development Corporation—Ampal has increased its capital more than 100-fold, bringing it to the sum of 54,300,000 dollars.***** Ampal has direct investments in the oil, chemical, sugar, shipbuilding and automobile industries. Through loans it gains the financial dependence of various agencies, banks and industrial and commercial enterprises in Israel. Through its branch, Israel Development Corporation, set up as an agency to direct investments in the Israeli economy, Ampal has a say in a number of other companies.

Also a powerful monopoly association, Palestine Eco-

* *Economic Annual 1962/63*, pp. 148, 203, 229, 231.

** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 61.

*** *Economic Annual 1960*, p. 308.

**** V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 22, p. 216.

***** Here and above: *The Jerusalem Post*, May 24, 1966; *The Israel Economist*, April 1950, p. 75; *Israel Economic Bulletin*, September/October 1956, p. 121.

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conomic Corporation, described as the largest American private investor* in Israel, was formed in 1926 as an instrument through which American Jews could render material assistance to production enterprises in Palestine.** In only the period from 1950 to 1959 its capital increased 70 per cent.*** PEC assets totalled 19,300,000 dollars in 1961.**** It has numerous daughter companies, banks and agencies, and shares in other companies. Having grown to gigantic proportions, PEC has its tentacles in all the key branches of Israel's economy.

PEC is linked with leading financial and industrial monopolies in the USA, such as the Wall Street bankers Lehman Brothers, Kuhn, Loeb and Company (one of the eight largest financial groups in the USA), the Mellon group of Pittsburgh, the Cabot Lodge group of Boston, and the Hanna group of Cleveland.*****

Indeed, Israel's economy is completely in bondage to foreign monopoly capital. The people of Israel have had and still have to pay dearly for American "aid", West German reparations and the country's alliance with international imperialism.

At the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel it was put on record that "Zionism—in other words, Jewish bourgeois nationalism—is the ruling reactionary ideology and policy of the official circles of our country, and of all educational and cultural institutions".* As a bourgeois nationalistic ideology, Zionism activates internal reaction in Israel and finds expression in the expansionist foreign policy of the country's rulers. Through Zionist agencies close contact is maintained between Israel's ruling élite and influential reactionary elements in the USA and other imperialist countries.

After the establishment of the State of Israel Zionism underwent a certain transformation, but it is precisely in a situation witnessing the existence of the Israeli state that the untenability of Zionism as an idea and practical guide, and its reactionary nature become strikingly manifest. The experience of the State of Israel has shown that Zionism has been unable to settle the so-called Jewish problem.

The tenets of Zionism determine Israel's policy, which serves the common interests of the country's ruling circles, imperialism and international obscurantism.

In home policy Zionism promotes the interests of the

* *Who's Who in Israel*, 1955, p. 490.

** *Palestine Economist Annual*, 1948, p. 55.

*** P. Dagan, *Op. cit.*, p. 65; *The Jerusalem Post*, January 20, 1961.

**** *Economic Annual 1962/63*, p. 146.

***** Victor Perlo, *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

* *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 91.

capitalists, while in foreign policy it has been transformed into an expansionist government programme directed, *inter alia*, against the neighbouring Arab states, inasmuch as territorial ambitions logically spring from the Zionist doctrine.

Zionism evolves "theories" justifying interference in the affairs of other countries and violations of their sovereignty, expounds racist ideas and threatens international peace. It is thereby a threat to the existence of Israel herself and is at variance with her national interests.

1. Zionism's Organisational Forms and Reactionary Character

Let us repeat, Zionism's road from Herzl to Weizmann, i.e., to the formation of the State of Israel, has been one of reaction, adventurism and deals with imperialism.

Into what has Zionism been transformed and what and whom does its ideology and policy serve today? What are its aims in the light of the existence of the State of Israel and how, in this connection, does it propose to settle the "Jewish problem"?

A new programme was adopted in 1951 at Jerusalem by the 23rd World Zionist Congress, which "had to face the task of redefining Zionism in the face of new realities".* The first (Basel) programme of 1897 was discarded. The Jerusalem programme formally defined the modern concepts of Zionism, and its aims were set down as follows: promote the strengthening of the State of Israel; gather into the country Jews living in exile; strengthen the unity of the Jewish people.** The Zionists have thus set themselves the task of supporting the ruling élite in Israel and its overseas patrons, the US imperialists.

The organisational structure of the World Zionist Organisation, the forms and methods of its work and, in the first place, its attitude to the state agencies in Israel have been geared to the attainment of these aims. As in the period prior to 1948, the World Zionist Organisation heads

* *The Jerusalem Post*, December 27, 1964.

** Norman Bentwich, *The Jews in Our Time*, p. 154.

the Zionist movement (i.e., the Zionist agencies and parties in the capitalist countries). Under the World Zionist Organisation-Jewish Agency (Status) Law of November 24, 1952,* in Israel the WZO and the Jewish Agency are two organisations combined into one: or rather, one organisation operating under two signboards: one in Israel and the other in the Diaspora. In Israel the WZO-Jewish Agency engages principally in the colonisation and development of the Jewish state; it supervises the settlement and employment of immigrants from the Diaspora and co-ordinates the Zionist and Jewish agencies operating in these spheres. Abroad the World Zionist Organisation pursues the objective of securing the solidarity of Jews of all countries in order to ensure mass immigration, and also of strengthening the State of Israel. The WZO Executive is, at the same time, the Executive of the Jewish Agency (with two headquarters: in Jerusalem and in New York) and operates in close contact with the Israeli Government. The WZO operates on the basis of "full co-operation and co-ordination . . . with the State of Israel and its Government, in accordance with the laws of the State" (Articles 7 and 8). Moreover, the 1952 law gives the Jewish Agency juridical and property rights, while its funds and institutions are exempt from taxes and other compulsory dues.

A fairly intricate mechanism has thus been created: while seeking to attract the Jews of the Diaspora, the WZO is subordinated to Israeli laws; in Israel, on the other hand, it functions as a foreign, extra-state agency with broad rights and powers (see below: agreement between the WZO and the Israeli Government) and has many ways of pressuring the Israeli Government. In other words, the WZO is a kind of legalised consortium consisting, on the one hand, of the Israeli ruling nationalists and extremists and, on the other, of American Zionist capitalists who direct this organisation from New York. It may be described as an octopus with numerous tentacles stretching throughout the world, embracing an incalculable number of Zionist agencies in all the leading capital-

* *The Jewish Agency for Israel*, Jerusalem, No. 16, September 1960, pp. 29, 30.

ist countries. In the last analysis, Israel's nationalistic ruling élite, which preaches Zionism, is only "part of the New York-based and US-controlled international Zionist concern".*

The WZO's functions and broad rights and powers in Israel are recorded in a covenant signed between the Government of Israel and the WZO Executive in July 1954.** In this covenant it is stated that the Zionist Executive organises (in contact with and through Zionist agencies in other countries) immigration and the transportation of immigrants and their property to Israel, while in Israel itself it co-operates in the settlement and absorption of immigrants. Through its agencies—Keren Kayemet Leyisrael and Keren Hayesod—it supervises the acquisition and amelioration of land. Moreover, through these agencies it acquires financial and material resources for the promotion of its functions. The Executive participates in the establishment and expansion of development enterprises in Israel, encourages private capital investments, assists cultural enterprises and institutions of higher learning, and mobilises resources for financing this activity. Lastly, the Executive co-ordinates the activities of all Zionist and Jewish institutions and organisations functioning in its sphere of activity.

The covenant stipulates that the Executive shall function in accordance with Israeli laws. However, it binds the Israeli Government to inform the Executive of every draft law affecting its functions before the draft is submitted to the Knesset. Moreover, under this covenant the Executive may transfer its functions or rights to any institutions at its own discretion with the sole proviso that the Government is informed of this. Lastly, the Government has to give the Executive all the "permits and facilities", including exemption from the payment of taxes, necessary for its functions. Co-operation between the Government of Israel and the Jewish Agency Executive in the spheres covered by the covenant is effected through a co-ordinating agency consisting of representatives of the Gov-

* Y. Ivanov, "Whom Are They Serving? The Real Face of Israel's Ruling Elite", *Izvestia*, July 1, 1967.

** *The Jewish Agency for Israel*, Jerusalem, No. 16, September 1960, pp. 32-35.

ernment and the Executive and headed by the Israeli Prime Minister.

The WZO's functions and activities, formally recorded in the covenant, are further evidence that in Israel it is a foreign agency with considerable rights and powers, and has the possibility of intervening in the country's life and dictating its terms. Moreover, as the Jordanian researcher Sami Hadawi writes, the Status Law and the 1954 covenant "legally directed the World Zionist Organisation to do for the State of Israel, beyond its boundaries, what the state neither can nor may do itself".*

The WZO-Jewish Agency is precisely the channel through which enormous sums of money—so-called donations from Zionist and Jewish organisations in the USA and other capitalist countries—reach Israel. Moreover, it is the channel through which are concluded the most unscrupulous and most provocative deals between the ruling Zionist élite in Israel, US and British imperialism and international reaction. The "sentimental" postulates of Zionist ideology are used with the most consummate hypocrisy to screen those deals from the Jewish masses and world opinion.

Also indicative is the purely organisational aspect of the WZO's activities. Under the new charter adopted in January 1960, its members may be territorial and regional Zionist organisations and also national and international Jewish organisations that do not share Zionist ideas but acknowledge the 1951 Jerusalem programme. The latter join the WZO on terms of "agreed smaller representation" and fewer rights than Zionist organisations. Thus, there may be Zionists and non-Zionists in the WZO.

The WZO-Jewish Agency's supreme body is the congress convened every three years. The 26th congress was held in 1964. Representation at that congress was as follows: 38 per cent for Israel, 29 per cent for the USA, and 33 per cent for other countries of the Diaspora.** The say in the organisation thus remains with the American-Israeli Zionist consortium.

* Sami Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest Palestine Between 1914-1967*, New York, 1967, p. 44.

** *The Jewish Agency for Israel*, p. 11.

The congress elects two bodies: the General Council and the Executive (with headquarters, as we have already noted, in Israel and in New York, i.e., actually two Executives). In the interim between congresses, the Executive is the administrative body in Israel and abroad. At present the Executive is represented by the President of the WZO-Jewish Agency, who spends six months in Israel and six months in New York, and 28 members,* including two Executive Chairmen (one in Israel and the other in New York), and one deputy in New York. The General Council consists of 102 members with a casting vote and a number of members with a consultative voice. It holds annual sessions and the Executive is subordinated to it.

Both in Israel and abroad the Executive functions through a number of departments, for instance, immigration, immigrant absorption, the study of the Torah, education in the Diaspora, and so on, and has overall administrative agencies: treasury, publication, the central Zionist archives, and others. At its sitting in January 1967, the General Council passed a decision on a partial structural reorganisation (reduction of the number of departments) of the Jewish Agency, which had become a bulky bureaucratic apparatus.

What are the "theoretical foundations" of modern Zionism? Present-day political Zionism bases itself on the classical postulates of Zionist ideology: the "everlasting" nature of anti-Semitism as an inevitable phenomenon in all countries and in all historical epochs; the existence of a "world-wide" or "united" Jewish "nation", which suffers eternally in exile (the Diaspora); and, lastly, the postulate that the Jewish problem, i.e., the problem of the "dispersal" of the "nation" is global (hence the arch-reactionary appeal for Jewish "inter-class" solidarity). It will be recalled that the Zionist ideologists proposed solving the "Jewish problem" through the acquisition of territory; i.e., the creation of an independent state. The present-day Zionists likewise declare that the "Jewish problem" can only be solved by "uniting the exiles", by getting the Jews

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5727 (1966/67), p. 272. Some of them are members of the Executive in Israel, and others are members of the Executive in New York.

to leave the Diaspora and abolishing the latter through the acquisition of territory.

However, the idea of gathering the Jews round Zion, which, it would seem, must find its highest embodiment in the creation of the Jewish state, is in fact rejected by the majority of those to whom it is directed. Thus, according to the modern Zionists, the Jews living outside Israel, in the Diaspora, should not only aspire to immigrate to the "motherland" but break down the obstacles to this immigration. The main thing is to be convinced that this is the sole road to "salvation", that this is the end and inevitable goal of Jews. But facts show that the Jews "living in exile", at least the majority of them, turn a deaf ear to the appeal for their return to the "land of forefathers", having not the least desire to regard Israel as their "motherland".

Another basic postulate of Zionism is that of a "world-wide" or "united" Jewish "nation". This lays bare the reactionary and dangerous aspect of the philosophy of both classical and modern Zionism. In this respect, the latter introduces nothing new, only striving to adapt classical postulates to present-day reality. Absolutisation of the "unity of the Jewish nation" and its isolation lead to the assertion that "the Jews are a chosen people", that "the Jews are a superior race" and so forth. Let us examine, briefly at least, the gnosiological roots of these claims of present-day Zionism to "exclusiveness". They go back to the religious Zionism of the Middle Ages. An idea is given by the philosophical system evolved in the Middle Ages by the celebrated Judah ha-Levi in the work *Sefer ha-Kusari*.

To back up the thesis about the "children of Israel" being a chosen race, Judah ha-Levi argues: "The dispersal of the people of Israel was a divine act to bring to the peoples of the world the spirit bestowed upon them." And further: "... the human race, prepared by Christianity and Islam, will one day recognise *the Jewish people as the bearer of divine light*." Judah ha-Levi crowned his arguments with the conclusion that a "special divinity

* G. Gretz, *A History of the Jews*, Russ. ed., St. Petersburg, 1902, pp. 142-43.

attaches to the Jewish people and the land of Canaan; they are holy vessels with a sacred content".*

Let us compare this with the utterances of present-day Zionist bourgeois philosophers: "A heritage has been handed down, for generations, from parent to child: 'You are different—you are a Jew.'**** "Inasmuch as Israel is called on to unite the human race with the race of God into a single whole it is still exceptional in the family of peoples."**** In *Religion in Israel Today* Joseph Badi builds up a "theoretical foundation" for the postulate about the "exclusiveness of the Jewish people", stressing that according to "the normative Biblical-Rabbinic view, Israel is not a 'natural' nation; indeed it is not a nation at all like the 'nations of the world'. It is a supernatural community."**** In fact, the reactionary theories of Judaism and Zionism are the source from which the Israeli leaders draw their "arguments" to reinforce Israel's prestige as the alleged successor to the ancient Biblical Hebrew kingdoms "in the land of Canaan". In the long run this is the basis for their undisguised ideological screen for expansionist claims with the object of restoring (!) the Hebrew kingdoms in their original frontiers. Consequently, Judaism and Zionism have a common basis.

This brings us to the question of the assimilation of the Jews. The very fact of assimilation is hotly denied by present-day Zionist sociologists, who use arguments about "Jewish exclusiveness" to "prove" that Jews cannot be assimilated. For example, Zvi Rudy writes that the "Jewish people have fallen exceedingly low" as a result of assimilation and other factors. And only their "national instinct", he says, prevented the total assimilation of the Jews, while their "intense individuality" was strong enough to preserve their integrity as such in many instances of assimilation.***** "Arguments" of this kind are refuted by reality, and the Zionist ideologists are sounding

* G. Grets, Op. cit., pp. 142-43 (my italics—G. N.).

** Alfred M. Lilienthal, *What Price Israel*, Chicago, 1953, p. 180.

*** Walter Schäble, *Brennpunkt Palästina*, Wuppertal, 1957, p. 78.

**** Joseph Badi, Op. cit., p. 14. For Judaism see F. Mayatsky, *Judaism, Its Substance and Origin*, Russ. ed., Kishinev, 1958.

***** Zvi Rudy, *Soziologie des jüdischen Volkes*, Rowohlt, 1965, pp. 114, 154.

the alarm by declaring that assimilation threatens the existence of the Jewish people.

In 1903 Lenin wrote: "Absolutely untenable scientifically, the idea that the Jews form a separate nation is reactionary politically. Irrefutable practical proof of that is furnished by generally known facts of recent history and of present-day political realities. All over Europe, the decline of medievalism and the development of political liberty went hand in hand with the political emancipation of the Jews, their abandonment of Yiddish for the language of the people among whom they lived, and, in general, their undeniable progressive assimilation with the surrounding population. . . . Can we possibly attribute to chance the fact that it is the reactionary forces all over Europe, and especially in Russia, who *oppose* the assimilation of the Jews and try to perpetuate their isolation?"

"That is precisely what the Jewish problem *amounts to*: assimilation or isolation? and the idea of a Jewish 'nationality' is definitely reactionary not only when expounded by its consistent advocates (the Zionists), but likewise on the lips of those who try to combine it with the ideas of Social-Democracy (the Bundists). The idea of a Jewish nationality runs counter to the interests of the Jewish proletariat, for it fosters among them, directly or indirectly, a spirit hostile to assimilation, the spirit of the 'ghetto'."

He indicated the only possible road for the genuine freedom of nations, a road that can bring freedom to the Jewish masses as well.

"Only by uniting the workers of all nations into one association," he said, "can the working class become a force, offer resistance to capitalism, and achieve a serious improvement in its living conditions."***

2. In the Service of Reaction

Let us examine how the Zionist "concepts" are used in practice, what objectives they pursue and whose interests they serve.

* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 7, pp. 100-01.

** Ibid., Vol. 19, p. 308.

According to the Zionist leaders the State of Israel came into being through the fulfilment of Zionism's political programme. This is belied by the facts. The UN decision of November 29, 1947 on the partition of Palestine and the formation of a Jewish state was passed independently of the Zionist movement. It was the result of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Palestine (Jews and Arabs), the result of the support this struggle received from progressive forces throughout the world. A large role was also played by the contradictions between the imperialist powers (chiefly between Britain and the USA).

Nevertheless, the leaders of Zionism proclaimed that Israel was their creation, that it embodied the highest aims of Zionism. Hiding behind and using the State of Israel, they have turned it into the centre of their activities and on that basis "legalise" the Zionist movement itself and its aims.

While the 23rd Zionist Congress, convened after the formation of the State of Israel, was still concerned with programme and organisational tasks in the light of the "new historical conditions", at the next congress, the 24th, held in 1956, the main question was the "vital need" to strengthen the Zionist movement in the immediate future,* and in 1959, on the eve of the 25th Congress, the "crisis in the movement" was seriously discussed. To surmount this crisis it was decided to enlarge the World Zionist Organisation by co-opting non-Zionist Jewish organisations on a federal basis, in connection with which *The Jerusalem Post* noted that this plan "would dilute its [the Zionist movement's—G.N.] ideological content".** In accordance with this decision the WZO drew up a plan for collective membership or the inclusion in the movement of entire organised Jewish communities in the Diaspora. It was recommended that the 27th Zionist Congress should approve the plan of setting up in countries where they do not exist national Zionist federations that would embrace all Zionist parties, and should also allow individual outstanding personalities, including non-Zionists, to become mem-

* "Congress and Reality", *The Israel Economist*, May 1956, p. 91.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, June 2 and 5, 1959.

bers of the WZO. In this artificial way the Zionist leaders seek to enlarge the movement and make it "international".

They regard Jewish immigration into Israel as a "problem of paramount importance". However, already at the 25th Zionist Congress in 1960 Nahum Goldmann, former president of the WZO, had to note the "increasing disenchantment with the Zionist movement" among Jewish young people in Israel and abroad, and that many of those whom it affected directly "feel that the Zionist mission was fulfilled when the State of Israel was established twelve years ago".* Nevertheless the Zionist leaders insist that it is the "duty" of the Jews of the Diaspora to immigrate to Israel. David Ben Gurion, for example, declared that "Jews who lived [and still live—G. N.] outside Israel were godless and violated the precepts of Judaism every day they remained away from the country". For every Jew there must be the "inner conviction that Zionism has only one meaning today: to Zion".**

One could write off the Zionist demand for compulsory immigration as nothing more than a piece of rhetoric because one cannot seriously accept the statement that Israel is prepared to accommodate the "dispersed", the nearly 14 million Jews in the world. Actually, however, the leaders of Israel and international Zionism urge not "any kind of immigration, but an immigration of young, pioneering, cultured and productive elements who can, together with the veteran settlers, help the country".*** This, properly speaking, is the basic practical aim of modern Zionism.

Further, to achieve the programme demand of helping to develop and strengthen Israel, the Zionist leaders have put forward the slogan: "Face to the countries of dispersal", which reveals the thoroughly reactionary nature of Zionist policy. The slogan "Face to the Diaspora" signifies a broad campaign for the indoctrination of the Jews of the Diaspora in order to turn Israel into a covenant of the people, into a kind of octopus with arms stretching into all the countries of the world for during the two

* *The New York Times*, December 28, 1960.

** *Ibid.*, December 29, 1960.

*** *Ibid.*, January 8, 1961.

thousand years of "dispersal" the Jews have become residents of many countries. In this connection a statement made by Ben Gurion merits attention. He said that Israel had to be the centre of world Jewry, its light and pride, arguing that the Biblical precept of the prophet Isaiah about the universal destiny of Israel had been fulfilled, and that Israel was now "the mainspring of Jewish solidarity and unity around the world". Now it was a question of carrying out the second Biblical precept, according to which Israel would be "a light unto the nations".*

Actually, this is Zionism's ideological offensive against the 12 million Jews living outside Israel. The efforts (backed by huge financial means) of the Zionists are directed towards inducing Jews throughout the world to divorce themselves artificially from the environment in their countries of residence and form a mighty rear of Israeli and international Zionism, with Israel as their sole centre of devotion and Tel Aviv and New York as their two centres of subordination. It is planned to launch this offensive with a "new attack" on the state of mind of the Jews "in exile" and thereby inaugurate a new chapter of closer co-operation between the Diaspora and Israel and, consequently, imbue the Zionist movement with new faith in its historical *raison d'être*.** Thus, the principal practical tasks of modern Zionism are: the utmost strengthening of the State of Israel, more immigration by Jewish youth, and ideological pressure on the Jews in the Diaspora.

It is planned to attain the latter aim, i.e., cultivate "spiritual bonds" with Israel among the Jews in the Diaspora, through the promotion of Hebrew education among the Jewish young generation in different countries under a programme requiring the study of the Hebrew language, Jewish history and the Bible in the original. This task itself is formulated as an "obligation" of every Jew "to his people" to give his children a Hebrew education, and unless he does this he will have not fulfilled his "real mission".*** Naturally, Zionist educational activity has a

* *The Jerusalem Post*, January 1, 1965.

** *Ibid.*, December 31, 1964; January 8, 1965.

*** *Ibid.*, January 1, 1965.

clear-cut political orientation: all Zionist educational institutions are under the direction of the Jewish Agency.

In March 1964 the Israeli Government and the World Zionist Organisation issued a joint statement, which read in part: "On behalf of the Government of Israel the Prime Minister expressed his agreement . . . that the effort aiming at the enhancement of the Zionist spirit in Jewish life is a matter of joint concern for the State of Israel and the World Zionist Organisation. Consequently, the Government gave expression to its vital interest in the Zionist Executive's plan of action in the Diaspora and its readiness to lend full assistance in its realisation.* By officially declaring itself a party in the Zionist movement the Israeli Government has assumed responsibility for the activity of the Zionists and the Zionist organisations abroad with all the ensuing consequences.

At the same time, the integration of Zionism with the State of Israel is leading to far-reaching consequences, above all, for the State of Israel itself. Thus, the claim that Israel is "unlike any other state" on account of its special "international" mission and that, therefore, the concept of independence and sovereignty in its conventional sense cannot be applied to it only hinders the establishment of good-neighbourly relations with other countries. At a sitting of the Zionist General Council in January 1967 the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, for instance, declared that Israel would never become a "great society" if it did not "pursue great enterprises outside itself". Israel, he said, had to be recognised internationally not as just another Mediterranean state but as "the focus of a universal Jewish responsibility and pride". Therefore, Eban argued, the millions of Jews throughout the world had to regard Israel's safety and honour as a cause worthy of every effort and sacrifice on their part.** Consequently, all members of the "world-wide Jewish nation" dispersed in different countries are "potential citizens of Israel"*** and have obligations to that country. These claims that the

* *The Jerusalem Post*, December 25, 1964.

** *Ibid.*, January 12, 1967.

*** In a leading article (see the issue for January 8, 1967) *The Jerusalem Post* called Israel "the potential if not the actual absorption centre of all the Jews of the Diaspora".

Jews of the Diaspora have a dual loyalty (i.e., to Israel and to the country of residence) amount to interference in the affairs of other countries. Moreover, on the pretext of resolving problems common to all Jews the Israeli Government claims the right to send special emissaries to other countries to maintain contact with the Jewish citizens (this function is now officially exercised by Israeli diplomatic representatives abroad). They hold that this is a legitimate mission, although actually its purport, as we have already emphasised, is to create a Zionist fifth column in other countries.

The Zionist leaders have now gone even farther than that: they are calling for joint action (in the form of active support) with the Government of Israel in the foreign policy sphere. For example, they have declared the formation of "Israel's security front" against the alleged threat of attack from the Arab countries as a matter "of direct concern to world Jewry and to the Zionist movement".* As conceived by the Zionists, this front must emerge and operate on the pattern of the American Peace Corps. In other words they have in mind those who have been deceived by Zionist propaganda and may be used at any time even for direct support of the adventurist policies of the Israeli ruling clique and its backers, the neocolonialists. Naturally, the Arab countries have every reason to regard Zionism as a paramount threat, and this was confirmed by the aggression unleashed by Israel in June 1967.

These practices by Zionism with the connivance of the Israeli Government only widen the gap between the Arab countries and Israel. Expansionist ambitions are the only element behind the absurd demand that all or most of the Jews should make the small territory of Israel their home. The proclamation that immigration is "a matter of life and death" to Israel has only one real meaning, and it is that without immigration there would be no basis for the existence of the Zionist movement generally, while, in its turn, immigration is used to justify expansionist aims.

Further, it should be noted that in relation to the State of Israel the World Zionist Organisation and, in particu-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, January 3, 5, 1965.

lar, its Executive in New York are a kind of Sanhedrin* that dictates its terms, demands subordination and so forth.

Lastly, another aspect of the present-day Zionist movement which gives rise to concern is, as we have already pointed out, that a joint political platform of Zionism and Judaism is taking shape more and more obviously on a common ideological foundation. The Zionist leaders, Nahum Goldmann among them, speak of "the importance of religion as a binding factor in Jewish life",** while the newspaper *Shearim*, organ of clerical circles in Israel, quite seriously noted that the spiritual awakening of the Jews on the basis of the "eternal strength of Judaism"*** was the best way to attract immigrants. The situation, as Norman Bentwich writes, is that "Zionism is today equated by many of its adherents ... with Judaism, and has the form of a national religion".**** Militant Zionism is thus drawing closer and dovetailing with Judaism, which it uses as a screen, an ideological foundation and justification, and openly turns religion into politics.

In this context one cannot help but agree with those who say that the policies and practices of Zionism as an ideology should be separated from the state.***** This is underscored by the newspaper *L'Humanité*, which wrote that Israel was now Judaic and Zionist and as such it "has become an expansionist state". The newspaper makes the point that as a Zionist state Israel can only speak on behalf of Israelis.†) Placed in the service of the Israeli ruling élite's political strategy, Zionism only complicates the situation for the State of Israel with which it is artificially linked, and runs counter to the country's national interests, especially the interests of the Israeli proletariat and all other working people, and is a threat to international peace and security.

* Supreme council of the Jews in ancient Judae before the fall of Jerusalem. It was not only the highest religious body but had jurisdiction over the making of policy and over the civil courts.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, January 1, 1965.

*** *Ibid.*, January 8, 1967.

**** Norman Bentwich, *Op. cit.*, p. 140.

***** This viewpoint is expounded by Y. Ivanov in the article "Zionism Without Make-Up", *Za rubezhom*, No. 32, August 4-10, 1967, p. 22.

†) *L'Humanité*, April 24, 1967.

The example of the Jewish State of Israel, which is developing along capitalist lines, strikingly shows that in it the Jewish working masses are not free of exploitation and bondage, while the hypocritical ideology of Zionism only diverts them from the class struggle aimed at really improving their condition, removing the Israeli bourgeoisie from power and establishing the power of the working people of Israel.

* * *

Zionism provides the Israeli leaders with the camouflage for all sorts of deals with the American monopolists, the neocolonialists and international reaction. The bourgeois writer Elmer Berger says that a complex dubious "national mechanism"* operates in capitalist countries, particularly the USA, to compel Jews to fulfil "national obligations" to Israel. Playing on Jewish feeling, the World Zionist Organisation accumulates enormous funds, which it spends to further the expansionist line of the Israeli rulers, the aggressive imperialist aims of the USA in alliance with Israel, and the indoctrination of the Jewish working people in Zionist philosophy, which is adapted to "mobilise Jews to serve the political interest of the State of Israel"*** and its overseas backers.

Zionism is used by racists and reactionaries as a "foundation" for stirring up anti-Semitism. On the other hand, the "theoretical postulates" of Zionism about "Jewish self-isolation" are very easily adapted for hostile propaganda and activity against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, where citizens of Jewish origin enjoy equal rights in all spheres of life. The Zionist leaders interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union by making an issue out of a non-existent Jewish problem; they aim to isolate and wrest citizens of Jewish origin from socialist reality by offering them the "charms" of capitalism.

The Zionist appeal for "bringing the dispersed together" logically turns into an expansionist political line aimed at the neighbouring Arab states. Moreover, as Qassim Hassan underlines, this "racialism inherent in

* Elmer Berger, *Judaism or Jewish Nationalism. The Alternative to Zionism*, New York, 1957, p. 38.

** Ibid., p. 158.

Zionism was destined in the event of initial success to acquire an aggressive or fascist character".* The attitude of the Arab countries towards Israel has been formulated as follows: "Those who oppose Zionism do not oppose Judaism or the Jewish people as members of an ancient race and believers in a time-honoured faith. They oppose an ideology, a political philosophy, a nationalistic movement."***

It must be stated emphatically that criticism of Zionism and statements against Zionism, which is a reactionary ideology and the expansionist policy of the Israeli ruling élite and international Zionist circles, have nothing in common with anti-Semitism, as the Zionists maintain.

Present-day Zionism remains the nationalistic ideology of the big Jewish bourgeoisie both in Israel and the USA. Its purpose is to divert the Israeli working people from the struggle for their rights, against oppression and exploitation, to prevent the Jewish masses in other capitalist countries from acting jointly with the proletariat against capitalism.

By justifying and practising interference in the internal affairs of other states, present-day Zionism is a major threat to peace and international security. It openly serves imperialism and aids the neocolonialist plans directed against the liberation movement and against the forces of progress throughout the world.

Zionist ideology fundamentally contravenes the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and is a hindrance to progress. The Communists of Israel expose Zionism as an instrument of the Jewish big bourgeoisie, as a "Jewish branch of imperialism",*** as an ideology hostile to the Soviet Union and the socialist community, as a weapon of imperialism and reaction threatening the national liberation movement of the Arab countries. It does not and cannot solve the Jewish problem, whose solution, as the classics of Marxism-Leninism pointed out, lies in the joint class struggle of all working people, including Jews, against oppression and exploitation of all kind.

* Qassim Hassan, *Zionism As It Stands*, New Delhi, 1956, p. 19.

** *Tension, Terror and Blood in the Holy Land*, p. 60.

*** *Communist Party of Israel. The 14th Congress*, p. 109.

ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION AGAINST THE ARAB
STATES IN JUNE 1967.
FIRST STAGE OF THE STRUGGLE IN THE UN
FOR POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The aggression launched by the Israeli ruling circles against the Arab states on June 5, 1967 was the logical continuation of Israel's increasingly more pronounced expansionist foreign policy and the direct consequence of her dependence on imperialism, mainly US imperialism. In the course of the preceding six months the Israeli leaders had considered the aggression as a foregone conclusion although they carefully concealed their plans and were only waiting for a favourable situation in which to choose the suitable moment. While the direct preparations for aggression were under way, Israel continued to provoke border conflicts with the Arab countries on a growing scale. Actually, these conflicts were planned and carefully prepared big operations during which the Israeli military called for broader action. At the same time, Tel Aviv was in constant consultation with the governments of the USA, Britain and the FRG.

A closer study of some developments of the period prior to June 5, which were the milestones of the line pursued by Tel Aviv, will show the extent of Israel's preparations for aggression. It may be considered that this period was started with the armed attack on the Jordanian village of As Samu on November 13, 1966, although this operation was only the continuation of the events of

July 14, 1966 (Israel's "reprisals" against Syria). Tel Aviv's real aims were even more strikingly revealed by the scale of the second (after the operation of July 1966) attack on the village of As Samu in Jordan ordered by the Israeli leaders allegedly in reprisal for terrorist acts from across the Jordanian frontier. According to the inquiry conducted by United Nations observers, 80 Patton tanks, more than 80 lorries, 12 Mirage aircraft and two infantry units took part in the "raid of November 13". This large force was used against As Samu and two neighbouring villages and a police station. In the village of As Samu the Israelis destroyed 125 houses, a clinic, schools and a shop, damaged the mosque and killed 18 and wounded 44 Jordanians, including civilians. This, to use the words of the Israeli newspaper *Hayom*, was how Israel defended her sovereignty, "in reliance on her military strength". Actually this raid was one of a series of tests in preparation for large-scale aggression. According to *The Jerusalem Post* the raid was called off at 09.45 hours, after the UN observers, to whom Jordan had appealed, had demanded a cease-fire.** The Security Council censured Israel for this action (resolution submitted by Mali and Nigeria), which it called a carefully planned "large-scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter". Even the USA and Britain had to declare that the raid was inexcusable.

Approximately until mid-February 1967 the Israeli leaders had to rest content with, as they themselves put it, a position of certain "restraint", which was, in particular, a result of the Security Council's condemnation of the As Samu raid. Therefore, in the continuous succession, especially from the close of December 1966 onwards, of frontier incidents, this time with Syria, mainly in the demilitarised zones north and southeast of Lake Tiberias, the Israeli troops confined themselves to "machine-gun duels" and also the use of tanks and artillery (for example the two-hour battles on January 9 and 11 in the Ter Katsor sector and in the vicinity of Lake Hule). There was fight-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, November 1, 1966.

** For facts about the Israeli raid on the village of As Samu see *The Jerusalem Post*, November 14, 16-17, 20, 25, 1966.

ing along the "machine-gun duel" pattern in the frontier incidents with Lebanon and Jordan in February 1967.

In order to camouflage their plans the Tel Aviv rulers had to agree to a meeting, on UN initiative, of the Israeli-Syrian armistice commission,* which through Israeli obstruction had not met since 1951. However, the Israeli rulers clung to their tactics of limiting its work to an inquiry into the armed incidents in the three demilitarised zones along the Syrian frontier, and ignored the need to settle the problem as such, i.e., to reaffirm the sovereign rights of the neighbouring state to the corresponding territory. Therefore, again as a result of obstruction by Israel, the work of the commission did not go further than three sittings (January 25 and 27, and February 2), but even these sittings were a model of straining nerves.

By confining the inquiry to the border incidents in isolation from the entire problem of Arab-Israeli disagreements and, besides, artificially fanning them, the Israeli leaders obtained the possibility of giving the impression that they were in a "state of defence".

Unquestionably, the "restraint" of the Israeli leaders after the As Samu raid was very relative. Evidence of the riot of passions in Tel Aviv during this period was the spate of statements by Premier Eshkol. On January 11, 1967 he told the press that Israel "will reply to force with force, but the time, the place and the weapons will be of our own choosing".**

On January 15 he informed the Government of the measures that had been taken by the army command to increase preparedness allegedly in connection with continuing Syrian aggression on the northern frontier. On January 17 he told the Knesset that if the Syrian "aggressive acts continued, Israel would react in accordance with the situation", although in the next breath he said that the UN had not acknowledged any "chain of malicious and irresponsible Syrian provocations".***

The debates in the Knesset at the close of January 1967 lifted the curtain on some of the reasons for the

* Commissions of this sort were set up in 1949 following the signing of armistice agreements with Syria, Egypt and Jordan.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, January 12, 1967.

*** *Ibid.*, January 16, 18, 1967.

"passiveness" of the Israeli leaders. For instance, as *The Jerusalem Post* reported, the ruling circles had split into two distinct camps following Eshkol's statement on the situation on the frontier with Syria: on the one hand, the parties of the ruling coalition (chiefly Mapam and partially Achdut Ha'avoda) insisted on using all the means available to diplomacy; on the other, the bourgeois extremist Gahal bloc (the General Zionist Party and Herut) together with the militarists of the Rafi Party urged for immediate military action against Syria.* The Mapai Party and the Government adopted a stand between the "activists" and the "moderates", with the result that their platform was approved by 54 votes to 21.

During this period the ruling coalition was thus unable to quash the resistance of its "Left" wing—the Mapam Party, and the situation was, therefore, assessed as one in which the people were not sufficiently prepared to take a "correct" view of decisive action. *The Economist*, for instance, wrote that public opinion was "beginning to play an unusually forceful part in influencing Government policy on border retaliation".** There was another reason for the "restraint" of the Tel Aviv authorities. It was given by *The Jerusalem Post*: "The US has again advised Israel not to react to Syrian aggression... It's unfortunately clear that the US is also only concerned to help prevent a major conflict into which outside powers might be drawn."*** The USA, naturally, had to take into account the political repercussions of the As Samu operation, and likewise needed a suitable pretext or challenge from such "disloyal" countries as Syria and Egypt to make a play at "impartiality".

A line towards "decisive action" began to emerge more and more forcefully by about mid-February. The beginning for this was laid by the Knesset sitting of February 14 devoted to a discussion of the work of the Israeli-Syrian armistice commission. Foreign Minister Eban made it plain in the Knesset that Israel's foreign policy was founded on an aspiration to act from positions

* *The Jerusalem Post*, January 25, 1967.

** *The Economist*, January 28, 1967, p. 316.

*** *The Jerusalem Post*, January 15, 1967.

of strength.* This could mean that since world indignation over the As Samu raid had somewhat abated the Israeli rulers had confidently begun to prepare another "miniature" aggression of the same series designed as a "test of strength" and to intimidate the Arab countries.

On March 24 the chief of the Israeli General Staff Rabin declared that Israel was doing everything in its power to acquire new weapons. This was when Ben Gurion was touring (from March 6 to 28) the USA, Canada and Britain.** Lastly, on April 5 Eban told the Knesset that the Syrian Government "could not be more mistaken" if it believed it could attack Israeli "with impunity", and that such steps would be carried out as were deemed "necessary to protect" Israeli territory.***

Within two days, on April 7, Israel launched another massive attack against Syria near Lake Tiberias.

The Israeli military regarded the "Tiberias operation" as "one of the most serious clashes" on Israel's northern borders since the war of 1948-1949. On Eshkol's orders, jet fighters, tanks, artillery and mortars were used in that seven-hour battle. Israeli bombers struck at the Syrian lines, penetrating 70 kilometres into Syrian territory. "At one stage of these attacks," *The Jerusalem Post* wrote, "the bombing planes operated 28 consecutive minutes without encountering any resistance".**** Israeli aircraft not only intruded into Syrian air space but bombed Damascus. A sinister note was struck by *The Jerusalem Post* when it wrote that until the battle of April 7 "we have not succeeded in convincing the Syrians... that this form of warfare endangers the prestige and even survival of their regime".***** These words abundantly illustrated the political aims of the Israeli aggression.

The incident of April 7 was an armed reconnaissance with a full spectrum of military and political tasks. It was a rehearsal for a fully prepared aggression.

* *The Jerusalem Post*, February 15, 1967.

** *Ibid.*, March 6, 1967.

*** *Ibid.*, April 6, 1967.

**** *Ibid.*, April 9, 1967.

***** *Ibid.*

The third stage of the preparations covered the period from approximately mid-April to June 5.

The developments until May 15 made it plain that the external forbearance of the Israeli ruling circles was only a temporary tactical move: they continued making bellicose statements. At this stage they had to take the Soviet warning into consideration. In its statement of April 26 the Soviet Foreign Ministry had put it on record that "Israel is playing a hazardous game with fire" in a region in direct proximity of the Soviet frontier and that the declarations of Israel's leaders had reaffirmed that they were out "to resolve the Israel-Arab conflict from positions of strength, by military means". In this statement it was underlined that the slippery policy Israel had been pursuing towards its neighbours for a number of years was fraught with danger, the responsibility for which would devolve entirely on the Israeli Government. The Soviet Government, the statement said, expected the Government of Israel to weigh the situation carefully and give up following in the wake of circles that had displayed political blindness and were prepared to turn their country into a toy in the hands of hostile external elements, thereby "endangering the vital interests of the people and their country's destiny".* The Israeli Government, however, paid no heed to the voice of reason and continued fanning tension, doggedly pursuing its aims. By that time, evidently, agreement had been reached with the USA on specific issues in the event of war. An indication of this is the revealing statement made by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in an interview published in the *US News & World Report*. He said that if Israel "were attacked in force by its neighbours", it would expect help from the USA and Britain. "We get these promises," he said, "when we ask the US for arms and are told: 'Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here.'""** He revealed that Israel expected to receive American Skyhawk fighter aircraft and that the number of these planes was "a military secret".***

* *Pravda*, April 27, 1967.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, April 12, 1967.

*** *Ibid.*

This interview, according to the Western press, was given by Eshkol before April 7, but it was published later and had the significance of an action programme. That the USA had adopted a definite stand was shown also by a statement by US Defence Secretary Robert McNamara in which he said it was necessary to use "some means" to offset "the communist move" in the Middle East.*

A provocative challenge by Israel was the military parade in Jerusalem on May 15 in violation of the UN decision on that city's international status, and also of the armistice agreement with Jordan banning military demonstrations, particularly with the participation of heavy weapons. This parade, the preparations for which had been in progress for four months, was held even against the advice of the USA and Britain, which did not find it possible to send representatives to attend it (the ambassadors of the great powers were not present). UN Secretary General U Thant declared that these actions of the Israeli Government were heightening tension in the Middle East. The insolence of the new "challenge of May 15" was shown also by the statement of the Minister Without Portfolio Yisrael Galili that the significance of the parade in Jerusalem would be judged "not by the number of ambassadors present but by our attitude towards the Defence Forces and the Capital" (which must be interpreted as a demonstration of strength and a claim to the possession of Jerusalem). In the same blustering vein Eban described as "a storm in a teacup" the decision of the ambassadors not to attend the parade and the stand taken on this question by U Thant. As Eshkol put it, the military parade "would take the covers off completely new kinds of . . . weapons".** The parade evoked a storm of indignation in the Arab countries, which sent a protest to the UN as early as May 10.

Eshkol's "Address to the Nation" of May 15 bristled with threats of "open combat" against the Arab countries "at a place, time and by a method of our own choosing". In the "Independence Message to Diaspora Jewry" he

* *The Jerusalem Post*, April 12, 1967.

** *Ibid.*, May 7, 1967.

said it was necessary "to make the bonds between Israel and the Diaspora stronger and closer".

In mid-May the Tel Aviv authorities launched concrete steps in the direction of aggression: earlier, on May 9 the Knesset had formally empowered the Government to begin hostilities against Syria. Israeli troops were massed on the Syrian frontier; from 11 to 13 brigades were transferred to this area. The attack was set for May 17. The Syrian Government informed the United Nations of the "open threat of war from Israel against Syria".* Tel Aviv's actions were bitterly denounced by the Arab countries. UAR President Nasser declared that if Israel attacked Syria the United Arab Republic would immediately begin military operations against the aggressor in accordance with its allied commitments under the 1966 treaty.

In line with these commitments the UAR took steps to contain aggression. These were defensive measures in the event Israel started a war. On May 18 the UAR Government requested the Security Council to withdraw the UN troops from UAR territory in the vicinity of Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, including Sharm-el-Sheikh in the Strait of Tiran: these troops had been stationed in these areas in 1957 after the triple aggression against the UAR. One of the motives for this request was that the presence of UN troops in these areas would give Israel military advantages in the event of an armed provocation against Syria. On May 22, UAR troops took over the areas from which the UN forces had been withdrawn, including Sharm-el-Sheikh, and on May 28 the UAR Government declared that the Gulf of 'Aqaba was closed to Israeli and other shipping transporting strategic goods to Israel. As President Nasser pointed out, this act reaffirmed the UAR's undisputed sovereign rights to the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Moreover it restored the situation that had existed prior to the triple aggression of 1956.

The settlement of the Gulf of 'Aqaba issue (in particular, freedom of navigation for Israel) could be achieved only within the framework of the UN provided the entire range of Arab-Israeli relations was examined. This would

* *Pravda*, May 16, 1967.

have finally relaxed the situation in the Middle East. Consequently all the prerequisites were on hand for a broad examination of the problem of Arab-Israeli relations at an international forum, and this, to some extent, undoubtedly lay at the back of the restraint displayed by the UAR leaders on the military-strategic level. Nasser's firm stand in support of Syria considerably cooled Tel Aviv's bellicosity and helped to remove the direct threat of an attack on Syria.

However, a peaceful settlement of the issue was exactly what did not fit into the plans of the Israeli leaders. Inasmuch as the transfer of Egyptian troops to the Sinai Peninsula staved off the attack on Syria, the Israeli rulers evolved a different tactical plan, spearheading it at the UAR. It was a difficult moment to assess developments from the historical angle. At first glance, Israel seemed to be acting in self-defence. However, the camouflaged and then overt reluctance to settle the problem of Arab-Israeli relations in the United Nations exposed the aggressive designs, plans and strategy line of the Israeli rulers. They were bent on acting in only one direction, i.e., towards armed action, counting on a sudden attack.

On May 18 Abba Eban told the ambassadors of the USA, Britain and France that the mounting tension caused by the concentration of Egyptian troops in the Sinai was compelling Israel "to increase its preparedness" and take counter-measures. On May 21 Israel carried out a partial mobilisation of its reservists. This was the largest mobilisation since 1956, and the Government decided "not to reveal any further details of its deliberations".* Eshkol's speech in the Knesset on May 22 was full of peaceable overtures and assurances to the UAR and Syria that "Israel was not heading for an attack on them, nor did it desire to undermine their security, attack their territory, or challenge their legitimate international rights".** It was declared that Israel was prepared to make every effort to stabilise the situation and establish peace in the Middle East. However, the Israeli Government objected to the UN troops, withdrawn from the UAR, being stationed in

* *The Jerusalem Post*, May 22, 1967.

** *Ibid.*, May 23, 1967.

Israeli territory on the frontier with its southern neighbour. The Israeli leaders claimed they were acting in the interests of peace even when they ordered the commencement of hostilities.

On May 23 the Soviet Government issued a statement in which it pointed out that in the Middle East the "situation was causing alarm from the standpoint of peace and international security"* and that the blame for the dangerous exacerbation once again devolved on Israel, which was acting with the knowledge and at the instigation of "certain imperialist circles". The statement warned against aggression in the Middle East and underscored that the Soviet Government would do everything in its power to preserve peace. UN Secretary General U Thant declared upon his return from a visit to the UAR in this period that the Egyptian leaders had assured him they would not initiate military action against Israel. Addressing an emergency sitting of the Security Council on May 24 he expressed the confidence that with co-operation from the interested sides it would be possible ultimately to achieve an acceptable, just, peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis; he emphasised that the withdrawal of UN troops from the United Arab Republic at the request of the Government should be regarded only as recognition of that country's sovereign rights.** From the very outset of that Security Council meeting the UAR made it plain that it desired to co-operate with the United Nations. This was stated by U Thant, who stressed in his report that the UAR had proposed restoring the pre-1956 *status quo* on the Egyptian-Israeli frontier, i.e., reaffirming the armistice agreement signed by the two countries in 1949.***

The Israeli Government demanded the opening of the Gulf of 'Aqaba and, possibly, was prepared to consider this question in the United Nations on condition Israel was given priority over the UAR. But even this approach was problematical because Israel's war preparations had reached a stage where retreat or delay could lead to serious economic complications and, besides, would have

* *Pravda*, May 24, 1967.

** *Ibid.*, May 28, 1967.

*** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, May 29, 1967.

meant losing the possibility of attaining the objectives of the conspiracy between the Zionists and the imperialists.

The Soviet Union continued to insist on a peaceful settlement of the entire problem of Arab-Israeli relations. A similar stand was adopted by France, which justly declared that the country that began hostilities in the obtaining situation would be regarded as the aggressor and suggested turning the conflict over to the four Great Powers, which would examine the entire problem of relations between Israel and the Arab countries.

The proposal for turning outstanding issues over to the Great Powers was formally supported by the USA and Britain, but their approach to the substance of the problem was fundamentally different. They wanted the Great Powers to confine themselves to an examination of only the latest conflict, making demands solely of the UAR and seeking to give Israel the advantage. Properly speaking, this was tantamount to encouraging the aggressor and it was assessed as such in Tel Aviv.

Just before the aggression was launched the Israeli leaders had received definite guarantees from the White House. During a visit to Canada at the close of May the Israeli President Zalman Shazar conferred with US President Lyndon B. Johnson and with the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who had flown urgently to Canada. *The Jerusalem Post* confirmed that Shazar was "plotting action against Egypt".* General mobilisation was completed in Israel on May 29. The guarantees from the USA and Britain, as the very well-informed journal *The Economist* wrote, were that if war broke out and "it looks as if Israel is not winning" there would be enormous pressure in the United States and Britain to come in and "tip the balance to an Israeli victory. . . . The West is committed to Israel's preservation as a viable state and would fight if that were threatened."**

A noteworthy fact is that this period witnessed the massive arming of Israel, particularly with US assistance. As *The Jerusalem Post* reported, in the course of that fiscal year the USA's military aid to Israel (officially given

* *The Jerusalem Post*, May 26, 1967.

** *The Economist*, June 3, 1967, p. 994.

as amounting to 27 million dollars) consisted exclusively of shipments of American missiles, aircraft, automatic rifles and light weapons.* In 1967 the Israeli Air Force began receiving US Skyhawk fighter planes. Also indicative was that steps to ensure financial means for war were taken precisely on June 4. The Knesset quickly approved the 1967 Development Loan designed for sale among Jews in other countries. A defence tax was instituted and the income tax for the remaining months of the 1967 fiscal year was increased 10 per cent.

Lastly, the Israeli ruling circles were faced with the task of strengthening their position inside the country and, above all, of uniting all the forces of reaction, militarism, extremism and militant clericalism. There was no disagreement among these forces as regards the political line of unleashing aggression. It was only a matter of consolidating their efforts, working out a common platform and achieving united action to ensure a solid foundation for the charted political line. On May 24 all the Zionist parties showed their readiness for united action by approving, 89 votes to 4 (the opposition votes came from the Communists), the Government's policy. Now it was necessary to set up a "national unity" Government not only for united action but also for the propaganda aim of creating the impression of "protecting national interests" and persuading the Israeli masses that this was indeed the case.

On May 28, Eshkol offered seats in the Government to the Right-wing opposition, and by June 1 the only obstacle to an extended coalition Government remained the divergence between the Prime Minister and Moshe Dayan, the Rafi Party's candidate for the post of Defence Minister (which had been occupied by Levi Eshkol). Eshkol was against Dayan's nomination on the grounds that he was not the person with whom it was possible to co-operate, for the sole reason that in the obtaining situation the Rafi representative would be the obvious candidate for the premiership. Dayan had the support of all the three clerical parties, whose parliamentary groups formed a united "religious bloc" in the voting on this issue. By the

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 2, 1967.

time the aggression was launched, the divergence between the "more moderate" elements and the "extremists" had been smoothed over. The formation of a "national unity" Government was announced on June 2. Included in it were: from the Rafi Party—Dayan as Defence Minister; from the Herut Party (represented in the Government for the first time since 1948) Begin; and from the bourgeois General Zionists Party—Sapir. The latter two (from the Gahal bloc) were appointed Ministers Without Portfolio. This was the most reactionary Government in Israel's history, the power passing into the hands of ultra-militarist, extremist elements headed by Right-wing social-Zionists in Mapai. Dayan's inclusion in the Government was the equivalent of an order to start aggression. Later Eshkol disclosed what had guided the behaviour of the Israeli ruling circles in the course of 21 days, i. e., from May 15 to June 5. It was a revealing statement and merits reproduction in full: "We were first asked to wait two days. Then we sent Mr. Abba Eban to the US—and we were asked to wait a further fortnight. President Johnson promised great things. They told us that 40-50 maritime powers would sign a guarantee for free passage through the Tiran Straits. We examined the situation and found that it really came down to a dozen, and finally to only two countries and then perhaps only one—Israel!"*

Tel Aviv was thus deciding on aggression at the very moment that the UN was engaged in a quest for ways of settling the conflict between the UAR and Israel and nothing was threatening the latter.**

The problem before the Zionist leaders was whether to use the element of surprise for an attack that would bring them to their coveted objectives or to abandon this idea in favour of a peaceful settlement of the problem as a whole. Impelled by expansionist ambitions they deliberately decided on aggression, taking nothing into consideration, not even the danger that mankind might be

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 9, 1967.

** This was later admitted by Eshkol himself when he was interviewed by the newspaper *Yediot Aharanot* (October 18, 1967). He said that the deployment of Egyptian forces along Israel's southern frontier was of a defensive nature. See *World Marxist Review*, April 1968, Vol. 11, No. 4, p. 36.

plunged into another world war. The order to start hostilities against the UAR was given by Dayan in the early hours of June 5.

This fairly detailed chronicle of the events leading up to the Israeli attack on the Arab countries clearly shows that Israel was the aggressor and not the "victim of aggression", as Tel Aviv would have the world believe. By launching the attack suddenly Israel obtained advantages of an offensive and positional nature and was able to achieve success in the operations against the UAR, Jordan and Syria within six days.

The following, in brief, are the factors that led to this temporary success.

1. The plan to attack the UAR rested, as we have noted, on the calculation that the strike would be sudden and unexpected. *The Jerusalem Post* frankly admitted that "the time element has been the crucial factor in this war".* From the political standpoint the "blitzkrieg" strategy adopted by Israel demonstrates that it was a perfidious act of aggression. From the military and strategic standpoint the advantages of a "blitzkrieg" to the aggressor, in this case to Israel, become obvious if it is borne in mind that Cairo and Damascus are respectively only 400 and 200 kilometres away from Tel Aviv, i.e., distances that can be covered in 20 and 10 minutes by modern aircraft, while it is only 17 kilometres from Tel Aviv to the western frontier of Jordan. In other words, in the conditions obtaining in the Middle East the attacking side has a strategic advantage.

The order to attack the UAR was given at 06.00 hours Greenwich mean time on June 5. The operation is described by *The Jerusalem Post*: "...around eight o'clock on the morning of Monday, June 5, the Israel Air Force was ready to strike out. Practically every Israeli aircraft that could fly and carry bombs, cannons or machine-guns was up in the air that morning. Only a few hours later Israel was able to announce the destruction of over 400 Egyptian planes. The destruction of the bulk of the Jordanian and Syrian air force followed in short order." And further: "The Israel Command was only too well aware that the

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 9, 1967.

decision had to be achieved still on that very first day."^{*} Moreover, according to the French bourgeois weekly *L'Express*, the Israel intelligence used information supplied by the NATO operation intelligence service.^{**}

The French newspaper *Le Figaro* reported that after Israel "had destroyed the enemy air force" it proceeded to the second phase, a land operation that took advantage of the initial surprise.^{***} The Israeli plan of operations in the Sinai Peninsula envisaged an advance in four directions: towards Gaza and the coastal road to El-Arish; in the centre of the plateau towards Abu-Ageila and the Suez Canal; in the southeast towards El Kuntilla; a task force was landed in the Strait of Tiran with the object of seizing the Sharm-el-Sheikh strongpoint. After the Sinai strike Israel's entire war machine was turned against Jordan and then against Syria. With regard to the latter, the aggressor employed "elastic, time-winning defensive tactics" while fighting was still raging in the south. The plan to deal with these countries piecemeal could only be justified by a "blitzkrieg" strategy.

2. According to the Israeli press, the UAR, Syria and Jordan (population—27 million) had armed forces with 210,000, 65,000 and 50,000 effectives respectively, while Israel, with a population of 2,700,000, including 30,000 Arabs who were exempt from conscription, had mobilised an army of 250,000 men by June 5.^{****} These data refute the legend that Israel was "small and weak" militarily. Moreover, the Israeli military had pursued a line aimed at disuniting the Arab countries politically and strategically. This is borne out by the Israeli Government's policy, particularly in 1966 and 1967, of placing Jordan in diplomatic isolation—which is further evidence that Israel had been nurturing its plans of aggression for a long time. Israeli propaganda kept grinding out the myth that the regime in Jordan was threatened. For instance, the Israe-

* *The Jerusalem Post Week-End Magazine*, June 23, 1967, p. 2.

** *L'Express*, June 18, 1967, p. 7.

*** *Le Figaro*, June 10-11, 1967.

**** *The Jerusalem Post*, May 14, 1967; *L'Express*, June 12-18, 1967. Actually, Israel had a 300,000-strong army alerted for combat. See L. Sheidin, "Imperialist Conspiracy in the Middle East", *Kommunist*, 1967, No. 11, p. 108.

li clerical newspaper *She'arim* wrote that the As Samu raid of November 13, 1966 had been undertaken with the objective of rescuing "King Hussein's throne".^{*} Moreover, the official "doctrine" in Tel Aviv was that Israel would not remain indifferent in face of any possible change of the internal situation in Jordan;^{**} Jordan was offered direct access to the Mediterranean across Israeli territory. Lastly, Abba Eban himself acknowledged that when hostilities were started on June 5, "Jordan was given every chance to remain outside the struggle".^{***} However, the defence treaty signed on June 1 between the UAR and Jordan foiled the intention of the Israeli militarists to drive a wedge between the UAR and Syria by isolating Jordan. Syria and Jordan declared a state of war on June 5, and on June 6 and 7 war was declared by a number of other Arab countries, whose troops, however, did not participate in the hostilities.

3. The Israeli aggressor waged war with unjustified brutality, utilising, for example, napalm against the UAR army which was deprived of air support and cover and had to operate on desert terrain that was devoid of natural cover. The Israeli troops were ordered to take no prisoners. *The Jerusalem Post* wrote that the "Egyptian soldiers . . . 'stayed put', often defending their positions to the last possible moment and closing their ranks again after the Israeli tanks had broken through so that a good many of the positions, passed at considerable cost, had to be stormed again".^{****}

Speaking on June 9, UAR President Gamal Abdel Nasser noted some of the reasons for the setbacks and forced withdrawal of the Egyptian army, one of which was the delay of the air force command to strike back when the Israeli aircraft had broken through.

4. Israel seized 60,000 square kilometres of Arab territory, an area three times larger than her own, and with a population of 1,500,000 or equal to almost 60 per cent of her own population.^{*****} The Israeli invaders occupied the

* *The Jerusalem Post*, December 1, 1966.

** *Ibid.*, January 9, 1967.

*** *Ibid.*, June 25, 1967.

**** *The Jerusalem Post Week-End Magazine*, June 23, 1967, p. 2.

***** *Pravda*, June 24, 1967.

Sinai Peninsula (which belongs to Egypt) up to the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, and Sharm-el-Sheikh. They occupied Jordan's entire western territory up to the River Jordan, including Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nablus; they seized some Syrian territory, including three former demilitarised zones, halting only 40 kilometres away from Damascus. A point to be noted is that most of the Arab territories were seized after the Security Council had passed its cease-fire decisions on June 6, 7 and 9.

When the fighting was at its height, *The New York Times* wrote that "Israeli strategy is now very simple. It is not to take prisoners but to smash the Arab war machine and then to hold on to territories and bargain for peace".* In the period from June 6 to 9, when Israel's representatives were employing delaying tactics in the Security Council, hypocritically demanding first a cease-fire and then the termination of the state of war simultaneously by "all" the Arab states, Israeli troops were advancing towards the Suez Canal. Israel took advantage of Jordan's acquiescence to the UN cease-fire decision to activate the offensive in the Sinai Peninsula, continue the advance across Jordanian territory and, in effect, start a large-scale offensive against Syria. It was only after vigorous intervention by the UN observers that the Israeli aggressor ended the hostilities at 19.30 hours Greenwich mean time on June 10. All this is further proof that Israel's aims were purely expansionist and that with encouragement from the USA and Britain her military successes whetted her appetite. Ignoring the Security Council's decisions and defying the United Nations, the Israeli ruling circles sought to snatch the maximum military spoils and then dictate their terms to the Arab countries.

5. In Israel there are ardent patriots. Headed by the Communist Party of Israel and its intrepid leaders Meir Vilner and Tawfiq Toubi, they consistently and courageously expose the policy which the country's ruling circles are pursuing in the interests of international imperialism and neocolonialism. On the eve of the aggression of June 5 the CPI made every effort to avert war, warning against the Government's dangerous adventurism. When

* *The New York Times*, June 9, 1967.

the aggression was launched the CPI came out against the war in the Knesset, in the Party press, in leaflets and at rallies, demanding a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the Israeli troops to the armistice line. The courageous patriots made themselves heard when chauvinistic passions were running high, and at once the ruling clique started repressions against them, arresting Party activists in Nazareth and Jaffa, members of the CPI Secretariat, including CPI Secretary Emile Habibi, CC member Mun'am Jarjoura, editor of the Communist newspaper *Al-Ittihad* A. Ashur, and other Communists.

The speeches made in the Knesset by the Communist deputies Vilner and Toubi are models of indomitable courage and genuine internationalism. The stand adopted by the CPI was that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestine problem could only be settled by peaceful means based on recognition of the rights of the people of Israel and the Arab people of Palestine. To achieve such a settlement the Israeli leaders have to stop taking orders from the imperialist powers, abandon their positions of strength policy and recognise the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine. Speaking in the Knesset on June 23, Meir Vilner, Secretary of the CPI Political Bureau, noted that Communist activists had been arrested and stressed that there was a danger of a military dictatorship. He said that there had been "political arrests because our Party favours the return to peace, the withdrawal of the army to the armistice lines, because we believe this is the way to protect the true interests of Israel". And further: "I want security for Israel, I want peace, not military adventures in the service of American and British imperialism in the Middle East... How do people speak nowadays of the Soviet Union, which saved millions of Jews from the nazis, and supported the establishment of Israel? The Foreign Ministry's reply to the Soviet Union was a shame and a disgrace."

The Sneh-Mikunis group, which had broken away from the CPI on the eve of the 15th Congress, departed from the class assessment of the Israeli aggression, sliding into nationalistic positions. It supported the war of aggression,

* *The Jerusalem Post Week-End Magazine*, June 23, 1967, p. 3.

identifying itself with the Government of Eshkol-Dayan-Begin.

The country's real patriots, with the CPI at their head, are pressing for the only possible way of settling the Arab-Israeli conflict and ensuring Israel's interests. Such a solution would give the country a lasting future. The way to achieve this was clearly formulated by Meir Vilner in an interview given to the newspaper *L'Unita*: "Not with the imperialists against the Arab peoples, but with the Arab peoples against the imperialists."^{*}

Consistently in line with its policy of safeguarding peace and the security of nations, the Soviet Union denounced the aggressor as soon as Israel started her attack of the Arab countries. In its Statement of June 5, 1967^{**} the Soviet Government made the following points: first, the Israeli Government had known that war could be avoided—this was what the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries had urged it to do, but it had chosen the road of aggression; second, while condemning the Israeli aggression the USSR proposed a series of urgent measures to put an end to it. Two days later, in its Statement of June 7, 1967,^{***} the Soviet Government seriously warned the Israeli leaders, who were continuing the aggression in defiance of the Security Council's resolutions. These statements were followed by a Note, on June 20, 1967, in which the Soviet Union declared that it had severed diplomatic relations with Israel.

The expansionist actions of the Israeli aggressors and the imperialist forces supporting them were opposed by the resolute, united front of the socialist countries. Six other socialist countries broke off diplomatic relations with Israel. The Statement of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties and Governments of Socialist Countries of June 9, 1967 warned that extreme measures would be taken if Israel continued her aggression.^{****} A resolution adopted on June 21, 1967^{*****} by a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Com-

* *Pravda*, July 7, 1967.

** *Ibid.*, June 6, 1967.

*** *Ibid.*, June 8, 1967.

**** *Ibid.*, June 10, 1967.

***** *Ibid.*, June 22, 1967.

munist Party of the Soviet Union on Soviet policy in connection with the Israeli aggression in the Middle East gave a political assessment of the conflict and declared that the "Israeli aggression is the result of a conspiracy of the most reactionary forces of international imperialism, chiefly of the USA" and "another link in the policy pursued by bellicose imperialist circles", who were trying to obstruct progress.

In the United Nations the Soviet Union launched resolute diplomatic initiatives to abolish the consequences of the Israeli aggression. It insisted on: 1) the cessation of hostilities as the first step; 2) the withdrawal of the Israeli troops to their former positions; 3) condemnation of the aggressor; and 4) compensation by the aggressor for the losses inflicted on the countries he had attacked. These, in the view of the USSR, were vital conditions for considering Arab-Israeli relations as a whole. The Soviet Union submitted the above four-point programme to the Security Council which met in emergency session from June 5 to 14, and to the extraordinary General Assembly that was convened, on Soviet initiative, on June 17 to consider the consequences of the aggression.

Addressing this session of the General Assembly on June 19, A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, who led the Soviet delegation, stated the Soviet stand and showed that the Israeli aggressor had acted deliberately. He stressed that "if Israel had any claims on her neighbours, she should have come here, to the United Nations, and sought a settlement by peaceful means. . . . But right cannot exist in isolation from duty."^{*} This just thesis was the key to the problem. Throughout her 20-year existence Israel, as we have repeatedly demonstrated, had been least of all interested in a real settlement of the problem of her relations with Arab countries, preferring an illegal *status quo* to the fulfilment of UN resolutions. Naturally, this led to a worsening of her relations with the Arab states. A. N. Kosygin laid stress on the guideline of Soviet foreign policy, namely, that "every people has the right to establish its own indepen-

* *Pravda*, June 20, 1967.

dent national state".* In other words, Israel has the same right to existence as any other country. The Soviet action against the aggression unleashed by the Israeli ruling circles was a denunciation of the extremist policy pursued by these circles. Of the five draft resolutions discussed at the above-mentioned session of the General Assembly, three (submitted by the Soviet Union, non-aligned countries and Albania) categorically demanded the withdrawal of the invasion force. The drafts submitted by the USA and 18 Latin American countries contained a similar point, but its fulfilment was made conditional on the discussion of the "entire spectrum of problems". The drafts submitted by the Soviet Union and the non-aligned countries received 45 and 53 votes respectively (with 46 against). Inasmuch as none of the four draft resolutions (the US draft was withdrawn) received the necessary two-thirds majority, all were rejected. Nonetheless, the political result of the General Assembly was self-evident: the Israeli aggression had been condemned by most countries. This was also shown by the adoption (by 99 votes) of two resolutions, of July 4 and 14, which declared that Israel had acted unlawfully in changing the status of Jerusalem, and the resolution of July 4, calling for an alleviation of the position of the Arab civilian population in the occupied territories and of Arab prisoners of war.

On account of the stand taken by the USA, Britain and some of their allies and also by countries dependent on Washington, the General Assembly was unable to adopt a decision on the principal issue, that of the withdrawal of the occupation forces. In the Soviet Government's Statement of July 23, 1967 it was stressed that all the peace-loving states had to continue their efforts to "compel the aggressor to withdraw his troops from the occupied territories".**

The political line pursued by the Israeli leaders after the aggression gave further evidence of the expansionist character of their objectives. It was not difficult to see what Tel Aviv was out to achieve. During the hostilities

* *Pravda*, June 20, 1967.

** *Ibid.*, July 23, 1967.

the Israeli invaders followed the pattern of the war of 1948-1949 by forcibly evicting the civilian Arab population. More than 200,000 Arab civilians had to flee from the occupied territories, swelling the ranks of the refugees, of whom there already were more than a million. Under pressure from world public opinion, the Israeli authorities have permitted a few score of Arab families to return to the western bank of the Jordan (chiefly from Amman), but the real aim of Tel Aviv is to settle new immigrants in the occupied territories in place of the expelled Arabs. Measures have been hurried through to prepare for the cultivation of 44,000 dunams of land in the demilitarised zones along the frontier with Syria and Jordan. To abolish the status of the Palestinian refugees they are being moved from Gaza to the western bank of the Jordan. Military governors have been appointed to the occupied territories. In other words, the aggressor is using nazi methods.

The Israeli leaders pompously marked the "victory" by holding a Government session in Jerusalem which included a visit to the Western Wall and Mount Scopus in the old part of Jerusalem, while the newspaper *She'arim* wrote in an emotional vein: "Holy Jerusalem . . . is again in the hands of Israel . . . we have liberated her from alien captivity and hoisted on her walls the flag of free and liberated Israel—after she had fallen to Edom 1,900 years ago".* This excursion into history is the only "argument" given to justify the rapidly growing expansionist demands of the Israeli extremists. After the cease-fire their policy has been to cling to the occupied territories. Dayan, who demands that the Israelis "stay where we are",** is the most outspoken in revealing Israel's expansionist ambitions. Ben Gurion is somewhat more cautious: he wants Israel to hold on to Jerusalem and Gaza and expounds the idea of forming an autonomous "buffer territory" garrisoned by Israeli troops on the western bank of the Jordan. Lastly, Eshkol expressed the view that the Government should not, for the time being, divulge its plan for

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 9, 1967.

** *Ibid.*, June 12, 1967.

the future of the occupied territories (statement in the Knesset on July 19).*

In violation of two UN decisions on the illegality of Jerusalem's integration, the Israeli invaders had recourse to the old practice of annexation. On June 29 a law was hastily passed placing Jerusalem under a single municipal council and making Israeli currency the legal tender throughout the city. Moreover, a census was taken of the population, taxes were instituted, and so on. Dayan went so far as to state that he did not see "any difference between Gaza and Nazareth any more".** The invaders have laid claim even to the Suez Canal.

The Israeli leaders have started feverish activity in yet another sphere, namely, in the creation of a powerful Zionist consortium. While their claims founded on "historical succession" must be regarded as potential plans for the creation of a "Zionist Empire" stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates, their call for the unity of Zionists "of the whole world" represent a claim to the formation of a political "intercontinental Zionist Empire". This programme became strikingly clear during the aggression: the convergence of Israeli and international Zionism, i.e., of various Zionist organisations in the capitalist countries, proceeded most actively at all stages of the aggression. For example, on May 7, 1967, Eshkol declared that the Jewish people (in the Diaspora— G. N.) and the State of Israel "must still be prepared for any sudden change".*** At an extraordinary meeting on May 23 the Jewish Agency Executive discussed "ways and means of mobilising the assistance of world Jewry . . . in the present crisis".****

Responding to the "emergency call for aid" from the Jewish Agency the US Zionist organisations quickly mapped out a programme of financial assistance to Israel by Jews in the USA for the duration of the crisis. A similar "emergency call" was adopted as a guide to action by Zionist leaders in Britain, Canada and France. Rabbi Friedmann arrived in Israel from the USA for confidential talks with Premier Eshkol, the Finance Minister Pin-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, July 20, 1967.

** *Ibid.*, July 6, 1967.

*** *Ibid.*, May 8, 1967.

**** *Ibid.*, May 24, 1967.

has Sapir and Louis Pincus, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive. The leaders of all the Zionist organisations and Jewish communities in the USA were informed of the results of these talks. In Britain the British Zionist Federation pressured the Government in connection with the situation in the Middle East. On May 31, Sapir flew to the USA, stopping en route at Rome, Bonn and Paris in order to brief the Israeli ambassadors. The purpose of his visit was to mobilise financial means. On June 5 the American Zionists (United Jewish Appeal) announced that the sum of money from the Jewish communities in the USA would be far in excess of what had been collected for Israel in previous drives. A "united Jerusalem" fund, a large portion of the money coming from the French banker Rothschild, with the West German Ambassador Pauls personally contributing 5,000 marks, was formed on June 9. The purpose of this activity was revealed by Ben Gurion, who urged "the immediate resettlement" of Jews in the Old City, Hebron and the Etzion Bloc so that this "move would demonstrate to the world that Israel was resolute in her decision to ensure the possession of these areas", which he called "former Jewish areas".* Shimon Peres, Rafi Secretary General, bluntly declared that "the key problem" facing Israel was immigration, that "a hundred million dollars will not save us but ten thousand Jews will".** These statements were made at a time when in the Security Council the Israeli representative Abba Eban was trying to persuade the world that his country had acted solely in order to forestal a "threat" from the UAR.

Before the aggression ended, Tel Aviv received more than 40 million dollars as emergency donations from Zionist organisations. This does not include the "united Jerusalem fund", whose target was 50 million dollars. Besides, the drive for donations after the aggression brought Israel 30 million dollars from the USA, and 20 million pounds from Britain. From West European countries, according to Pinhas Sapir, this drive yielded a sum 15-16 times larger than the 2,600,000 dollars given to Israel in 1966.***

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 12, 1967.

** *Ibid.*

*** *Ibid.*, June 1, 12, 20, 1967.

The developments linked with the June 5 aggression provide evidence of the efforts that Israeli and international Zionism are making to set up an "Empire" without geographical boundaries but with definite political frontiers. On this score, Baron Edmond de Rothschild, a descendant of a pioneer in the "land of forefathers", declared soon after the cease-fire that for every Jew, regardless of where he lived, it was a matter of honour to demand double nationality.* International Zionism counts, for instance, on "the best Jewish minds" coming to Israel to serve "the motherland" for a certain period.** In other words, the Zionists hold that Jews throughout the world are obligated to give money to Israel, send their sons to the Israeli army and dispatch all sorts of information and assistance that would in all cases help the "motherland". Already functioning today is what is practically an international financial consortium of representatives of Zionist capital. Consisting of 60 businessmen from 14 countries, it renders a wide range of economic assistance to Israel. It must be borne in mind that international Zionist capital grew out of the exploitation of Jewish toilers and their brothers—working people in other countries, from where this capital flows to Israel.

Regarding the further political plans of the Zionists, *The Jerusalem Post* wrote: "Israel, as a result of the war ... has grown considerably in territory and in population. ... We may have to say, come ... only come and build your land and the Third Jewish Commonwealth. ... All the military and diplomatic victories will not avail us if tens of thousands of the best Jews of the Diaspora do not join us in the next few years."*** And here is how the objectives of Israel's further policy have been formulated by the reactionary Zionist newspaper *Ha'aretz* on January 24, 1968: "Total support for the strategic interests of the Western powers in the cold war against the East European countries; a new military initiative against the Arab countries; conquest of the eastern part of Jordan; overthrow of the present regime in the UAR and of the entire political system supporting it; conquest of the oil pipe-

* *The Jerusalem Post*, June 13, 1967.

** *Ibid.*

*** *Ibid.*, June 22, 1967.

lines of Iraq Petroleum Company and Aramco; occupation of the Saudi Arabian coast along the Gulf of 'Aqaba', and so on.* It would be harder to characterise the pursued aims more openly. Israel's ruling circles are deliberately complicating the situation in the Middle East, and in this they have the backing of reactionary circles in the USA, Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany. But these forces, as the TASS Statement of July 21, 1967 pointed, "are playing a hazardous game with fire".

It took only a year after the Israeli aggression to show that this warning was justified.

Taking the lesson of their setback into account, the Arab states gradually began to surmount the differences between them and achieve unity of action. At a conference held in Khartoum from August 1 to 5, the Foreign Ministers of 13 Arab countries discussed joint measures to terminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression and co-ordinate further policy towards Israel (in preparation for a summit meeting). Moreover, they charted the further line of their joint struggle against imperialism.**

On November 22, 1967 (by an irony of fate—almost the exact date of the UN resolution on the partition of Palestine 20 years before) the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that could become the basis for abolishing the consequences of the Israeli aggression and for achieving a political settlement of the conflict as a whole. Based on a draft submitted by Britain, this was a compromise resolution.*** It called for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East through the application of the following principles: a) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; b) termination of all claims or states of bel-

* *L'Humanité*, March 26, 1968.

** During the conflict seven Arab states broke off diplomatic relations with the USA and Britain and adopted a number of economic sanctions in regard to these countries. For details of the Khartoum conference see *Pravda*, September 5, 1967.

*** Three other draft resolutions were presented to the Security Council: by the USSR, jointly by India, Mali and Nigeria, and by the USA. Although the Soviet and joint Asian-African drafts were more consistent, the Soviet delegation voted for the British compromise resolution in order to achieve unity of action against the aggressor. The US draft was worded in such a way as to give the advantage to Israel.

ligerency and "acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force". The resolution also called for: a) freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; b) a just settlement of the refugee problem; c) a guarantee of the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area through the establishment of demilitarised zones.*

For all its good points, this resolution has the drawback that some of the wording is vague. However, its key point is that Israeli troops are to withdraw from the occupied territories.

In fulfilment of the November resolution the UN sent its special representative, Gunnar Jarring, to the Middle East to "establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement". Gunnar Jarring began his mission in December 1967.

Israel thus had the opportunity to settle the conflict with the Arab countries, and in any case to terminate the 19-year state of war. It will be remembered that the Israeli leaders had proclaimed the termination of the war as the principal objective of the aggression of June 1967. But this was precisely the moment when a phase began in which the aggressor and his imperialist patrons were most fully exposed.

While the Arab countries, the UAR in particular, prompted by their aspiration to settle the conflict within the framework of the United Nations, accepted the resolution of November 22 as the basis for a settlement, Tel Aviv quickly forgot all its hypocritical assurances to the effect that it had no territorial ambitions. The Israeli leaders demanded "direct negotiations" with the full knowledge that this condition was unacceptable to the Arab countries. Their aim was to humiliate their adversary and force the victims of aggression to accept their terms. These tactics were employed deliberately in order to

* *Keesing's Contemporary Archives. Weekly Diary of World Events*, Vol. XVI, 1967-1968, p. 22473.

wreck any possibility of achieving a political settlement of the conflict.

Israel ignored the United Nations, defying its 123 members. On November 21, 1967 (the date on which the Security Council considered the resolution on the principles for settling the conflict) Israeli troops made another attack on Jordan. The armed provocations were repeated on January 8, 1968, February 15, March 21, April 8 and May 1 of the same year with fighting along the entire cease-fire line or along a front of more than 100 kilometres. The above-mentioned incidents were only the massive attacks; from September 1967 onwards Israel engaged continuously in small-scale provocations. On Jordanian territory alone in the course of a year after the cease-fire 5,000 civilians were killed, 7,000 Arabs were arrested, more than 100,000 people were driven out of their homes and tens of villages were set on fire and destroyed.* Israel made it impossible to restore the Suez Canal to navigation.

On March 25, 1968 the Security Council denounced the Israeli attack on Jordan and on May 2 called on Israel to abandon her intention to hold a military parade in the Arab part of Jerusalem. Tel Aviv ignored this decision as well, and was again condemned by the Security Council. On May 21 the Security Council once more called on the Israeli rulers to give up their intention to annex the Arab part of Jerusalem.

In a letter to Gunnar Jarring on May 9 the UAR Government suggested drawing up a schedule for co-ordinated measures to normalise the situation in the Middle East.** "This is an important initiative," the Soviet Foreign Minister told the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on June 27, 1968, "and the Soviet Government is prepared to help carry out this plan."***

How did Israel react to all this? *The Israel Economist*, for instance, wrote that discussions of an allegedly academic nature had sprung up between groups among the ruling circles "advocating the annexation of the occupied territories and the creation of a Greater Land of Israel or

* *Pravda*, June 6, 1968.

** *Ibid.*, May 13, 1968.

*** *Ibid.*, June 28, 1968.

opposing this as endangering the Jewish character of the State and its humanitarian and democratic nature".* To the accompaniment of statements of this kind the Israeli rulers mapped out a system of measures to "settle" or annex occupied territories. One of these is a ten-year plan of agricultural development in occupied areas which are to be settled by Jews. Kibbutzim of a para-military type have already been set up in Kfar-Etzion near Banias and in the Sinai Peninsula between El-Arish and Port Said. Fortifications are being hurriedly erected along the entire cease-fire line.

Tel Aviv seeks to dictate its own terms. In any case, Israel is clearly out to include the Arab part of Jerusalem, Gaza and the Golan Heights in her territory, and turn the western bank of the River Jordan into a buffer state with an Israeli garrison. These are described as "modest" demands. At the Herut Congress in May 1968, the party leader Begin spoke of establishing "de facto sovereignty in all parts of the historical land of Israel liberated from foreign rule".**

But it is not easy to achieve these expansionist ambitions. In face of the growing resistance from the Arab population, a resistance that in the occupied territories has acquired the nature of a guerrilla movement, and of Israel's immense loss of prestige in the world, Israeli hawks of the Dayan type are urging a new round of the war. *The Israel Economist* made this quite clear when it wrote that "Dayan saw the possibility of a fourth war—or at least a major outbreak of hostilities—in the near future".***

The Israeli extremists believe that another war would break the resistance of the Arabs and compel them to accept any ultimatum; it would again put world public opinion before a *fait accompli*, and the results of the June 1967 aggression would then be the point of departure for demarcating the frontiers of a "Greater Israel"; lastly, another war would give added impetus to the efforts of the Zionists to settle Jewish immigrants in occupied Arab territories. To back up these plans Israel began massing

* *The Israel Economist*, February 1968, p. 38.

** *Pravda*, May 29, 1968.

*** *The Israel Economist*, February 1968, p. 41.

troops along the cease-fire line in March 1968 and in the course of the next two months. The 27th World Zionist Congress, held in mid-June, adopted the meaningfully titled "Jerusalem Programme" for uniting the Jewish people in Israel.

Lastly, another plan has been drawn up against the contingency that matters do not reach a fourth round. This plan envisages consolidating Israel's hold on the occupied Arab territories by "legalising" the actual but dangerous *status quo*, as has been the case during the years since the war of 1948-1949. This plan was given a boost as a result of Eshkol's visit to the USA, when Washington undertook to give attentive and favourable consideration to the question of "maintaining Israel's defence capability".* After having given Israel 48 jet bombers in June 1967, the USA agreed to deliver another 20 Skyhawk aircraft and 50 Phantom fighters, while the US Congress passed a decision to render Israel unlimited military aid (while stopping such aid to Jordan).

The June aggression cost Israel more than 3,000 million Israeli pounds.** In 1968, according to *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, her war budget reached "record dimensions". It has been estimated roughly that this budget totals nearly 20 per cent of the country's national product and amounts to 2,200 million Israeli pounds, which is five times the size of the military budget approved five years earlier. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* wrote that in 12 months Israel's economy "covered the road from depression to the brink of further inflation".*** Nonetheless, an additional military budget of 500 million Israeli pounds was adopted in June 1968.

The Israeli rulers are playing with fire by refusing to abide by the Security Council's decision of November 22, which provides the basis for a political settlement of the conflict. As the Soviet Government pointed out in its Statement of March 23, 1968, to fail to discharge the commitments of a member of the UN in accordance with that organisation's Charter "is tantamount to ranging oneself

* *Pravda*, January 10, 1968.

** Meir Vilner, "Boomerang of Aggression", *Za rubezhom*, 1968, No. 26 (419), p. 5.

*** *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 16, 1968.

against the UN, to defying this world peace-keeping organisation".* Such a situation can hardly last long.

So long as the consequences of the aggression are not terminated, the Israeli ruling circles endanger the very existence of the State of Israel and create a constant danger to peace in the Middle East. Under all circumstances, the termination of the consequences of the aggression is only a matter of time. Israel continues to face mounting economic and political difficulties and increasing unemployment. Since the war the country has been swept by waves of strikes. The Israeli leaders are seeking to prepare the ground for a military dictatorship. But the future of Israel does not belong to these circles. As was noted at the 16th plenary meeting of the CPI Central Committee, all the patriotic forces are uniting round the Communist Party of Israel.** The future of Israel belongs to the Israeli working people.

* Pravda, March 23, 1968.

** At this plenary meeting, the CPI CC also denounced the Sneh-Mikunis group as having betrayed proletarian internationalism (see Pravda, August 8, 1967).

THE PROBLEM OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
AND THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS
OF THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE.
SOME FACTS ON THE GENESIS
OF THE IMPERIALIST-ZIONIST ALLIANCE
AND THE OUTLOOK
FOR A SETTLEMENT
(1968-July 1971).

SECOND STAGE OF THE STRUGGLE IN THE UN
FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The adoption of the resolution of November 22, 1967 marked the end of the first stage of the struggle in the United Nations for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This stage thus witnessed the failure of the Israeli rulers' tactics of raising every possible obstacle to any step towards abolishing the consequences of the aggression and achieving peace. The Israeli rulers counted on acting from positions of strength to force the Arab countries to accept a prolonged "no war, no peace" situation, in other words, to turn the *fait accompli* of the annexation of Arab territory into a time-legalised *status quo*.

Under the Zionist "Greater Israel" programme there was to be a repetition of the history of the two preceding decades, when Israel's seizure of over 6,000 square kilometres of Arab territory was "legalised" in precisely this manner. In the circumstances, the analogy was fraught with even more sinister prospects, for new bellicose pronouncements were made in Jerusalem soon after that city's annexation.

One way or another, the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 reaffirmed that the Israeli aggressor's ultimatum demanding direct talks with the Arab states was untenable. This was plainly at variance with the plans of world Zionism and its imperialist backers in the

USA. The Soviet Union's determined insistence on the abolition of the consequences of the Israeli aggression, the clear-cut and increasing consolidation of Arab unity following the aggression, and the growing Afro-Asian solidarity against imperialism helped to shatter the designs of the Israeli aggressor and enabled the Security Council to pass its resolution with the aim of achieving peace in the Middle East.

The quest for the ways and means of implementing this resolution formed the content of the second stage of the struggle in the United Nations for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. The significance of the role played by the UN is that it has placed the Israeli rulers in a position where they are finding it extremely difficult to dictate terms to the Arab states. Moreover, international guarantees backed by the authority of the United Nations could be a means helping to achieve lasting peace in the Middle East.

The importance of the role played by the UN is all the greater in view of the fact that since the close of 1967 there has been a further aggravation of the Arab-Israeli conflict due to the attitude of the Tel Aviv rulers. The Israeli ruling circles have persistently ignored the UN resolutions and used every pretext to hot up the situation in order to spark a new military explosion in the Middle East. Another objective of Israel's "active offensive" policy was to give its rulers the possibility of manoeuvring and to this end they re-stated their "terms" for a peaceful settlement, i.e., their demand for direct talks and for "agreed and secure borders" as defined in this formula. This "peace programme"* was enunciated by Eshkol (in a speech to newspaper editors on December 1, 1967) as a counter-balance to the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967 demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab territories without any pre-conditions.

At the same time, Tel Aviv hastily planned and implemented steps to annex the occupied territories. This included the "Israelisation" of these territories by moving

* *Keesing's Contemporary Archives...*, January 13-20, 1968, p. 22474. The "peace programme" was proclaimed by Israel officially on October 8, 1968 (see below).

or even expelling the Arab civilian population from their homes and by agricultural colonisation, i.e., by setting up para-military settlements of Jewish immigrants.

If we trace the evolution of Arab-Israeli relations following the adoption of the Security Council's resolution of November 1967 we shall see that these measures are an expression of a well-defined policy.

In the spring of 1968 the sporadic armed clashes that recurred with increasing frequency after the close of 1967 grew into an open "small war". Its stages are as follows: in the period from January to March 1968 there was an uninterrupted series of armed attacks on Jordan; from April to the end of 1968 armed clashes flared up along the entire cease-fire line with the UAR, Jordan and Syria and also along the Lebanese frontier; throughout the whole of 1969 there was no let-up in Israeli armed attacks, particularly against the UAR and Syria, and also against Iraq; the "massive reprisals" against neighbouring countries—the setting on fire of the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in the autumn of 1969, the attacks on civilian objectives in the spring of 1970, namely, a factory in Abu-Zaabal and a school in Bahr el-Bacre in the UAR; the shelling of the Suez Canal zone and the armed clashes along all the truce lines until the renewal of the cease-fire in August 1970.

Throughout this period the Israeli military went to all ends to move hostilities to the territory of Arab states. Furthermore, they hit industrial and civilian targets deep in the interior regions. Even during the three cease-fire periods from August 7, 1970 to March 7, 1971 Israeli troops raided Arab territory, particularly targets in the Lebanon.* A point to be noted is that regarding Zionist strategy even Western authors have written not without grounds that if Israel were not stopped she would never return her loot, i. e., the occupied Arab territories, for the "Zionists know no bounds".**

Beginning at the close of 1967, following the adoption by the Security Council of its November 1967 resolution,

* See below.

** F. Scheidel, *Israel, Jerusalem der ganzen Menschheit, Weltprotest der Christenheit*, Vienna, 1968, p. 23.

the struggle in the United Nations for a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict proceeded along two main directions: 1) opposition to Israel's US-encouraged mounting expansionism; and 2) a quest for ways and means of carrying out the Security Council's resolution of November 22, 1967 and also the proposals and projects put forward towards the same end (with the withdrawal of the occupation forces as the basic demand in the approach to the problem in all cases).

A peaceful settlement in the Middle East was the subject of the debates in the General Assembly at its 23rd (1968), 24th (1969) and 25th (1970) sessions. At the same time, the question of Israel's annexationist policy in the occupied territories and her acts of provocation against neighbouring states continued to figure in the agenda of the Security Council. The resolutions passed by the Security Council unanimously or by a majority vote made it abundantly clear who was to blame for starting the "small war" in the Middle East.

In 1968 the Security Council passed the following resolutions denouncing Israel's actions: the above-mentioned resolutions of March 24 (condemning the raids into Jordan) and of May 2 and 21 censuring the annexationist measures in Jerusalem; the resolution of August 16 stigmatised Israel for her actions against Jordan and warned her against any repetition of acts of aggression. The General Assembly resolution of December 19 provided for the formation of a commission to inquire into Israeli acts against the civilian population in the occupied territories.

The Israeli Government rejected this UN resolution, refusing to recognise the competence of the UN commission. On December 29, 1968 Israel was censured for a raid on the Beirut aerodrome.

On July 3, 1969 the Security Council passed a resolution against Israel's annexation of Jerusalem, stressing the illegality of all the measures and actions of the Israeli authorities to change that city's status. This resolution deplored "all the legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel to change the status of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of the land and the property on that land", stressing that none of these measures

and actions could "alter the city's status".* This was also underscored in the resolution of September 15, which condemned the action in which the Holy Al Aqsa Mosque was set on fire. In 1970 the Security Council passed resolutions condemning Israel for the bombing of civilian targets in Egypt (the factory at Abu-Zaabal and the school in Bahr el-Bacre); on May 12 and 20 and September 5—for raids into the Lebanon.

The situation in the Middle East was debated at the 25th General Assembly (from October 27 to November 3, 1970). On November 4 the General Assembly adopted, by a majority vote, a resolution on the situation in the Middle East based on a draft submitted by a group of Afro-Asian and non-aligned countries. This resolution thus summed up three years of struggle (particularly within the UN framework) to implement the Security Council resolution of November 1967. While demanding the forthwith implementation of the November 22, 1967 resolution, it called for a renewal of the mission led by the UN special representative, Gunnar Jarring, recommended prolonging the cease-fire for another three months** and, if necessary, examining the question of taking additional steps to ensure the fulfilment of the November 1967 resolution.*** As might have been expected, this resolution was rejected by Israel's rulers on the grounds that it was not acceptable.

In an effort to justify the actions of the Tel Aviv rulers, the *Israel Government Yearbook* gave the following assessment of the decisions adopted by the Security Council in 1968 and 1969: that the Security Council "found itself too often discussing Arab belligerency... not seldom tricked out as self-righteous indignation stirred by 'unprovoked' Israeli attacks"; that due to the "pro-Arab bloc" the Security Council had been unable to reach "a balance verdict" at its sitting on November 1, 1968 in connection with the shelling in the Suez Canal zone and the "Israel counter-attack"; that for the commando raid on Beirut airport on December 29, 1968 Israel had been condemned "in the sharpest terms" by a "packed jury"; that

* *Pravda*, July 25, 1970.

** See below.

*** *Pravda*, October 30, November 6, 1970.

on March 27, 1969 Israel was again condemned (for actions against Jordan) by a "ready-made anti-Israel majority"; that the Security Council resolution of July 3, 1969 condemning Israel for its actions in Jerusalem had been dictated by a quest for empty legality; and, lastly, that approximately on the same "grounds" Israel had refused to recognise the competence of the UN commission (consisting of representatives of Yugoslavia, Somali and Ceylon) set up in September 1969 to inquire into the situation in the occupied territories.*

Violations of human rights in occupied Arab territories were again examined in the UN Commission on Human Rights at its 27th session in March 1971. A UN commission of inquiry into these violations began working in July 1971.

The Jarring mission was part of the quest for a peaceful settlement within the UN framework. The following traces the work of the Jarring mission chronologically: in December 1967 and in the course of the first five months of 1968 Jarring was constantly visiting Cairo, Jerusalem and Amman, where he had confidential talks, and in mid-May submitted to U Thant his first report on the results of these talks.

At its initial stage the Jarring mediation mission worked first until December 1968 and then until April 1969. The mission was suspended when the Big Four (USSR, USA, Britain and France) started consultations in connection with the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East.** Jarring resumed his mission in March 1970 and continued it after the break in June 1970 (when the sides in the conflict accepted the United States proposal for a temporary cease-fire).***

Due to the stand adopted by Israel the Jarring mission broke down in August 1970 and was resumed only on January 5, 1971. But on account of the same reason, namely, the actions of the Israeli rulers, Jarring had to cut short his duties as early as March 1971. The Jarring mission remains virtually paralysed to this day.

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5730 (1969/70), pp. 224-25.

** See below.

*** See below.

It is quite obvious that from the very beginning the Jarring mission could have yielded results only if both sides in the conflict had accepted the Security Council resolution of November 1967 *in toto*. However, while Egypt and other Arab countries were prepared to abide by that resolution, Israel denied it recognition. From the very outset it was her intention to use the Jarring mission as a pretext for procrastination and for obstructing every possible step aimed at achieving a settlement. Time and again she demanded what for the Arabs were unacceptable direct negotiations and terms for "secure borders", giving her own interpretation of this formula. As understood by Tel Aviv, this meant the annexation of at least the larger portion of the occupied Arab territories. Moreover, as seen by Tel Aviv, the sole purpose of the Jarring mission was to iron out the technicalities for contract (with Jarring's mediation) between the sides in the conflict.

As early as 1969 U Thant had warned against attempts at a "narrow interpretation" of the Jarring mission, in other words, against attempts to reduce the UN Ambassador's role to consultative functions.* The Big Four consultations have enhanced the importance of the Jarring mission and the competence of the UN Ambassador. Developments are bearing this out.

The consultations between the Big Four** permanent Security Council members, who bear most of the responsibility for maintaining world peace and security, must be assessed as an undeniably favourable development. The very fact that it has become possible for the four Great Powers*** to hold consultations in the UN on the ways of settling the Middle East conflict is undoubtedly a factor

* "U Thant's Annual Report on the International Situation", *Keesing's Contemporary Archives...*, 1969/1970, p. 23623; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, April 11, 1969.

** These consultations are being held by the permanent representatives of these powers in the United Nations.

*** Consultations were held between the USSR and the USA in the United Nations throughout the period from July 1969 to the close of 1970. Like the four-way peace efforts in the UN, these bilateral consultations pursued the aim of paving the way to a settlement in the Middle East. However, they proved to be unrealistic on account of the USA's pro-Israel attitude.

checking Tel Aviv's expansionist ambitions and its demand, couched in the terms of an ultimatum, for direct negotiations. The purpose of these consultations is to find ways of carrying out the Security Council resolution of November 1967 and thereby bringing peace to the Middle East. Lastly, it is quite evident that a UN-sponsored international guarantee by the four Great Powers or a guarantee by the Security Council could be the earnest of lasting peace in the Middle East.

On the recommendation of France, which shares the Soviet viewpoint,* several rounds of consultations took place between the Big Four in the course of 18 months beginning in April 1969 and also in 1971. The substance and aims of these consultations were set out in a communiqué issued at the end of the first meeting in 1969. In this communiqué it was stated that "the permanent UN representatives of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the USA met on April 4 and entered into a discussion on *how they could help to achieve a political settlement in the Middle East*". Moreover, it was stated that the Four Powers' approach to the problem was based on the Security Council resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967, which they "fully accept and support". They "reaffirmed their support for Dr. Jarring's mission".

Further in the communiqué it was noted that the Four Powers "were agreed that the situation in the Middle East is serious and urgent and must not be permitted to jeopardise international security" and that they had "entered into a discussion on matters of substance and have started defining areas of agreement; and that there was a common concern to make urgent progress".** These underlying principles determined the direction, purpose and content of the Four-Power consultations.

Thus, the significance of these consultations is that they are directed towards helping to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East. In particular, one of their im-

* *Keesing's Contemporary Archives...*, January 25-February 1, 1969, p. 23152.

** *Pravda*, June 5, 1969, (My italics.—G. N.). On the Four-Power consultations see also, for instance, *Keesing's Contemporary Archives...*, January 25-February 1, 1969, p. 23152; May 3-10, 1969, p. 23325; November 15-22, 1969, p. 23669; January 24-31, 1970, p. 23785.

mediate aims is to enable UN Ambassador Gunnar Jarring to carry out his mission.

In its efforts to help establish peace in the Middle East, the Soviet Union positively assesses the possibilities of the Four-Power consultations in the UN. This was re-emphasised by Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, in February 1970 in messages to US President Richard Nixon, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and French President Georges Pompidou.

In these messages Kosygin pointed out that today "the pressing need is to make Israel renounce her policy of armed provocations and make it possible for a lasting peace to be established in the Middle East". He stressed that "to this end it is necessary, in particular, to make effective use of the available possibilities for consultations between the powers, including the Four-Power consultations between the USSR, the USA, Britain and France, which are being held in the Security Council".* In a letter to UN Secretary General U Thant in July 1971, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko also underscored the Soviet Union's readiness to take part, along with the other permanent members of the Security Council, in setting up international guarantees for a political settlement in the Middle East.**

Egypt and other Arab states attach great importance to the efforts of the United Nations and the fact that Four-Power consultations are being held in it to secure a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.***

A sharply negative attitude to these consultations has been adopted by the Israeli Government. As we have already shown, it is erecting every possible barrier to a political settlement in the Middle East. The US policy of aiding and abetting the Israeli aggressor has not made it possible to achieve a positive result at the Four-Power consultations.

Yet it is quite evident that agreement between the four Great Powers could help to settle the Middle East problem peacefully. In the obtaining situation the attain-

* *Pravda*, February 13, 1970.

** *Ibid.*, July 21, 1971.

*** "Sadat for a Peaceful Settlement", *The Baghdad Observer*, March 8, 1971.

ment of peace in that area on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 is increasingly a *sine qua non*.

All the more is this becoming a pressing need in view of the "peace plan", which the Israeli leaders have elevated to the diplomatic level and which, in effect, blots out the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. We refer to the "nine-point peace plan" which the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban presented to the 23rd General Assembly on October 8, 1968. It demands guarantees for a peaceful settlement on the basis of bilateral treaties between Israel and each of the neighbouring Arab states separately (points 2, 8). It is thus based on the principle of direct negotiations and insists on "agreed borders" (points 2, 4) as interpreted by Tel Aviv and on the recognition of Israel's annexation of Jerusalem. It says nothing about any commitment by Israel to withdraw her troops from the occupied Arab territories or of the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland.

The Soviet Plan for a Settlement

On December 30, 1968, on the eve of the Four-Power consultations, the Soviet Union suggested a package plan (which could also serve as a possible basis for an exchange of views between the Four Powers on the question of a settlement) for a stage-by-stage solution of all outstanding issues and the attainment of agreement through the mediation of UN Ambassador Jarring. It envisaged that this agreement should simultaneously cover all the aspects of a settlement in the Middle East (the Soviet plan included the idea of a timetable as suggested by Egypt in 1968—see above).

Concretely, the Soviet peace plan** provided, first and foremost, for the possibility of reaching agreement on simultaneous declarations by Israel and the neighbouring Arab states to the effect that they were prepared to ter-

* *Keesing's Contemporary Archives...*, November 16-23, 1968, pp. 23030-31.

** *Pravda*, October 25, 1969.

minate the state of war between them and achieve a peaceful settlement following the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories. This would be followed by a statement by Israel declaring that she was prepared, on a date to be fixed, to begin withdrawing her troops from the occupied Arab territories.

Moreover, the plan envisaged that the sides in the conflict should deposit (on the day the troop withdrawal begins) the pertinent documents on the termination of the state of war, and on respect for political rights and the fulfilment of commitments regarding the *status quo* of territories and the security of each state in the region. On the basis of the agreement, that would be reached through Jarring, and on the basis of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, the sides could coordinate the provisions on the security and recognition of frontiers, the freedom of navigation on international waterways in the region, the settlement of the refugee problem, and the territorial inviolability and political independence of each of the states in the region.

The plan called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories by two stages: in the course of the first month to definite intermediate lines, and in the course of the second month to the lines they had occupied prior to June 5, 1967; UN troops were to be stationed at a number of places and the establishment of demilitarised zones on either side on the frontiers was not to be ruled out. Further, provision was made for guarantees by the Four Powers or guarantees by the UN Security Council on the preservation of peace in the Middle East.

This is quite obviously a constructive plan. Underlying it are the principles of justice and reciprocity with regard to rights and obligations devolving on the sides in the process of reaching agreement and giving rise to a realistic prospect of a settlement. Implementation of this plan would signify the abolition of the consequences of the Israeli aggression through the withdrawal of the invading troops from all Arab territories. Besides, it would guarantee the right of all the states in the region to secure existence, including the recognition of Israel, which is a condition that is made, formally at least, by Israel herself.

Thus, the possibility of finding realistic ways and making a concrete effort at settling the conflict peacefully is quite plainly offered in the Soviet Union's peace plan and Egypt's constructive proposals. There are possibilities in this direction also within the UN framework. Nonetheless, the Arab-Israeli conflict remains unresolved because Israel, which relies on support from US imperialism and international Zionism, refuses to achieve a just peace with her neighbours.

* * *

Throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict, an inseparable component of the problem of establishing a just peace in the Middle East is that of ensuring the legitimate rights and interests of the Palestinian Arabs, this being the essence of the Palestine problem. This problem embraces the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination, the right of the refugees to return to their former places of residence and their right to self-defence (thus making the Palestinian resistance movement against the Israeli aggressor unquestionably legal).

All the above-listed rights of the Palestinians have been confirmed or implied in the corresponding UN resolutions. It is, therefore, beyond all question that the settlement of this problem should be an inalienable part of the future peace treaty, for this is the only way lasting peace can be achieved in the Middle East. But it is precisely this settlement of the problem that is resisted in every way by the Israeli aggressor.

Here it must be recalled, and with full grounds, that the UN decision of November 29, 1947 on the partition of Palestine was founded on principles ensuring the rights of both the Jews and the Arabs (who comprised two-thirds of the population in that country). Subsequent Zionist policy, which, after Israel was formed, became the gist of the policy of her rulers, was not only to block the creation of a Palestinian Arab state but to prevent the question from even being raised. Moreover, most of the territory of this non-created Palestinian Arab state was actually occupied by Israel following the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949. That explains why Israel's rulers refused to sign a peace treaty with the neighbouring Arab coun-

tries to end the temporary *status quo* of the frontiers established by the armistice of 1949.

The comprehensive solution of all these problems in the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict would mean Israel's fulfilment of the UN decision of 1948 on the return of the Palestinian refugees (this being one of the conditions of the Arab countries for peace negotiations with Israel). This would mean that the question of Israel's permanent frontiers should be settled only on the basis of the 1947 resolution, which called for the return of the seized Arab territory. Lastly, it would mean the attainment for Tel Aviv of a permanent peace with the Arabs and the recognition of Israel by the latter as one of the states of the Middle East, which, if one is to believe Tel Aviv's assurances, is the only desire cherished by the Israeli rulers.

The corresponding obligations were imposed on Israel when she was admitted to UN membership in May 1949, namely the mandatory fulfilment of the UN resolutions of November 29, 1947 (on the partition of Palestine) and of December 11, 1948 (on refugees).^{*} But these resolutions have been consistently ignored by Tel Aviv, which turned this into its standing political line. For more than two decades it has thereby deliberately pursued a policy of denying the Palestinian Arabs, expelled from their homeland and exposed to untold suffering, the right to national existence.

Is it just that by the will of the Zionists of Israel all rights should be enjoyed by one part of the population (Jewish) at the expense of the other (Arab)? By so doing Israel defies the United Nations despite the fact that to this organisation it owes its existence as a state. Should not the UN, therefore, take more resolute measures against those who have deliberately turned the usurpation of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs into a standing policy?

The Israeli leaders refuse to recognise the Palestinians as a party in negotiations or the legality of the Palestinian resistance movement, depicting it as pursuing ter-

^{*} UN Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part II, April 5-May 18, 1949, Lake Success, New York, p. 18.

rorist aims. Tel Aviv is seeking to exclude the Palestinians from the annals of history. Under these conditions the only solution that may be considered as just is to ensure the rights and interests of the two peoples of former Palestine.*

The Israeli leaders have annexed Jerusalem and proclaimed it the capital, enforcing Israeli laws in it. They are thus challenging the UN, which gave Jerusalem the status of an international city. It will be recalled that the UN decision on Jerusalem's internationalisation remains in force to this day. Evan M. Wilson believes "Jerusalem could be the key to a solution of the overall Palestine problem".** But under all circumstances the arbitrary rule in Jerusalem of the Israeli Zionists, who shamelessly ignore the UN decisions and defy the whole world, cannot be tolerated.

The Two Rogers Plans

On December 9, 1969, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers presented a United States plan for a Middle East settlement. This plan was put forward after the Arab states had scored a series of successes on the anti-imperialist front. Moreover, by that time it had become clear that Israel and her patrons had failed to force the Arab countries to accept a dictated peace. In other words, in coming forward with a "peace initiative" the USA had to take into account the changes that had taken place in the Middle East and manoeuvre.

The Rogers plan contained the following points: 1) *in toto* recognition of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 as the only way to reach agreement through peace negotiations; 2) relaxation of the "no peace no war situation"; 3) the drawing up by the sides in the conflict of detailed terms for ensuring the security of the frontiers (including the establishment of demilitarised zones) and their approval in mutual agreements achieved through Jarring on the basis of Rhodes types negotia-

* S. Astakhov, "Israeli Expansionism and the Palestinian Refugees", *International Affairs*, Moscow, No. 7, 1968, pp. 42-43.

** Evan M. Wilson, "The Internationalisation of Jerusalem", *The Middle East Journal*, Washington, Winter 1969, Vol. 23, No. 1, p. 11.

tions;* 4) withdrawal of troops from the occupied Arab territories; 5) preservation of Jerusalem's status as a united city that would be open for commercial transit and for "persons of all faiths and nationalities" and "with roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and religious life of the city".**

Thus, though based on *in toto* recognition of the Security Council's 1967 resolution, the Rogers plan did not rule out the possibility of achieving peace conditions through direct contact between the sides in the conflict. Furthermore, although it called for the withdrawal of the occupation forces it did not rule out (through the reservation about Rhodes type negotiations) the possibility of frontier modifications. The question of Jerusalem's status was also formulated in Israel's favour. The pro-Israel tenor of the Rogers plan was quite self-evident.

Nevertheless, official Tel Aviv at once attacked this plan, asserting that because it omitted mention of direct negotiations it "aroused widespread misgivings in Israel and among its friends in the USA".***

At a special sitting of the Israeli Government on December 22, 1969 it was "found necessary" to make the following statement: "The Cabinet discussed the disquieting initiatives of the US Government within the sphere of the Four-Power talks... The Cabinet rejects these American proposals, in that they: prejudice the chances of establishing peace; disregard the essential need to determine secure and agreed borders through the signing of peace treaties by direct negotiation...**** The Israeli rulers thus made no effort to hide their expansionist ambitions. The whole project was a farce with the USA and Israel cast in the leading roles. The attitude of the UAR and other Arab countries to the Rogers plan was expressed by the newspaper *Al Ahram*, which described it as "obviously favourable to Israel".*****

* The talks held in 1949 on Rhodes Island between Israel and the Arab countries through UN mediation.

** *A Search for Peace in the Middle East*, London, 1971, p. 38.

*** *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5730 (1969/70), p. 229.

**** *Ibid.*

***** *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*..., January 24-31, 1969/70, p. 23785; I. Belyaev, "Middle East Crisis and Washington's Manoeuvres", *International Affairs*, Moscow, No. 4, 1970, pp. 30-35.

At first glance the impression might have been conveyed that for some time Washington was trying to continue the "peace initiative". This was partly explained by the fact that due to the actions of the Zionist lobby there was among the US ruling circles some divergence over the question of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. However, as we have already pointed out, the principal reason for the US "peace initiative" was that the situation in the Middle East had altered.

By the spring of 1970 it had become obvious that the UAR's defence potential had increased. *The Economist*, for example, acknowledged that the situation had altered and that Israel was no longer free "to bomb Egypt at will".* In this situation the USA put forward its second Rogers plan, which was officially announced on June 25, 1970.

The new plan consisted of two points: a cease-fire for at least 90 days and the resumption of peace negotiations between the sides in the conflict through Gunnar Jarring.** Compared with the Security Council resolution of November 1967, the June Rogers plan thus contained nothing new. Even *The New York Times* had to admit that the Rogers plan was presented for discussion in an altered situation,** in other words, that the USA was looking for new ways of putting its old Middle East policy into effect.

On July 22, 1970, the UAR gave an affirmative reply to the proposals in the new American plan, thereby reaffirming its desire for peace and its constructive approach to the problem of a political settlement of the Middle East conflict. The UAR's attitude to the Rogers plan proposals was supported by Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan.

Tel Aviv had no alternative but to accept the plan. This was announced on August 4. The cease-fire agreement came into force on August 7. However, with the backing of the Zionist lobby in Washington, Tel Aviv to all intents and purposes wrecked the Jarring mission.

* *The Economist*, May 30, 1970, p. 32.

** *The New York Times*, July 7, 1970.

*** *Ibid.*

which could only resume its functions at the beginning of 1971. Nonetheless, Tel Aviv had to agree to an extension of the cease-fire period for another three months, beginning with November 5, 1970. But this "agreement" of the Israeli Zionists was also paid for by the US with fresh deliveries of armaments. Tel Aviv thus sought to utilise the cease-fire period to achieve definite advantages, particularly in the build up of its military potential. By preventing the Jarring mission from resuming its functions for four months Tel Aviv showed it was not interested in the new possibilities for a political settlement in the Middle East.

The Israeli extremists were, as was pointed out by Emile Habibi, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Israel, determined to make it appear that the Arabs had killed the hopes for peace.* The political machine nursed by Israel and international Zionism was switched on to its full capacity to squash Arab hopes for peace and compel them to reject a political settlement, thereby engineering a new exacerbation of the situation. Every means was used: from slanderous fabrications about redeployments of Egyptian missiles in the Suez Canal zone, and blunt statements brazenly admitting that Israel was building up her military potential, to the refusal to return the occupied Arab lands, to violations of the Lebanon's territorial sovereignty and armed attacks on Jordan and in the Suez Canal zone and, lastly, to the use of the US and Israeli intelligence services, whose threads led to the internal developments in the Lebanon and Jordan. However, the UAR's realistic stand not only made it possible to repulse the Zionist onslaught but put Israel before the threat of total isolation on the international scene.

Egypt's Peace Proposals

Let us try to trace developments from the moment the Jarring mission resumed its functions on January 5, 1971. At that stage of the negotiations there clearly were many favourable factors for the achievement of a settlement. A

* *Pravda*, August 12, 1970.

chronology of the developments during the first six months of 1971 brings these factors out into bolder relief. The attitude of the sides in the conflict was clearly defined after Jarring's first talks with representatives of the UAR, Jordan and Israel. The Israeli proposals that were presented to Jarring in Tel Aviv on January 9 again boiled down to a demand for direct negotiations, put forward the formula of "secure and agreed frontiers" and contained two new points: the indefinite prolongation of the truce and the transfer of the venue of contacts from New York to the Mediterranean.*

For its part, the UAR submitted a six-point peace plan on January 18 and stated its willingness to abide entirely by the Security Council resolution of November 1967. This plan, too, provided for the possibility of establishing demilitarised zones and for an international guarantee of peace in the Middle East by the four Great Powers.** Further peace proposals were made by the UAR on February 4. In a speech in the National Assembly, President Sadat proposed a plan for the partial withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Suez Canal zone as a first step towards an overall political settlement and as a measure making it possible to open the canal to international shipping. Moreover, Sadat stressed the necessity for maintaining the rights of the Palestinian refugees (as a sovereign side in the conflict) and declared that in the interests of a settlement the UAR was prepared to prolong the cease-fire for a third period (for a month).***

In reply to these proposals Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir told the Knesset on February 9 that Sadat's plan for a partial military withdrawal from the Suez Canal zone would give Egypt a "strategic advantage" and that Israel was only prepared to discuss an agreement outside the framework of peace negotiations.**** This was a flat rejection of Egypt's peace proposals.

Extremely indicative was the diplomatic activity by the UAR and Israel in connection with the Jarring mis-

* *Keesing's Contemporary Archives...*, February 6-13, 1971, p. 24430.

** *Ibid.*

*** *New Times* No. 8, February 24, 1971, p. 13.

**** *Keesing's Contemporary Archives...*, March 20-27, 1971, p. 24504.

sion, particularly round the steps taken by the UN Ambassador. On February 8, Jarring sent these countries a letter in which he noted that he had "come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock . . . is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them". Further, he stressed that "Israel would give a commitment to withdraw her forces from occupied Arab territory" and that the UAR "would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel",* in other words, that both sides had to specify their attitude to the Security Council resolution.

On February 15 the UAR replied that it was prepared to give the commitments required by Jarring. In addition, in order to achieve peace it made a number of new constructive proposals and declared it was prepared to ensure free navigation in the Suez Canal and the Strait of Tiran and to allow international forces to be stationed at Sharm-as-Sheikh as a guarantee of free navigation for Israeli ships in the Gulf of 'Aqaba. Further, as "a guarantee of a peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every state in the area" the UAR suggested demilitarised zones astride the borders and a UN peace force, in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would take part.

Here the UAR stipulated the condition that Israel should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Security Council decision of November 1967, above all, to withdraw her forces from all the occupied territories and state her preparedness to achieve a just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with the UN resolutions. Lastly, in its reply the UAR declared that if Israel gave these commitments it would be ready to sign a peace agreement.** One can judge the significance of this Egyptian peace action by the assessment given of it, for example, in the *Newsweek*, which wrote that even in Washington it was believed that Cairo "was making an earnest effort in search of peace". In UN diplomatic circles

* *Keesing's Contemporary Archives...*, March 20-27, 1971, p. 24503.

** *Ibid.*

the comment was that "this could turn out to be the most important diplomatic breakthrough since the six-day war".*

On February 21, after debating the Egyptian proposals of February 15 for four hours, the Israeli Government published a statement in which it was declared that Israel would not agree to withdraw her forces to "the armistice line of June 4, 1967".** On a lower official level it was declared in Tel Aviv that Jarring had exceeded his powers. In its reply*** to Jarring on February 26 the Israeli Government only reiterated its refusal to withdraw its forces from all the occupied territories and stated that the only solution it could see for the refugee problem was to pay them compensation and settle them in neighbouring countries. This was put forward instead of the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland.

On March 7, Sadat refused another formal extension of the cease-fire and called for further urgent political efforts to settle the crisis, one of the channels being the Four-Power consultations.**** Interviewed somewhat earlier by the *Newsweek*, Sadat declared: "It won't be our responsibility if the Israelis refuse the guarantees that are being offered."*****

To this day Israel is thus refusing to meet the principal condition for a peaceful settlement, namely, the *in toto* fulfilment of the commitments set out in the Security Council resolution. Instead, she is putting forward various projects in opposition to the resolution in the shape of the battered formula of direct negotiations and "agreed borders", which, as we have already pointed out, Tel Aviv interprets as signifying nothing less than the annexation of more Arab territory. The only right accorded to the Arab side is to agree to this brigandage and give it the form of a peace settlement.

The Tel Aviv rulers are deliberately trying to bury in oblivion the fact that their aggression against the Arab countries had in itself been an act of piracy. The Zionists,

* *Newsweek*, March 1, 1971, p. 10.

** *Keesing's Contemporary Archives* . . . , March 20-27, 1971, p. 24504.

*** *Ibid.*, pp. 24503-04.

**** *The Baghdad Observer*, March 8, 1971.

***** *Newsweek*, February 22, 1971, p. 13.

it will be recalled, had purposely provoked the Arabs into action which they later gave out as manifestations of Arab "intractability", whereas in reality they were only a reaction to the brazen challenge which, as we have shown in this book, the Israeli leaders kept hurling at the Arab countries for almost two decades, until June 1967. It was Israel's adamant refusal to abide by the UN resolutions that for almost two decades made it impossible to raise even the question of the temporary *status quo* (under the agreement of 1949) of the Arab territory seized by Israel, and enabled her in fact to annex this territory. So far as Israel's ruling élite was concerned the problem of the Palestinian Arabs was non-existent. Moreover, the expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs by the Zionist terrorists in 1947 and 1948 only helped to give effect to Tel Aviv's plans for expansion. Tel Aviv is quite plainly counting on employing the same tactics today.

The Soviet attitude to the Middle East crisis is, as before, that a political settlement must be sought through the implementation of the Security Council resolution of November 1967. The USSR, as we have noted, urges the utilisation of all possibilities, notably within the UN framework, including the Four-Power consultations, for achieving a political settlement. In its statement of February 28, 1971 the Soviet Government pointed out in all seriousness that in the Middle East today the "alternatives are: a political settlement or a military clash".* The Soviet Union's policy of peace was re-emphasised in the statement "For a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East" adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU. In this statement it is noted that the Soviet Union is unswervingly pursuing the Leninist policy of peace and friendship among peoples and that from this position it "will continue to support the just cause of the Arab peoples who suffered from Israeli aggression, to support their efforts at regaining their violated rights, to secure a fair political settlement in the Middle East, and to protect the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine".** The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty

* *Pravda*, February 28, 1971.

** 24th Congress of the CPSU, Moscow, 1971, p. 329.

of Friendship and Co-operation (signed on May 27, 1971), which came into force on July 1, 1971, is the guarantee of the Arab countries' new possibilities of countering the onslaught of the Israeli extremists.

What, in the long run, happened to the widely advertised so-called peace initiative started by the USA at the close of 1969 and continued until the mid-1970? There is no longer any doubt that Tel Aviv's forecasts regarding the outcome of what was described by *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* as a "tactical reassessment"* in United States policy have proved to be well-founded.

As was reported by *The Jerusalem Post*, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers assured a group of Senators in March 1971 that actually "the US is not calling on Israel to give up Arab territories in advance of a Middle East peace settlement",** in other words, the USA actually left it to the Israeli leaders to decide on the withdrawal of their troops. This gives the whole essence of the USA's "peace" efforts. It is therefore not surprising that Rogers' visit to the Middle East, notably to Egypt and Israel, in May 1971 and the visits by the US State Department officials Donald Bergus and Michael Sterner to Egypt in June and July of the same year boiled down to empty declarations about peace.

Some Facts of the Genesis of the Imperialist-Zionist Alliance. Possible Prospects for a Settlement

A closer look must be taken at what lies behind the fact that the situation in the Middle East remains extremely tense and arouses growing anxiety. For four years Israel has been defying the United Nations and showing no inclination to return the Arab lands.

What, properly speaking, is Israel out to achieve and how can one formulate the content of her programme? An idea may be gleaned from the political programmes put forward by the Zionist parties at the Knesset elections in October 1968. In one way or another all contained the

* *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, February 10, 1971, p. 4.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, March 26, 1971.

Zionist call for the "rejuvenation of historic Israel", this being the substance of Zionist policy and strategy. On behalf of the Mai Dayan restated this policy and strategy, saying that "in the second century since the beginning of the new return to Zion, the renaissance of the people works in two ways: colonisation and widening of frontiers".*

The Gahal bloc enlarged on the idea of the "historical rights of the Jews to the Land of Israel",** while the clerical bloc called for the rejuvenation of the "whole Land of Israel" in its historical boundaries and for the proclamation of Jerusalem as a "holy Jewish city".*** The Free Centre and Land of Israel Rightist groups put forward a programme for the creation of a "great historic Israel" and regarded the existing armistice lines as a "minimum" attainment.****

Mention must be made of the alignment of forces in the third "national unity" coalition Government that was formed on December 15, 1969 as a result of the last elections. Judging by the distribution of ministerial portfolios, it is 50:50-between the conditionally more moderate Right and Left Zionist-Socialists of Mai and Mapam,***** on the one hand, and the ultra-extremist Gahal*) bloc with the obscurantist National Religious Party and the big bourgeois Independent Liberals, on the other. Actually, together with the militarists from the former Rafi (which merged with Mai), the open extremists and reactionaries had considerably more weight, not counting the most influential and truculently aggressive hawks in the Mai leadership.

Small wonder that the principal aim of the Government's programme is the "ingathering of the Jewish people in its historic homeland" and the development and unity of Jerusalem as the "capital of Israel". Moreover, it was declared that the Government "will join its efforts

* *Information Bulletin*, 1968, No. 11, p. 18.

** *The Jerusalem Post*, July 2, 1969.

*** *Ibid.*, August 22, October 24, 1969.

**** *Ibid.*, October 10, 1969.

***** Which in 1969 formed a coalition with Mai. Before the Gahal bloc walked out of the Government (see next footnote), the coalition held 12 of the 24 ministerial posts.

*) The Gahal bloc walked out of the Government on August 4, 1970, after the Government had approved the Rogers plan.

with the Zionist movement".* In the light of this programme can one believe that the Israeli leaders seriously consider achieving a just peace settlement with the Arab countries?

At the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of Israel it was underscored that Israel's rulers were pursuing a policy that was flouting the state interests of Israel and its people.

What nourishes the confidence of the Israeli élite? Naturally, the backing of international Zionism and imperialism, above all of the USA. It is an indisputable fact that international Zionism has grown more aggressive and that the imperialist-Zionist alliance is more close-knit than before. The influential Zionist lobby in the USA represents billionaires of Jewish origin, in other words, the imperialists themselves. The advantage that these imperialists have over their rivals is that Zionist capital is united internationally. The role played by the Zionist lobby in the USA in creating the explosive situation in the Middle East is noted, for example, by the Arab author Henry Cattán in *Palestine, the Arabs and Israel*. He writes: "Zionist influence in the USA has been the main factor which has led to this dangerous situation... Mobilising all its forces, exploiting the 'Jewish vote', and making full use of Jewish control over a large number of media of information, Zionism has been able until now to generate considerable American support, both political and financial, in favour of Israel."***

The New Jerusalem Programme, adopted by the 27th Zionist Congress in June 1968, merits closer attention. The aims proclaimed in it are: 1) "the unity of the Jewish people and the centrality of the Land of Israel*** in its life"; 2) "the ingathering of the Jewish people in its historic homeland"; 3) "the strengthening of the State of Israel"; 4) "the preservation of the identity of Jewish people."**** In other words the "New Jerusalem Programme" of in-

* *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5730 (1969/70), pp. 25-26, 28.

** Henry Cattán, *Palestine, the Arabs and Israel*, London, 1969, p. 128.

*** The term expressing the expansionist ambitions of Israel's rulers and used by them to designate Israel's "historic" boundaries.

**** *The Jerusalem Post*, June 19, 1968.

ternational and Israeli Zionism is a programme for the "rejuvenation of historic Israel" and preaches the racist idea of the exclusiveness and superiority of the "Jewish nation". How does this openly expansionist and racist programme tie in with the statements of the Tel Aviv leaders that they want to live in peace with the Arabs and desire Israel's inclusion in the system of Middle East states?

Anti-communism, anti-socialism and anti-Sovietism quite logically form the basic orientation of international Zionism.

The progressive processes and the anti-imperialist struggle of the Arab peoples are undermining the positions of neocolonialism in the Middle East and thereby running counter to the interests of the Israeli Zionists, who have allied themselves with the imperialist powers. Far from making any attempt to disguise this, the high priests of Zionism continue to rely on imperialism, thereby showing that in its essence Zionism is inseparable from and owes its vitality to imperialism. By virtue of its nationalist, aggressive and reactionary nature, Zionism is hostile to the national liberation movement of the Arab East.

A religious way of life, accompanied by a sharp strengthening of the clericals and by a riot of racism, is quite plainly sinking deeper roots in Israel herself. Evidence of this is a law passed in March 1970 specifying "who can be regarded as a Jew". By and large this is the result of the fact that all aspects of life in that country are governed by Zionist ideology nourished by Judaism, which is becoming an extremely bellicose religion. The ideology and policies of Zionism are thus the real foundation for the further intensification of internal reaction and the aggressiveness of Israel's foreign policy.

This is exactly the point when it must be recalled that the UN resolution of 1947 envisaged the creation of Israel as a *democratic* Jewish state. The present policies of Israel's rulers have made short work of that resolution.

However, as the Communist Party of Israel has noted, "one must not identify the State of Israel with Zionism" and that "Zionist, bourgeois nationalism, which dominates

* *Information Bulletin*, 1969, No. 3-4, Special Issue, p. 207.

in our country, has brought and is bringing disasters on the people of Israel and on the State of Israel".* It will therefore be appreciated that the "struggle against the Zionist ideology and policy is a vital interest of the people of Israel".** The future of Israel lies not on the road of open or "creeping" annexations, which underlie the policies of Israel's ruling élite, but on the road of peaceful relations with the neighbouring Arab states.

In only the period between 1967 and 1969 Israel received over 2,500 million dollars in Zionist "donations", while by 1971 aid from the USA had amounted to 1,000 million dollars, which included deliveries of aircraft, tanks and other armaments. The Tel Aviv rulers have embarked on a policy of total militarisation. They are making every effort to conclude a formal political agreement with the USA and secure some form of association with NATO. On the other hand, as we have emphasised, they are placing every possible obstruction in the way of the peace efforts being made in the UN.

Are there realistic prospects for a settlement in the Middle East? First and foremost, it is quite clear that Israel cannot repeat the practice of the past two decades. Further, as we have shown, there are positive conditions for the normalisation of the Middle East situation, namely, the proposals for a peaceful settlement made by the USSR and Egypt and the decisions passed by the UN to supplement the resolution of November 1967. The questions of a settlement, the progressive consolidation of the countries of that region and Israel's democratisation will undoubtedly be resolved as the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples goes from one success to another. There is also no doubt that in Israel herself the progressive forces united round the Communist Party of Israel will grow and gain strength. The developments following the June aggression have shown that the forces opposed to the Government's expansionist policy are consolidating their positions more markedly. At the same time, the working masses, particularly the poorest sections

* *Information Bulletin*, 1969, No. 3-4, Special Issue, pp. 164-65.

** *Ibid.*, p. 213.

of the population, are gradually freeing themselves from the Zionist eyewash about "Jewish fraternity".

The struggle for peace is being joined more actively by Israeli intellectuals, chiefly scientists and University teachers and students, and also progressives in other walks of life. The peace movement in Israel is gaining momentum under the slogan: "Peace is dearer than territory." A large demonstration was held by peace fighters in Jerusalem in March 1971. An unprecedented strike movement has gripped Israel. There has been an appreciable increase in the number of strikes since August 1971, when the Israeli pound was devaluated. A major demonstration of Black Panthers (an organisation of Oriental Jews, the Sephardim) took place in Tel Aviv in May 1971 as an expression of the strong protests against the socio-ethnic discrimination against Oriental Jews. All forms of the struggle in Israel will most certainly merge more and more in a general movement for peace and for social changes in Israel.

Real conditions for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem will undoubtedly be created in the course of these changes.

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